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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1995 INSC 788
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1995 INSC 788
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners (original plaintiffs) and the eighth respondent filed a civil suit seeking a perpetual injunction to restrain Respondents 1 to 7 from dispossessing them from the disputed land. The defendants asserted that the petitioners had trespassed upon approximately 3 kanals of their land and were in unlawful possession. Accordingly, they filed a counter-claim for possession within their written statement.

The trial court dismissed the petitioners’ suit and decreed possession in favour of the defendants for two kanals, two marlas and one biswa of land identified by specific survey numbers. The first appellate court affirmed the decree, and the High Court upheld the same in RSA No. 1190 of 1994 on 18 May 1995. The petitioners then filed the present Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, by virtue of Order 8 Rule 6A(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a defendant can maintain a counter-claim for possession in a suit that was originally filed only for a perpetual injunction.
  2. Whether the defendants’ counter-claim was filed within the time permitted under Order 8 Rule 6A(1) CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners’ Arguments

  • In a suit confined to relief of perpetual injunction, the defendants are not entitled to set up a counter-claim for possession.
  • Even if such a counter-claim is theoretically permissible, the defendants did not file it within the time limit prescribed by Order 8 Rule 6A CPC.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the text and legislative history of Order 8 Rule 6A(1) CPC, which was introduced by the 1976 amendment following the Law Commission’s recommendations to reduce multiplicity of proceedings. It noted that prior to 1976, counter-claims were generally limited to money claims, but the amendment broadened the scope to “any right or claim” accruing to the defendant, provided two key constraints are met:

  • The counter-claim must be pleaded in the written statement or before the time for delivering the written statement expires.
  • The counter-claim must not exceed the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court.

Applying these principles, the Court held that a counter-claim for possession is permissible in a suit for injunction because:

  • The language of Rule 6A(1) is sufficiently broad to encompass such relief.
  • Allowing the counter-claim promotes judicial economy by avoiding separate litigation.
  • The counter-claim, on facts, was filed within approximately two months of the suit, well inside the permissible period for delivering the written statement.

Consequently, the Court found no procedural illegality in the lower courts’ acceptance of the counter-claim and the resulting decree for possession.

Holding and Implications

Special Leave Petition DISMISSED.

The decree for possession in favour of Respondents 1 to 7, as affirmed by the trial court, first appellate court, and High Court, remains intact. The judgment clarifies that post-1976, defendants may assert counter-claims for possession even in suits framed solely for injunction, provided the statutory conditions under Order 8 Rule 6A CPC are satisfied. No new precedent was set beyond this statutory interpretation, but the decision underscores the expanded scope of counter-claims intended by the 1976 amendment.

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    Gurbachan Singh v. Bhag Singh And Others

    Order

    1. The petitioner and the eighth respondent had filed a suit for perpetual injunction restraining Respondents 1 to 7 from dispossessing them from the suit land or part thereof. Respondents/defendants filed the written statement contending that the petitioner and the eighth respondent had trespassed into their land of an extent of 3 kanals and they are in unlawful possession. Thereby, they raised counter-claim, in the written statement, for possession. The trial court, while dismissing the suit of the petitioners, granted decree for possession of two kanals, two marlas and one biswa comprising survey numbers mentioned therein. On appeal, it was confirmed and the High Court confirmed it in RSA No. 1190 of 1994 on 18-5-1995. Thus this special leave petition.

    2. The contention raised in the courts below was that in a suit for perpetual injunction, the respondents could not lay any counter-claim for possession. Order 8, Rule 6(A)(1) of the CPC, 1908 as amended in 1976 reads thus:

    “A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Rule 6, set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not:
    Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court.”

    3. It is true that Rule 6-A(a) was introduced by the Amendment Act of 1976. Preceding the amendment, it was settled law that except in a money claim, counter-claim or set-off cannot be set up in other suits. The Law Commission of India had recommended, to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings, right to the defendants to raise the plea of set-off in addition to a counter-claim in Rule 6 in the same suit irrespective of the fact whether the cause of action for counter-claim or set-off had accrued to the defendant either before or after the filing of the suit. The limitation was that the counter-claim or set-off must be pleaded by way of defence in the written statement before the defendant filed his written statement or before the time-limit for delivering the written statement has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not. Further limitation was that the counter-claim should not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, by laying the counter-claim, pecuniary jurisdiction of the court cannot be divested and the power to try the suit already entertained cannot be taken away by accepting the counter-claim beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. Thus considered, we hold that in a suit for injunction, the counter-claim for possession also could be entertained, by operation of Order 8, Rule 6(A)(1) of the CPC.

    4. It is sought to be contended that the counter-claim was not filed within the time given for laying the same. It would appear from the list of the dates given by the petitioner himself that the counter-claim was filed within two months from the date of the suit itself.

    5. Under these circumstances, the special leave petition is dismissed.

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    Comments

    Gurbachan Singh v. Bhag Singh And Others
    (Nov 24, 1995)