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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2004 INSC 265
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 302, 376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2004 INSC 265
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 302, 376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns the rape and murder of a 10-year-old girl in December 1978. The victim was last seen chewing sugarcane at the “kolhu” (crushing mill) of Rajendra Singh, father of the accused Devendra Singh. Witnesses later observed the accused walking with the child toward his sugarcane field. When the victim did not return home, her father Brij Lal (PW 1) and villagers searched the accused’s field but were initially prevented from entering. After further insistence, they discovered a freshly dug spot where the child’s body was found buried. A First Information Report was lodged the same evening, leading to investigation and charge-sheeting of the accused under Sections 302, 376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Sessions Court convicted the accused and imposed life imprisonment for murder, seven years for rape, and five years for causing disappearance of evidence. On appeal, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court reversed the conviction and acquitted the accused, principally disbelieving PW 4—an alleged eyewitness aged about sixteen. The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present judgment delivered by Arijit Pasayat, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in discarding the testimony of PW 4 as unreliable and thereby in acquitting the accused.
  2. Whether the remaining evidence—particularly the “last-seen” circumstance and recovery of the body from the accused’s field—was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
  3. Whether the Supreme Court could justifiably overturn an order of acquittal on the ground that the High Court’s findings were perverse.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (State of Uttar Pradesh)

  • PW 4’s delay in disclosing the incident was adequately explained by his youth, illiteracy, and fear of the accused, a reputedly violent person; his conduct was therefore not unnatural.
  • The record does not support the High Court’s observation that PW 4 admitted not having witnessed the crime or refused cross-examination; these are errors of record.
  • Even apart from PW 4, the testimonies of PWs 2 and 3 (who saw the accused with the victim shortly before her disappearance) and the discovery of the body in the accused’s field constitute compelling circumstantial evidence establishing guilt.
  • Medical evidence corroborates rape and homicidal death, aligning with the prosecution story.

Respondent (Accused, represented by Amicus Curiae)

  • The High Court correctly deemed PW 4’s behaviour—especially his three-day silence and inconsistent statements—unnatural and unreliable.
  • Once PW 4 is excluded, the remaining “last-seen” evidence is insufficient for conviction.
  • The High Court’s view is reasonable; hence its order of acquittal should not be disturbed on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rana Partap v. State of Haryana (1983) 3 SCC 327 There is no uniform or “natural” human reaction to witnessing a crime; conduct varies with circumstances. Used to reject the High Court’s view that PW 4’s delayed disclosure was inherently suspicious or unnatural.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first addressed the High Court’s credibility assessment of PW 4. It held that:

  • The High Court misread the record; PW 4 never stated he had not witnessed the crime, nor did he refuse cross-examination.
  • PW 4’s youth, illiteracy, and alleged threats from the accused plausibly explained his temporary silence. Relying on Rana Partap, the Court emphasised that behaviour following a traumatic event cannot be judged by a rigid standard.

Having restored credence to PW 4, the Court found his account of seeing the accused throttling the victim to be direct evidence. Even if PW 4 were ignored, other circumstances independently pointed to guilt:

  • PWs 2 and 3 placed the accused with the victim shortly before her disappearance (“last-seen” principle).
  • The victim’s body was exhumed from the accused’s field, a location he initially tried to shield from search.
  • Medical findings confirmed rape and homicidal strangulation, matching the prosecution narrative.

These factors formed an unbroken chain leading to the “inevitable conclusion” that the accused committed rape and murder. The Court characterised the High Court’s contrary findings as “patently perverse,” warranting interference even with an acquittal.

Holding and Implications

Conviction Restored; Appeal Allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s acquittal, reinstated the trial court’s convictions under Sections 302, 376, and 201 IPC, and ordered the accused to surrender immediately to serve his sentences.

Implications: The decision re-affirms that appellate intervention is permissible where an acquittal rests on a perverse appreciation of evidence. It also underscores the principle that a witness’s conduct must be judged in the context of human behavioural diversity, not by preconceived notions of “natural” reactions.

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    State Of U.P v. Devendra Singh .

    Arijit Pasayat, J.— The State of Uttar Pradesh in this appeal questioned the legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which set aside the conviction of the accused-respondent under Sections 302, 376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). The trial court had found the accused guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment for life for the first offence, and seven years and five years for the other two offences respectively. The High Court, in appeal, reversed the judgment of the trial court and directed acquittal.

    2. Background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows:

    Complainant Brij Lal (PW 1) was the father of the deceased aged about 10 years. On 26-12-1978, at about noon, the deceased went to the “kolhu” of Rajendra Singh, father of the accused, in order to chew sugarcane. She was seen chewing the sugarcane at the “kolhu” by the witnesses. She, however, did not return home. The complainant (PW 1) searched for her, but she could not be found. He was told by the witnesses that the deceased was seen chewing sugarcane at the “kolhu” of the accused and later on she was seen going with the accused towards his sugarcane field. The complainant and some other witnesses went the next day to the sugarcane field of accused Devendra Singh in order to search for the deceased in the said field. The accused did not permit the complainant to have a look at the said sugarcane field. Thereafter, the complainant took the “Pardhan” of the village with him as well as other persons and all of them searched for the deceased in the sugarcane field of the accused. During the search, some portion of the field towards the south was found to be freshly dug. The complainant and others dug the said place and the dead body of the deceased was found buried there. The complainant asked the other persons present there to keep a watch over the dead body and he himself went to the police station to lodge the report. The complainant lodged the report at PS Bilgram at 7.10 p.m on 27-12-1978. On the basis of the information, investigation was undertaken. On completion of investigation charge-sheet was placed. The accused person pleaded innocence and faced trial.

    3. The prosecution examined primarily three witnesses to substantiate its accusations. They are PWs 2 and 3 who claimed to have seen the accused in the company of the deceased just prior to the occurrence, and PW 4 who claimed to be an eyewitness. He is stated to have seen the accused throttling the deceased. The High Court found that the evidence of PW 4 did not inspire confidence. His conduct was unnatural. It was accepted that he had not disclosed about his having seen the occurrence for about three days. The High Court also noticed that the said witness at one place had admitted that he had not seen the occurrence but during his examination later on the next day again stated that he had seen the occurrence. In this background the witness was held to be unreliable. The High Court held that there was no other material to link the accused with the alleged crime.

    4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. Merely because PW 4 who was at the relevant time about 16 years of age, and has given reasons as to why he did not disclose having seen the throttling for about three days, that should not have been held sufficient to wipe out his credible evidence. He is an illiterate boy belonging to a very backward place and was a farm labourer. Therefore, the High Court should not have held that his conduct was not unnatural. It was pointed out that there is no record to show that he had admitted not to have seen the occurrence. It appears to be an error of record. Further, the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 and the fact that the dead body was found in the field of the accused, who prevented people from going into the field initially, are circumstances which unerringly pointed to the guilt of the accused. The medical evidence clearly established that the victim was raped and murdered.

    5. In response, Mr Ranjan Mukherjee, learned amicus curiae urged that the High Court has rightly discarded the evidence of PW 4, finding his conduct to be unnatural. Though the record does not show it, on the first day of examination, PW 4 had stated not to have seen the occurrence. The statement on the next day, shows that in all probability he had said so. If the evidence of PW 4 is kept out of consideration, evidence of others who claimed to have seen the accused in the company of the deceased prior to the incident is of no consequence. The High Court's view is reasonable since the appeal is against the judgment of acquittal.

    6. In view of the rival submissions, it has to be first seen whether the prosecution has established its case. Strictly speaking, the case is not of circumstantial evidence. Human behaviour varies from person to person. Different people behave and react differently in different situations. Human behaviour depends upon the facts and circumstances of each given case. How a person would react and behave in a particular situation can never be predicted. Every person who witnesses a serious crime reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counterattacking the assailants. Some may remain tightlipped, overawed either on account of the antecedents of the assailant or threats given by him. Each one reacts in his special way even in similar circumstances, leave alone, the varying nature depending upon a variety of circumstances. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way. (See Rana Partap v. State of Haryana (1983) 3 SCC 327.)

    7. As rightly noted by the trial court, the witness was a young lad and according to his testimony the accused was a hardened criminal with records of violence. It is his evidence that he was threatened by the accused, therefore, his silence in not telling others for some time, cannot, in the circumstances of the case, be held to be suspicious and unnatural. Further, the High Court erred in observing that he had stated during examination about his having not seen the occurrence and later on clarifying that he did so because of threats given by the accused. PW 4 nowhere stated of his having not seen the occurrence. The High Court also committed another error in holding that the witness refused to be cross-examined. This fact is also not borne out from the record.

    8. Coupled with the evidence of PW 4, the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 who claimed to have seen the deceased and the accused shortly before the occurrence is of significance. Even if the High Court kept out of consideration PW 4's evidence, the last-seen theory was a factor which was not duly considered by the High Court. The dead body was found in the field of the accused and evidence on record also shows that the accused initially prevented PW 1 and others from searching his field, but after a lot of persuasion he permitted the persons searching for the dead body to go to his field and in fact the dead body was recovered therefrom. The said solid circumstance is sufficient, coupled with the initial repulsion exhibited by the accused to substantiate the guilt of the accused.

    9. The evidence on record leads to the inevitable conclusion that the accused was responsible for the rape and murder of the victim. Though the judgment under challenge is one of acquittal, in view of the patently perverse conclusions arrived at by the High Court, the same is indefensible and is set aside. The conviction as recorded by the trial court and the sentences imposed are restored. The accused shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve the sentence imposed by the trial court.

    10. We record our appreciation for the fair and able manner in which Mr Ranjan Mukherjee, learned amicus curiae argued the case.

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    Comments

    State Of U.P v. Devendra Singh .
    (Apr 13, 2004)