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Citation Codes
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2000 INSC 99
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Indian Penal Code
  • Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
  • Section 3(2)(v) of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2000 INSC 99
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Indian Penal Code
  • Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
  • Section 3(2)(v) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was tried before the Sessions Judge, Buldhana for fatally stabbing Saoji Gamaji Jadhav with a jambiya (knife) on the evening of 25 August 1992. Originally charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989, he was convicted by the trial court only for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC (five-year rigorous imprisonment) and for the SC/ST offence (one-year rigorous imprisonment and Rs 1,000 fine).

Both the State and the appellant appealed. The High Court allowed the State’s appeal, converted the conviction to murder under Section 302 IPC, imposed life imprisonment, and upheld the conviction under Section 3(2)(v). The appellant’s appeal was dismissed. The present judgment arises from the appellant’s further appeal challenging the High Court’s common order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence proved the requisite intention to kill so as to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC, or only warranted conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC.
  2. Whether the ingredients of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act were satisfied in the absence of proof that the offence was committed “on the ground that” the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The trial court correctly found that only one serious blow was intentionally inflicted; remaining injuries were sustained during a scuffle, negating the mens rea for murder.
  • No evidence showed that the assault was motivated by the victim’s caste; hence Section 3(2)(v) was inapplicable.

State’s Arguments

  • The High Court properly inferred an intention to kill from the multiple injuries and eyewitness testimony of PWs 4 and 5.
  • The conviction under Section 3(2)(v) should stand because the victim was admittedly a Scheduled Caste member.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Analyzing the testimony of eyewitness Deubai (PW 4) and Manoj (PW 5) together with the medical evidence of Dr. Umesh Nawade (PW 3), the Court observed:

  • Injury 1—a deep incised wound—was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death; Injuries 2 and 3 were superficial, and Injuries 4-10 were mere abrasions consistent with a fall or scuffle.
  • Given PW 4’s position behind the assailant, she could not have witnessed blows delivered from behind; thus, it was more plausible that one deliberate blow (Injury 1) was followed by a scuffle during which the remaining minor injuries occurred.
  • The trial court’s assessment harmonized with the medical testimony, whereas the High Court “brushed aside” that evidence and assumed an intention to inflict all injuries.
  • Section 3(2)(v) requires the prosecution to prove that the offence was committed because the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The record was silent on any caste-based motive; mere proof of the victim’s caste was insufficient.

Holding and Implications

Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s conviction under Section 302 IPC and restored the trial court’s conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC (five-year rigorous imprisonment). The conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act was quashed. As the appellant had already served more than five years, he was ordered to be released forthwith.

Implications: The decision confines its effect to the parties, underscoring the necessity of medical-legal consistency in inferring intent and clarifying that Section 3(2)(v) applies only when caste-based motivation is affirmatively proved.

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    Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State Of Maharashtra .

    S. Rajendra Babu, J.— The appellant was charged by the Sessions Judge, Buldhana of having caused grievous injuries to one Saoji Gamaji Jadhav (the deceased) with jambiya (knife) intentionally and knowingly that they would result in his death and thus committed an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. He was also charged under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The appellant stood convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. He was further convicted of the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs 1000, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. Both the State and appellant filed separate appeals to the High Court. The High Court, on re-examination of the evidence on record, allowed the appeal filed by the State and convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs 200, in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month while maintaining the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. Both the sentences are stated to run concurrently. The appeal filed by the appellant stood dismissed. Hence this appeal against the common order made by the High Court in the said two appeals.

    2. The prosecution case as unfolded by the witnesses is that between 7 and 8 p.m on 25-8-1992 Saoji Gamaji Jadhav who belongs to a Scheduled Caste was done away to death. It is stated that the appellant and the deceased are residents of Nandra Koli Village situate 7 kilometres from Buldhana. On the fateful day the deceased returned to the house at dusk and after some time left the house informing his wife that he would be going out for some time and would return soon thereafter. After about half an hour, the deceased left his home, the appellant came to the house of the deceased and enquired from Deubai (PW 4), wife of deceased Saoji Gamaji Jadhav. She found that he was having a jambiya. On coming to know from her that her husband had gone out of the house, the appellant started running through the lane. As the appellant was seen by Deubai with the jambiya, she got suspicious and followed him and near the hospital of Dr Kalwaghe, she saw the appellant stabbing the deceased. She stated that the appellant after giving two or three blows with the jambiya to the deceased who fell on the ground, ran away. When he left the place, she found that the deceased was having bleeding injuries and she tried to tie up a cloth around the wound but in the meanwhile he succumbed to the injuries. Thereafter she with the help of the Police Patil went to Police Station Buldhana and lodged a complaint when the PSI, Shri Oval visited the spot and after recording her complaint and registering a case conducted inquest. When the appellant was in the custody, he produced the jambiya. After completing the investigation a charge-sheet was laid for the offences stated earlier before the Jurisdictional Magistrate who committed the same to the Court of Session. On charges being framed, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and denied having caused any injuries to the deceased or committed murder. In the course of evidence, the defence suggested to the prosecution that the deceased was under the influence of alcohol and he himself had a dagger; that a scuffle took place when he attacked the appellant, as a result of which he died out of injuries caused by himself, that the appellant had not caused any injury and that he tried to save himself.

    3. There was no dispute that the deceased met with a homicidal death and this fact is amply established by the medical evidence on record. There were as many as 10 injuries on him as disclosed by Dr Umesh Nawade (PW 3), who conducted the post-mortem examination. He found that Injuries 4 to 10 were only skin-deep or abrasions whereas Injuries 1, 2 and 3 were of a serious nature. They are as follows:

    “1. Incised wound, left infra-clavicular region in middle of size 6 cm × 2½ cm × 4½ cm. Edges gaping, blood oozing and blood clots seen.
    2. Incised gaping wound, left infra-axillary region in 4th ICS, 1 cm × 1 cm skin-deep, blood clots seen.
    3. Incised gaping wound, left posterior axillary line, 4 cm × 1 cm × 2 cm deep. Reddish-black colour.
    4. Abrasion left elbow, size 3 cm × 2 cm.
    5. CLW over left ulnar head, 1 cm × 1 cm skin-deep.
    6. Abrasion just below Injury 5, 1 cm × 1 cm.
    7. Abrasion left posterior iliac crest, 1 cm × 1 cm.
    8. Abrasion left angle of lower lip, 1 cm × 1 cm.
    9. Abrasion right orbit out region, 1 cm × 1 cm.
    10. Abrasion right forehead, 1 cm × 1 cm.”

    4. He also stated that there is a fracture of the second rib on the left side in the middle, pleura — incised 5 cm × 1 cm; that Injury 1 was grievous injury and was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. He further stated that Injuries 2 and 3 could be caused by the same weapon and he was definite that Injury 1 could not be caused due to a fall on a curved and pointed stone. He, however, admitted that Injuries 2 and 3 were skin-deep, not affecting any bone and could be caused in the course of a scuffle and Injury 1 could not have been caused on the person holding a dagger and sitting on the chest of the victim who caught hold the hands with a dagger.

    5. The trial court accepted the evidence of Deubai (PW 4) and Manoj (PW 5). Manoj corroborated the evidence tendered by Deubai to the extent of having seen the appellant having a jambiya in his hand when Deubai (PW 4) was following him and that he found something very suspicious so he followed both of them. That is how he witnessed the scuffle and the injuries caused by the appellant to the deceased. Deubai admitted in the course of her cross-examination that a scuffle took place between the appellant and her husband and her husband fell on the ground; that for a considerable time, the scuffle went on; that while on some occasions the appellant was on the ground, on some other occasions her husband was on the ground; that the appellant and the deceased were overpowering each other. PW 5 also stated that he saw the deceased coming in front of the hospital of Dr Kalwaghe and the appellant was following him with a dagger and gave blows with the dagger on the person of the deceased. The trial court found from these circumstances that the appellant had no intention to kill the deceased and that after giving one blow, other injuries had been caused due to a scuffle. This was amply supported by the evidence of the medical officer that Injuries 2 and 4 to 10 could be caused in the scuffle, or injuries other than Injury 1 could be caused due to obstruction by the deceased. Therefore, it could not be inferred that the appellant intended to inflict more injuries than Injury 1. If this aspect is borne in mind, it would be clear that the appellant had given only one blow with the jambiya resulting in his death and, therefore, the trial court found that it would not be proper to convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The argument relating to private defence was straight away rejected for there were no injuries on the person of the appellant and the attack had been made by the appellant himself. The trial court discarded the evidence relating to discovery of the weapon and jacket for the reasons set forth in the order. The trial court also convicted the appellant for the offence arising under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act only on the basis that there was no controversy that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste and convicted him.

    6. On appeal by the State, the High Court is of the view that the present case is not a case of single injury and there was direct evidence of PWs 4 and 5 in respect of blows given by the appellant to the deceased and the mere opinion of the doctor that Injuries 2 to 10 could be caused during a scuffle would not rule out the possibility of causing incised injuries. On that basis, the High Court was of the opinion that there was an intention to kill the deceased and did not agree with the view of the trial court that though the appellant had some grudge against the deceased, he did not intend to kill him but inflicted only a single injury and the other injuries were caused as a result of a scuffle that followed.

    7. The findings of the High Court are under challenge before us. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the view taken by the trial court is justified and should be accepted and there was no basis for the High Court to rule out the same. Further, he pleaded that no case was established for an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The learned counsel for the State, however, supported the view taken by the High Court.

    8. It is in the evidence of Deubai (PW 4) that when she followed the appellant, she saw that the appellant went from behind her husband and stabbed him with the dagger at the left-side shoulder and thereafter gave blows of the dagger to the deceased. If she had been following the appellant, she could not have seen him giving a blow to the deceased from the back. Only when the scuffle started taking place, injuries could have been inflicted and she could have seen those injuries. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that only one serious injury was caused by the appellant to the deceased which is Injury 1 while all other injuries, as opined by the doctor, could have been caused during the scuffle. This appreciation of evidence by the trial court stands to reason. The High Court brushed aside the medical evidence to draw an inference that there was an intention on the part of the appellant to cause all the injuries. The evidence of the doctor means that Injuries 4 to 10, which are mere abrasions or skin-deep, could not have been caused by him but these abrasions could have been caused by falling on the ground and coming in contact with a rough surface. The probability that while Injury 1 could have been inflicted by the appellant, Injuries 2 and 3 could have been caused in the course of the scuffle cannot be ruled out. In this view of the matter, we think that the view taken by the trial court is preferable to the view taken by the High Court as there is a sufficient cogency in the reasoning adopted by the trial court. The High Court does not appear to have appreciated this aspect of the matter at all.

    9. Section 3(2)(v) of the Act provides that whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine. In the present case, there is no evidence at all to the effect that the appellant committed the offence alleged against him on the ground that the deceased is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. To attract the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Indian Penal Code is committed against him on the basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect. In these circumstances, the conviction under the aforesaid provision by the trial court as well as by the High Court ought to be set aside.

    10. In the result, we reverse the judgment of the High Court insofar as this aspect of the matter is concerned and acquit the appellant of the said charge while we set aside the conviction under Section 302 IPC and restore that of the trial court imposing a punishment of five years for an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. It is brought to our notice that the appellant has already been in custody for more than five years now. Therefore he should be set at liberty forthwith. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

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    Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Feb 24, 2000)