AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 327
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 147 of the present Act
  • Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Motor Vehicles Act, Section II(1)
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923)
  • Section 147(1)(b) of the present Act
  • Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Section 147(1)(b) of the Act
  • Chapter XI of the Act covers the subject “Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against Third-Party Risks” under Section 146(1) of which no person shall use a motor vehicle in public unless there is a valid policy of insurance which complies with the requirements of the Chapter. The mandatory requirements of such insurance policy have been provided in Section 147.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 327
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 147 of the present Act
  • Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
  • Motor Vehicles Act, Section II(1)
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923)
  • Section 147(1)(b) of the present Act
  • Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Section 147(1)(b) of the Act
  • Chapter XI of the Act covers the subject “Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against Third-Party Risks” under Section 146(1) of which no person shall use a motor vehicle in public unless there is a valid policy of insurance which complies with the requirements of the Chapter. The mandatory requirements of such insurance policy have been provided in Section 147.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant owned a public service vehicle (“trekker”) used for carrying passengers for hire. Shashi Bhushan Singh was employed by the appellant as a khalasi (cleaner). On 21-10-1998 the vehicle met with an accident in which the employee died. The legal heirs of the deceased filed a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 against both the appellant (employer/vehicle owner) and the respondent-insurer. The Workmen's Compensation Court held that the vehicle was comprehensively insured with the respondent, that the accident occurred during the policy period, and it therefore directed the insurer to deposit the statutory compensation.

The respondent challenged that order before the Patna High Court by writ petition. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that absent a special contract, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 did not require the insurer to cover the risk to a khalasi. The appellant thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 147(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 makes an insurer statutorily liable for death of a khalasi/cleaner employed in a public service vehicle.
  2. Whether the wording of the insurance policy and the payment of premium for “13 + 1” seating capacity extend coverage to a khalasi as a “passenger” or “conductor”.
  3. Whether a comprehensive insurance policy, without specific additional premium, automatically covers risks to employees other than drivers, conductors, or ticket examiners.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The deceased should be treated as a “passenger” under Section 147(1)(b)(ii); the words “any person/any passenger” are of wide amplitude.
  • The policy certificate lists “13 + 1” under seating capacity, the “+1” (cleaner) indicating that premium was paid to cover the khalasi.
  • Alternatively, the deceased functioned as a “conductor,” a class expressly mentioned in the proviso, making the insurer liable.
  • A comprehensive policy by its very nature covers all risks including the death of a khalasi.

Respondent Insurance Company’s Arguments

  • No additional premium was paid for any employee other than the driver; the policy shows premium only for 13 passengers and one driver.
  • Under Section 147(1)(b) read with its proviso, an insurer is required to cover employees only if they are drivers, conductors, or ticket examiners; a khalasi does not fall within these categories.
  • The comprehensive character of the policy affects quantum of indemnity, not the classes of persons covered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T.V. Jose (Dr) v. Chacko P.M, (2001) 8 SCC 748 Party relying on a policy must produce the policy; appellate court may examine original policy. Justified production of the insurance policy during arguments despite appellant’s objection.
New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh, (2000) 1 SCC 237 The expressions “any person”/“any passenger” in Section 147 are broad. Court acknowledged breadth but held proviso carves out employee exception.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Philomina Mathew, 1993 ACJ 1166 (Ker) (FB) Interpretation of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 regarding employees carried for hire/reward. Distinguished because the 1939 Act contained an additional employee category absent in Section 147 of the 1988 Act.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C.M. Jaya, (2002) 2 SCC 278 Meaning of “comprehensive” policy—covers quantum, not additional classes of risk. Used to reject appellant’s claim that a comprehensive policy per se covers a khalasi.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined Section 147(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and its proviso. While sub-clauses (i) and (ii) speak broadly of “any person” or “any passenger,” the proviso specifically restricts compulsory coverage for employees, limiting it to:

  • Drivers;
  • Conductors or ticket examiners of public service vehicles; and
  • Employees carried in a goods carriage.

Because the deceased was neither a driver, conductor, nor ticket examiner, the statute did not require the insurer to cover him. The Court noted that parties may contract for wider coverage, but the appellant failed to prove any special contract or payment of additional premium extending coverage to a khalasi. The policy itself contained a clause excluding liability for employees “except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act.” Premium records showed payment for 13 passengers and one driver only.

The argument that the deceased should be regarded as a passenger was rejected; if employees automatically qualified as passengers, the proviso would be redundant. The Court also dismissed the claim that the khalasi was a conductor, pointing out the absence of premium for a conductor and doubting the equivalence of the two roles. Finally, relying on New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C.M. Jaya, the Court held that a “comprehensive” policy merely affects the amount payable, not the scope of persons covered.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The insurer is not liable to pay compensation for the death of the khalasi; the High Court’s decision setting aside the Workmen's Compensation Court’s order is affirmed. Each party bears its own costs.

Implications: The judgment reaffirms that, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, compulsory insurance does not extend to every category of employee. Unless additional premium is paid or a special contract exists, insurers are liable only for the employees enumerated in the proviso to Section 147(1)(b). No new precedent was created, but the decision clarifies statutory limits on insurer liability for employees such as cleaners or khalasis.

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    Ramashray Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. And Others

    Ruma Pal, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The appellant is the owner of a vehicle, described as a “trekker”, in which passengers are carried for hire. He employed Shashi Bhushan Singh as a “khalasi” of the vehicle. On 21-10-1998 the vehicle met with an accident as a result of which Shashi Bhushan Singh died. The legal heirs of the deceased employee filed a claim in the Workmen's Compensation Court against the appellant, as the owner of the vehicle, and against the respondent Insurance Company. The Workmen's Compensation Court held that the vehicle had been comprehensively insured with the respondent and that since the accident had occurred during the period of insurance, the Insurance Company was liable to pay the compensation on account of the death of the employee. The respondent was, therefore, directed to deposit the compensation determined under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

    3. The decision was challenged by the respondent before the High Court at Patna under Article 226. The High Court allowed the writ petition. It held that in the absence of any special contract between the appellant and the respondent, the rights of the parties were governed by the statute which did not require the respondent to cover liability in respect of an accident to a khalasi. The statute in question is the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (referred to hereinafter as the Act).

    4. The appellant has impugned the decision of the High Court before this Court, primarily on the ground that the High Court had misconstrued the provisions of the Act and in particular clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147. It was contended that the insurance policy expressly covered the death or injury to the khalasi. Our attention was drawn to the insurance certificate where under the heading “Particulars of the Vehicle Insured” there is a column which refers to “Seating capacity including driver and cleaner”. Under this sub-head the figure “13+1” has been inserted. A cleaner, as accepted by both parties before us, would include a khalasi. The appellant submitted that he had paid premium on the basis of 13+1 to cover the liability in question.

    5. The respondent has refuted the claim that an additional premium was paid to cover the risk pertaining to a khalasi. It is contended that in terms of the insurance policy, as also under the provisions of Section 147(1)(b), no employee of the insured apart from the driver was covered.

    6. Chapter XI of the Act covers the subject “Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against Third-Party Risks” under Section 146(1) of which no person shall use a motor vehicle in public unless there is a valid policy of insurance which complies with the requirements of the Chapter. The mandatory requirements of such insurance policy have been provided in Section 147..

    7. The relevant extract of Section 147 is reproduced with emphasis on the words on which the appellant's case rests:

    “147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.—(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which—
    (a)***
    (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)—
    (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
    (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:
    Provided that a policy shall not be required—
    (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee—
    (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or
    (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or
    (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or
    (ii) to cover any contractual liability.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    8. Over and above the risks which are covered by this statutory provision, parties may of course enter into a contract by which the insurer agrees to cover additional risks. It is not the appellant's case that apart from the policy of insurance there was any contract between the appellant and the Insurance Company. The policy has a clause which defines the limits of liability in respect of death or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle under Section II(1) of the terms and conditions of the policy. In proviso (b) to Section II(1), it has been expressly stated that

    “Except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Company shall not be liable in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person in the employment of the insured arising out of and in the course of such employment.”

    9. A copy of the original policy was produced by the respondents in the course of arguments. The appellant has objected to the production of the policy at this stage. We would have understood and upheld the submission had the appellant not based his claim on the policy. Indeed, in the absence of the policy, we could not have entertained the appellant's claim at all. [See: T.V Jose (Dr) v. Chacko P.M (2001) 8 SCC 748]

    10. The appellant's first submission was that Shashi Bhushan Singh was a passenger. The appellant's submission that the phrases “any person” and “any passenger” in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (b) to Section 147(1) are of wide amplitude, is correct. (See: New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh (2000) 1 SCC 237.) However, the proviso to the sub-section carves out an exception in respect of one class of persons and passengers, namely, employees of the insured. In other words, if the “person” or “passenger” is an employee, then the insurer is required under the statute to cover only certain employees. As stated earlier, this would still allow the insured to enter into an agreement to cover other employees, but under the proviso to Section 147(1)(b), it is clear that for the purposes of Section 146(1), a policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of any employment of the person insured unless: first, the liability of the insured arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and second, if the employee is engaged in driving the vehicle and if it is a public service vehicle, is engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle. If the employee concerned is neither a driver nor conductor nor examiner of tickets, the insured cannot claim that the employee would come under the description of “any person” or “passenger”. If this were permissible, then there would be no need to make special provisions for employees of the insured. The mere mention of the word “cleaner” while describing the seating capacity of the vehicle does not mean that the cleaner was therefore a passenger. Besides, the claim of the deceased employee was adjudicated upon by the Workmen's Compensation Court which could have assumed jurisdiction and passed an order directing compensation only on the basis that the deceased was an employee. This order cannot now be enforced on the basis that the deceased was a passenger.

    11. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court relied on by the appellant in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Philomina Mathew 1993 ACJ 1166 (Ker) (FB) was based on a construction of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the corresponding section to which under the present Act is Section 147. The relevant provisions of the two sections which are otherwise in pari materia are materially different in one respect. Section 95 covered a fourth category of employee after the three now mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) to the proviso to Section 147(1)(b) viz.

    “where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises”.
    (emphasis supplied)

    12. So a person carried in pursuance of a contract of employment would be a passenger and would be covered as such. The exclusion of this clause in the proviso to Section 147(1)(b) of the present Act bolsters our reasoning that employees other than the three mentioned are not covered by Section 147(1)(b).

    13. The appellant's next submission was that the employee concerned was a “conductor”. It is doubtful whether a “khalasi” and a conductor are the same. But assuming this were so, there is nothing to show that the appellant had paid any additional premium to cover the risk of injury to a conductor. On the contrary, the policy shows that premium was paid for 13 passengers and 1 driver. There is no payment of premium for a conductor.

    14. The appellant's final submission was that as the policy was a comprehensive one, it would cover all risks including the death of the khalasi. The submission is unacceptable. An insurance policy only covers the person or classes of persons specified in the policy. A comprehensive policy merely means that the loss sustained by such person/persons will be payable up to the insured amount irrespective of the actual loss suffered. (See: New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C.M Jaya (2002) 2 SCC 278; Colinvaux: Law of Insurance (7th Edn., pp. 93-94.)

    15. Consequently, although the appellant's claim under the insurance policy arose under the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the employee concerned was not engaged in the capacity of a driver in respect of whom alone premium was paid apart from the passengers, his claim is unsustainable.

    16. The appeal is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

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    Ramashray Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. And Others
    (Jul 22, 2003)