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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2001 INSC 307
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 25 of the Act, Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949
  • Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
  • the Act [purpose to prevent unreasonable eviction and also to control rent]
  • Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 25 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2001 INSC 307
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 25 of the Act, Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949
  • Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
  • Article 14 of the Constitution
  • Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
  • the Act [purpose to prevent unreasonable eviction and also to control rent]
  • Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 25 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Two notifications were issued by the State of Kerala under Section 25 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (“the Act”):

  • SRO No. 435/92 dated 7 March 1992 (published 7 April 1992) exempting, in public interest, all buildings of churches and mosques of minority religions from the operation of Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the Act.
  • SRO No. 769/96, later in time, extending exemption to buildings of dioceses, archdioceses, monasteries, convents, wakfs and madarsas and amending the earlier notification.

A batch of writ petitions challenged these notifications before the Kerala High Court. The High Court quashed both notifications, holding that the Government had acted arbitrarily and without supporting material, and that blanket exemptions based on ownership offended constitutional principles.

The State of Kerala and other affected parties filed civil appeals before the Supreme Court of India. The present opinion resolves those appeals, including Civil Appeal No. 5628 of 2000 and several connected matters, after granting leave in the lead Special Leave Petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government of Kerala validly exercised its power under Section 25 of the Act in granting blanket exemptions to buildings owned by religious and charitable institutions of minority religions.
  2. Whether such exemptions amount to arbitrary or discriminatory State action violative of Article 14 of the Constitution due to alleged lack of “public interest” or “sufficient cause.”
  3. Whether the High Court erred in distinguishing Section 25 of the Kerala Act from the parallel provision (Section 29) in the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (State of Kerala and Supporting Institutions)

  • Relied on Supreme Court precedents (P.J. Irani and S. Kandaswamy Chettiar) to contend that religious and charitable trusts form a distinct class, justifying exemption without offending Article 14.
  • Asserted that the purpose of the Act is to curb unreasonable rent increases and evictions, and that religious/charitable landlords are unlikely to misuse their position.
  • Submitted that “public interest” is satisfied because exemptions enable trusts to better fulfil their charitable or religious objectives.

Respondents (Writ-Petitioners before the High Court)

  • Argued there was “total non-application of mind” by the State, claiming the guidelines accepted in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar were ignored.
  • Contended that a blanket exemption based solely on ownership is impermissible, especially when some exempted buildings are used commercially.
  • Maintained that absence of concrete material or affidavits on hardships justified the High Court’s interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1731; (1962) 2 SCR 169 Power to exempt buildings of religious/charitable trusts from Rent Control statute is not violative of Article 14; such trusts form a separate class. Cited to reinforce that similar exemption power has already been upheld by the Supreme Court and is constitutionally valid.
S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N., (1985) 1 SCC 290 Upheld total exemption to religious or charitable trusts under Tamil Nadu Act; trusts unlikely to act unreasonably toward tenants. Treated as the governing precedent; Supreme Court held the appellant institutions fall within the same “well-recognised group,” making the Kerala exemption similarly valid.
Jayakaran v. Kerala Health R.&W. Society, 1994 1 KLT 24 Kerala High Court had earlier sustained exemptions granted in public interest, even where notification stated no reasons. Used to show consistent judicial approval within Kerala for exemptions benefiting charitable bodies.
State of Kerala v. Vijayan, 1978 KLT 342 Kerala High Court upheld exemption for Devaswom Board property. Cited to demonstrate historical acceptance of exemptions for religious bodies in Kerala.
Lakshmanan v. Mohamood, 1992 1 KLT 85 (FB) Exemption granted to registered wakfs sustained. Relied upon to affirm that wakfs are part of the same protected category.
Rohtas Industries v. S.D. Agarwal, (1969) 1 SCC 325; (1969) 3 SCR 108 If there is no material for forming the statutory opinion, courts may infer non-application of mind. Respondents invoked this case; the Supreme Court distinguished it, noting supportive material in the present record, including binding precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s approach flawed for several reasons:

  • No substantive difference between Section 25 of the Kerala Act and Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Act. Both powers must conform to Article 14 and cannot be exercised arbitrarily; therefore the linguistic variation relied on by the High Court was “not of much materiality.”
  • Valid classification. Consistent with S. Kandaswamy Chettiar, buildings owned by religious or charitable trusts constitute a distinct class. Such institutions are unlikely to exploit tenants, and exemption aids the fulfilment of their public purposes.
  • Application of mind presumed. The State’s counter-affidavit expressly invoked Supreme Court precedents supporting exemption. In light of those authorities and earlier Kerala decisions, the Court held there was adequate material; mere absence of detailed factual data did not evidence arbitrariness.
  • Irrelevance of wider constitutional discourse. The High Court’s discussion of secularism and administrative law was deemed a “tangent”; the only relevant inquiry was whether the statutory conditions (“public interest or any other sufficient cause”) were met.
  • Absence of demonstrated hardship to tenants. The Court noted no evidence that the exempted landlords were poised to charge excessive rents or evict tenants unreasonably; speculation alone was insufficient to invalidate the notifications.

Holding and Implications

Civil Appeals Nos. 5628, 5781, 6375, 6376, 6378, 6380, 6381, 6372, 6374 of 2000 and 4456 of 2001 ALLOWED. The impugned Kerala High Court judgment is set aside and the two notifications (SRO No. 435/92 and SRO No. 769/96) are declared valid. Consequently, the writ petitions are dismissed.

Civil Appeals Nos. 6373 and 6382 of 2000 DISMISSED in view of the main ruling.

Implications: The decision affirms the State’s power to exempt buildings owned by religious and charitable bodies from rent-control protections when done in public interest. It reinforces the classification doctrine previously recognised and signals judicial deference where exemptions serve acknowledged public or charitable purposes. The ruling does not create new precedent but consolidates existing principles under Article 14 as applied to rent-control legislation.

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    Christ The King Cathedral v. John Ancheril And Another

    S. Rajendra Babu, J.—

    CAs Nos. 5628, 5781, 6375, 6376, 6378, 6380, 6381, 6372, 6374 of 2000 and 4456 of 2001 [arising out of SLP (C) No. 11259 of 2000]

    1. Leave granted in SLP (C) No. 11259 of 2000.

    2. Two notifications were issued under Section 25 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short “the Act”) — one SRO No. 435/92 issued on 7-3-1992 published in the Kerala Gazette on 7-4-1992, which exempted in public interest the buildings of all churches/mosques of all the minority religions from the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the Act and another notification SRO No. 769/96 was published exempting buildings of all dioceses, archdioceses, monasteries, convents, wakfs and madarsas also from the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the Act and amended the earlier notification. A batch of writ petitions was filed in the High Court challenging the validity of these notifications. The High Court held that there is no application of mind by the Government in issuing the impugned notifications resulting in arbitrary exercise of the discretionary powers conferred upon a statutory authority and there is no material before the Government to exercise such exemption. In reaching this conclusion, the High Court took into consideration that the buildings of churches or mosques are commercially used and, therefore, granting of exemption under Section 25 of the Act on the basis of ownership is not right. The High Court also proceeded to consider the scope of the secular nature of the Constitution and observed that conferment of power upon the Government to grant such blanket exemptions would defeat the very power conferred on it.

    3. In the counter-affidavit the State supported the exemptions on the basis of the law declared by this Court. This Court in P.J Irani v. State of Madras AIR 1961 SC 1731, (1962) 2 SCR 169 held that a similar power vested under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 to exempt any building from the provisions of the Madras Act is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by holding that the charitable and religious trusts or endowments fall into a separate class. In S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N (1985) 1 SCC 290 this Court upheld grant of total exemption in respect of buildings belonging to public trusts, religious or charitable in nature, on the basis that such trusts constituted a well-recognised distinct group inasmuch as they not only serve public purpose, but the disbursement of their income is governed by the objects with which they are created.

    4. On an earlier occasion in Jayakaran v. Kerala Health R & W Society (1994) 1 KLT 24 the High Court held as follows: (KLT p. 25, para 2)

    “Grant of exemption in favour of charitable bodies like the petitioner must be held to be in public interest. Even though no reasons are stated in the notification granting exemption, it is enough if it is stated in the counter-affidavit. The notification granting exemption is undisputably being in public interest, the same is not open to challenge on the ground urged in the original petition.”

    5. The High Court after referring to the said decision held that the exercise of discretionary power is subject to test of reasonableness but observed that by one stroke the entire buildings owned by minority religions in the State have been taken away from the purview of the Act without being supported by any material enabling the Government to consider the issue in a legal and proper manner uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations or acting under the dictation of a third party. The High Court compared the provisions under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 considered in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case (1985) 1 SCC 290 and the provisions of the Act under consideration and drew a distinction between the two provisions. The relevant portions of the said two Acts are as follows:

    Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Act Section 25 of the Act 29. Exemptions.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Government may, subject to such conditions as they deem fit, by notification, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act. 25. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Government may, in public interest or for any other sufficient cause, by notification in the Gazette, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act.

    The High Court noticed that the power of exemption under Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Act is general in nature, while such power could be exercised under the Act only “in public interest or for any other sufficient cause”. But, we find that distinction sought to be made by the High Court on the basis of language of these two provisions is not well founded. The Government may grant exemption and while granting exemption even under the Tamil Nadu Act, it has got to bear in mind that it should be in public interest or for any other sufficient cause and it cannot be whimsical or arbitrary exercise of these powers as such action could attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, distinction sought to be made by the High Court between these two provisions is not of much materiality.

    6. The law had been stated by this Court to the effect that public religious or charitable endowments or trusts constitute a well-recognised group which serves not only public purposes, but disbursement of their income is governed by the objects with which they are created and buildings belonging to such endowments or trusts clearly fall into a class distinct from the buildings owned by private landlords. It is in respect of three areas a regulation would be made under the Act, as has been done in other similar enactments and these areas are: (i) with respect to regulation of lease of buildings (residential or non-residential); (ii) control of rent of such buildings; and (iii) control of eviction of tenants from such buildings. A public trust, as has been held in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case (1985) 1 SCC 290 is not likely to act unreasonably either in the matter of enhancement of rent or eviction of tenants being institutions of religion or charity. On that basis, this Court upheld the validity of the exemption granted under the Tamil Nadu Act in favour of such trust or endowment. In the present case, the contention has been specifically put forth that the appellants fall into that very category which came up for consideration before this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case (1985) 1 SCC 290. Therefore, no distinction can be made between that class of owners of the buildings in that case and in the present case. We do not understand as to what other material was required by the Court in a matter of this nature if the contention put forth before this Court is not that churches or mosques, dioceses, archdioceses, monasteries, convents, wakfs and madarsas are not religious and charitable in nature.

    7. Shri Nageswara Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that there is total non-application of mind by the Government in the matter of grant of exemption and the guidelines indicated in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case (1985) 1 SCC 290 have not been followed in the present case and, therefore, the exemption should not have been granted in the present case. In S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case (1985) 1 SCC 290 an affidavit had been filed as to the lower rents that were being paid and that the tenants were exploiting the situation and had brought the charitable institutions to a situation of helplessness and that position not having been challenged the Court made those orders. If we bear in mind the fact that the purpose of the Act is apparently to prevent unreasonable eviction and also to control rent and if the trustees of religious and public charities are given freedom to charge normal market rent with the further freedom to evict the tenants for not paying such market rent, the result would be unjust and cause hardship to them. But apprehension, by itself, is not sufficient. There is no material on record to show that in any of these cases the landlords would resort to such a course of action. On the other hand, if the building belonging to such public trust or religious institution is exempt from the Act, the purpose of the trust could be carried out much better, is quite clear. If that is the object with which the Government has granted exemption, we do not think there is any reason to quash the notifications impugned before the High Court.

    8. The High Court has unnecessarily gone at tangent on various constitutional and administrative law questions which are wholly unnecessary to be decided in the present case. The High Court ought to have riveted its attention only to the aspect whether there was due application of mind to the issue of notifications in question in terms of the provisions of the Act and, if that aspect was satisfied, no further questions arose for consideration in the present case and thus the observations made by the High Court, in our view, with respect, are irrelevant.

    9. An argument is sought to be raised on the basis of ownership of property that there should not have been a distinction as is being made in the present case. That was the very basis of distinction made in case of statutory bodies like the Housing Board, local authorities which was noticed in Jayakaran v. Kerala Health R & W Society case (1994) 1 KLT 24 or registered wakfs which was considered in Lakshmanan v. Mohamood (1992) 1 KLT 85 (FB). When such bodies or institutions fall into a distinct class by themselves and exemption granted to them would serve a public purpose, namely, to carry out the objects of the trust or the endowment or religious activity in a broad sense, we do not think that the fine distinction sought to be made by the High Court in this regard is justified.

    10. Reliance is placed before us on the decision in Rohtas Industries v. S.D Agarwal (1969) 1 SCC 325, (1969) 3 SCR 108 to contend that if there is no material at all upon which the authority could form the requisite opinion, the court may infer that the authority passed the order without applying its mind to the relevant facts. But, in the present case, we should look at the fact that this Court had in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case (1985) 1 SCC 290 explained the scope of the provisions similar to Section 25 of the Act and the parameters within which such power could be exercised. Thereafter, the Kerala High Court in Jayakaran v. Kerala Health R & W Society case (1994) 1 KLT 24 had upheld the notification as being in public interest even in the absence of any reasons being stated in the notification. Again, the same Court had upheld a similar notification in relation to property belonging to Devaswom Board in State of Kerala v. Vijayan 1978 KLT 342 and to a wakf in Lakshmanan v. Mohamood case (1992) 1 KLT 85 (FB). Therefore, we think that the decision of the High Court has to be set aside and the notifications issued impugned in the two writ petitions are held to be valid.

    11. The writ petitions deserve to be dismissed by allowing civil appeals. Ordered accordingly. No costs.

    CAs Nos. 6373 and 6382 of 2000

    12. In view of the orders made in Civil Appeal No. 5628 of 2000 and connected matters, these civil appeals shall stand dismissed.

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    Comments

    Christ The King Cathedral v. John Ancheril And Another
    (Jul 24, 2001)