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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
008 INSC 1127
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 376, 302 and 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”)
  • The Income Tax Act is not mentioned, but a reference to it is made in Section 15 of the Legal Judgment Excerpt
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • the Code (referring to the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973)
  • Section 313 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
008 INSC 1127
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 376, 302 and 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”)
  • The Income Tax Act is not mentioned, but a reference to it is made in Section 15 of the Legal Judgment Excerpt
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • the Code (referring to the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973)
  • Section 313 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the rape and murder of 14-year-old Kumari Suneeta on 17 November 1992 in Village Jamal Nagar, District Unnao, Uttar Pradesh. According to the prosecution, the two respondents followed the victim to a nearby field, sexually assaulted her, strangled her and concealed the body in a patawar. Her brother Radhey Lal lodged the First Information Report the same afternoon.

The investigation involved an inquest, seizure of the victim’s clothing, use of a dog squad and recovery of items allegedly linked to the respondents. On completion of investigation, both respondents were charged under Sections 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.

The 5th Additional Sessions Judge relied on five incriminating circumstances and convicted the respondents, imposing the death penalty under Section 302, life imprisonment under Section 376 and seven years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 201. A reference for confirmation of the death sentence was made under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

On appeal, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the circumstantial evidence did not form a complete chain, doubted the “last-seen” and extra-judicial confession evidence, rejected reliance on the dog-squad tracking and consequently acquitted the respondents, also rejecting the death-sentence reference.

The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court formed an unbroken and conclusive chain pointing only to the guilt of the respondents.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the “last-seen” evidence, the alleged extra-judicial confession and the tracking-dog evidence.
  3. Consequently, whether the acquittal of the respondents should be set aside and the convictions and sentences restored.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (State of Uttar Pradesh)

  • Contended that the five circumstances accepted by the trial court collectively constituted a complete chain incompatible with any hypothesis of innocence.
  • Emphasised that the respondents were seen near the place and time of occurrence, satisfying the “last-seen” doctrine.
  • Maintained that the extra-judicial confession made before CW-1 was sufficient in itself to ground a conviction.
  • Relied on the dog-squad evidence to corroborate involvement of the respondents.

No detailed arguments of the respondents were recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1977) 2 SCC 99 Circumstantial evidence must be incompatible with innocence. Cited to reaffirm the strict standard the prosecution must meet.
Eradu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 316 Chain of circumstances must be complete. Referenced in the general discussion of governing principles.
Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 330 Need for conclusiveness in circumstantial evidence. Formed part of the composite jurisprudence relied upon.
State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi 1985 Supp SCC 79 Inferences must exclude every hypothesis except guilt. Used to test the prosecution’s theory against alternative possibilities.
Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1987) 1 SCC 1 Cumulative impact of circumstances must establish guilt. Supported the High Court’s assessment that the chain was incomplete.
Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P., 1989 Supp (1) SCC 560 Circumstantial evidence to be closely connected to the fact in issue. Reiterated while analysing each circumstance individually.
Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1954 SC 621 Cumulative effect must negative innocence. Applied while evaluating if the five circumstances met the test.
C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 10 SCC 193 No gap should remain in the evidentiary chain. Cited to underscore the High Court’s finding of gaps.
Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706 Four tests for circumstantial evidence. Formed the analytical framework for scrutiny of the prosecution case.
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86 If two inferences are possible, the one favouring the accused must prevail. Bolstered the High Court’s benefit-of-doubt approach.
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 Exclusion of every hypothesis but guilt. Quoted while holding that alternative hypotheses remained open.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 Five conditions precedent for conviction on circumstantial evidence. Bench applied these conditions and found them unmet.
State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 Reaffirmation of the above principles. Illustrative support for the legal standards applied.
State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh (2003) 11 SCC 261 Same context of circumstantial evidence. Cited in continuation of the jurisprudence.
State of U.P. v. Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 Parameters of the “last-seen” theory. Used to show that the time gap here was not narrow enough.
Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. (2006) 10 SCC 172 Need for corroboration even where “last-seen” gap is small. Supported rejection of “last-seen” as decisive.
Bodhraj v. State of J&K (2002) 8 SCC 45 Caution in applying “last-seen” principle. Further authority for the Court’s cautious approach.
Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab (2005) 12 SCC 438 Similar factual matrix regarding time gap. Parallels drawn to demonstrate insufficiency of evidence.
Abdul Rajak Murtaja Dafedar v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 234 Limited weight of dog-tracking evidence. Court noted that even in that case conviction was sustained only after excluding dog evidence, undermining its utility here.
R. v. Montgomery (1866 N.I. 160) Concerns and limitations of tracker-dog evidence. Cited to illustrate reasons for treating dog-tracking with caution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court meticulously applied long-standing principles governing convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence. It observed that:

  • The five circumstances identified by the trial court—motive, presence near the scene, dog-tracking, absence of animus to falsely implicate, and an allegedly complete chain—were individually and cumulatively insufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
  • There was no reliable “last-seen” evidence. Simply seeing the respondents in the vicinity did not meet the narrow time-gap requirement articulated in State of U.P. v. Satish and related cases.
  • The extra-judicial confession attributed to respondent Ram Balak was inherently unreliable: it was allegedly made eleven days after the incident, inconsistently reported to the police three days after the incident, and the prosecution failed to confront the respondent with this statement during examination under Section 313 CrPC, violating basic fair-trial requirements.
  • Dog-tracking evidence, even if admissible, carries limited probative value. Citing Abdul Rajak Murtaja Dafedar and the English case of R. v. Montgomery, the Court emphasised that canine deductions cannot be the foundation of a conviction.
  • Applying the cumulative-chain test from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda and allied precedents, the Court concluded that material links were missing and that alternative hypotheses remained plausible.

Accordingly, the Court agreed with the High Court that the prosecution had not proven the respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED – ACQUITTAL CONFIRMED.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgment, leaving the respondents’ acquittal intact and the death-sentence reference rejected. The decision reinforces the judiciary’s rigorous benchmarks for convictions based on circumstantial evidence, underscores the limited evidentiary value of tracker-dog testimony, and reiterates that “last-seen” and extra-judicial confession evidence must meet stringent reliability standards. No new legal precedent was created, but existing principles were emphatically applied.

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    State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Balak And Another

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.*— The State of U.P is in appeal questioning the correctness of judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which directed acquittal of the respondents. The learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge found the respondents guilty of offence punishable under Sections 376, 302 and 201 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). Each was sentenced to death for the offence relatable to Section 302 IPC, life imprisonment for the offence relatable to Section 376 IPC and 7 years imprisonment for the offence relatable to Section 201 IPC.

    2. The appellants preferred appeal before the High Court and a reference was made by the trial court under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) for confirmation of the death sentence. The High Court by the impugned judgment found that the accusations have not been established by the prosecution and therefore directed acquittal. Capital reference was rejected.

    3. The prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows:

    According to the prosecution, murder and rape was committed by the respondents on 17-11-1992 at about 7.00 a.m in the morning, when Kumari Suneeta, the deceased victim aged about 14 years had gone to ease herself in the nearby open field in Village Jamal Nagar, Police Station Safipur, District Unnao. When on 17-11-1992 at about 7.00 a.m, Kumari Suneeta had gone to attend the call of nature in the nearby open field, both the accused followed her and after catching hold of her committed rape upon her and thereafter killed her by strangulation. They thereafter, concealed the dead body of Kumari Suneeta by throwing it in the nearby patawar. When she did not return back to her home, the family members of Kumari Suneeta started searching for her and ultimately at about 2.00 p.m, the dead body of Kumari Suneeta was found in the patawar.

    4. After recovery of the dead body of Kumari Suneeta, Radhey Lal (PW 1), brother of the deceased lodged a report about the incident at Police Station Safipur, District Unnao at 3.45 p.m on the same day. The distance of the police station is 6 miles from the place of the incident. Sheo Harsh Tewari (CW 2), Sub-Inspector was present at the police station at the time when the report was lodged, therefore, he immediately proceeded to the place of the incident and reached there in the evening. He prepared inquest report at about 4.30 p.m and other relevant papers Ext. Ka 6 to Ka 10 and sent the dead body to mortuary for the post-mortem examination. The investigating officer thereafter prepared site-plan, Ext. Ka 14 and recovered bali, lutia, chappal, chaddhi, etc. from the place of the incident. The investigating officer also recovered salwar and frock which were found to be wrapped on the neck of the deceased. It is further said that thereafter, the investigating officer called the dog squad and on the request of the investigating officer, the dog squad reached there on 18-11-1992 at about 12.45 p.m It is said that the dogs after smelling the footprints of the accused from the place of the incident reached the house of Shiv Balak.

    5. On 2-12-1992, the investigating officer arrested Ram Balak and recovered one lutia of Shiv Balak from the place of the incident on the pointing out of accused Ram Balak. Shiv Balak subsequently surrendered in the court. The autopsy on the dead body of the deceased was conducted on 18-11-1992 by Dr. Satya Prakash, Medical Officer, District Hospital, Unnao. Accused Ram Balak, after the incident, visited the house of Iqbal Ahmad (CW-1) and confessed his guilt. After completing the investigation, the investigating officer submitted the charge-sheet against the accused persons.

    6. Since the accused persons pleaded innocence, the trial was held. Seven witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove the version which rested on circumstantial evidence. The learned trial Judge after scrutinising the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the prosecution has successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, he convicted and sentenced the respondents as mentioned above.

    7. The respondents feeling aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the trial court, filed the criminal appeal before the High Court challenging their conviction and sentence as aforesaid. The stand before the High Court was that there is no evidence at all against the present respondents and the learned court below committed an error in holding that the prosecution by means of circumstantial evidence has proved the guilt of the respondents beyond doubt.

    8. In the instant case there is no eyewitness account. The conviction of the respondents is based only on circumstantial evidence. The learned trial Judge while convicting the respondents relied upon five circumstances, namely (i) the motive behind the crime was teasing of the deceased by the accused persons and thereafter they were scolded by the deceased, (ii) the accused persons were seen on the date and time of the incident near the place of the incident which led to their involvement, (iii) the police dog squad proved the guilt of the accused persons, (iv) the witnesses had no reason to implicate the accused persons falsely, and (v) there is no missing link in the prosecution story.

    9. The High Court held that the circumstances do not make a complete chain of circumstances. There was no evidence to show that the accused were last seen in the company of the deceased. Merely because they were seen near the place of incidence, that cannot be a ground to show their involvement. The High Court noted that though there was some reference to the alleged extra-judicial confession before CW 1 by the accused Ram Balak, the said confessional statement was not confronted to the accused while the statement of accused Ram Balak was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”). The High Court also found that the evidence of this witness was not believable. Accordingly, the High Court directed acquittal.

    10. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is a complete chain of circumstances and, therefore, the High Court ought to have upheld the conviction as recorded by the trial court.

    11. “9. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1977) 2 SCC 99, AIR 1977 SC 1063, Eradu v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1956 SC 316, Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 330, AIR 1983 SC 446, State of U.P v. Sukhbasi 1985 Supp SCC 79, AIR 1985 SC 1224, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1987) 1 SCC 1, AIR 1987 SC 350 and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P 1989 Supp (1) SCC 560, AIR 1989 SC 1890) The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR 1954 SC 621 it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt.
    10. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P (1996) 10 SCC 193 wherein it has been observed thus:
    ‘21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.’
    11. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, AIR 1990 SC 79 it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:
    ‘(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
    (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
    (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and
    (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.’
    12. In State of U.P v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86, 1992 Cri LJ 1104 it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.
    13. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book Wills' Circumstantial Evidence (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence:
    ‘(1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt; and (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted.’
    14. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952.
    15. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P AIR 1952 SC 343 it was observed thus: (AIR pp. 345-46, para 10)
    ‘10. … It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.’
    16. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, AIR 1984 SC 1622. Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:
    (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘may be’ established;
    (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
    (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
    (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and
    (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

    These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180, and State of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh (2003) 11 SCC 261.

    12. So far as the last seen aspect is concerned it is necessary to take note of two decisions of this Court. In State of U.P v. Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 it was noted as follows:

    “22. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2.”

    13. In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P (2006) 10 SCC 172 it was noted as follows:

    “27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration.”

    (See also Bodhraj v. State of J&K (2002) 8 SCC 45.)

    14. A similar view was also taken in Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab (2005) 12 SCC 438. Factual position in the present case is almost similar, so far as time gap is concerned.

    15. Out of the circumstances highlighted above really none is of any significance. Learned counsel for the appellant State highlighted that the extra-judicial confession itself was sufficient to record the conviction. On a reading of the evidence of CW 1 it is noticed that accused Ram Balak did not say a word about his own involvement. On the contrary, he said that he did not do anything and made some statements about the alleged act of the co-accused. Additionally, in his examination under Section 313 of the Code, no question was put to him regarding his so-called extra-judicial confession. To add to the vulnerability, his statement is to the effect that after about 11 days of the incidence the extra-judicial confession was made. Strangely, he stated that he told the police after three days of the incidence about the extra-judicial confession. It is inconceivable that a person would tell the police after three days of the incidence about the purported extra-judicial confession which according to the witness himself was made after eleven days. Learned counsel for the State submitted that there may be some confusion. But it is seen that not at one place, but at different places this has been repeated by the witness.

    16. Learned counsel for the appellant also refers to a judgment of this Court in Abdul Rajak Murtaja Dafedar v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 234, AIR 1970 SC 283 more particularly para 11 that the dog squad had proved the guilt of the accused persons. In this context it is relevant to take note of what has been stated in para 11 which reads as follows:

    “11. It was lastly urged on behalf of the appellant that the lower courts ought not to have relied upon the evidence of dog tracking and such evidence was not admissible in order to prove the guilt of the appellant. The evidence of tracker dogs has been much discussed. In Canada and in Scotland it has been admitted. But in the United States there are conflicting decisions:
    ‘There have been considerable uncertainty in the minds of the courts as to the reliability of dogs in identifying criminals and such conflict of opinion on the question of the admissibility of their actions in evidence. A survey of the cases, however, reveals that most courts in which the question of the admissibility of evidence of trailing by bloodhounds has been presented take the position that upon a proper foundation being laid by proof that the dogs were qualified to trail human beings, and that the circumstances surrounding the trailer were such as to make it probable that the persons trailed was the guilty party, such evidence is admissible and may be permitted to go to the jury for what it is worth as one of the circumstances which may tend to connect the defendant with the crime.’ (para 378, Am. Juris, 2nd Edn., Vol. 29, p. 429.)
    There are three objections which are usually advanced against the reception of such evidence. First, since it is manifest that the dog cannot go into the box and give his evidence on oath, and consequently submit himself to cross-examination, the dog's human companion must go into the box and report the dog's evidence, and this is clearly hearsay. Secondly, there is a feeling that in criminal cases the life and liberty of a human being should not be dependent on canine inferences. And, thirdly, it is suggested that even if such evidence is strictly admissible under the rules of evidence it should be excluded because it is likely to have a dramatic impact on the jury out of proportion to its true evidential value. In R. v. Montgomery 1866 NI 160 a police constable observed men stealing wire by the side of a railway line. They ran away when he approached them. Shortly afterwards the police got them on a nearby road. About an hour and half later the police tracker dog was taken to the base of the telegraph pole and when he had made a few preliminary sniffs he set off and tracked continuously until he stopped in evident perplexity at the spot where the accused had been put into the police car. At the trial it appeared that other evidence against the accused that they had been stealing the wire was inconclusive and that the evidence of the behaviour of the tracker dog was crucial to sustain the conviction. In these circumstances the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that the evidence of the constable who handled the dog on its tracking and reported the dog's reactions was properly admitted. The Court did not regard its evidence as a species of hearsay but instead the dog was described as ‘a tracking instrument’ and the handler was regarded as reporting the movements of the instrument, in the same way that a constable in traffic case might have reported on the behaviour of his speedometer. It was argued in that case that the tracker dog's evidence could be likened to the type of evidence accepted from scientific experts describing chemical reactions, blood tests and the actions of bacilli. The comparison does not, however, appear to be sound because the behaviour of chemicals, blood corpuscles and bacilli contains no element of conscious volition or deliberate choice. But dogs are intelligent animals with many thought processes similar to the thought processes of human beings and wherever you have thought processes there is always the risk of error, deception and even self-deception. For these reasons we are of the opinion that in the present state of scientific knowledge evidence of dog tracking, even if admissible, is not ordinarily of much weight.”

    It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that in the said case this Court had upheld the conviction. Though in the said case the conviction was upheld, but that was done after excluding the evidence of dog squad. This Court found that the rest of the prosecution evidence proved the charges for which the appellants therein had been convicted.

    17. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

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    State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Balak And Another
    (Oct 3, 2008)