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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 361
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 148-A of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Order 21 Rule 97, Order 21 Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 361
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 148-A of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Order 21 Rule 97, Order 21 Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The decree-holder, Bibi Haliman and others, obtained a decree for eviction in Title Suit No. 8 of 1983 concerning Holding No. 116 (Old)/182 (New), Ward No. 2, Giridih Municipality. Execution Case No. 12 of 1984 was initiated. Delivery of possession was effected against Judgment-debtors 1-6, but Judgment-debtor 7 resisted, asserting that the property belonged to a religious body, Tanzeem-e-Sufia (Sufi Ashram).

An application by the objector was initially entertained as Misc. Case No. 1 of 1994, but the High Court set that order aside as premature because no application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC had yet been filed by the decree-holder.

The appellant (Tanzeem-e-Sufia) instituted Title Suit No. 66 of 1993 seeking declaration of title and confirmation of possession and lodged a caveat under Section 148-A CPC. On 13-3-1995 the decree-holder filed a petition for delivery of possession. The appellant requested the executing court to treat that petition as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC so that it could lodge objections. By order dated 17-8-2001, the executing court rejected the request, holding that the appellant had no locus and could proceed, if at all, only under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC after dispossession. The High Court, in revision, upheld that view. The present civil appeal challenges those orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree-holder’s petition dated 13-3-1995 for delivery of possession amounts to an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC.
  2. If so, whether a third party claiming independent rights and possession (the appellant) is entitled to be heard and to have its objections adjudicated under Order 21 Rules 97 and 101 CPC at the execution stage, rather than being relegated to proceedings under Rule 99 after dispossession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The decree-holder’s petition of 13-3-1995 is, in substance, an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC because it complains of resistance/obstruction by a person in possession.
  • Order 21 Rule 97 uses the expression “any person,” which, as explained by the Supreme Court in Shreenath v. Rajesh, includes persons not bound by the decree; hence the appellant is entitled to be heard.
  • Forcing the appellant first to suffer dispossession and then to litigate under Rule 99 is contrary to the principle laid down in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shreenath v. Rajesh, (1998) 4 SCC 543 “Any person” in Order 21 Rule 97 includes persons not bound by the decree; objections can be decided at execution stage. Relied upon to hold that the appellant, though not a judgment-debtor, could object under Rule 97.
Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694 Executing court must decide objections under Rule 97 on merits before ordering delivery; it should not insist on dispossession first. Used to find fault with the executing court’s direction that the appellant seek relief only after dispossession under Rule 99.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Court examined the text of Order 21 Rules 97, 99 and 101 CPC. Rule 97 empowers a decree-holder to apply when resistance to delivery is encountered; Rule 101 mandates that all questions of right, title or interest arising in such proceedings be adjudicated in execution and not by a separate suit.

2. A close reading of the decree-holder’s petition dated 13-3-1995 revealed express allegations of obstruction by Tanzeem-e-Sufia and a prayer for removal of that obstruction with police aid. Although the petition did not cite Rule 97, its contents squarely invoked that provision; nomenclature is not decisive.

3. Once the petition is treated as a Rule 97 application, the appellant, being the very person alleged to obstruct, was entitled to notice and a hearing. Its caveat filed under Section 148-A CPC reinforced this entitlement.

4. The executing court erred in denying audience to the appellant and directing it to proceed only under Rule 99 after dispossession. That approach was expressly rejected in Brahmdeo Chaudhary.

5. The High Court’s affirmation of the executing court was likewise flawed. It overlooked Rule 101 CPC, which bars relegating questions of title to a separate suit when they arise in Rule 97 proceedings. The pendency of Title Suit No. 66 of 1993 therefore did not justify refusal of hearing in execution.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; orders of the High Court and the executing court set aside.

The executing court must rehear and decide the decree-holder’s application dated 13-3-1995 after giving the appellant an opportunity to file and press objections. The Court directed an expeditious disposal and awarded “costs easy.” The decision reinforces that objections by third parties in possession must be adjudicated under Order 21 Rules 97 and 101 CPC at the execution stage, thereby avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and ensuring procedural fairness.

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    Tanzeem-E-Sufia v. Bibi Haliman And Others

    Brijesh Kumar, J.— Leave granted.

    2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

    3. While issuing notice on 28-9-2001, this Court passed the following order:

    “Issue notice limited to the question as to why the petitioner should not be allowed to pursue at least one of the two remedies either to proceed with application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC or with civil suit. Until further orders the petitioner shall not be removed from possession in execution of decree.”

    The brief facts of the case are that the respondent Bibi Haliman and others had filed Title Suit No. 8 of 1983 for eviction of the defendants. The suit relates to Holding No. 116 (Old)/182 (New) situated in Ward No. 2 of Giridhih Municipality. The suit was decreed in favour of Bibi Haliman in pursuance whereof the defendants were to hand over the possession of suit property to the plaintiff. The decree-holder Bibi Haliman and others filed Execution Case No. 12 of 1984 for obtaining the possession of the premises indicated above. It is said that according to the report of the Nazir dated 26-7-1992, Judgment-debtors 1 to 6 had vacated the suit premises but Judgment-debtor 7 Siwaitulla, son of Kahamatulla had not given the possession and at the time the Nazir went to execute the delivery of the possession he found that the judgment-debtor was lying in bed and doctors attending him told the Nazir that the judgment-debtor was a heart patient and he should not be informed about the warrant of delivery of possession as it may adversely affect his condition. According to the report, the son of the judgment-debtor told the Nazir that the property belongs to Sufi Ashram where Sufi Dhyan Kendra has been established with Registration No. 196, Tanzeem-e-Sufia Sufi Sant Ashram, hence the delivery of possession could not be effected. Judgment-debtor 7 filed an application under Section 151 CPC on behalf of one Ashok Kumar Gupta, Secretary, Tanzeem Sufia. The said application was registered as Misc. Case No. 1 of 1994 by order dated 14-2-1994. The decree-holder preferred Civil Revision No. 125/94-R against the order dated 14-2-1994 at the Ranchi Bench of the High Court. The revision had been allowed on 13-9-1994 and order dated 14-2-1994 was set aside by the High Court observing that the applications dated 3-8-1992 and 12-10-1993, moved on behalf of the objector, a third party, at the stage of execution proceeding when the decree-holder had not, despite the report of the Nazir, filed an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC, were premature.

    4. The appellant also filed Title Suit No. 66 of 1993 against the decree-holders in respect of the same premises with a prayer for declaration of title in their favour, confirmation of possession and in case found dispossessed during the pendency of the suit, then a decree for recovery of possession was also prayed for. It was further prayed that the decree obtained in Title Suit No. 8 of 1983 be declared not binding on the plaintiff, namely, the present appellant. In Execution Case No. 12 of 1984, the appellant filed a caveat under Section 148-A of the Civil Procedure Code praying that in case any application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC is filed by the decree-holder, in that event the caveator may be heard before passing any order on such an application. The decree-holder, thereafter filed a petition dated 13-3-1995, for issuance of writ of delivery of possession. The appellant requested the executing court to treat the said application dated 13-3-1995 moved by the decree-holder as a petition under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. The executing court by order dated 17-8-2001, rejected the prayer of the appellant to treat the application dated 13-3-1995 as a petition under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC observing that the appellant had no locus standi to raise objection and the only remedy available to him would be to move the executing court under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC and ordered for delivery of possession to the decree-holder.

    5. The appellant preferred a civil revision against the abovenoted order dated 17-8-2001 passed by the executing court. In the High Court it was submitted that a third party in possession is entitled to file objections in proceedings initiated by the decree-holder under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC for delivery of possession. The High Court rejected the revision observing that the appellant has already filed a suit for declaration of title after declaring the decree passed in Title Suit No. 8 of 1983 as not binding on it and for confirmation of its possession etc. over the property in question. Therefore, it was not entitled to invoke the provisions of Order 21 Rule 97 CPC for the same relief.

    6. Shri Sanyal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently urged that the petition dated 13-3-1995 moved by the decree-holder for delivery of possession before the executing court, should be treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. And in that event, the appellant shall be entitled to file objections before the executing court as a third party in possession and such objections are liable to be decided in accordance with law.

    7. A perusal of Order 21 Rule 97 shall facilitate the proper appreciation of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. It reads as follows:

    “97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property.—(1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the court complaining of such resistance or obstruction.
    (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.”

    8. The abovenoted provision entitles the decree-holder to bring it to the notice of the executing court the fact that the execution of the decree is being resisted or obstructed by any person in possession of the property. The executing court would adjudicate upon the application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 97 in accordance with law.

    9. We may also peruse Rule 99 Order 21, which reads as under:

    “99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser.—(1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the court complaining of such dispossession.
    (2) Where any such application is made, the court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.”

    10. The above provision is to be availed of after a person in possession claiming its independent right is dispossessed, in that event such third person can complain of dispossession to the executing court.

    11. It will also be appropriate to peruse Rule 101 of Order 21; it reads as under:

    “101. Question to be determined.—All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions.”

    12. We have already seen that the decree obtained by the decree-holder could not be executed by the respondents insofar as it related to Defendant 7. As against others the decree had been executed. The decree-holder thus filed an application dated 13-3-1995 for issuance of writ of delivery of possession. The appellant requested that it may be treated as an application by the decree-holder under Order 21 Rule 97. We feel that the petition dated 13-3-1995 is actually an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC. Though the said provision is not specifically indicated in the application but a perusal of the application shows that the resistance/obstruction in delivery of possession, by and at the instance of the appellant is clearly indicated therein. It is mentioned that the office of Tanzeem-e-Sufia known as Sufia Ashram, is being run in a portion of the premises in question. It is also stated that one Ashok Kumar Gupta has been set up by the judgment-debtor as Secretary of the Society. A prayer has been made for delivery of possession by removing all obstructions with the assistance of armed police and lady constables etc. Such an application is envisaged under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC and that being the position, it entitles the appellant to be heard before passing any order on the application moved by the decree-holder. There is no question of treating the application dated 13-3-1995 as one under Order 21 Rule 97, in fact it is an application under that provision. The appellant took extra precaution to inform the court about its intention to file objections beforehand and requested for a hearing. Once an application was moved by the decree-holder on 13-3-1995 there was no occasion to refuse hearing to the appellant. According to the appellant, it is in possession of the property having been gifted to it by one of its followers viz. Chandobibi.

    13. In support of the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, Shri Sanyal placed reliance upon a decision of this Court reported in Shreenath v. Rajesh (1998) 4 SCC 543. It has been held in this case that the term “any person” includes even a person not bound by the decree who shall also be entitled to file objections. It has been so provided to widen the scope of Order 21 Rule 97, so that all such matters may be decided at the execution stage itself to curtail the lengthy procedure of an independent suit claiming a right not to be dispossessed from the property covered by the decree of a court. Another decision relied upon is reported in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal (1997) 3 SCC 694. It has been held that the executing court must first adjudicate upon the objection of the objector on merits under Rule 97(2) of Order 21 CPC. It is also observed that it should not be insisted that possession be handed over first and an application under Order 21 Rule 99 be moved later on complaining about dispossession.

    14. We find that in the case in hand the appellant is claiming its independent right over the property and asserts its possession thereof. Order 21 Rule 101 clearly provides that all questions relating to right, title or interest in property relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be dealt with the application and not by a separate suit. The High Court therefore, erred in refusing to hear the appellant, on the ground that it has already filed a suit for declaration of its title and for declaration that the decree passed in Title Suit No. 8 of 1983 is not binding on it. The provision contained under Order 21 Rule 101 CPC seems to have escaped the notice of the High Court while passing the order. We would also like to observe that the reasoning given by the executing court while rejecting the application of the appellant as indicated in the order of the High Court, that the remedy of the appellant would only lie by moving an application under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC is also erroneous as in the case of Brahmdeo Chaudhary (1998) 4 SCC 543 it has been held that it should not be insisted that possession be delivered first and the objector may later on move the court under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC.

    15. For the reasons indicated above, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as passed by the executing court. We further provide that the executing court shall dispose of the application dated 13-3-1995 moved by the respondents afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. In the interest of justice it is desirable that the application is disposed of expeditiously.

    16. Costs easy.

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    Tanzeem-E-Sufia v. Bibi Haliman And Others
    (Sep 3, 2002)