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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 144
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
  • Article 311(2) of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 144
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
  • Article 311(2) of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a constable in the police force, along with others, was charged with offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and also under Sections 323 and 324 IPC. The Sessions Court convicted the petitioner and others for these offences.

On appeal, the High Court set aside the petitioner’s conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 IPC, but maintained his conviction under Section 323 IPC and released him on probation. Following this, the petitioner sought reinstatement into service.

The competent authorities, who had already dismissed the petitioner from service, declined to reinstate him by relying on Rule 16.2(2) of the Punjab Police Rules. The petitioner challenged this refusal. A Division Bench of the High Court, in LPA No. 657 of 1995 by order dated 8-8-1995, dismissed his challenge. The present matter is a special leave petition (SLP) against that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner’s acquittal of the charges under Sections 302 read with 34 IPC and 324 IPC, coupled with his release on probation for the conviction under Section 323 IPC, removed any impediment to his reinstatement in service, despite Rule 16.2(2) of the Punjab Police Rules.
  2. Whether, in light of the effect of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and the petitioner’s conviction under Section 323 IPC, the authorities were justified in refusing reinstatement and in imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, or whether a lesser penalty was appropriate.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner’s counsel contended that since the petitioner had been acquitted of the offences under Sections 302 and 324 IPC and had been released on probation for the offence under Section 323 IPC, there was no impediment to his reinstatement in service.
  • On this basis, it was argued that the decision of the authorities and the High Court in refusing reinstatement was not valid in law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shankar Dass v. Union of India, (1985) 2 SCC 358

Held that on acquittal and release on probation under Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, the authorities are entitled to consider, on the facts of each case, whether the employee could be reinstated in service.

Also held that removal from service was invalid where opportunity was not given before taking the decision.

The Court distinguished this precedent. It recognized that the decision allows authorities to consider reinstatement in appropriate cases but emphasized that conviction and release on probation are distinct: conviction remains, while probation only suspends the sentence.

The Court noted that in Shankar Dass, the removal was set aside because no opportunity was given, a situation different from the present case; therefore, the ratio did not assist the petitioner in securing reinstatement.

Union of India v. Bakshi Ram, (1990) 2 SCC 426; (1990) 12 ATC 914

Considered the effect of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 on the power to remove a public servant and on conviction as a disqualification, even where the person is released on probation.

Held that Section 12, while giving certain rights to the offender, does not wipe out the offence, and that conviction continues to operate as a disqualification which the authorities may consider in imposing the punishment of removal from service.

The Court applied this ratio to the present case, holding that the petitioner’s conviction under Section 323 IPC, notwithstanding his release on probation, remained a disqualification.

Relying on this precedent, the Court concluded that the authorities were entitled to treat the conviction as misconduct justifying termination from service, but, following the approach in Bakshi Ram, converted the penalty from dismissal to removal from service.

Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera, (1995) 3 SCC 377; (1995) 29 ATC 574

Addressed whether a disciplinary authority must await the final outcome of a criminal case before acting.

Held that once an accused is convicted, such conviction can form the basis for action under the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, subject to the ultimate result of the prosecution.

If the case ultimately ends in favour of the accused and he is honourably acquitted, the authorities are required to reconsider the order of removal.

The Court referred to this decision to explain that conviction itself is sufficient ground for disciplinary action, while any subsequent honourable acquittal would require reconsideration.

It held that this ratio did not assist the petitioner because he remained convicted under Section 323 IPC, and that conviction constituted a disqualification despite his release on probation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that his acquittal on the more serious charges and release on probation for the lesser offence removed any barrier to reinstatement.

It emphasized the distinction between conviction and release on probation. Conviction is one aspect, and release on probation is another: probation merely enables the offender to avoid undergoing the sentence upon maintaining good conduct during the probation period. If the offender commits another offence during probation, the probation can be terminated and the sentence enforced. Thus, release on probation does not erase the conviction.

The Court characterized the petitioner’s conviction as arising from his participation in causing death and injury to a person. It noted that, as a constable and a disciplined member of the police force, he was expected to prevent the commission of crime, not to participate in it. His conduct leading to conviction therefore amounted to misconduct justifying disciplinary consequences.

Considering Shankar Dass v. Union of India, the Court acknowledged that authorities may, in individual cases, decide whether an employee who has been acquitted and released on probation should be reinstated. However, it pointed out that in Shankar Dass, removal from service was invalidated because no opportunity had been given before the decision, which was not the basis of the present challenge. Hence, that decision did not support the petitioner’s claim to reinstatement.

Relying on Union of India v. Bakshi Ram, the Court affirmed that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act does not wipe out the offence or the fact of conviction; the conviction continues as a disqualification that may be taken into account by the authorities in imposing punishment, including removal from service. The Court applied this principle directly to the petitioner’s conviction under Section 323 IPC.

By referring to S. Nagoor Meera, the Court further underscored that a conviction by a criminal court can itself form the basis for action under the proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, with any subsequent honourable acquittal merely triggering a duty to reconsider the removal. Since the petitioner remained convicted under Section 323 IPC, this reasoning did not aid him.

On this combined reasoning, the Court held that the authorities were justified in rejecting the petitioner’s claim for reinstatement. Nonetheless, following the approach in Bakshi Ram, the Court moderated the penalty by converting the punishment from dismissal to removal from service.

Holding and Implications

The special leave petition is DISMISSED, and the penalty is converted from dismissal to removal from service.

The Court upheld the refusal to reinstate the petitioner, confirming that his conviction under Section 323 IPC, despite his release on probation, constituted a valid disqualification in service law and justified his separation from the police force. The only modification granted to the petitioner is that the disciplinary penalty stands altered from dismissal to removal from service. The opinion confines itself to the resolution of the petitioner’s service status, and no broader implications are discussed in the provided text.

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    Karam Singh v. State Of Punjab And Another

    Order

    1. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The admitted facts are that the petitioner and others were charged for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC and also under Sections 323 and 324. The Sessions Court convicted the petitioner and others but on appeal, the High Court set aside the conviction of the petitioner under Section 302 read with Section 34 and also under Section 324 but maintained the conviction under Section 323 and released him on probation. Thereafter, the petitioner sought for reinstatement. The authorities, since have already dismissed the petitioner declined to reinstate him into the service, in view of the provisions of Rule 16.2(2) of the Punjab Police Rules. He challenged its correctness thereof. The Division Bench of the High Court in LPA No. 657 of 1995 by order dated 8-8-1995 dismissed the same. Thus this special leave petition.

    2. It is contended by Shri Kapoor, learned counsel for the petitioner, that since the petitioner has been acquitted of the charge for the offence under Sections 302 and 324 IPC and he having been released on probation for offence under Section 323, it cannot be said that there is any impediment in his way for reinstatement and that, therefore, the view of the authorities and the High Court is not valid in law. We find no force in the contention. It is true that this Court in Shankar Dass v. Union of India (1985) 2 SCC 358 had held that on acquittal and release on probation under Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, the authorities are entitled to consider on the facts in each case whether the appellant therein could be reinstated into the service. It is to be remembered that conviction is one part of it and release on probation is another. Later part only enables the delinquent not to undergo the sentence on showing his good conduct during the period for which probation was granted. Suppose during the period of probation, he commits another offence, then his probation gets terminated and he would be liable to undergo the sentence. When a civil servant is convicted for an offence, it is his misconduct that led to the dismissal. The conviction in this case is on the ground of his participation in causing the death of and causing injury to one person. Though he was acquitted of the offence of murder, he being a constable at the relevant time and being a disciplined member of the force, he was not expected to participate in the commission of crime; instead, he was expected to prevent the commission. In Shankar Dass case (1985) 2 SCC 358 it was held that since opportunity was not given before taking the decision, the removal from service was held not valid in law.

    3. In Union of India v. Bakshi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 426, (1990) 12 ATC 914 this Court considered the effect of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act and of the power to remove a public servant and also the conviction as a disqualification, though he was released on probation. After approving the consistent reasoning given by several High Courts as noted in paragraph 11 of the judgment, this Court held that though Section 12 gives a right to the delinquent, it does not wipe out the offence and it would be a disqualification attached to the conviction. The authorities would be entitled to take that factor into consideration in imposing punishment of removal from service. In that case, the penalty of dismissal from service was altered into one of removal from service.

    4. In Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) v. S. Nagoor Meera (1995) 3 SCC 377, (1995) 29 ATC 574 another Bench of this Court has considered the controversy whether, when the accused is convicted by the criminal court, the disciplinary authority would still await the outcome of the case. This Court opined that once the accused was convicted, it forms basis for taking the action under proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, which will, however, be subject to the ultimate result of the prosecution case. In the event the case ends in favour of the accused and honourably gets acquitted, then the authorities are required to reconsider the order of removal. That ratio also does not help the petitioner since he has already been convicted under Section 323 and it is a disqualification though he was released on probation. Under these circumstances, the ratio in Bakshi Ram case (1990) 2 SCC 426, (1990) 12 ATC 914 would be applicable to the facts in this case. In that view, the petitioner being a member of the disciplined police force, the authorities were justified in rejecting his reinstatement. However, we convert the penalty of dismissal into one of removal from service.

    5. The SLP is accordingly dismissed.

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    Comments

    Karam Singh v. State Of Punjab And Another
    (Jan 29, 1996)