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2009 INSC 742
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 74 of the Contract Act
  • Sections 5 and 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 742
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 74 of the Contract Act
  • Sections 5 and 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents are employees posted at the Faridabad Thermal Power Plant under the appellant-Corporation (successor of the Haryana State Electricity Board). Claiming that co-employees at the Panipat Thermal Power Plant were receiving higher pay scales for identical work, they filed Civil Suit No. 180 of 1999 before the Civil Judge, Faridabad. They sought (i) a declaration of entitlement to the higher scales and (ii) a mandatory injunction directing actual payment.

On 17-11-2000 the trial court decreed the suit, granting the higher pay scales but denying interest. The decree was made “subject to the decision of RSA No. 800 of 1992 (Anil Kapoor case).” That second appeal and the connected writ petition were finally decided on 09-10-2001 in favour of the employees, and special leave petitions were dismissed on 20-01-2003. No appeal was successfully pursued against the trial court’s decree; a belated first appeal (filed on 24-03-2005) was dismissed as time-barred.

The decree-holders commenced execution. The appellant objected, contending that the decree was merely declaratory and that arrears beyond three years could not be claimed. The executing court rejected the objections (23-08-2005), and a revision was dismissed by the High Court. The present appeals questioned those orders before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree dated 17-11-2000 is merely declaratory or also contains a mandatory component capable of execution for payment of arrears.
  2. Consequently, whether the executing court can enforce payment of arrears beyond a three-year period or at all.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The decree is only declaratory; therefore, an execution petition for monetary relief is not maintainable.
  • Even if executable, recovery of arrears should be restricted to three years preceding the execution proceedings.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The decree expressly grants a mandatory injunction directing payment of the specified pay scales; hence it is executable.
  • All arrears flowing from the effective dates fixed in the decree must be paid because the decree has attained finality up to the Supreme Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Commissioner of Police (Traffic) Delhi, (2009) 3 SCC 634 A judgment must be read as a whole; authority is limited to what it actually decides. Used to emphasise that the trial court’s decree must be construed in its entirety, revealing both declaratory and mandatory elements.
State of M.P. v. Mangilal Sharma, (1998) 2 SCC 510 A purely declaratory decree does not authorize an executing court to grant consequential reliefs not expressly ordered. Distinguished on facts; unlike Mangilal, the present decree contains an express mandatory injunction.
Bhawarlal Bhandari v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises, (1999) 1 SCC 558 An executing court cannot treat a decree as a nullity unless the court passing it lacked inherent jurisdiction. Relied on to hold that objections regarding limitation or quantum cannot render the decree inexecutable.
Deepa Bhargava v. Mahesh Bhargava, (2009) 2 SCC 294 Executing court cannot go behind or modify a decree; it must execute it as it stands. Cited to affirm that the executing court was right in enforcing the pay-scale decree without alteration.
Haryana SEB v. Anil Kapoor (RSA No. 800 of 1992 & connected writ), Punjab & Haryana High Court, judgment dated 09-10-2001 Recognised higher pay scales for similarly situated employees. The trial court made its decree expressly “subject to” the outcome of this case; once the High Court upheld the claim, the conditionality stood satisfied.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court undertook a textual and contextual reading of the trial court’s judgment. It noted that:

  • The plaint sought both a declaration of entitlement and a mandatory injunction for release of the higher pay scales;
  • The trial court framed issues corresponding to both reliefs and ultimately “decreed” the suit, explicitly granting the scales while refusing interest;
  • Denying interest was seen as confirmation that the court consciously granted substantive monetary relief, not a mere declaratory finding.

On settled law, an executing court cannot re-examine the merits or limit relief unless the decree is a nullity. The objections raised were therefore beyond the permissible scope of Section 47 CPC. The Court distinguished Mangilal Sharma because that decree lacked a mandatory component, whereas the present decree combines declaration with a direction, making it executable. Precedents such as Deepa Bhargava reinforced the rule that execution must follow the decree’s plain terms.

The contention that arrears should be restricted to three years involved factual inquiries into accrual dates, which the executing court is not entitled to reopen when the decree itself specifies the effective dates. Therefore, the objections failed.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED.

Immediate Effect: The decree-holders are entitled to execution for payment of the higher pay scales with effect from the dates specified (24-10-1991 and 01-01-1996). No interest is payable, consistent with the original decree.

Broader Implications: The decision re-affirms that where a decree combines declaratory and mandatory reliefs, it is fully executable, and executing courts cannot revisit merits or impose new limitations. It underscores the principle that once a decree attains finality, objections under Section 47 CPC must be confined to questions of nullity or jurisdiction, not substantive entitlement.

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    Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited And Another v. Gulshan Lal And Others

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted. Interpretation of a judgment of the Civil Judge, Faridabad in Civil Suit No. 180 of 1999 dated 17-11-2000 is in question in these appeals. The respondents are employees of the appellant Board, a successor of Haryana State Electricity Board constituted and incorporated under Sections 5 and 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. The respondents were employees of a Thermal Power Plant at Faridabad. Indisputably, the appellant has another Thermal Power Plant at Panipat.

    2. Inter alia on the premise that the employees similarly situated and working at Panipat Thermal Power Plant were receiving a higher salary, the aforementioned suit was filed praying inter alia for the following reliefs:

    “(a) a decree of declaration in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiffs entitled to receive the said higher pay scale of Rs 1400-2600 w.e.f 24-10-1991, and of Rs 5000-150-8000 w.e.f 1-1-1996 along with interest @ 18% p.a from the date of due till actual payment, as given to their co-employees as mentioned in Para 2 above of the plaint, on the basis of principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’;
    (b) a decree of mandatory injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, directing the defendants to release/pay to the plaintiffs the said higher pay scales of Rs 1400-2600 w.e.f 24-10-1991 and of Rs 5000-150-8000 w.e.f 1-1-1996 along with interest @ 18% p.a from the date of due till actual payment, forthwith;”

    3. The issues which were framed in the aforementioned suit in terms of the pleadings of the parties were as under:

    “(1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to receive the pay scales of Rs 1400-2600 w.e.f 24-10-1991 and of Rs 5000 to 8000 w.e.f 1-1-1996 along with interest at the rate of 18% p.a from the defendants?
    (2) If Issue 1 is proved, whether the plaintiffs are entitled for mandatory injunction as prayed for?”

    The learned trial Judge while determining the said Issues 1 and 2, relying on or on the basis of a judgment and decree passed in Anil Kapoor v. Haryana State Electricity Board being RSA No. 800 of 1992 which was then pending in second appeal before the High Court of Haryana held as under:

    “The plaintiffs are entitled to get the benefit as ordered by the Hon'ble High Court and which would be subject to the decision of RSA No. 800 of 1992. The plaintiffs have proved the legal notice served by them through counsel which is placed on record as Ext. P-1, as admitted by DW 1 in his cross-examination, but no reply was given by the defendants.”

    It was directed:

    “For the reasons recorded above, Issues 1 and 2 are decided in favour of the plaintiffs to the effect that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive pay scale of Rs 1400-2600 w.e.f 24-10-1991 and Rs 5000-8000 w.e.f 1-1-1996 subject to decision of RSA No. 800 of 1992.”

    4. On the aforementioned findings, the following relief was granted:

    “In sequel of my aforesaid discussion on the aforesaid issues, the suit of the plaintiffs for declaration and mandatory injunction succeeds and the same is hereby decreed to the effect that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive the pay scale of Rs 1400-2600 w.e.f 24-10-1991 and Rs 5000-8000 w.e.f 1-1-1996. However, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any interest as claimed. Keeping in view of the circumstances of the case, both the parties are left to bear their own costs. Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly and file be consigned to the record room.”

    Indisputably the said decree has attained finality as the same has been upheld up to this Court.

    5. An execution petition was filed. The appellants herein filed an objection to the said execution petition raising a contention that a mere declaratory relief having been passed in the favour of the decree-holder, they were not entitled to the arrears of pay, stating:

    “In view of the judgment dated 9-10-2001 of the Hon'ble High Court in RSA No. 800 of 1992, the present decree-holders are not entitled for any relief and in case they are paid the arrears it will further multiply the litigation as their pay scale shall become higher than their functional cadre post and will adversely affect the entire policy of various categories of staff of the erstwhile Board (now Corporation).”

    6. The said objection petition was dismissed by a reason of an order dated 23-8-2005 passed by the learned executing court upon considering the findings of the trial court in the suit, stating:

    “It is apparent from a bare reading of the aforesaid findings that the grant of pay scales of Rs 1400-2600 w.e.f 24-10-1991 and Rs 5000-8000 w.e.f 1-1-1996 was subject to the decision of RSA No. 800 of 1992. It is not disputed that the said RSA titled as Haryana SEB v. Anil Kapoor was disposed of along with Civil Writ Petition No. 1632 of 1999 titled as Anil Kapoor v. Haryana Power Generation Corpn. and the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court vide judgment dated 9-10-2001 allowed the said writ petition and dismissed Appeal No. 800 of 1992. Aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment dated 9-10-2001, the judgment-debtor had preferred Special Leave Petitions Nos. 14609-10 of 2002 in the Hon'ble Supreme Court which were also dismissed on 20-1-2003. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor has failed to bring on record the fact that the judgment and decree dated 17-11-2000 was ever challenged in any competent court of law, wherein the same was set aside or the operation of the said judgment was ever stayed. Hence, the judgment and decree dated 17-11-2000 must be held to have attained finality. Moreover, judgment-debtor has not claimed any lack of jurisdiction or legal infirmity making the judgment in question to be unexecutable.”

    A revision application was filed thereagainst which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court.

    7. Mr Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would submit that a mere declaratory decree having been passed, the execution petition was not maintainable. In any event, the learned counsel urged, no arrears of pay could have been granted for a period of more than three years. Ms Indu Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would support the impugned judgment.

    8. Indisputably, the respondents herein in terms of the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court passed in RSA No. 800 of 1992 titled as Haryana SEB v. Anil Kapoor were said to be similarly situated and were granted the following higher grade/pay scales:

    (a) Rs 950-20-1150/25-1500 w.e.f 1-1-1986;
    (b) Rs 1200-30-1560/40-2040 w.e.f 1-5-1990;
    (c) Rs 1400-2600 w.e.f 24-10-1991;
    (d) Rs 5000-150-8000 w.e.f 1-1-1996.

    9. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the said suit inter alia holding that it was admitted that the respondents had been getting lesser pay as compared to other co-employees and thus on the basis of the principle of equal pay for equal work and being senior to the other employees cannot be deprived of the scales of pay allowed to their juniors. It was furthermore directed that the respondent-plaintiffs were entitled to derive the benefit as ordered by the High Court which would be subject to the decision of RSA No. 800 of 1992. Indisputably RSA No. 88 of 1992 was dismissed by the High Court by a judgment and order dated 9-10-2001 and special leave petition preferred thereagainst had also been dismissed.

    10. We may notice that a first appeal preferred against the original judgment and decree passed in the suit filed by the respondent was filed by the appellant only on 24-3-2005 which was dismissed on the ground of delay. A civil revision application filed thereagainst had also been dismissed. Concededly the decree passed by the civil court has attained finality. The only question which arises for consideration is as to whether having regard to the nature of the decree passed, is it executable?

    11. A decree, as is well known, should ordinarily be confined to the prayer made in the plaint. We have noticed hereinbefore, that the respondents herein not only prayed for a declaration in regard to their entitlement to receive a higher scale of pay but also for a decree of mandatory injunction in their favour directing them to release/pay the said higher scales of pay. They had prayed for grant of interest on the aforementioned amount. The entitlement of the respondent-plaintiffs to receive the emoluments in the scales of pay mentioned therein and the date from which they had been working was specified. The learned Judge in no uncertain terms held that no interest shall be payable thereupon. Denial of payment of interest, in our opinion, is significant and the same leads to the conclusion that the court was conscious of the fact that not only the respondent-plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration but also to a mandatory injunction. But for the purpose of construction of a judgment, it must be read as a whole. The issues framed in that behalf assume great significance. We have noticed, hereinbefore, that both the issues framed by the learned trial Judge had correlation with the reliefs claimed for.

    12. In U.P SRTC v. Commr. of Police (Traffic) Delhi (2009) 3 SCC 634 this Court held:

    “32. A decision is an authority, it is trite, for which it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. This wholesome principle is equally applicable in the matter of construction of a judgment. A judgment is not to be construed as a statute. It must be construed upon reading the same as a whole. For the said purpose, the attending circumstances may also be taken into consideration.”

    13. Thus, when relief had been granted upon taking into consideration not only the declaratory relief prayed for but also the relief for mandatory injunction, we are of the opinion, that the learned trial Judge and consequently the High Court were correct in their views.

    14. Furthermore it is beyond any doubt or dispute that the decree was passed having regard to the decision of the Court in Anil Kapoor case. In the said case, Anil Kapoor not only filed the suit but also filed a writ petition. Once the decision in Anil Kapoor case was followed that not only they would be entitled to scale of pay but also the other reliefs prayed for by them, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that having regard to the fact that Anil Kapoor and various other persons being junior to the plaintiffs having been held to be entitled to a relief, the respondents were also held to be entitled to the same relief.

    15. This Court furthermore in State of M.P v. Mangilal Sharma (1998) 2 SCC 510 categorically held as under:

    “6. A declaratory decree merely declares the right of the decree-holder vis-à-vis the judgment-debtor and does not in terms direct the judgment-debtor to do or refrain from doing any particular act or thing. Since in the present case decree does not direct reinstatement or payment of arrears of salary the executing court could not issue any process for the purpose as that would be going outside or beyond the decree. The respondent as a decree-holder was free to seek his remedy for arrears of salary in the suit for declaration. The executing court has no jurisdiction to direct payment of salary or grant any other consequential relief which does not flow directly and necessarily from the declaratory decree. It is not that if in a suit for declaration where the plaintiff is able to seek further relief he must seek that relief though he may not be in need of that further relief. In the present suit the plaintiff while seeking relief of declaration would certainly have asked for other reliefs like the reinstatement, arrears of salary and consequential benefits. He was, however, satisfied with a relief of declaration knowing that the Government would honour the decree and would reinstate him. We will therefore assume that the suit for mere declaration filed by the respondent-plaintiff was maintainable, as the question of maintainability of the suit is not in issue before us.”

    However in that case as the decree for reinstatement and back wages had not been granted, the Court opined that the executing court cannot grant a further relief. Herein in the present case, however, as noticed, the respondents not only had prayed for a declaratory decree but also decree for mandatory injunction.

    16. Mr Jain has relied upon a decision of this Court in Bhawarlal Bhandari v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises (1999) 1 SCC 558. Therein the decree was passed by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction and in that situation this Court considered as to whether a decree passed by a court wholly without jurisdiction would be a nullity to hold:

    “10. The aforesaid decision of this Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case. This is not a case in which the award decree on the face of it was shown to be without jurisdiction. Even if the decree was passed beyond the period of limitation, it would be an error of law or at the highest, a wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate proceedings and not by the executing court which was bound by such decree. It is not the case of the respondent that the Court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction to pass such a decree. This becomes all the more so when the respondent did not think it fit to file objection against the award which was sought to be made the rule of the court.”

    It is on that premise the question which has been raised by Mr Jain that the court could not have passed a decree for back wages for a period of more than three years assumes importance. Whether by reason of the decree the respondents would be getting some amount by way of back wages for a period of more than three years would depend upon the facts of each case. It would also depend upon the date on which the cause of action of suit arose.

    17. As indicated hereinbefore, for the purpose of allowing an objection filed on behalf of a judgment-debtor under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was incumbent on him to show that the decree was ex facie nullity. For the said purpose, the court is precluded from making an in-depth scrutiny as regards the entitlement of the plaintiff with reference to not only his claim made in the plaint but also the defence set up by the judgment-debtor. As the judgment of the trial court could not have been reopened, the correctness thereof could not have been put to question.

    18. It is also well known that an executing court cannot go behind the decree. If on a fair interpretation of the judgment, order and decree passed by a court having appropriate jurisdiction in that behalf, the reliefs sought for by the plaintiff appear to have been granted, there is no reason as to why the executing court shall deprive him from obtaining the fruits of the decree.

    19. In Deepa Bhargava v. Mahesh Bhargava (2009) 2 SCC 294, (2008) 16 Scale 305 this Court held as under:

    “9. … An executing court, it is well known, cannot go behind the decree. It has no jurisdiction to modify a decree. It must execute the decree as it is. A default clause contained in a compromise decree even otherwise would not be considered to be penal in nature so as to attract the provisions of Section 74 of the Contract Act.”

    20. It is also not a case where this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to mould an order. The decree passed by the learned trial court has attained finality. Whether rightly or wrongly, the judgment of the learned trial Judge has been affirmed by this Court. It is one thing to say that no right having crystallised in favour of a party to the lis, this Court can mould the relief appropriately, but it is another thing to say that despite the decree being found to be an executable one, this Court will refuse to direct execution thereof.

    21. We are not oblivious of the fact that the respondents legally would not have been entitled to the reliefs prayed for by them. However, as a decree has been passed, we do not intend to go behind the same. The executing court shall, it goes without saying, execute the decree strictly in terms thereof.

    22. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this case. The appeal is dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

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    Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited And Another v. Gulshan Lal And Others
    (May 6, 2009)