AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • the 1983 Income Tax Act (Section 5, Subsection 2)
  • Sections 4 and 6 of the Act
  • Section 88 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911
  • Section 55 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 read with Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 4 and 6 of the Act
  • Section 48 of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and Section 5-A of the Act and Section 6 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • the 1983 Income Tax Act (Section 5, Subsection 2)
  • Sections 4 and 6 of the Act
  • Section 88 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911
  • Section 55 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 read with Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 4 and 6 of the Act
  • Section 48 of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and Section 5-A of the Act and Section 6 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 20 October 1976 the Government of Punjab issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 declaring that 14 bighas 13 biswas of land in Khasra No. 2012, Bhatinda, were needed for construction of a public park at the request and expense of the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda (the appellant). A declaration under Section 6 followed on 5 July 1977.

Smt Parwati Devi (respondent 2) challenged those notifications in Civil Writ Petition 2315/1977, which the Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissed on 26 April 1978; this Court refused special leave on 4 May 1979. During that litigation the acquisition proceedings were stayed. After the stay was lifted, respondents 2 and 3 applied before the Additional Deputy Commissioner (acting as Collector) to drop the acquisition, asserting that more than six years had passed without the Government taking possession. They relied on the Full Bench decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of Haryana.

By order dated 20 December 1982 the Additional Deputy Commissioner accepted their plea and held that the notifications had “lapsed.” The Municipal Committee’s writ petition (CWP 3534/1984) challenging that order was dismissed by the High Court on 8 May 1985, the court holding that (a) the Municipal Committee lacked locus standi and (b) the State could abandon the acquisition for good reasons. The Committee obtained special leave and filed the present appeal.

During pendency of the appeal Smt Parwati Devi died; respondent 3, also her legal representative, remained ex parte.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, had locus standi to challenge the Collector’s order dropping the acquisition proceedings.
  2. Whether, in the absence of a formal withdrawal under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, the State Government could be deemed to have abandoned the acquisition, justifying the Collector’s action.
  3. Whether the Collector could declare that the Section 4 and Section 6 notifications had lapsed merely because possession had not been taken within a particular period, relying on Radhey Shyam Gupta.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Municipal Committee, Bhatinda)

  • The Committee was a person aggrieved because the land was being acquired at its request and expense; therefore it had locus standi to challenge the Collector’s order.
  • The Collector lacked statutory power to quash or declare lapsed notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6; his role was confined to making an award.
  • Any delay in taking possession was due to court-ordered stays; such delay could not invalidate the notifications, nor had the State withdrawn the acquisition under Section 48.

Respondents’ Arguments (Smt Parwati Devi & Sudesh Kumar)

  • More than six years had elapsed without the Government taking possession; therefore, following Radhey Shyam Gupta, the notifications were deemed to have lapsed.
  • The State was competent to abandon the acquisition, and the Collector could accordingly drop the proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of Haryana (1982 PLJ 349; AIR 1982 P&H 519) Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 lapse if possession is not taken within one year. The Collector relied on this decision; the Supreme Court noted that it had subsequently been disapproved and held that the Collector’s reliance was misplaced.
Improvement Trust, Faridkot v. Jagjit Singh (1987 Supp SCC 608) Disapproved the rule in Radhey Shyam Gupta. Cited by the Supreme Court to show that Radhey Shyam Gupta no longer represented good law.
State of Punjab v. Hari Om Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. (1987 Supp SCC 687) Also disapproved the rule in Radhey Shyam Gupta. Reinforced the Court’s conclusion that the Collector could not deem the notifications to have lapsed.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

1. Locus Standi of the Appellant: The Court examined the recitals in the Section 4 notification and Section 6 declaration, both of which expressly stated that the land was being acquired at the appellant’s request and expense for a public park. The Municipal Committee had also been a party to earlier litigation concerning the same land. Because the Collector’s order directly affected the Committee’s interest in creation of the public park, the Committee was a “person aggrieved” and entitled to challenge that order. The High Court’s contrary view was erroneous.

2. Alleged Abandonment of Acquisition: Abandonment requires a formal withdrawal under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. The record contained no such notification. The High Court therefore erred in reasoning that the State Government had abandoned the acquisition “for good reasons.”

3. Validity of the Collector’s Order: The Collector based his decision on Radhey Shyam Gupta, holding that the notifications had lapsed because possession was not taken within one year. The Supreme Court pointed out that Radhey Shyam Gupta had been disapproved in subsequent Supreme Court decisions (Improvement Trust, Faridkot and Hari Om Co-operative Society). Consequently, the Collector had no authority to declare the notifications lapsed, and his order was legally unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; High Court judgment dated 8 May 1985 set aside. The writ petition filed by the Municipal Committee is allowed, and the Collector’s order dated 20 December 1983 (quashing the acquisition) is quashed. The Collector, Bhatinda, is directed to proceed with the acquisition in accordance with law.

Implications: The land-acquisition process for the proposed public park is revived; delay alone does not nullify acquisition notifications, and subordinate authorities cannot declare such notifications lapsed without statutory withdrawal by the State. The decision reinforces earlier Supreme Court rulings disapproving the principle in Radhey Shyam Gupta but does not create a new doctrine.

    Municipal Committee, Bhatinda v. Land Acquisition Collector And Others

    S.C Agrawal, J.— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated May 8, 1985 whereby Civil Writ Petition No. 3534 of 1984 filed by the appellant was dismissed.

    2. On October 20, 1976, the Government of Punjab issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) whereby it was notified that land measuring 14 bighas and 13 biswas comprised in Khasra No. 2012 situated at Bhatinda was required for the construction of a public park by the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda. After considering the report submitted under Section 5-A of the Act, the State Government issued a declaration under Section 6 of the Act on July 5, 1977 in relation to the said land. Civil Writ Petition No. 2315 of 1977 filed by Smt Parwati Devi, respondent 2 (deceased), to challenge the validity of the said notification and declaration was dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court by its judgment and order dated April 26, 1978 and special leave to appeal against the said decision was refused by this Court on May 4, 1979. It appears that during the pendency of the said writ petition in the High Court and the special leave petition in this Court, the acquisition proceedings had been stayed and the same were revived after the dismissal of the special leave petition by this Court. While the said proceedings were pending before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda exercising the powers of Collector, Bhatinda, Smt Parwati Devi and Sudesh Kumar, respondent 3 herein, filed an application whereby it was prayed that the acquisition proceedings be dropped and the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act be quashed for the reason that a period of six years had elapsed and that possession had not been taken by the Government and the applicants were still in possession of the land in question. In that application, reliance was placed on the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of Haryana 1982 PLJ 349, AIR 1982 P&H 519, 1982 Land LR 561 (2) and other decisions of the High Court. The appellant filed a reply to the said application wherein it was submitted that the notifications were not liable to be quashed and no such power to quash the notification vested in the Collector who has only to make an award. In the said reply, it was also stated that the delay in disposal of the acquisition proceedings was on account of the pendency of the matter in the High Court and this Court and that the market price of the land had already been obtained from the revenue authority. The said application filed by respondents 2 and 3 was allowed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda by his order dated December 20, 1982 on the view that in a case where the possession of the land is not taken within one year of the issuance of the notification under Section 6 of the Act, the notification would be deemed to have lapsed. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court to challenge the said order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda. It was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated May 8, 1985 on the view that the appellant had no locus standi to file the writ petition and further that the State Government was always competent to abandon the acquisition of land and in this case, it had been done for good reasons. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has filed this appeal.

    3. Smt Parwati Devi, respondent 2, died during the pendency of the matter in this Court. Respondent 3, who is also the legal representative of deceased respondent 2, has not appeared in spite of notice.

    4. Having heard Shri K.K Mohan, the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal, we are of the view that the judgment of the High Court cannot be upheld and must be set aside. As mentioned earlier, the High Court has refused to interfere on two grounds, namely, (a) the appellant had no locus standi to file the writ petition; and (b) the collector was fully competent to pass the impugned order inasmuch as the State Government was always competent to abandon the acquisition of land and in this case, it has been done for good reasons.

    5. As regards the locus standi of the appellant to file the writ petition, it may be stated that in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, it is specifically mentioned that the land is required for the purposes of Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, namely, for the construction of public park etc. In the said notification, it is further stated:

    “And whereas in pursuance of the provisions of Section 88 of the said Act, the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda has requested the Government of Punjab, to acquire the said land under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on payment by the said ‘Bhatinda Municipality’ of compensation awarded under that Act and of any other charges incurred in acquiring the land as specified below.”

    6. Similarly, in the declaration issued under Section 6, it is stated:

    “Whereas the Governor of Punjab, after considering the report made under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is satisfied that the land described in the specifications below is needed for a public purpose for providing public park etc. at the expense of the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda under Section 55 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 read with Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”

    7. From the aforesaid recitals in the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, it is evident that the acquisition of the land in question was at the request of the appellant for the purpose of construction of a public park. It may also be mentioned that in the earlier writ petition filed by Smt Parwati Devi which was dismissed by the High Court and against which order special leave to appeal was refused by this Court, the appellant had been impleaded as a respondent. Furthermore, the cause title of the proceedings, as described in the application submitted by respondents 2 and 3 before the Additional Deputy Commissioner for quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6, was “Municipal Committee v. Roshan Lal”. The appellant had filed a reply opposing the said application submitted by respondents 2 and 3 before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda. After considering the said reply, the Additional Deputy Commissioner had passed the impugned order dated December 20, 1983. It would thus appear that the application submitted by respondents 2 and 3 before the Additional Deputy Commissioner gave rise to a lis between respondents 2 and 3 and the appellant on the question whether the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act be deemed to have lapsed. The said lis was decided in favour of respondents 2 and 3 and against the appellant by the Additional Deputy Commissioner by his order dated December 20, 1983. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the appellant was not a person aggrieved by the order dated December 20, 1983 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner holding that the proceedings for the acquisition of the land in question for the construction of public park at Bhatinda by the appellant be deemed to have lapsed. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in holding that the appellant had no locus standi to file the writ petition seeking to challenge the said order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner.

    8. As regards the other ground given by the High Court for rejecting the writ petition, that the State Government was always competent to abandon the acquisition of land and in this case, it had been done for good reasons, it may be stated that there is nothing on the record to show that the State Government has issued a notification withdrawing from the acquisition and to abandon the acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate as to how the High Court has concluded that the State Government was always competent to abandon the acquisition of land and in this case, it had been done for good reasons.

    9. The Additional Deputy Commissioner did not proceed on the basis that the State Government had withdrawn from the acquisition. In the order dated December 20, 1983, he has held that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 should be deemed to have lapsed in view of the decisions of the High Court. The decision of Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Radhey Shyam Gupta case 1982 PLJ 349, AIR 1982 P&H 519, 1982 Land LR 561 (2) on which reliance was placed by respondents 2 and 3 has been disapproved by this Court. (See : Improvement Trust, Faridkot v. Jagjit Singh 1987 Supp SCC 608 and State of Punjab v. Hari Om Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. Amritsar 1987 Supp SCC 687.) The Additional Deputy Commissioner could not, therefore, drop the acquisition proceedings on the ground that notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act should be deemed to have lapsed. The order dated December 20, 1983 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner is unsustainable and the High Court was in error in upholding the said order.

    10. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court dated May 8, 1985 in Civil Writ Petition No. 3534 of 1984 is set aside, the said writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the order dated December 20, 1983 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Bhatinda is set aside. The Collector, Bhatinda, is directed to proceed with the acquisition proceedings in accordance with law. No orders to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Municipal Committee, Bhatinda v. Land Acquisition Collector And Others
    (Apr 15, 1993)