N. Krishnamachari v. Managing Director, Apsrtc, Hyderabad And Others, Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Neutral Citations

1994 INSC 316

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

SLP (Civil) No. 12213 of 1994, decided on August 12, 1994

Disposition

dismissed

Attorney(S)

K. Madhava Reddy, Senior Advocate (D. Prakash Reddy and Ms D. Bharathi Reddy, Advocates, with him) for the Petitioner;
B. Parthasarathi, Advocate, for the Respondents.

Judges

Justice K. Ramaswamy
Justice N. Venkatachala

Acts

Article 226 of the Constitution
Section 3(d) of the Act
Section 4(1) of the Act
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Section 3(b), Land Acquisition Act
Section 54 of the Act
Section 4(1), Section 6 of the Act
Section 54, Land Acquisition Act

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 8 July 1988 the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire land in Tirupati for construction of an APSRTC bus-stand complex. A declaration under Section 6 followed. Several landowners, including the present petitioner, challenged the acquisition in W.P. Nos. 838 of 1990, 12450 of 1988, 12919 of 1988 and 13631 of 1988. APSRTC, the beneficiary of the acquisition, was impleaded in some of the writ petitions.

When the writ petitions were listed for final hearing the Corporation’s counsel did not appear because his name was omitted from the court’s cause list. The High Court subsequently quashed the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration. APSRTC filed review petitions. Two review petitions were dismissed on the ground that the Corporation was not an “interested party.” However, in Review W.P.M.P. No. 21806 of 1993 (concerning the present petitioner) the Division Bench allowed review, restored the Section 4(1) notification, and quashed only the Section 6 declaration. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal from that order, giving rise to the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether APSRTC, as the beneficiary of the acquisition, qualifies as a “person interested” under Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act and therefore has locus standi to participate in or seek review of proceedings challenging the acquisition.
Whether the High Court’s differing treatment of the same Section 4(1) notification in separate review petitions creates a conflicting legal position requiring correction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Claimed a conflict in High Court decisions: two review petitions were dismissed for want of locus standi while the present review was entertained, implying inconsistent recognition of APSRTC’s status as an interested party.
Asserted a conflict between Supreme Court precedents on beneficiary locus standi, namely Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel (1971 3 SCC 821) and Himalayan Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (1980 3 SCC 223), and contended that the conflict remained unresolved.
Argued that because other writ petitions had resulted in quashing the entire Section 4(1) notification, sustaining it in the petitioner’s case would lead to conflicting operative orders regarding the same acquisition.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents’ legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel (1971 3 SCC 821)	Held that a municipal corporation, though ultimate beneficiary, was not an “interested party” entitled to appeal.	Court noted that the decision did not consider the wide definition in Section 3(b) and therefore treated it as an infirm precedent.
Himalayan Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (1980 3 SCC 223)	Recognised the beneficiary of acquisition as a “person interested” with locus standi to participate in proceedings.	Court relied on this and subsequent consistent decisions to affirm that APSRTC is an “interested party.”

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act defines “person interested” in broad terms, encompassing the beneficiary of an acquisition. The earlier Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation decision overlooked this statutory definition, whereas Himalayan Tiles and later cases correctly applied it. Consequently, no real conflict of authority persists.

Applying this principle, the Court declared APSRTC to be a “person interested,” entitled to support the validity of the Section 4(1) notification and to seek review of adverse High Court orders. The High Court therefore erred when, in other review petitions, it denied locus standi to the Corporation. Nevertheless, that error was not directly before the Court in the present SLP.

Addressing the alleged conflict in operative High Court orders, the Supreme Court examined the impugned order and found that the Division Bench had, in fact, sustained the entire Section 4(1) notification and quashed only the Section 6 declaration. Because the declaration had been issued on 11 July 1988 after the High Court had already stayed further proceedings, it was patently illegal and rightly quashed. Hence, there was no inconsistency requiring intervention.

The Court also noted the parties’ ongoing negotiations regarding acquisition of only a portion (54 cents) of the petitioner’s land but declined to express any opinion, leaving that matter to the parties and the Government.

Holding and Implications

SLP DISMISSED.

The Section 4(1) acquisition notification remains valid, while the Section 6 declaration stands quashed. APSRTC is affirmed as a “person interested” under the Act, clarifying its right to participate in similar litigation, but the decision sets no new legal precedent beyond reaffirming existing jurisprudence. The petitioner may negotiate with APSRTC or the Government regarding partial acquisition; the Court expressed no view on that course of action.

Show full summary ...

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

N. Krishnamachari v. Managing Director, Apsrtc, Hyderabad And Others

Order

1. The Government of Andhra Pradesh published the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 8-7-1988 acquiring certain lands for the construction of bus stand complex in Tirupati town (Lord Balaji Pilgrimage Centre) followed by a declaration issued under Section 6 with which we would later deal with. The notification was challenged by the interested persons including the petitioner in WP Nos. 838 of 1990, 12450 of 1988, 12919 of 1988 and 13631 of 1988. In some of the writ petitions the APSRTC — the beneficiary impleaded itself as a party respondent to the writ petitions. When the writ petitions had come up for final hearing, the name of the counsel for the Corporation was not printed in the cause list published by the High Court. Consequently the counsel could not notice the posting of the writ petitions and the disposal thereof. Thereafter, the counsel filed an application for review of the orders of the Division Bench. We are informed that in two cases, the review petitions seem to have been dismissed on the ground that Corporation was not a party to the writ petitions and that, therefore, the review petition would not lie at their instance. The review petition relating to the interest of the petitioner in the lands is concerned, by the impugned order dated 15-4-1994 in Review WPMP No. 21806 of 1993, the Division Bench set aside the order quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and upheld quashing the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act. Thus, this special leave petition.

2. It is contended by Mr Madhava Reddy, learned Senior Counsel that there is a conflict of decisions as regards selfsame matters that two review petitions were dismissed relating to other claimants holding that the Corporation was not a necessary party, in other words, it was not an interested party and review petition in the impugned order was allowed by implication that the Corporation was an interested party. It is also further contended that on the question of locus standi of the beneficiary to be impleaded as a party, there is a conflict of decisions of this Court in Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel (1971) 3 SCC 821 and Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (1980) 3 SCC 223, (1980) 3 SCR 235 and when this conflict was brought to the notice of another Bench that Bench has distinguished the decision of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. case (1971) 3 SCC 821 and that therefore, the conflict still subsists and requires to be resolved. We do not find force in the contentions. In Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. case (1971) 3 SCC 821 the Bench had held that when the property was acquired for the benefit of the Municipal Corporation by the State, though ultimately the municipality may be benefited, it has no right to file an appeal against the decision of the High Court as the Corporation is not an interested party. It would appear that Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, definition of “person interested” had not been brought to the attention of the learned Judges. When Section 3(b) defined in a wide language, would bring within its ambit the beneficiary to be a person interested, the omission to bring to the notice of the Court important provisions of the law constitutes an infirmity in the judgment. However, in later decisions starting with Himalayan Tiles case (1980) 3 SCC 223, (1980) 3 SCR 235 this Court consistently has held that the beneficiary is a person interested to protect the interest which the beneficiary seeks to acquire in the land under the notification, including perfect title to the property and payment of proper compensation. Therefore, it is entitled to challenge the award when it was made without notice to it even by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, apart from impleading itself as a party respondent in the acquisition proceedings or pending appeal or independently filing an appeal under Section 54 of the Act. In view of this later development of law, we do not find that the conflict any longer subsists. Therefore, we hold that APSRTC is a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act and that, therefore, it is entitled to support the validity of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act when it is the subject-matter of the challenge in the High Court. The High Court is, therefore, not right in its conclusion that the Corporation is not an interested party and the High Court has committed grievous error of law in refusing the review petition. But, however, that order is not before us.

3. It is next contended that there is a conflict of operation of the orders in two cases regarding the same notification published under Section 4(1) which was quashed at the instance of others and in this case the declaration alone has been quashed sustaining the notification under Section 4(1). A reading of the order of the Division Bench discloses that the entire notification under Section 4(1) has been sustained. Only declaration under Section 6 was quashed. It would be seen that notification under Section 4(1) was published on 8-7-1988 and subsistence was published on 28-7-1988, paper publication too was done. Immediately, the writ petitions were filed on 26-8-1988 and further proceedings were stayed by the High Court even before the declaration was published. Under these circumstances, the declaration under Section 6 published on 11-7-1988 obviously was illegal. Accordingly, the declaration alone was rightly quashed. It is represented that after filing the writ petition, the Corporation had negotiated with the petitioner confining the need to acquire only 54 cents of land out of the petitioner's land. We do not express any opinion on this. It is open to the petitioner, if he so desires, to negotiate with the Corporation or with the Government and it is for the Government to take appropriate decision.

4. The SLP is accordingly dismissed with the above clarification.

N. Krishnamachari v. Managing Director, Apsrtc, Hyderabad And Others

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

N. Krishnamachari v. Managing Director, Apsrtc, Hyderabad And Others

Comments