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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (plaintiff) filed a suit seeking a decree of permanent injunction to restrain the appellant (defendant) from dispossessing him from agricultural land measuring 31 kanals 2 marlas in Village Harsaru, Tehsil and District Gurgaon. The plaintiff asserted possession under a registered 99-year lease deed dated 21-6-1971 executed by the defendant. The defendant countered that he had purchased the land by a registered sale deed dated 23-6-1971, that the lease was only a paper transaction intended to avoid pre-emption claims, and that he had remained in possession throughout.

The trial court framed issues on the plaintiff’s status and entitlement to injunction, found that the plaintiff was in possession as lessee, and decreed the suit, restraining the defendant from interference except in due course of law. The District Judge, in first appeal, re-assessed the evidence—including jamabandi and khasra girdawari entries—and affirmed that the plaintiff’s possession continued at least until Kharif 1987, well beyond the suit’s filing in March 1988. The decree was upheld.

The defendant’s second appeal to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was dismissed. The High Court, noting concurrent factual findings and the limited scope of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, declined to interfere. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff was in actual possession of the suit land on the date of the suit, thereby entitling him to a decree of permanent injunction.
  2. Whether, in light of concurrent findings of fact, the High Court erred in dismissing the second appeal for want of a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The suit for permanent injunction simpliciter was not maintainable because the plaintiff was not in actual physical possession of the land at filing.
  • The appellant had, after purchasing the land, constructed a house and installed a tubewell, demonstrating his own possession and negating the plaintiff’s claim.

The opinion does not detail any arguments advanced by the respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court characterized possession as a pure question of fact. It noted that both the trial court and the first appellate court had rejected the defendant’s contention that the lease was merely a paper transaction, relying on revenue records and oral testimony to find continuous possession with the plaintiff. Because these concurrent factual findings stood unshaken, the High Court correctly refused to interfere within the confines of Section 100 CPC, which permits second-appeal interference only on substantial questions of law. The Supreme Court saw no legal error in that assessment and concluded that the appeal lacked merit.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed; the decree of permanent injunction in favour of the plaintiff stands affirmed. No costs were awarded.

The decision maintains the status quo by upholding concurrent factual findings and reiterates the restricted scope of second appeals under Section 100 CPC. It sets no new legal precedent but confirms that factual determinations, once concurrently reached, are generally immune from further appellate challenge.

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    Mohan Lal v. Nihal Singh .

    D.P Mohapatra, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The defendant has filed this appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the second appeal filed by him and confirming the judgment and decree passed by the courts below decreeing the suit.

    3. The respondent herein filed the suit for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellant from dispossessing him from the suit land described in para 1 of the plaint and from interfering with possession of the plaintiff over the suit land bearing Khewat No. 269, Khata No. 373, Rect No. 77, Killas Nos. 2(7-11), 3(7-11), 8(8-0), 9(8-0) total measuring 31 kanals 2 marlas situated within the revenue estate of Village Harsaru, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, in any manner without notice to and knowledge of the plaintiff. In the alternative the plaintiff prayed that in case the defendant succeeds in dispossessing him from the suit land during pendency of the suit a decree for mandatory injunction for restoration of possession of the suit land may be granted in his favour.

    4. The case of the plaintiff, sans unnecessary details, was that he got the suit land under a lease for a period of 99 years from the defendant vide the registered lease deed dated 21-6-1971 and since then he is in possession of the property.

    5. The case pleaded by the defendant on the other hand was that he had purchased the suit land from one Mohan Lal under the registered sale deed dated 23-6-1971 and in order to save the land from any pre-emptive claim of relations of the vendor he had executed the lease deed in favour of the plaintiff who is his brother-in-law. According to the defendant the said lease was a paper transaction; it was not given effect to and he (defendant) remained in possession of the suit land all along.

    6. The trial court considering the pleadings of the parties framed several issues of which Issue 1 is whether the plaintiff is a pattadar of the agricultural land mentioned in para 1 of the plaint; and if so, to what effect. Issue 2 was whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as claimed for.

    7. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence led in the case the trial court held that the defendant purchased the suit land including the tubewell existing thereon by the sale deed dated 23-6-1971 and he is the owner of the same; whereas possession of the plaintiff is as a lessee and thus answered both the issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The trial court decreed the suit for injunction and restrained the defendant from interfering with possession of the plaintiff over the suit land except in due course of law.

    8. On appeal by the defendant the District Judge, Gurgaon on a fresh assessment and appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties held that possession of the plaintiff over the suit land is recorded in the entries of the jamabandi and khasra girdawari up to the period Khariff 1987 while the present suit was instituted on 22-3-1988. The lower appellate court further held that from the evidence adduced on record it was fully established that the plaintiff had not surrendered his possession nor given up his tenancy rights in favour of the defendant on the basis of the cancellation deed Ext. DW 2/1 as claimed by the defendant; rather from the evidence it is established that he continuously remained in possession of the suit property from the date of execution of the lease deed. The lower appellate court upheld the findings of the trial court on all issues and dismissed the appeal.

    9. In the second appeal filed by the defendant the High Court took note of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant that since the plaintiff was not in actual physical possession of the suit land on the date of the institution of the suit, the suit for injunction was not legally maintainable. Judging the contention in the light of the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below which were based on the revenue records and the oral evidence led in the suit, the High Court declined to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the courts below and dismissed the second appeal.

    10. Shri T.L Vishwanath Iyer, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant reiterated the contention that since the plaintiff was not in actual physical possession of the suit land the suit for a decree of permanent injunction simpliciter was not maintainable. Elucidating the point learned Senior Counsel submitted that the defendant after purchasing the suit land had constructed a house on a portion of it and had dug a tubewell thereon. In such circumstances, the learned counsel submitted, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land.

    11. The question of possession of the suit land is essentially one of fact. As noted earlier, the trial court on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record declined to accept the case of the defendant that the lease deed executed by him in favour of the plaintiff was a mere paper transaction and that he (defendant) had remained in possession of the property all along. The trial court recorded a positive finding based on the revenue records and the oral evidence led by the plaintiff that he had come into possession of the land under the lease deed and continued to possess the same all along. The lower appellate court, which is the final court of fact, confirmed the finding of the trial court regarding the plaintiff's possession over the suit land and upheld the judgment of the trial court decreeing the suit. Before the High Court the contention that was raised related to the question of possession. There was hardly any scope for the High Court to interfere with the finding of possession concurrently recorded by the courts below within the limited parameters of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. As the second appeal did not involve any substantial question of law the High Court rightly dismissed the same.

    12. In the result, this appeal being devoid of merit, is dismissed. No costs.

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    Comments

    Mohan Lal v. Nihal Singh .
    (Oct 18, 2001)