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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 9(1)(a) and Section 9-A(1) of the Act
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 9(1)(a) of the Act
  • Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1979
  • Section 3 of the Act
  • Civil Procedure Code, Section 105
  • Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (Central Act 15 of 1882)
  • Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 9 and Section 9-A of the Act
  • Section 9 of the Act
  • Act 2 of 1980
  • Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act
  • Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1973
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 9(1)(a) and Section 9-A(1) of the Act
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 9(1)(a) of the Act
  • Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1979
  • Section 3 of the Act
  • Civil Procedure Code, Section 105
  • Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (Central Act 15 of 1882)
  • Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 9 and Section 9-A of the Act
  • Section 9 of the Act
  • Act 2 of 1980
  • Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act
  • Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1973
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs instituted O.S. No. 1472 of 1972 before the District Magistrate, Salem seeking eviction of the defendants from a portion of land described as ABCD (20 ft. × 16 ft.). They alleged that the defendants’ three-year lease had been validly terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and that the defendants had additionally encroached on adjacent land (MNOP), thereby owing arrears of rent and damages.

The defendants contended that their tenancy covered the entire MNOP area from January 1955, that they had erected a thatched structure worth Rs 3,000, and that they were protected by the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act (“the Act”). They also filed an application under Section 9 of the Act.

The trial court decreed eviction, holding that the lease was confined to ABCD, began on 6 May 1957, and that the Act did not protect the defendants because the relevant Government Order extending the Act to Salem pre-dated their tenancy. The Section 9 application was dismissed.

In first appeal the suit was dismissed. The appellate court agreed that the lease was only over ABCD but held that the Act’s extension of 29 January 1958 was operative, thus protecting the defendants; it also faulted the plaintiffs for not issuing a Section 11 notice.

On second appeal, a learned Single Judge reinstated the trial court’s decree. He held that—even after accounting for subsequent statutory extensions (including Act 2 of 1980)—the defendants had failed to file a timely Section 9 application and therefore could not invoke the Act. He distinguished the Madras High Court decision in Johari Bi v. K. Vinayakam.

The present civil appeal was preferred by the defendants against that Single-Judge decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act applied to the defendants’ tenancy in view of multiple and apparently overlapping Government Orders extending the Act to Salem.
  2. Whether the defendants’ Section 9 application, filed prior to Act 2 of 1980, satisfied the statutory requirement or was rendered ineffective for want of a fresh application.
  3. Whether failure by the plaintiffs to issue notice under Section 11 of the Act rendered the eviction suit non-maintainable.
  4. Whether, under Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dismissal of an interlocutory Section 9 application could still be challenged in an appeal against the decree without filing a separate statutory appeal under Section 9-A of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Defendants)

  • The earlier Section 9 application, although dismissed before Act 2 of 1980 came into force, should be deemed sufficient compliance with Section 9 as interpreted in Johari Bi v. K. Vinayakam.
  • Consequently, they are entitled to purchase the land under the Act and resist eviction.

Respondents (Plaintiffs)

  • Section 9 demands a fresh, independent application within one month of the Act’s extension; no such application was filed after Act 2 of 1980.
  • Because the defendants did not appeal the dismissal of their earlier Section 9 application, there was no application pending when the Act subsequently extended, and the defendants cannot claim its protection.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Johari Bi (Mrs) v. K. Vinayakam (1976) 1 MLJ 220; AIR 1976 Mad 267 An application filed before the commencement of an amending Act can satisfy the timing requirement under Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act. The Single Judge distinguished it on facts; the present Court indicates that its principle may be relevant and requires reconsideration by the High Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy noted several unresolved factual–legal questions concerning the serial extensions of the Act to Salem: (1) the necessity for a second extension on 29 January 1958 after an earlier extension on 19 September 1956; (2) the legal effect of G.O. No. 1695 dated 17 June 1959 rescinding the 1958 extension; and (3) the rationale for a further extension through Act 2 of 1980. The Court deemed clarification of these matters “quite material” to deciding the appeal.

Addressing the procedural objection raised by the plaintiffs, the Court interpreted Section 9 and Section 9-A of the Act in conjunction with Section 105 CPC. It held that a Section 9 application filed as an interlocutory application in an eviction suit remains open to challenge in any subsequent appeal from the decree; the tenant need not file a separate statutory appeal against dismissal of the interlocutory application. Accordingly, the High Court erred in deeming the defendants’ earlier Section 9 application non-existent or ineffective solely because no separate appeal was filed or no fresh application was made post-1980.

The Court expressly refrained from ruling on the substantive applicability of the Act until the factual chronology of Government Orders is clarified. It therefore remitted the matter for a fresh, comprehensive determination.

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed in part; matter remitted to the Madras High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

Consequences: the High Court must (a) ascertain the legal effect of the multiple Government Orders extending and rescinding the Act’s application to Salem, (b) reconsider the status and sufficiency of the defendants’ Section 9 application in light of Section 105 CPC and relevant precedent, and (c) decide the suit afresh after taking additional evidence if required. No costs were awarded. The decision sets no final precedent on the substantive issues but clarifies that interlocutory orders under Section 9 can be contested in appeals from the final decree without a separate statutory appeal.

    Thailammal And Others v. Janardhan Raju And Others

    B.P Jeevan Reddy, J.— After hearing counsel for both the parties we are of the opinion that the matter must go back to the High Court since certain relevant aspects are not clear from the record before us.

    2. Defendants are the appellants. The respondents-plaintiffs instituted a suit for eviction in the Court of District Magistrate, Salem being O.S No. 1472 of 1972. The plaintiffs' case was that they had let out the portion marked ABCD admeasuring 20 ft. × 16 ft., delineated in the plaint plan, on lease to the defendants for a period of three years. At the end of three years the plaintiff sent a notice terminating the defendants' tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendants not only did not vacate the land but also encroached upon an adjoining portion and have thus come into possession of a larger area MNOP. They are not only liable to be evicted and to pay the arrears of rent but are also liable to pay damages for use and occupation of the excess land occupied by them.

    3. The defence of the appellants was that they were the tenants of the entire area marked as MNOP and that the tenancy had commenced in January 1955 and not on May 6, 1957 as alleged by the plaintiffs. They stated that they had also put up a thatched construction on the said land at a cost of Rs 3000 and that they are entitled to the benefit of Madras City Tenants' Protection Act (hereinafter called ‘the Act’). They also filed an application under Section 9 of the Act in the said suit.

    4. The trial court framed appropriate issues and after considering the evidence adduced by both the parties, decreed the suit on the following findings:

    “(a) The lease was in respect of the smaller portion ABCD only and that the defendants have subsequently encroached upon the adjoining portion.
    (b) The tenancy commenced on May 6, 1957 and not in January 1955.
    (c) That the Act was extended to Salem Town on September 19, 1956 and then again on January 29, 1958, but the subsequent extension was rescinded in G.O No. 1695, which meant that the extension of the Act on September 19, 1956 was effective. Inasmuch as the defendants' tenancy commenced subsequent to September 19, 1956, the defendants are not entitled to the protection of the Act.”

    5. The application filed by defendants under Section 9 of the Act was also dismissed.

    6. The defendants appealed against the decree of the trial court, which was allowed, and suit dismissed, on the following findings:

    “(a) The lease was in respect of ABCD area only and the defendants had indeed encroached upon the adjoining site as alleged by the plaintiffs.
    (b) The plaintiffs have not filed GOMs. 1695 dated June 17, 1959 which means that the extension of the Act on January 29, 1958 was effective. If so, the tenancy of the defendants having commenced on May 6, 1957 — i.e, earlier to January 29, 1958 — they are entitled to the benefit of the Act.
    (c) The plaintiffs have also not issued the notice under Section 11 of the Act terminating the lease and, therefore, the suit is not maintainable.”

    7. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court plaintiffs filed the second appeal which has been heard and allowed by a learned Single Judge under the impugned judgment. The learned Single Judge agreed with the contention of the counsel for the plaintiffs that GOMs. 1695 dated June 17, 1959 was indeed a part of the record and, therefore, it must be deemed that the extension of the Act on January 29, 1958 has been rescinded. Having said so, the learned Judge observed that the said circumstance has no significance inasmuch as the Act was subsequently extended to Salem town by Act 2 of 1980. Accordingly, the learned Judge held that the suit lease is covered by the Act and the defendants can seek the benefit of the Act provided they comply with the conditions prescribed therein. The learned Judge then examined whether the defendants did in fact comply with the requirements of Section 9 of the Act and found that they did not, inasmuch as they did not file an application under Section 9 within one month of the coming into force of the said Amendment Act. The learned Judge also noticed that the application filed under Section 9 by the defendants was rightly dismissed because the defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the Act on that date. The defendants' counsel then brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge the decision of Madras High Court in Johari Bi (Mrs) v. K. Vinayakam (1976) 1 MLJ 220, AIR 1976 Mad 267 wherein an application filed prior to the commencement of the Act was held to be in compliance with the requirements of the Act. The learned Single Judge distinguished the said decision on facts and held it inapplicable to the present case. He observed that the application under Section 9 previously filed by the defendants was rightly dismissed since at that time the defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the Act and that they did not file another application within the period prescribed by Section 9 after the coming into force of Amendment Act 2 of 1980. The learned Single Judge held further that the appellate court was wrong in holding that plaintiff's suit must fail on account of not issuing the notice under Section 11 of the Act. On this reasoning the learned Judge allowed the second appeal, set aside the appellate decree and restored the decree of the trial court.

    8. In this appeal it is contended by Shri Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge was not right in holding that the principle of the decision in Johari Bi (1976) 1 MLJ 220, AIR 1976 Mad 267 was not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. He submitted that the application filed prior to the coming into force of Amendment Act 2 of 1980 should be deemed to be in compliance with the requirement of Section 9 and the defendant must be held to be entitled to the benefit of the Act. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that Section 9 of the Act contemplates an independent application and that Section 9-A provides for an appeal too against the orders passed on such application. He submitted that no appeal was preferred by the defendants against the order of the trial court dismissing their application under Section 9 and, therefore, no application under Section 9 was pending on the date the Amendment Act 2 of 1980 came into force.

    9. The first aspect which could not be clarified before us is this : If the Act was extended to Salem town on September 19, 1956 in the first instance, why was it necessary to extend it over again on January 29, 1958. It is equally not clear what is the effect of G.O No. 1695 dated June 17, 1959 rescinding the extension on January 29, 1958. Yet again, what was the occasion for extending the Act once again in 1980 by the Amendment Act 2 of 1980. We are unable to understand this repeated application of the Act to the same town and the occasion or the necessity therefor. We are of the opinion that this aspect is quite material for the decision of this case and must be clarified.

    10. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is concerned, we are of the opinion that according to Section 9 it is open to a defendant to file an application thereunder in the suit for ejectment filed by the landlord against him. Such an application would be in the nature of an interlocutory application in the suit. In such a situation, it follows that once an appeal is filed by the defendant against the decree of the trial court, he is entitled to challenge the correctness of any interlocutory order passed in the suit, in such appeal, by virtue of Section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is not necessary in such a case that he should prefer an independent appeal against the order dismissing an interlocutory application, even if it is appealable. This principle is of equal application herein even though the interlocutory application is one under Section 9 of the Act. Accordingly, it must be held that in the appeal/second appeal against the decree of the trial court, it was open to the defendants to challenge the correctness of the order dismissing their application under Section 9. The High Court was, therefore, not right in holding that the said application having been dismissed by trial court and no fresh application having been filed, it must be held that there was no application under Section 9. The application filed by the defendants in the trial court must be deemed to be pending during the pendency of the appeal/second appeal. Of course, what is its effect in law is a matter to be considered by the High Court hereinafter.

    11. We may, at this stage, refer to Section 9(1)(a) and Section 9-A(1) of the Act. They read thus:

    “9. Application to Court for directing the landlord to sell land.— (1)(a)(i) Any tenant who is entitled to compensation under Section 3 and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted or proceeding under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, taken by the landlord, may, within one month of the date of the publication of Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1979 in the Madras Government Gazette or of the date with effect from which this Act is extended to the municipal town, township or village in which the land is situate or within one month after the service on him of summons apply to the Court for an order that the landlord shall be directed to sell for a price to be fixed by the Court, the whole or part of, the extent of land specified in the application
    (ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a)(i) of this sub-section, any such tenant as is referred to in sub-clause (ii)(b) of clause (4) of Section 2 or his heirs, may, within a period of two months from the date of the publication of the Madras City Tenants' Protection (Amendment) Act, 1973 apply to the Court. Whether or not a suit for ejectment has been instituted or proceeding under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (Central Act 15 of 1882) has been taken by the landlord or whether or not such suit or proceeding is pending having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for ejectment or in the city of Madras either to such Court or to the Presidency Small Cause Court, for an order that the landlord under the tenancy agreement shall be directed to sell for a price to be fixed by the Court the whole or part of the extent of land specified in the application.
    9-A. Appeals.— (1) An appeal shall lie from an order passed by a Court under Section 6, Section 7, Section 7-A or Section 9 to the Court to which an appeal would lie from any decree passed by the former Court and the decision in such appeal shall be final:
    Provided that from an order passed—
    (i) by the Chief Judge of the Presidency Small Cause Court, an appeal shall lie to the High Court, and
    (ii) by any other Judge of the Presidency Small Cause Court, an appeal shall lie to the Chief Judge.”

    12. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed in part and the matter is remitted back to the Madras High Court. The High Court shall now deal with the same and dispose it of in accordance with law. We make it clear that if the High Court finds it necessary, it shall be open to it to receive such additional material as it thinks appropriate for clarifying the aspect mentioned hereinabove or to call for a finding from the courts below in that behalf.

    13. Having regard to the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal.

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    Comments

    Thailammal And Others v. Janardhan Raju And Others
    (Dec 20, 1991)