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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Mohan Singh, the appellant, was promoted to the post of Assistant on 20-10-1973 and confirmed with effect from 13-10-1980. When a vacancy for Superintendent Grade I arose on 27-11-1989—following the promotion of Gurdev Singh as Assistant Registrar—the Advocate General, Punjab, promoted Mohan Singh to that post. Respondents Tarlok Singh and Deena Nath Singla challenged this promotion before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP No. 80 of 1990. A Single Judge allowed the writ petition and a Division Bench dismissed Mohan Singh’s intra-court appeal (LPA No. 796 of 1994) on 26-11-1994. Mohan Singh thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, resulting in the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the vacancy arising on 27-11-1989 was the sixth vacancy in the roster and therefore reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate, entitling the appellant to promotion.
  2. Whether a “double jump” promotion—from Assistant directly to Superintendent Grade I—was permissible when the intermediary post of Superintendent Grade II existed.
  3. Whether Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Secretariat (State Service Class III) Rules, 1963, or analogous draft rules in the Advocate General’s office, authorised the impugned promotion.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The vacancy created by Gurdev Singh’s promotion was the fifth, not the sixth, in the roster and therefore not reserved for Scheduled Castes; the appellant could not claim it on that basis.
  • A promotion directly from Assistant to Superintendent Grade I constituted an impermissible “double jump” because the post of Superintendent Grade II was available.

Appellant’s and Advocate General’s Arguments

  • The roster showed that the contested vacancy was the sixth and consequently reserved for Scheduled Castes, so the appellant was rightly promoted.
  • Rule 8 of the 1963 Rules, routinely applied in the Secretariat and accepted in practice within the Advocate General’s office, allows promotion of Assistants with ten years of experience directly to Superintendent Grade I; hence no bar existed to the so-called double jump.
  • Draft rules identical to Rule 8 had already been forwarded for government approval, evidencing consistent administrative practice.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first addressed whether the vacancy was reserved. Drawing upon a chart in the record that traced vacancies since 1970, the Court determined that the first vacancy occurred on 3-6-1970 and a second post was created on 17-7-1975 for Shiv Kumar Sharma. Counting each subsequent vacancy, the Court concluded that the contested vacancy was the sixth, which the roster earmarked for Scheduled Caste candidates. Consequently, the appellant’s claim to the post on reservation grounds was upheld.

Regarding the alleged impermissible “double jump,” the Court analysed Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Secretariat (State Service Class III) Rules, 1963. Rule 8 allows promotion to Superintendent (Section Officer) from among Assistants with ten years’ experience or Deputy Superintendents with one year’s experience. Although the government had admitted in a companion appeal that Rule 8 was technically inapplicable to the Advocate General’s establishment, the Court emphasised long-standing administrative practice applying Rule 8 or similar draft rules in allied governmental wings. The Court found no rational basis to deny the same promotional pathway to employees in the Advocate General’s office, a unit of government service, particularly when comparable promotions had historically been made before the creation of Superintendent Grade II.

The Court therefore held that both the reservation position and the accepted practice under Rule 8 justified the appellant’s promotion.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; HIGH COURT JUDGMENTS SET ASIDE; WRIT PETITION DISMISSED.

Immediate Effect: Mohan Singh’s promotion to Superintendent Grade I stands restored, and the High Court’s contrary decisions are nullified. Broader Implication: While the judgment does not create new precedent, it reinforces that long-standing administrative practice and analogous rules may justify direct promotions in allied services when no distinct functional difference is shown.

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    Mohan Singh And Others v. State Of Punjab And Others

    Order

    1. Leave granted.

    2. Appellant, Mohan Singh, was promoted as an Assistant on 20-10-1973 and was confirmed with effect from 13-10-1980. When vacancy in the post of Superintendent Grade I arose on 27-11-1989 on promotion of one Gurdev Singh as Assistant Registrar, the Advocate General, Punjab promoted him as Superintendent Grade I. Calling that promotion in question, Respondents Tarlok Singh and Deena Nath Singla filed CWP No. 80 of 1990 in the High Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge and LPA No. 796 of 1994 filed by the appellant — Mohan Singh was dismissed by a Division Bench by order dated 26-11-1994. Thus, these appeals by special leave.

    3. The only question is whether the appellant is entitled for promotion from the post of Assistant to the post of Superintendent Grade I. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the post which fell vacant on the promotion of Gurdev Singh was not reserved, it being the fifth post and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to that post. We find no force in the contention. The chart at p. 16 of the Paper-Book (prepared on the basis of averments made in the counter-affidavit of the Advocate General filed in the High Court) clearly indicates that the first vacancy occurred on 3-6-1970. On second occasion, namely, 17-7-1975, a second post of Superintendent Grade I was created and Shiv Kumar Sharma, who was working as PA to the Advocate General, was appointed to that post. It is contended that the same cannot be considered as second vacancy. We do not agree, as when the second post was created on 17-7-1975, though the incumbent was promoted along with creation of the post, it is clear that a vacancy had arisen. Thus considered, the Advocate General was right in his stand taken in the High Court that the vacancy at hand was the 6th vacancy reserved for member of the Schedule Castes as per the roster.

    4. The contention raised in this matter, which was accepted by the High Court, is whether double jump can be given from the post of Assistant to the post of Superintendent Grade I when intermediary post of Superintendent Grade II is available. Though prima facie the contention appears to be attractive as indicated in the order dated 16-1-1995 while issuing notice, on going through the Rules we find that the same is really not acceptable. It is not in dispute that Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Secretariat (State Service Class III) Rules, 1963 provides thus:

    “The posts in the service shall be filled in the following manner:
    (b) In case of Superintendent (or Section Officer) — (i) by promotion from amongst Assistants. Section Officers of the Punjab Civil Secretariat having an experience of working on that post for a minimum period of one year or from amongst such Deputy Superintendents, Assistants-in-charge and Assistants as are members of the Punjab Civil Secretariat (State Service Class III) and have an experience of working as Deputy Superintendent for a minimum period of one year or an experience of working as an Assistant for a period of ten years, as the case may be.”

    5. It would clearly indicate that a Section Officer of the Punjab Secretariat having an experience of working on that post for a minimum period of one year, or Deputy Superintendent, Assistants-in-charge and Assistants as members of the Punjab Civil Secretariat (State Service Class III) and having experience of working as Deputy Superintendent for a minimum period of one year or an experience of working as an Assistant for a period of ten years, as the case may be, are eligible for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade I. In other words, a Deputy Superintendent with a minimum experience of one year in that post or an experience of 10 years as an Assistant is eligible for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade I. It is true, as rightly contended for the contesting respondents, that Rule 8 is inapplicable, as admitted by the Government in their appeal which is a companion to this appeal. But Rule 8 permitted the promotion in question. The Advocate General also drafted rules similar to Rule 8 and sent to the Government and are pending approval.

    6. When a practice has grown to accept aforesaid rules and when Rule 8 is being applied to the Secretariat service, we find that there would be no justification to deny the same benefit to the persons in allied services though the rules are not per se applied, unless discernible differentia touching the nature of the service is shown to which effect there is nothing before us. The Government in their appeal has supported the contention of the Advocate General in promoting the appellant. It is seen that earlier this principle was followed in the office of the Advocate General; no doubt prior to the creation of the post of Superintendent Grade II. When the practice has grown and the Government itself has been following the same rules and draft rules also contain such a provision, we think that the same may also be followed in the office of the Advocate General which is part of the wing of the Government.

    7. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in allowing the writ petition filed by Respondents 3 and 4. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The orders of the Division Bench and the Single Judge are set aside. The writ petition filed by these respondents stands dismissed. No costs.

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    Mohan Singh And Others v. State Of Punjab And Others
    (Apr 10, 1995)