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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 831
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Sections 25-F and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-FFF, Section 25-F of the Act
  • Sections 25-F to 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-F of the 1947 Act
  • Section 2(cc) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-G of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-FF of the Act
  • Section 25-FFF of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 831
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Sections 25-F and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-FFF, Section 25-F of the Act
  • Sections 25-F to 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-F of the 1947 Act
  • Section 2(cc) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-G of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-FF of the Act
  • Section 25-FFF of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The District Red Cross Society, Karnal, operated several charitable projects including a Maternity Hospital, Drug De-addiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre, Family Planning Centre and Viklang Kendra. Ms. Babita Arora was appointed as a Staff Nurse in the Maternity Hospital on 20 March 1992 and worked continuously until 30 September 1998, when the Hospital was shut down for financial reasons. Claiming violation of Sections 25-F to 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the “Act”) and alleging that juniors were retained elsewhere, she sought reinstatement with back wages.

The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Karnal, treated the termination as retrenchment, held it illegal, and directed reinstatement with full back wages in four separate references (Nos. 1433-1436 of 1999). The High Court of Punjab & Haryana dismissed the employer’s writ petitions on 24 October 2002, affirming the awards. The District Red Cross Society obtained special-leave and brought the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether termination of service following the closure of the Maternity Hospital constituted “retrenchment” under Section 25-F of the Act or “closure” under Section 25-FFF.
  2. Consequently, whether the employees were entitled to reinstatement with back wages or merely to compensation prescribed for closure.

Arguments of the Parties

Employees (Respondents)

  • Termination violated Sections 25-F to 25-H because no notice, compensation or “last-come-first-go” principle was followed.
  • The alleged closure was illusory; the Out-Patient Department continued and other projects under the same management were operational, where the employees could have been absorbed.
  • Juniors were retained in other units, contravening Section 25-G.

District Red Cross Society (Appellant)

  • The Industrial Disputes Act did not apply to charitable hospitals and social organisations.
  • The Maternity Hospital was genuinely and permanently closed owing to drastic fall in donations; the entire staff was discharged.
  • Respondents were offered alternative employment in the Drug De-addiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre but refused.
  • Since the unit itself was closed, the case attracted Section 25-FFF and not Section 25-F; only compensation, not reinstatement, was payable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Workmen v. Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 860 Tribunal cannot compel an employer to reopen a genuinely closed unit; closure of part of business is within managerial discretion. Supported the view that courts cannot order reopening of a closed hospital when closure is bona fide.
Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Workmen, (1973) 3 SCC 564 “Undertaking” in Section 25-FFF includes part of a business; closure of a component unit qualifies. Cited to show that shutting one unit attracts Section 25-FFF even if other units continue.
Workmen v. Straw Board Mfg. Co. Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 681 Test of functional integrity: whether one unit is so integral that the rest cannot function without it. Used to establish that the Maternity Hospital lacked functional integration with other projects.
J.K. Synthetics v. Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra, (2001) 2 SCC 87 Closure may relate to a part of the plant; entire establishment need not cease. Reinforced that a partial closure is sufficient to invoke Section 25-FFF.
Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal, (2005) 2 SCC 638 Section 25-F applies in closures only for computing compensation; employment ends upon valid closure. Relied on to conclude that only compensation, not reinstatement, follows a valid closure.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court distinguished between “retrenchment” (Section 25-F) and “closure” (Section 25-FFF), emphasising the 1982 insertion of the statutory definition of “closure” in Section 2(cc) (“permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof”). Reviewing precedent, the Court held:

  • Closing a distinct unit lacking functional integration with other units amounts to closure under Section 25-FFF, even if the employer’s remaining activities continue.
  • The Maternity Hospital was a stand-alone entity, run solely on public donations and not government grants, unlike the other centres. Its financial non-viability was uncontroverted by the employees.
  • Upon genuine closure, the employer-employee relationship ends; workmen are entitled only to statutory compensation calculated as per Section 25-F, by virtue of the wording “as if” in Section 25-FFF.
  • The Tribunal and High Court therefore erred in treating the termination as retrenchment and ordering reinstatement.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Allowed; awards of reinstatement and High Court judgment set aside. The employees are to receive compensation under Section 25-FFF within two months, failing which they may approach the Tribunal for computation.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that closure of a financially distinct and functionally separate unit attracts Section 25-FFF, limiting employee relief to compensation and precluding reinstatement. It clarifies the boundary between retrenchment and closure without creating new precedent but consolidating existing jurisprudence.

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    District Red Cross Society v. Babita Arora

    G.P Mathur, J.— Leave granted.

    2. These appeals, by special leave, have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 24-10-2002 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, by which four writ petitions filed by the appellant herein were dismissed by a common order. In the writ petitions challenge was raised to the awards dated 7-9-2001 of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Karnal in References Nos. 1433 to 1436 of 1999.

    3. We will give the facts of Civil Writ Petition No. 1236 of 2002 which was directed against the award made in Reference No. 1433 of 1999. Babita Arora (the respondent herein) filed a claim petition before the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Karnal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) on the ground, inter alia, that she was appointed as Staff Nurse in the appellant, District Red Cross Society, Karnal, by the order dated 20-3-1992 and she continuously worked on the said post till her services were terminated on 30-9-1998, due to the closing down of Red Cross Maternity Hospital, but the management had not followed the procedure laid down in Sections 25-F to 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) which was a clear violation of the statutory provisions. The management had also not followed the principle of “first come last go” while terminating her services and had thereby contravened Section 25-G of the Act. No retrenchment compensation was paid to her at the time of termination of her services. The alleged closing down of the Maternity Hospital was only a paper transaction as the Outpatient Department was still functioning and the patients were being given treatment by the doctors as well as by other staff. Tubectomy operations were still being conducted in the hospital. Her case further was that there were several other schemes/projects under the appellant, like, Family Welfare Scheme, Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre, etc., where the respondent could be absorbed. It was accordingly prayed that an award may be passed directing the appellant to reinstate her in service with continuity of service and full back wages.

    4. The appellant District Red Cross Society, Karnal filed written statement on the ground, inter alia, that claim petition was not maintainable as the hospitals and social organisations were not covered under the Industrial Disputes Act. The services of the respondent were terminated on account of closing down of the Red Cross Maternity Hospital w.e.f 30-9-1998 as the hospital was being run on donations and not on government grant. The donations had considerably reduced and due to financial constraints and heavy expenditure, the appellant had no option but to close the Maternity Hospital. It was further pleaded that on account of closure of the charitable Maternity Hospital, the services of the entire staff working therein had been terminated and no one was retained in service. The respondent was, however, offered a post in another organisation viz. Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre, Karnal, wherein a post of nurse was sanctioned by the Government on 2-11-1998, but the respondent refused to accept the said offer.

    5. The parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their case. The appellant employer examined Brahm Dutt, Clerk, incharge of the District Red Cross Society, Karnal, who stated that the management carried on social work and the same was done on charitable basis from the donations received from public. The appellant Society was also running a Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre, a Family Planning Centre and a Viklang Kendra, which were being run as separate establishments as they were receiving grants from the Government to the extent of 90% to 100%. A decision was taken in a meeting held on 4-9-1998 to close down the Maternity Hospital on account of extreme financial stringency as it was not receiving any aid from the Government and was being run entirely from donations. In the said meeting Civil Surgeon, Karnal, had suggested that all the facilities of a maternity hospital were available in the Civil Hospital which was nearby and the hospital being run by the Red Cross Society was not serving any useful purpose. He also stated that the respondent had been offered service in Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre but she refused the said offer.

    6. The Tribunal held that the appellant Society was running a Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre, a Family Planning Centre and a Viklang Kendra and thus it cannot be said that the establishment of the appellant had been closed. It was further held that the respondent had completed more than 240 days of service in the year preceding the date of termination of her service and, therefore, she was entitled to retrenchment compensation which had not been given by the management and thus termination of her service was in violation of Section 25-F of the Act. It was also held that persons junior to the respondent were working in the aforesaid other centres of the appellant and thus the termination of her service was in clear violation of Section 25-G of the Act. On these findings, the Tribunal held that the termination of service of the respondent was illegal and contrary to law and accordingly gave an award directing her reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages from the date of demand notice i.e 6-11-1998. Similar awards were given in the three other adjudication cases and orders for reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages were passed in favour of the employees concerned (the respondents herein).

    7. The appellant challenged the awards of the Tribunal by filing four writ petitions in the High Court. The High Court held that from the evidence on record it could be safely concluded that the appellant Red Cross Society was running other projects like Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre, Family Planning Centre and Viklang Kendra and they had not been closed. The Red Cross Society, Karnal itself had not ceased to exist and its other units were functioning. It was further held that in a case where other units which are under the same management are functioning and the Red Cross Society was receiving grants from the Government, the termination of the services of the respondents was clearly illegal. On these findings, the writ petitions were dismissed.

    8. As mentioned earlier, it was the specific case of the appellant District Red Cross Society that the Maternity Hospital had been closed down w.e.f 30-9-1998 as it was not receiving any grant from the Government, but was being run on donations and was thus experiencing extreme financial stringency. It was also the case of the appellant that the services of the entire staff of the Maternity Hospital had been terminated on account of closing down of the hospital and the respondent Babita Arora had been offered the post in another organisation viz. Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre. In fact, there is no dispute from the side of the respondent regarding closing down of the Maternity Hospital. Para 2 of the claim statement filed by the respondent Babita Arora reads as under:

    “2. That the services of the workman have been terminated due to the closing down of Red Cross Maternity Hospital, Karnal w.e.f 30-9-1998 but the management has not followed the procedures laid down in Sections 25-F and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act which is a clear violation of the Act.”

    9. The question which arises for consideration is whether the respondent is entitled to protection of Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act if the establishment in which she was working itself has been closed down though certain other wings or units of the appellant District Red Cross Society, Karnal have not been closed down and are still functioning. Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act lays down the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen and it reads as under:

    “25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until—
    (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
    (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
    (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.”

    10. Section 25-FFF deals with compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings. The relevant part of sub-section (1) of Section 25-FFF (omitting the proviso) reads as under:

    “25-FFF. Compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings.—(1) Where an undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F, as if the workman had been retrenched:
    Provided….”

    Therefore, the legislature has treated closing down of undertakings which automatically result in termination of services of all workmen working therein differently from a retrenchment simpliciter as defined in Section 25-F of the Act.

    11. In Workmen v. Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Ltd. AIR 1970 SC 860, (1969) 2 SCR 282 it was held as under: (AIR p. 860)

    “No Industrial Tribunal, even in a reference under Section 10(1)(d) can interfere with discretion exercised by a company in the matter of closing down some of its branches or depots. Even if such closure may not amount to closure of business of the company, the Tribunal has no power to issue orders directing a company to reopen a closed depot or branch, if the company, in fact, closes it down and that closure is genuine and real. The closure may be treated as stoppage of part of the activity or business of the company. Such stoppage of part of a business is an act of management which is entirely in the discretion of the company carrying on the business.”

    12. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Workmen (1973) 3 SCC 564, 1973 Lab IC 461 it was held by this Court as under in para 10 of the Report:

    “10. The word undertaking as used in Section 25-FFF seems to us to have been used in its ordinary sense connoting thereby any work, enterprise, project or business undertaking. It is not intended to cover the entire industry or business of the employer as was suggested on behalf of the respondents. Even closure or stoppage of a part of the business or activities of the employer would seem in law to be covered by this sub-section. The question has indeed to be decided on the facts of each case.”

    13. In Workmen v. Straw Board Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1974) 4 SCC 681, (1974) 1 LLJ 499 this Court laid down the test of closure of a unit by observing that the most important aspect in a case relating to closure is whether one unit has such componental relation that the closing of one must lead to the closing of the other or the one cannot reasonably exist without the other. Functional integrity will assume an added significance in the case of closure.

    14. It appears that after the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, the legislature by an amendment made in the year 1982 to the Industrial Disputes Act defined the word “closure” by adding Section 2(cc). Section 2(cc) of the Act reads as under:

    “2. (cc) ‘closure’ means the permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof;”

    15. It is, therefore, clear that in order to attract Section 25-FFF it is not necessary that the entire establishment of an employer should be closed. If a unit or part of an undertaking which has no functional integrity with other units is closed, it will amount to closure within the meaning of Section 25-FFF of the Act. In J.K Synthetics v. Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra (2001) 2 SCC 87 it has been observed that the closure need not be of the entire plant. A closure can also be of a part of the plant. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal (2005) 2 SCC 638 it was held as under in para 21 of the Report:

    “21. How far and to what extent the provisions of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act would apply in case of transfer of undertaking or closure thereof is the question involved in this appeal. A plain reading of the provisions contained in Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF of the 1947 Act leaves no manner of doubt that Section 25-F thereof is to apply only for the purpose of computation of compensation and for no other. The expression ‘as if’ used in Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF of the 1947 Act is of great significance. The said term merely envisages computation of compensation in terms of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act and not the other consequences flowing therefrom. Both Section 25-FF and Section 25-FFF provide for payment of compensation only, in case of transfer or closure of the undertaking. Once a valid transfer or a valid closure comes into effect, the relationship of employer and employee does not survive and ceases to exist. Compensation is required to be paid to the workman as a consequence thereof and for no other purpose.”

    16. The position in law is, therefore, well settled that if the entire establishment of the employer is not closed down but only a unit or undertaking is closed down which has no functional integrity with other units or undertaking, the provisions of Section 25-FFF of the Act will get attracted and the workmen are only entitled to compensation as provided in Section 25-FFF of the Act which has to be calculated in accordance with Section 25-F of the Act. The Tribunal and also the High Court clearly erred in holding that as other units of the appellant Red Cross Society like Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre, Family Planning Centre and Viklang Kendra were functioning, the termination of services of the respondent would amount to retrenchment. The Maternity Hospital was functioning as a distinct entity. It was not receiving any grant from the Government and was being run entirely on charitable basis from donations received from public. Due to financial stringency, the Maternity Hospital had to be closed down. The other three units viz. Drug Deaddiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre, Family Planning Centre and Viklang Kendra are receiving grants from the Government and are functioning as separate entities and the mere fact that they have not been closed down, cannot lead to the inference that the termination of services of the respondent was by way of retrenchment which was illegal on account of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

    17. In view of the findings recorded above, the respondent would be entitled to compensation only in accordance with Section 25-FFF of the Act and the award of reinstatement in service with back wages passed by the Tribunal which was affirmed by the High Court cannot be sustained and must be set aside.

    18. The cases of other three respondents are exactly identical to that of Babita Arora as they were all working in the Maternity Hospital. Therefore, the awards passed by the Tribunal directing their reinstatement in service and back wages have to be set aside.

    19. In the result, the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The judgment and order dated 24-10-2002 of the High Court and the awards dated 7-9-2001 of the Tribunal are set aside. The appellant shall pay the compensation to the respondents in accordance with Section 25-FFF of the Act within two months from today, failing which it will be open to the respondents to approach the Tribunal for computation of the amount. No costs.

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    District Red Cross Society v. Babita Arora
    (Aug 14, 2007)