Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai And Others, Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 8422 of 1997, decided on November 28, 1997

Disposition

remanded

Attorney(S)

G.B Sathe, D.N Hungod, Advocates, for the Appellant;
D.N Mishra, Advocate, for JBD & Co., Advocate, for the Respondents.

Judges

Justice S.B. Majmudar

Acts

clause 15 of the Letters Patent, Section 6(3) of the Act
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
Section 108 of the Government of India Act
Section 107 of the Government of India Act

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A suit numbered 411 of 1993 was filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. On 15 November 1994, a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, exercising original jurisdiction, decreed the suit. An intra-court appeal was then preferred to a Division Bench of the same High Court. Relying on Section 6(3) of the Act—which bars any appeal or revision—the Division Bench held that the appeal was not maintainable and dismissed it (Appeal No. 960 of 1994). The aggrieved party approached the Supreme Court by special leave, challenging the Division Bench’s view on maintainability.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an intra-court appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court is maintainable against a decree passed by a Single Judge exercising original jurisdiction under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in light of the statutory bar contained in Section 6(3).
Whether Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act expressly or impliedly overrides the appellate jurisdiction conferred by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent governing the Bombay High Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides an independent charter for an appeal from a Single Judge’s judgment rendered in original jurisdiction; this right is not curtailed unless a statute expressly excludes it.
Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act bars only statutory appeals or revisions; it does not expressly bar a Letters Patent appeal.

Respondents' Arguments

Section 6(3) of the Act contains an absolute prohibition against any appeal or revision from an order under Section 6, thereby rendering the appeal before the Division Bench incompetent.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that a statutory bar on appeals cannot abrogate the constitutional or charter-based powers of a High Court unless the statute does so in clear terms. It observed that:

Clause 15 of the Letters Patent expressly authorises an appeal from a Single Judge’s judgment rendered in original jurisdiction.
Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act, while barring “any appeal or revision,” does not specifically refer to or exclude Letters Patent appeals.
In the absence of express exclusion, the paramount charter (Letters Patent) continues to operate, and the intra-court appeal remains maintainable.

Accordingly, the Division Bench erred in dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench’s judgment, restored Appeal No. 960 of 1994 to the file of the Bombay High Court, and directed that it be heard on merits expeditiously. The present appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that, absent an express statutory exclusion, the appellate jurisdiction provided by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent survives even where a statute (here, Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act) purports to bar appeals generally. While the judgment does not lay down a new precedent beyond this clarification, it ensures that intra-court appeals in similar circumstances remain available unless explicitly ousted by legislation.

Show full summary ...

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai And Others

Order

1. Leave granted. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The short question is whether an appeal would lie before a Division Bench of the High Court against an order of the learned Single Judge rendered by him in proceedings under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Learned Single Judge passed an order dated 15-11-1994 in Suit No. 411 of 1993 decreeing the suit in terms thereof. When an appeal was carried to the Division Bench of the High Court against the said order, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the appeal was not maintainable in view of sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act. The said provision certainly bars any appeal or revision against any order passed by the court under Section 6 of the Act. To that extent the decision of the Division Bench cannot be found fault with. However, one contention canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant requires closer scrutiny. He submitted that even if an appeal would not lie under sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act by itself against any order passed by the court under Section 6 of the Act, this was an order passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court exercising original jurisdiction. Therefore, under clause 15 of the Letters Patent which is a charter under which the High Court of Bombay functioned, the said provision for appeal would not have been whittled down by the statutory provisions of Section 6(3) of the Act. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is extracted hereunder:

“15. Appeal from the courts of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction.—And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bombay, Fort William in Bengal from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of a revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, on or after the first day of February, 1929 in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our heirs or successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.”

3. Now it is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Even the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned expressly excludes appeals under letters patent. No such bar is discernible from Section 6(3) of the Act. It could not be seriously contended by learned counsel for the respondents that if clause 15 of the Letters Patent is invoked then the order would be appealable. Consequently, in our view, on the clear language of clause 15 of the Letters Patent which is applicable to Bombay High Court, the said appeal was maintainable as the order under appeal was passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court exercising original jurisdiction of the court. Only on that short ground the appeal is required to be allowed.

4. The judgment and order of the High Court in Appeal No. 960 of 1994 are set aside and the appeal is restored to the file of the High Court for being proceeded further in accordance with law. As the appeal of 1994 is being restored to the file of the High Court, the High Court is requested to decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible.

5. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs. We make it clear that we express no opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties.

Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai And Others

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondents' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Vinita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai And Others

Comments