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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1995 INSC 114
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act
  • Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (Sections 14(2), 17 and 29)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1995 INSC 114
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act
  • Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (Sections 14(2), 17 and 29)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In Civil Appeals Nos. 3882-85 of 1990 and related Special Leave Petitions, the Supreme Court of India, by consent of the parties, referred all disputes to the sole arbitration of Mr. J.P. Thakur (order dated 18-11-1991). The arbitrator entered reference, heard both sides, and rendered an award on 14-02-1994. He filed the award in the Registry of the Supreme Court, which issued notice of filing to counsel for both sides on 29-04-1994.

On 11-07-1994 the respondents, M/s C.K. Ahuja and another, filed applications under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking to make the award a rule of court and claiming interest at 24 % on the awarded sum. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (“BCCL”) filed objections to the award only on 20-11-1994—well after the statutory thirty-day period—prompting a dispute over limitation and the proper forum for filing and challenging the award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether objections to the arbitral award filed by BCCL on 20-11-1994 were barred by limitation under the Arbitration Act, 1940.
  2. Whether the Supreme Court was the proper forum for filing the award and for entertaining objections, given that the reference to arbitration had been made by the Supreme Court itself.
  3. Consequent entitlement, if any, of the respondents to interest on the awarded amount.

Arguments of the Parties

M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (Objector)

  • The award was “not filed and signed in proper manner” and therefore should not be considered.
  • A copy of the award had not been supplied, preventing BCCL from filing timely objections.
  • Because the award was allegedly not filed in the “proper court,” limitation could not begin to run; reliance placed on State of M.P. v. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd. (1972) 1 SCC 702.

M/s C.K. Ahuja & Another (Applicants)

  • The arbitration proceedings originated from an order of the Supreme Court; hence the award was correctly filed in the Supreme Court.
  • Notice of filing given by the Registry in April 1994 triggered the limitation period; BCCL’s objections in November 1994 were hopelessly late.
  • No objection to the forum had been raised earlier, even in BCCL’s written objections, and such an argument was therefore waived.
  • Relied on Food Corp. of India v. E. Kuttappan (1993) 3 SCC 445 and related cases for the proposition that limitation runs from the date the filing of the award is made known to the parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of M.P. v. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd. (1972) 1 SCC 702 Where the Supreme Court appoints the arbitrator, it retains jurisdiction unless expressly divested; forum for subsequent proceedings is the Supreme Court. Cited to affirm that the award, and any objections, were properly before the Supreme Court.
Food Corp. of India v. E. Kuttappan (1993) 3 SCC 445 Limitation for objections runs from the date the filing of the award is made known to the parties, not from any later formal notice. Used to hold that limitation began in April 1994 when counsel were notified, rendering BCCL’s November 1994 objections time-barred.
Nilkantha Shidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti (1962) 2 SCR 551 Earlier authority on commencement of limitation upon notice/knowledge of filing of award. Relied upon indirectly through Kuttappan to support the same limitation principle.
Indian Rayon Corpn. Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co. (P) Ltd. (1988) 4 SCC 31 Further authority on limitation running from knowledge of filing. Referenced through Kuttappan to reinforce the limitation analysis.
Punjab SEB v. Ludhiana Steels (P) Ltd. (1993) 1 SCC 205 When the Supreme Court refers matters to arbitration, the award must be filed in the Supreme Court. Cited to bolster the conclusion that the award was properly filed in the present Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice G.N. Ray, writing for the Court, adopted the following analytical steps:

  1. Proper Forum: Relying on Saith and Skelton and Punjab SEB precedents, the Court held that because the Supreme Court had itself referred the disputes to arbitration and had not divested jurisdiction, the award was correctly filed in the Supreme Court.
  2. Commencement of Limitation: Applying the ratio in Food Corp. of India v. E. Kuttappan (and the earlier cases it followed), the Court concluded that limitation for objections started when the Registry notified counsel of the filing in April 1994. Actual inspection on 03-10-1994 could not revive or extend the statutory period.
  3. Waiver of Forum Objection: BCCL had not raised any plea about improper forum in its written objections; thus, even if the argument had merit, it was deemed waived.
  4. Delay Fatal to Objections: Given the thirty-day limit under the Arbitration Act, BCCL’s objections filed on 20-11-1994 were “hopelessly barred.”
  5. Merits of the Award: The Court briefly remarked that, independent of limitation, it saw “no reason” to interfere with the arbitral award.
  6. Interest: Considering the facts, the Court awarded interest at 12 % per annum from the date of the award until realisation, instead of the 24 % claimed.

Holding and Implications

The Interlocutory Applications Nos. 9-12 of 1994 are allowed; the arbitral award dated 14-02-1994 is made rule of court, with interest at 12 % per annum from the date of the award until realisation; no order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The respondents may enforce the award with 12 % interest; BCCL’s objections are dismissed as time-barred.

Broader Implications: The decision re-affirms two principles: (1) when the Supreme Court appoints an arbitrator, it remains the proper forum for subsequent proceedings unless explicitly stated otherwise; and (2) limitation for challenging an award begins when parties are made aware of its filing, underscoring the importance of prompt action by objecting parties. No new legal doctrine was created, but existing precedent on jurisdiction and limitation in arbitration was reinforced.

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    Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. C.K Ahuja And Another

    G.N Ray, J.— In Civil Appeals Nos. 3882-85 of 1990 and SLPs (Civil) Nos. 10832-33 of 1989 this Court by order dated 18-11-1991 referred the disputes and differences in the said civil appeals and leave applications to arbitration by consent of parties. The order passed on 18-11-1991 is to the following effect:

    “The disputes and differences referred to in the aforesaid matters are by consent referred to the arbitration of Mr J.P Thakur, Dy. Chief Engineer (Civil) Koylanagar P.O, Koylanagar District, Dhanbad, Bihar. Both the parties undertake to file a regular reference agreement before the said arbitrator within two weeks. Award to be made within four months thereafter.”

    2. The sole arbitrator thereafter entered the reference and parties to the arbitration appeared before the arbitrator and made submissions. The arbitrator thereafter made an award on 14-2-1994 and such award was filed before this Court by the arbitrator. The Registry of this Court gave notice of filing of the award on 29-4-1994 to the learned counsel for both the parties. The respondents namely M/s C.K Ahuja and another made an application under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 on 11-7-1994 before this Court inter alia praying that the award dated 14-2-1994 delivered by the sole arbitrator, Shri J.P Thakur, be made rule of court and interest @ 24% be also given to the appellants on the awarded sum from the date of the award. It appears that Civil Appeals Nos. 3882-85 of 1990 were listed on 22-3-1993 for hearing but in view of the fact that the disputes relating to the appeals had been referred to arbitration by consent of parties this Court by order dated 22-3-1993 dismissed the said appeals.

    3. The applications under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act came up for hearing but on the prayer of Mr G.S Chatterjee, the learned counsel for M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., a direction was given to issue fresh notice on M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. about the filing of the award. Such notice, however, was issued without prejudice to the contentions of learned counsel for M/s C.K Ahuja and another that the period for filing objections was already barred by limitation. The objections to the award have, however, been filed on 20-11-1994.

    4. The said applications under Sections 14(2), 17 and 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act have been numbered as IAs Nos. 9-12 of 1994 in Civil Appeals Nos. 3882-85 of 1990. At the hearing of the said applications, learned counsel appearing for M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. has contended that as the award was not filed and signed in proper manner, the same should not be taken into consideration. It was also contended that the copy of the award was required to be supplied to the parties and since copy of the award was not given to M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., the question of filing objections did not arise. It was also contended that the said award was not filed in proper court. Accordingly, there was no question of limitation running from the date of filing the award. In support of the contention that there will be no question of limitation if the award is not filed in proper court reliance is made to a decision of this Court in State of M.P v. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd. (1972) 1 SCC 702. It may be stated here that the learned counsel for M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. took inspection of the award on 3-10-1994 but the objection to the award was not filed within thirty days from such inspection. Disputing the said contentions, Mr Bhandare, the learned counsel appearing for M/s C.K Ahuja and another, has contended that the reference to arbitration has been made by this Court on the prayer of the parties. Accordingly, the arbitration proceedings have originated in this Court. Therefore the award is required to be filed before this Court. Consequently, the objection if any to the award is also required to be filed before this Court. He has also submitted that at no point of time, any objection was raised by M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. about the alleged impropriety in filing the award before this Court even though the notice of the counsel was drawn about filing of the award in April 1994. Even in the petition of objection filed before this Court, no objection has been taken by M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. that the award should not have been filed before this Court. Accordingly, such contention should not be allowed to be raised at the hearing of these applications. Mr Bhandare has also contended that when the award has been filed in the Court and the attention of the learned counsel for the parties drawn by the Registry of this Court about the filing of the award, the period of limitation for filing objection to such award will run from the date of the notice. Although on the prayer of the learned counsel for the objector, a fresh notice was issued later on, the limitation for filing objection to the award cannot be counted from the date of such notice issued subsequently by this Court at the instance of the learned counsel for M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. In support of this contention Mr Bhandare has referred to a decision of this Court in Food Corpn. of India v. E. Kuttappan (1993) 3 SCC 445, JT (1993) 4 SC 90. In the said decision reference was made to an earlier decision of this Court in Nilkantha Shidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti (1962) 2 SCR 551, AIR 1962 SC 666 and Indian Rayon Corpn. Ltd. v. Raunaq and Co. (P) Ltd. (1988) 4 SCC 31 It has been held in the decision in Food Corpn. of India case (1993) 3 SCC 445, JT (1993) 4 SC 90 that the obligation of filing the award in court is a legal imperative on the arbitrator and when the award was filed in Court and the parties were aware of such filing of the award in Court, the limitation to file objection would run from the date of filing the award being made known to the parties, and not from any subsequent date when a notice of filing of such award was subsequently issued to the parties concerned.

    5. Mr Bhandare has contended that in the instant case the Registry of this Court specifically drew the attention of the counsel in April 1994 about the filing of the award but despite such knowledge, the appellant, M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. did not choose to file any objection to the said award. Even after taking inspection of the award on 3-10-1994 the objection has not been filed within a period of thirty days from such inspection but the objection has been filed only on 20-11-1994. Accordingly, the objection to the award should not be considered as the same is hopelessly barred by limitation.

    6. In our view, the contention raised by Mr Bhandare is wholly justified. The Registry of this Court gave notice to the learned counsel for the parties about the filing of the award in April 1994. It is nobody's case that counsel had an authority to take such notice on behalf of either of the party. It was also open to the counsel to take inspection of the award. As a matter of fact, such inspection was also taken on 3-10-1994 but no objection was filed within thirty days either from the notice given by the Registry in April 1994 or from the date of inspection of the award on 3-10-1994. It has been held by this Court in State of M.P v. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd. (1972) 1 SCC 702 that where the Arbitrator was appointed by the Supreme Court by consent of parties and no further directions were given in the said order which would indicate that the Supreme Court had not divested itself of its jurisdiction to deal with the award or matters arising out of award, the forum for taking further action is the Supreme Court. It has also been held in the said decision that in the absence of any other court having been invested with such jurisdiction, the only conclusion that is possible is that further orders must be passed only by the Court that passed the order, namely, the Supreme Court. Mr Bhandare has relied on a later decision of this Court in Punjab SEB v. Ludhiana Steels (P) Ltd. (1993) 1 SCC 205 in support of his contention that when reference to arbitration was made by this Court, the award is to be filed in this Court only. We may only indicate that the said decision has a distinguishing feature inasmuch as in that case after making reference to arbitration, this Court specifically directed that the award would be sent to Registry of this Court. In any event, even if it is assumed that the award should be filed in other Court when the notice of filing of the award was given by the Registry of this Court, objection as to the award including objection as to forum ought to have been raised before this Court and it will not be open to the parties to altogether ignore the notice of filing the award given by the Registry of this Court. We may also indicate here that in the petition of objection it has not been urged that there has been any impropriety in filing the award in this Court. Accordingly, such objection should not be permitted to be raised at this stage as the objection to the award has been filed long after the period of limitation, the same should be dismissed. We may also indicate here that even on merit, we do not think that any interference is called for against the award. We, therefore, allow the Interlocutory Applications Nos. 9 to 12 of 1994 and direct the award to be made rule of court. It also appears to us that in the facts of the case, the applicants M/s C.K Ahuja and another, are entitled to get an award of interest @ 12% from the date of the award till realisation. The interlocutory applications are accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. C.K Ahuja And Another
    (Feb 14, 1995)