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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 12(3)(b) of the Act
  • Section 12(3)(a) of the Landlord-Tenant Act, Section 12(3)(b) of the Landlord-Tenant Act, Article 227 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
  • Section 12(3)(a) of the Act
  • Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  • Section 12(2) of the Act
  • Section 12 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 12(3)(b) of the Act
  • Section 12(3)(a) of the Landlord-Tenant Act, Section 12(3)(b) of the Landlord-Tenant Act, Article 227 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
  • Section 12(3)(a) of the Act
  • Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
  • Section 12(2) of the Act
  • Section 12 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The predecessor of the respondents (Shantabai, the landlady) let the suit premises to the appellants for residential purposes at an initial rent of Rs 70 per month, later increased to Rs 80. Alleging rent arrears from 1-4-1971 and asserting a bona fide personal requirement, she served a notice dated 28-7-1972 under Section 12(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (“the Act”).

She then filed an eviction suit under the Act. The trial court decreed eviction, but the appellate court reversed that decision and dismissed the suit, finding neither arrears constituting “neglect” nor bona fide need proven. Upon a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court re-evaluated the evidence, set aside the appellate court’s judgment, and restored the trial court’s decree. The present appeal by the tenants reaches the Supreme Court by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenants “neglected to make payment” of rent arrears within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act, thereby justifying compulsory eviction.
  2. Whether, in the alternative, Section 12(3)(b) applied given the tenants’ payments and conduct.
  3. Whether the High Court exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution by re-appreciating facts and reversing the appellate authority’s findings.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Interpretation of “neglect” under Section 12(3)(a): The Court emphasised that eviction under Section 12(3)(a) hinges on the tenant’s “neglect to make payment,” not on the landlord’s actual receipt of money. The tenants received the statutory notice on 1-8-1972 and remitted a money order for Rs 400 on 1-9-1972—squarely within the one-month window mandated by the statute. A second money order for Rs 500 followed on 4-10-1972. Both were refused by the landlady. Dispatch within time demonstrated diligence; refusal could not be imputed to tenant “neglect.”

Inapplicability of Sections 12(3)(a) and 12(3)(b): Because full arrears were tendered within the statutory period, the prerequisites for either sub-section were absent. Consequently, the tenants were not liable to eviction on arrears grounds, and the finding of the first appellate court dismissing the suit was sound.

Limits of Article 227 supervision: The Supreme Court criticised the High Court for effectively converting its supervisory writ jurisdiction into a second appeal. The special rent legislation intentionally withholds a further appellate tier to secure finality; Article 227 cannot be invoked to re-evaluate evidence unless there is grave dereliction or flagrant injustice, which was not present here.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: Appeal ALLOWED; the High Court’s judgment is set aside and the first appellate court’s dismissal of the eviction suit is restored.

Implications: The judgment reiterates that timely tender of rent—irrespective of landlord acceptance—negates “neglect” for purposes of Section 12(3)(a). It also underscores the restricted scope of High Court interference under Article 227, affirming legislative intent to confer finality on appellate authority decisions in rent-control matters. For the parties, eviction is averted; additionally, the Court prospectively enhances monthly rent to Rs 600 effective 1-9-1995.

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    Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani And Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi Deceased Through His Heirs And Legal Representatives

    Kuldip Singh, J.— Special leave granted.

    2. Shantabai, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents herein, instituted a suit under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the Act) for possession of the suit premises against the appellants-tenants. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed (sic dismissed) the suit. The Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court set aside the judgment of the appellate court and restored that of the trial court. This appeal, by the tenants, is against the judgment of the High Court.

    3. The suit premises was rented to the appellants for residential purposes at a monthly rent of Rs 70. The rent was, later on, increased to Rs 80. The landlady served a notice dated 28-7-1972 terminating the appellants' tenancy on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement by her. It was mentioned in the notice that arrears of rent from 1-4-1971 were due from the tenants. As far as the bona fide requirement is concerned the trial court rejected the case of the landlady. On the issue of arrears of rent the trial court negatived the contention of the landlady that the tenants neglected to pay the rent for more than six months. The trial court, however, held that the case of the landlady was covered under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act and since the tenants failed to comply with the said provisions they were liable to be evicted. The appellate court came to the conclusion that the bona fide requirement was not proved by the landlady. On the issue of arrears it was held that the landlady, having failed to prove that the tenants neglected to pay rent for more than six months, neither the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) nor of Section 12(3)(b) of the Act were attracted and as such the appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court. During the pendency of the appeal the original landlady died and her legal heirs were brought on record.

    4. The judgment of the appellate court was challenged by the respondents by way of petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court converted itself into an appellate court and reappreciated all the issues dealt with and decided by the two courts below. The High Court reversed the findings of the appellate court and held that the appellants neglected to make payment of the arrears of rent in terms of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act and as such were liable to be evicted.

    5. We may at this stage notice the provisions of Section 12 of the Act which are reproduced hereunder:

    “12. (1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, insofar as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act.
    (2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
    (3) (a) Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2) the (Court shall pass a decree) for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession.
    (b) In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court.”

    6. As mentioned above, the landlady served notice in terms of Section 12(2) of the Act on 28-7-1972. The notice was received by the appellants on 1-8-1972. The appellants sent a money order for Rs 400 to the landlady on 1-9-1972. It is not disputed that the said amount covered the arrears up to 31-8-1972. It is also on record that another money order for Rs 500 was sent by the appellants on 4-10-1972 which covered the arrears up to 31-10-1972. The landlady refused to accept both the money orders.

    7. As mentioned above, the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was received by the appellants on 1-8-1972 and they sent the first money order on 1-9-1972. The High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the money order, having been sent on 1-9-1972, was within “the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section 2”. The High Court, however, fell into patent error in reaching the conclusion that the actual payment having not been received by the landlady within the said period there was neglect on the part of the tenants to make payment. The sine qua non for eviction of a tenant under Section 12(3)(a) is “the neglect to make payment” and not the actual making of the ‘payment’. When a money order or a demand draft is sent to the landlord, during the specified period, it cannot be said that the tenant has “neglected to make payment”. The expression ‘neglect’ means “to fail to give due care, attention, or time to. To fail through thoughtlessness or carelessness. To ignore or disregard”. We are of the view that in the facts of the present case it is not possible to hold that the appellants neglected to make payment within the specified period after the receipt of the notice.

    8. Since the total arrears mentioned in the notice dated 28-7-1972 were paid by the appellants and there was no neglect on their part to make payment, neither the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) nor of Section 12(3)(b) are attracted in this case. The High Court fell into patent error in reversing the judgment of the appellate court.

    9. Before parting with this judgment we would like to say that the High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the present case. The Act is a special legislation governing landlord-tenant relationship and disputes. The legislature has, in its wisdom, not provided second appeal or revision to the High Court. The object is to give finality to the decision of the appellate authority. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.

    10. We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the appellate court. No costs.

    11. The appellants are paying Rs 80 per month as rent since 1980. It would be fair and just to increase the rent reasonably. After hearing learned counsel we direct the appellants to pay Rs 600 as rent with effect from 1-9-1995.

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