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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The Haryana Act 11 of 1973
  • Section 3 of the Punjab Act
  • Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  • East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act 3 of 1949)
  • the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short “the Punjab Act”)
  • Haryana Urban (Control of Rent) and Eviction Act, 1973
  • Section 13 of the Haryana (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act
  • Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
  • Rent Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The Haryana Act 11 of 1973
  • Section 3 of the Punjab Act
  • Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  • East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act 3 of 1949)
  • the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short “the Punjab Act”)
  • Haryana Urban (Control of Rent) and Eviction Act, 1973
  • Section 13 of the Haryana (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act
  • Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
  • Rent Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent-landlord instituted a civil suit seeking eviction of the appellant-tenant from Shop No. 652 W-3, Panipat, together with recovery of Rs 330 as compensation for use and occupation (14-1-1976 to 13-3-1976), Rs 134.06 as house tax, and Rs 15.94 as notice expenses. The premises had been newly constructed in December 1968 after the earlier tenant vacated. On 14-2-1975 the appellant took the shop on an 11-month lease at Rs 165 per month plus house tax. When the term expired the landlord served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, but the tenant did not vacate.

The tenant contested the suit, challenging the civil court’s jurisdiction on the ground that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (as applied to Haryana) governed the tenancy and noting that the landlord had already filed an ejectment petition under that Act regarding an upstairs room. The trial court framed seven issues, found for the landlord on all, and decreed eviction. The first appellate court affirmed the decree but set aside the specific finding that the building was constructed anew in December 1968, leaving that matter to be decided in execution. In second appeal, a learned Single Judge of the High Court held the suit maintainable, reading a 22-10-1971 State notification as exempting buildings constructed in 1968-70 from the Rent Act for five years “from the date of exemption.” The present appeal is from that High Court decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 22-10-1971 notification issued under Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act exempted the suit premises from the Rent Act on the date the eviction suit was filed, thereby permitting a civil suit under general law.
  2. Consequently, whether the civil courts possessed jurisdiction to decree eviction, or whether the landlord’s exclusive remedy lay under the Rent Restriction Act.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised the language of the 22-10-1971 notification, which “exempts every building constructed during the years 1968, 1969, 1970 from the provisions of the said Act for a period of five years from the date of its completion.” It noted the concurrent findings of all courts that the shop was completed in December 1968. Accordingly, the exemption expired in December 1973—five years after completion—not five years after the notification date, as the High Court had assumed.

Because the civil eviction suit was filed on 30-3-1976, the period of exemption had lapsed and the premises were squarely governed by the Rent Act. Under the statutory scheme, a landlord must seek eviction only on the grounds and before the forums provided by that Act. The reliance on general law and the jurisdiction of the civil court were therefore misconceived. The High Court’s contrary view constituted a “complete error” in ignoring the true effect of the notification and the mandatory nature of the Rent Act once the exemption period ended.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; decrees of the courts below set aside; civil suit held not maintainable.

As the Rent Act applied on the suit date, the landlord’s remedy lies exclusively under that Act. The decision nullifies the eviction decree, restores the tenant to possession, and signals that post-exemption premises must be litigated within the Rent Act framework. No costs were awarded because the respondent was unrepresented, and the judgment sets no new precedent beyond applying the plain language of the statutory notification.

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    Anand Prakash Malik v. Bhagwandas .

    1. The respondent filed a civil suit under the general law for eviction of the appellant from Shop No. 652.W-3 situate at Panipat and for recovery of Rs 330 as compensation for use and occupation from 14-1-1976 to 13-3-1976, besides a sum of Rs 134.06 p. as house tax and Rs 15.94 p. as notice expenses.

    2. According to the case set up by the landlord in the plaint after the demised premises were vacated by an earlier tenant, Bhagwan Singh, he reconstructed the shop after getting sanction from the Municipal Committee, Panipat. The construction was completed in December 1968. The appellant-tenant took the premises on rent for a period of 11 months with effect from 14-2-1975 @ Rs 165 per month plus house tax after executing a rent note dated 14-2-1975.

    3. After the expiry of the period of 11 months, the tenancy stood determined by efflux of time and the tenant who did not vacate was holding over the property in suit as a tenant-in-sufferance. It was pleaded that a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was issued to the tenant but despite that he did not vacate the premises. A specific plea was raised by the landlord to the effect that provisions of the Haryana Act 11 of 1973 were not attracted and suit under the general law was competent.

    4. The tenant resisted the suit and in the written statement, apart from raising other objections regarding the maintainability of the suit in the present form and the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit, it was asserted that the landlord had filed the ejectment petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 in respect of the room upstairs and, therefore, the suit under the general law could not proceed. Service of any legal and valid notice was also denied.

    5. From the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:

    “(1) Whether the property in suit was constructed anew after 31-3-1962 as alleged and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to try this suit? OPP

    (2) Whether the tenancy of the defendant was determined by a valid notice as alleged and if so, to what effect? OPP

    (3) Whether the defendant has been holding over the property after the expiry of the agreed period of lease as alleged? OPP

    (4) Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD

    (5) Whether the plaintiff has filed petition under Section 13 of the Haryana (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act representing Property No. 651 as alleged and if so, to what effect? OPD

    (6) Whether the shop and a room upstairs constructed one tenancy for a commercial purpose as alleged and if so to what effect? OPD

    (7) Relief.”

    6. The trial court after recording the evidence, held under Issue 1 that the demised premises had been constructed anew in December 1968. Issues 2 to 7 were decided in favour of the landlord and the suit was decreed. On appeal, the findings recorded by the trial court under Issues 2 to 7 were not assailed. Finding on Issue 1, however, was challenged. The first appellate court set aside the finding on Issue 1 and opined:

    “(12) The setting aside of finding on Issue 1 is necessary, because if the finding remains on record it is likely to affect adversely one or the other party. The finding would have been allowed to remain intact if it would have been shown that a decision on this issue was necessary for deciding the suit. I have already shown above that decision of this issue was not necessary and that this matter was premature.

    (13) In the light of the above discussion I set aside the finding of the learned lower court on Issue 1 and direct that this matter whether the property in dispute was constructed on the date as alleged in the plaint or whether the property is covered by the Rent Act or not, whether the decree of the civil court is executable or not, shall be decided by the executing court if and when such a dispute is raised before the executing court.”

    7. The first appellate court, however, confirmed the decree passed by the trial court.

    8. A second appeal was filed in the High Court by the appellant. The learned Single Judge of the High Court rightly found that the approach of the first appellate court on Issue 1 was wholly erroneous. The learned Single Judge however, found that despite the application of the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short “the Punjab Act”) to the territories forming State of Haryana before the enactment of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent) and Eviction Act, 1973, by virtue of a notification dated 22-10-1971 published in the Haryana Government Gazette of 2-11-1971, the buildings constructed during the years 1968, 1969 and 1970 were exempted from the provisions of the Punjab Act for a period of five years from the date of “exemption” and as such the civil suit was maintainable.

    9. This appeal by special leave calls in question the order of the High Court.

    10. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. Nobody has appeared for the respondent.

    11. The finding of the learned Single Judge noticed above is based on a misreading of the notification.

    12. The notification dated 22-10-1971 issued in exercise of the powers under Section 3 of the Punjab Act by the Government of Haryana reads thus:

    “Notification No. 5601. S.T.A 71/30701.—In exercise of power conferred by Section 3 of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act 3 of 1949) the Governor of Haryana hereby exempts every building constructed during the years 1968, 1969, 1970 from the provisions of the said Act for a period of 5 years from the date of its completion.”

    13. A plain reading of the notification shows that exemption from the provisions of the Rent Act has been granted to buildings constructed during 1968, 1969 and 1970 for a period of five years from the date of its “completion”. It is not disputed and as a matter of fact it has been held by all the three courts below that the premises in dispute were constructed anew in December 1968. Therefore, the period of exemption of five years from the provisions of the Rent Act pursuant to the notification dated 22-10-1971 has to be reckoned from the date of completion of the construction and not from the date of the notification. The building was constructed in December 1968. The period of exemption, as such, expired in December 1973. Thus exemption from the provisions of the Rent Act was not available on 30-3-1976, when the civil suit for eviction was filed. Since, the provisions of the Rent Act were applicable to the building in question on the date when the suit for eviction was filed, the eviction of the tenant could only be sought under the provisions of the Rent Act and on the grounds as contained therein. Recourse to a civil suit under the general laws for seeking eviction of the tenant was not permissible. The learned Single Judge fell in complete error in ignoring this vital aspect of the case.

    14. Consequently, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the courts below and hold that the suit filed by the landlord under the general laws for eviction of the tenant was not competent and the remedy for eviction of the appellant lay under the Rent Restriction Act. Since, the respondent is not present, we make no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Anand Prakash Malik v. Bhagwandas .
    (Apr 28, 1998)