AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 845
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 44 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • The Insurance Act, 1938
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 845
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 44 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • The Insurance Act, 1938
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise out of income-tax assessments made on various insurance companies governed by the Insurance Act, 1938. The assessing officer had made additions under Section 44 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which were upheld by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, however, deleted the additions. The Revenue challenged the Tribunal’s orders before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the departmental appeals on the ground that the Revenue had not obtained clearance from the Committee of Disputes (COD) within one month, as purportedly mandated by earlier Supreme Court directions in ONGC v. CCE. The Revenue therefore appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a rigid, one-month time-limit exists for securing clearance from the Committee of Disputes before prosecuting litigation between the Union of India (or its departments) and public sector undertakings.
  2. Whether appeals filed without such clearance, but subsequently referred to the COD after the one-month period, are liable to be dismissed as non-maintainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant — Union of India/Income-tax Department

  • The Supreme Court’s earlier orders only emphasised the desirability of prompt reference to the COD; they did not lay down an inflexible statutory limitation period.
  • Delay in approaching the COD should not, by itself, invalidate the appeal; courts should instead examine whether the delay was due to lethargy or indifference.
  • Even where the COD declines permission, it may still be open to the Department to agitate the matter through appropriate proceedings.

Respondent — Insurance Companies

  • In some cases the COD has expressly refused permission; those appeals have, therefore, become infructuous.
  • The High Court correctly applied the Supreme Court’s direction in ONGC v. CCE by insisting that reference to the COD be made within one month.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
ONGC v. CCE, (2004) 6 SCC 437 Clarified that disputes involving Union/PSUs must first be placed before the COD; indicated that pending matters should be referred within one month. High Court treated the one-month indication as a mandatory limit; Supreme Court holds it only stresses urgency and is not rigid.
ONGC v. CCE, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 541 (order dated 11-10-1991) Created the High-Powered Committee and directed courts to insist on its clearance before proceeding with litigation between government entities. Relied upon to reaffirm that clearance is required, but absence of clearance at filing stage does not automatically bar the appeal if reference is later made.
ONGC Ltd. v. City & Industrial Development Corpn. Maharashtra Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 39 Extended the COD mechanism to disputes involving State Governments and public sector undertakings. Cited illustratively to show the evolving scope of COD jurisdiction; not decisive to the present outcome.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court revisited its earlier directions establishing the COD and scrutinised the language stressing expedition. It observed that:

  • No “rigid time-frame” was prescribed; the reference to one month was intended only to underscore urgency.
  • Failure to meet the one-month period does not per se render the appeal illegal; courts must instead assess whether the delay reflects culpable lethargy.
  • The COD itself must consider references on their merits even if they are made belatedly; refusal to entertain a matter solely because of delay is unsustainable.
  • Where the COD has in fact granted clearance, there is no impediment for courts to decide the matter on merits.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the High Court erred in treating the one-month period as mandatory and in dismissing the appeals without examining whether the delay was justified or whether the COD had since been approached.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and directed that the question of continuing the appeals be reconsidered after the COD’s report is received.

Implications: The decision clarifies that the COD clearance mechanism is mandatory, but the one-month reference period is not a jurisdictional bar. Courts must look for evidence of lethargy or indifference rather than impose a strict limitation period. The ruling preserves governmental rights of appeal while reinforcing the need for prompt administrative action; it does not create new substantive precedent but elucidates the procedural contours of COD clearance.

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    Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi Vi v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. In all these appeals, identical questions are involved. The assessee in each case is an insurance company and is covered by the Insurance Act, 1938 (in short “the Insurance Act”). According to the appellant, every insurance company has to be assessed under Section 44 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”) as per Rule 5 of the First Schedule. An assessment was made in each case and the same was upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (in short “the Tribunal”) deleted the addition made. The Tribunal accepted the stand of the respondent Insurance Company. Certain other connected cases were also dealt with.

    3. In all these appeals the question is whether the Department would prefer appeals and/or file petitions without obtaining clearance from the Committee of Disputes (in short “COD”) constituted in terms of order of this Court. According to the High Court it was necessary to refer the matter to the said Committee. The High Court held that the same was to be done within a period of one month in terms of the order of this Court in ONGC v. CCE (2004) 6 SCC 437. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed.

    4. The High Court held that since this Court had set the time-frame there is no scope for any deviation therefrom.

    5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is really no statutory and/or rigidly framed time-limit. This Court only highlighted the desirability of early action so that unnecessary litigation can be avoided.

    6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in some cases the Committee concerned has also declined to grant permission and those appeals have become infructuous. In ONGC case (2004) 6 SCC 437 this Court observed as follows:

    “5. It is also clarified that even the pending matters before any court or tribunal should also be the subject-matter of the deliberations of the High-Powered Committee. All the matters pending as of today either instituted by the Union of India or any of the public sector undertakings shall within one month from today be referred by the appellant or the petitioner, as the case may be, to the High-Powered Committee. The High-Powered Committee will deal with these matters most expeditiously and endeavour to resolve the matters.
    6. Accordingly, there should be no bar to the lodgement of an appeal or petition either by the Union of India or the public sector undertakings before any court or tribunal so as to save limitation. But, before such filing every endeavour should be made to have the clearance of the High-Powered Committee.
    7. However, as to what the court or tribunal should do if such judicial remedies are sought before such a court or tribunal, the order of 11-10-1991 1995 Supp (4) SCC 541 clarifies:
    ‘4. It shall be the obligation of every court and every tribunal where such a dispute is raised hereafter to demand a clearance from the Committee in case it has not been so pleaded and in the absence of the clearance, the proceedings would not be proceeded with.’
    8. Wherever appeals, petitions, etc. are filed without the clearance of the High-Powered Committee so as to save limitation, the appellant or the petitioner, as the case may be, shall within a month from such filing, refer the matter to the High-Powered Committee, with prior notice to the designated authority in the Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of India authorised to receive notices in that behalf. Shri K.T.S Tulsi, learned Additional Solicitor General stated that in order to coordinate these references of the High-Powered Committee the Government proposes to nominate the Under-Secretary (Coordination) in the Cabinet Secretariat as the nodal authority to coordinate these references. The reference shall be deemed to have been made and become effective only after a notice of the reference is lodged with the said nodal authority. The reference shall be deemed to be valid if made in the case of the Union of India by its Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, and in the case of public sector undertakings by its Chairman, Managing Director or Chief Executive, as the case may be. It is only after such reference to the High-Powered Committee is made in the manner indicated that the operation of the order or proceedings under challenge shall be suspended till the High-Powered Committee resolves the dispute or gives clearance to the litigation. If the High-Powered Committee is unable to resolve the matter for reasons to be recorded by it, it shall grant clearance for the litigation.” (underlined for emphasis)

    7. Referring to the order passed by this Court on 11-10-1991 i.e ONGC v. CCE 1995 Supp (4) SCC 541 this Court held that in the matter of setting up of the function of the High-Powered Committee for resolving disputes between the Union of India on one hand and public sector undertaking on the other required some clarifications as some misconceptions arose.

    8. In ONGC case 1995 Supp (4) SCC 541 in para 3 it was noted as follows:

    “3. We direct that the Government of India shall set up a committee consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Industry, the Bureau of Public Enterprises and the Ministry of Law, to monitor disputes between Ministry and Ministry of Government of India, Ministry and public sector undertakings of the Government of India and public sector undertakings in between themselves, to ensure that no litigation comes to court or to a tribunal without the matter having been first examined by the Committee and its clearance for litigation. Government may include a representative of the Ministry concerned in a specific case and one from the Ministry of Finance in the Committee. Senior officers only should be nominated so that the Committee would function with status, control and discipline.”

    9. In para 4 it was further observed as follows: (ONGC case 1995 Supp (4) SCC 541)

    “4. It shall be the obligation of every court and every tribunal where such a dispute is raised hereafter to demand a clearance from the Committee in case it has not been so pleaded and in the absence of the clearance, the proceedings would not be proceeded with.”

    10. Subsequently, the disputes involving the State Governments and the public sector undertakings have been considered by this Court and one such matter was dealt with in ONGC Ltd. v. City & Industrial Development Corpn. Maharashtra Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 39

    11. It needs to be emphasised that there was actually no rigid time-frame indicated by this Court. The emphasis on one month's time was to show the urgency needed. Merely because there is some delay in approaching the Committee, that does not make the action illegal. The Committee is required to deal with the matter expeditiously so that there is no unnecessary backlog of appeals which ultimately may not be pursued. In that sense, it is imperative that the authorities concerned take urgent action otherwise the intended objective would be frustrated. There is no scope for lethargy. It is to be tested by the Court as to whether there was any indifference and lethargy, and in appropriate cases, refuse to interfere. In these cases factual position is not that. Therefore, we set aside the order of the High Court in each case and direct consideration of the question of desirability to proceed in the matter before it on receipt of the report from the Committee concerned.

    12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even if the Committee has declined to grant permission, it is still open to raise the issues in appropriate proceedings. We express no opinion in that regard. But where the Committee has declined to deal with the matter on the ground of belated approach, the same cannot be sustained in view of our present order. The Committee has to consider the matter on merits.

    13. It is to be noted that where permission has been granted by the Committee there is no impediment on the Court to examine the matter and take a decision on merits. But where there is no belated approach as noted above, the matter has to be decided. The court has to decide whether because of unexplained delay and lethargic action it would decline to entertain the matters. That would depend on the factual scenario in each case, and no straitjacket formula can be adopted.

    14. The appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi Vi v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited .
    (Jul 18, 2008)