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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 274
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952
  • Section 19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
  • Section 8(1)(b) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952
  • Section 19, Subsection (1) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection (2) of the Act
  • Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 274
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952
  • Section 19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
  • Section 8(1)(b) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952
  • Section 19, Subsection (1) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection (2) of the Act
  • Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1 filed Civil Writ Petition No. 1345 of 1986 in the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8(1)(b) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. The land in question had been acquired on 20-3-1970, with the acquisition notification published on 27-3-1970, and an application requesting appointment of an arbitrator was allegedly submitted on 11-4-1971. After approximately sixteen years, the writ petition was instituted on 6-3-1986.

The High Court referred the matter to a Lok Adalat where, on 29-5-2000, a direction was issued to appoint an arbitrator, subject to any objection the Union of India might raise before the High Court. The Union of India filed an application on 16-8-2000 to recall the Lok Adalat order; the Lok Adalat acceded and, on 25-9-2000, remitted the case to the High Court for adjudication on merits.

On 23-11-2000, a learned Single Judge nevertheless ordered appointment of an arbitrator, substantially relying on the earlier Lok Adalat direction. The Union of India’s letters patent appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench, which held that the Lok Adalat order had merged into the Single Judge’s order and was therefore operative. The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Lok Adalat can validly direct appointment of an arbitrator when no compromise or settlement between the parties has been reached.
  2. Whether the Lok Adalat’s order could merge into, and thereby validate, the Single Judge’s decision directing appointment of an arbitrator.
  3. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court erred in dismissing the letters patent appeal without considering the principles laid down in earlier Supreme Court decisions, particularly Union of India v. Munsha.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Union of India)

  • The direction to appoint an arbitrator is untenable in view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Munsha (1995 Supp (4) SCC 660).
  • Under Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, a Lok Adalat may dispose of a matter only through a compromise or settlement; neither existed in the present case, rendering the Lok Adalat order—and any purported merger—invalid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Munsha, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 660 Sets out the conditions under which an arbitrator may be appointed pursuant to the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act. The Supreme Court directed the High Court to consider the effect and relevance of Munsha while rehearing the writ petition.
State of Punjab v. Ganpat Raj, (2006) 8 SCC 364 Clarifies the limited jurisdiction of Lok Adalats and the non-applicability of the doctrine of merger where the Lok Adalat lacks authority. The Court held that the High Court had failed to take note of this decision, necessitating remand.
NFU Development Trust Ltd., Re, (1972) 1 WLR 1548; (1973) 1 All ER 135 (Ch D) Defines “compromise” as involving mutual concessions, underscoring that it cannot be equated with total surrender. Cited to illustrate that the present case did not involve a bilateral compromise or settlement; therefore, the Lok Adalat lacked jurisdiction to pass the order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined Section 20 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, emphasizing that a Lok Adalat may decide a matter only when a “compromise or settlement” is reached between the parties. The Court explained the legal meaning of “compromise” and “settlement,” citing NFU Development Trust Ltd., Re, to demonstrate that such an arrangement requires mutual concessions, which were absent here. Consequently, the Lok Adalat lacked competence to order appointment of an arbitrator.

Because the Lok Adalat’s action was beyond its statutory authority, the doctrine of merger could not operate; the invalid order could not merge into, or confer validity upon, the Single Judge’s decision. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench overlooked this jurisdictional defect and failed to consider binding precedent (Ganpat Raj and Munsha).

Given these errors, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s orders were legally unsustainable and that a fresh adjudication of the writ petition was necessary.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; MATTER REMITTED to the Punjab and Haryana High Court for rehearing of Civil Writ Petition No. 1345 of 1986 on the merits, with a direction to dispose of it within four months of receiving the Supreme Court’s judgment. No costs were awarded.

The immediate effect is that the High Court’s prior orders directing appointment of an arbitrator stand set aside. The ruling reinforces the limited jurisdiction of Lok Adalats, clarifying that they cannot pronounce orders in the absence of a bona fide compromise or settlement. No new legal precedent was established, but existing Supreme Court jurisprudence on Lok Adalats’ powers was reaffirmed.

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    Union Of India v. Ananto (Dead) And Another

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the letters patent appeal, filed by the appellant Union of India and its functionaries. By the impugned order the view expressed by a learned Single Judge was affirmed.

    3. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

    A writ petition was filed by Respondent 1 which was numbered as Civil Writ Petition No. 1345 of 1986. When the writ petition was heard there was no appearance on behalf of the present appellant. It appears that before the writ petition was taken up for hearing by the learned Single Judge the matter was referred to Lok Adalat where an order dated 29-5-2000 was passed. Prayer in the writ petition was to appoint an arbitrator in terms of Section 8(1)(b) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (in short “the Act”). In the writ petition it was stated that the land was acquired on 20-3-1970 and a notice in Form J was issued. The notification for acquisition was published in the Official Gazette on 27-3-1970. Writ petitioner claimed to have filed an application to appoint an arbitrator on 11-4-1971. The writ petition was filed after about 16 years i.e on 6-3-1986 praying for appointment of an arbitrator. On 29-5-2000 a direction was issued by the Lok Adalat to appoint an arbitrator. In the order it was stated that if the Union of India had any objection then an appropriate application could be filed before the High Court for fresh adjudication. On 16-8-2000 an application for recalling the order of the Lok Adalat was filed before the Lok Adalat. The earlier order was recalled and by order dated 25-9-2000 the matter was sent to the High Court for adjudication on merits. As noted above, on 23-11-2000 learned Single Judge passed the order directing appointment of an arbitrator in the line of what had been directed earlier by the Lok Adalat. The letters patent appeal was dismissed on the ground that when the matter is referred to Lok Adalat and when after series of discussions before the Lok Adalat and when considerable time was spent and certain terms of settlement were found reasonable by the Lok Adalat, that formed basis of order of the learned Single Judge and the same was perfectly in order. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

    4. The Division Bench also noted that the order of the Lok Adalat had merged into order of the learned Single Judge and had therefore, become operative.

    5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the view of the High Court is clearly untenable. Reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in Union of India v. Munsha 1995 Supp (4) SCC 660 to contend that the direction for appointment of an arbitrator was clearly untenable.

    6. “6. The matters which can be taken up by the Lok Adalat for disposal are enumerated in Section 20 of the [Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (in short ‘the Legal Services Act’)] which reads as follows:
    ‘20. Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats.—(1) Where in any case referred to in Clause (i) of sub-section (5) of Section 19,—
    (i)(a) the parties thereof agree; or
    (b) one of the parties thereof makes an application to the court,
    for referring the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement and if such court is prima facie satisfied that there are chances of such settlement; or
    (ii) the court is satisfied that the matter is an appropriate one to be taken cognizance of by the Lok Adalat,
    the court shall refer the case to the Lok Adalat:
    Provided that no case shall be referred to the Lok Adalat under sub-clause (b) of Clause (i) or Clause (ii) by such court except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties.
    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the authority or committee organising the Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) of Section 19 may, on receipt of an application from any one of the parties to any matter referred to in Clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of Section 19 that such matter needs to be determined by a Lok Adalat, refer such matter to the Lok Adalat, for determination:
    Provided that no matter shall be referred to the Lok Adalat except after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the other party.
    (3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties.
    (4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles.
    (5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court, from which the reference has been received under sub-section (1) for disposal in accordance with law.
    (6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties, in a matter referred to in sub-section (2), that Lok Adalat shall advise the parties to seek remedy in a court.
    (7) Where the record of the case is returned under sub-section (5) to the court, such court shall proceed to deal with such case from the stage which was reached before such reference under sub-section (1).’
    7. The specific language used in sub-section (3) of Section 20 makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose of a matter by way of a compromise or settlement between the parties. Two crucial terms in sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 20 are ‘compromise’ and ‘settlement’. The former expression means settlement of differences by mutual concessions. It is an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims by reciprocal modification of demands. As per Termes de la Ley, ‘compromise is a mutual promise of two or more parties that are at controversy’. As per Bouvier it is ‘an agreement between two or more persons, who, to avoid a law suit, amicably settle their differences, on such terms as they can agree upon’. The word ‘compromise’ implies some element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe total surrender. (See NFU Development Trust Ltd., Re (1972) 1 WLR 1548, (1973) 1 All ER 135 (Ch D).) A compromise is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment. ‘Settlement’ is termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent. The case at hand did not involve compromise or settlement and could not have been disposed of by the Lok Adalat. If no compromise or settlement is or could be arrived at, no order can be passed by the Lok Adalat.”

    Therefore, question of merger of Lok Adalat's order does not arise.

    7. Both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench failed to take note of what has been stated by this Court in State of Punjab v. Ganpat Raj (2006) 8 SCC 364. In the fitness of things, therefore, we remit the matter to the High Court to hear the writ petition afresh. Since the matter is pending since long, we request the High Court to dispose of the matter within four months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment. While doing so, the effect and relevance of judgment in Munsha case 1995 Supp (4) SCC 660 shall be considered. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of the case.

    8. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Union Of India v. Ananto (Dead) And Another
    (Mar 9, 2007)