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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1991 INSC 302
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5(1) of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867
  • Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867
  • Section 1(1) of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867
  • Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • The Code
  • Section 204 of the Code, Chapter XX of the Code, Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1991 INSC 302
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5(1) of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867
  • Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867
  • Section 1(1) of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867
  • Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • The Code
  • Section 204 of the Code, Chapter XX of the Code, Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The complainant, an advocate (Respondent 2), filed a private complaint before the Additional Judicial Magistrate alleging defamation under Sections 500 and 34 IPC against three persons connected with the widely circulated daily newspaper “Malayalam Manorama”: the Chief Editor (appellant K.M. Mathew), and its Printer and Publisher. After taking cognizance in C.C. No. 496 of 1985, the Magistrate issued summons and all accused entered appearance and pleaded not guilty.

Prior to recording any evidence, the Chief Editor moved an application requesting that proceedings against him be dropped on the ground that the complaint contained no averment linking him with the selection or publication of the impugned news item. The Magistrate agreed and ordered that the complaint “so far as it relates to the Chief Editor could not be proceeded with.”

The complainant filed a revision before the Kerala High Court. The High Court allowed the revision, holding that once process had issued in a summons case, the Magistrate was bound to conduct a full trial under Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure and could not discharge or drop proceedings at any intermediate stage. The Chief Editor obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which granted leave and heard the matter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in a summons case instituted on a private complaint, a Magistrate possesses jurisdiction to drop proceedings against an accused after issuance of process but before the recording of evidence.
  2. Whether the absence of specific averments implicating a “Chief Editor” attracts the statutory presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, so as to justify his being tried for defamation.

Arguments of the Parties

Chief Editor (Appellant)

  • Pointed out that the complaint contained no allegation that he selected, edited, reviewed or consented to publication of the offending article.
  • Asserted that Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act raises a presumption only against the person whose name is printed as “Editor,” not against a person described merely as “Chief Editor.”
  • Contended that compelling him to face trial without a prima facie case would be oppressive and contrary to law.

Complainant (Respondent 2)

  • Relied on the presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act to impute liability to the Chief Editor.
  • Supported the High Court’s view that once cognizance had been taken and summons issued, the Magistrate had no procedural power to drop proceedings until after a full trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Maharashtra v. Dr R.B. Chowdhary (1967) 3 SCR 708 Section 7 presumption applies only to the person named as “Editor” on the newspaper. Used to show that a “Chief Editor” is outside the statutory presumption and cannot be automatically held liable.
D.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narain Sharma (1970) 3 SCC 558 Clarified the scope of liability under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act. Reinforced that mere designation without control over publication is insufficient for criminal liability.
Narasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra Mohanty (1974) 3 SCC 680 Reiterated that the statutory presumption is rebuttable and limited to the printed “Editor.” Cited to negate the complainant’s reliance on Section 7 against the appellant.
Haji C.H. Mohammad Koya v. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya (1979) 2 SCC 8 Further authority on the restrictive ambit of Section 7 presumption. Supported the conclusion that no prima facie case existed against the Chief Editor.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that although Chapter XX of the Code prescribes the normal course for a summons trial after the accused appears, a Magistrate retains inherent judicial discretion to reconsider and rescind the issuance of process. An order issuing process is an interim order, not a judgment, and may be varied or recalled if, on a re-examination of the complaint, the Magistrate finds no offence made out against a particular accused.

The Court emphasized that criminal trial should commence only when there are specific allegations linking the accused to the offence. In the present complaint, there were no positive averments that the Chief Editor controlled, approved, or even knew of the publication of the allegedly defamatory article. The complainant’s reliance on Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act was misplaced because that presumption attaches solely to the person whose name is printed as “Editor,” not to a “Chief Editor.” Consequently, requiring the appellant to stand trial would be oppressive and contrary to the principle that no person should be tried without a prima facie case.

The High Court’s view that the Code furnishes no mechanism for dropping proceedings once process issues was labeled “too technical” and contrary to the implied powers of the Magistrate under Section 204 CrPC.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court order set aside. The Magistrate’s order directing that the complaint shall not proceed against the Chief Editor stands restored.

Implications: The decision clarifies that a Magistrate in a summons case possesses the power to recall or rescind process where the complaint, on its face, discloses no offence against an accused. It also reaffirms that the statutory presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act is confined to the printed “Editor,” thereby limiting vicarious criminal liability for press publications. No new precedent is set, but existing principles are reaffirmed and applied.

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    K.M Mathew v. State Of Kerala And Another

    K. Jagannatha Shetty, J.— We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of the matter.

    2. This appeal against a decision of the Kerala High Court raises an important question concerning the power of the Magistrate to drop proceedings against an accused in a summons case after process is issued.

    3. The facts are simple. K.M Mathew — appellant is the Chief Editor of Malayalam Manorama. It is a daily newspaper with wide circulation in the State of Kerala and seems to be the largest language news∼paper in India. Separate editions of the newspaper are published from different centres, namely, Trivandrum, Kottayam, Cochin and Calicut. At each of these centres, there is a separate Editor who is responsible for selection and publication of news items. The Chief Editor is based at Kottayam and he is responsible for the general policy of the daily and various other publications of the Manorama group of publications. Respondent 2 is an advocate. He was aggrieved by a news item published in the daily. His case was that the news item was published with the sole object of ridiculing and defaming him. He lodged a complaint before the court of Additional Judicial Magistrate against the Chief Editor, the Printer and Publisher of the newspaper alleging that they have committed an offence punishable under Sections 500 and 34 IPC. The learned Magistrate examined the complainant on oath and took the complaint on file as C.C No. 496 of 1985. He issued summons to the accused. The accused upon service entered appearance and pleaded not guilty.

    4. Before the evidence was recorded, the Chief Editor requested the Magistrate to drop the proceedings against him. He contended that the complainant has not alleged that the Chief Editor was responsible for selection of the news item and publication thereof. There was not even an averment in the complaint that the Chief Editor has perused the material or edited before its publication or that it was published with his knowledge or consent. After hearing the parties the Magistrate accepted the plea of the Chief Editor and dropped the proceedings against him. To be more precise, the Magistrate directed that the complaint so far as it relates to the Chief Editor could not be proceeded with.

    5. The complainant took up the matter to the High Court in revision. The High Court allowed the revision and set aside the order of the Magistrate.

    6. The High Court did not examine whether the complainant has or has not made out a case against the Chief Editor. The High Court rested its conclusion solely on the procedural requirements of the trial of a summons case. It has been pointed out that in any private complaint triable as a summons case the Magistrate, after taking cognizance of the offence and issuing process, has no jurisdiction to drop proceedings against the accused. He is bound to proceed under Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the accused enters appearance. He will have to state the particulars of the offence and record the plea of the accused. When the accused pleads not guilty, he will have to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence produced in support of the prosecution. Then he will have to hear the accused and take all such evidence produced in support of the defence. The High Court went on to state that the question of conviction or acquittal will arise only after recording evidence of the parties. There is no question of discharging the accused at an intermediate stage. There is no provision in the Code for dropping the proceedings against any accused. So stating, the High Court has directed the Magistrate to proceed with the trial of all the accused.

    7. The High Court seems to be too technical in this regard. If one reads carefully the provisions relating to trial of summons cases, the power to drop proceedings against the accused cannot be denied to the Magistrate. Section 204 of the Code indicates that the proceedings before the Magistrate commences upon taking cognizance of the offence and the issue of summons to the accused. When the accused enters appearance in response to the summons, the Magistrate has to take proceedings under Chapter XX of the Code. But the need to try the accused arises when there is allegation in the complaint that the accused has committed the crime. If there is no allegation in the complaint involving the accused in the commission of the crime, it is implied that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed against the accused.

    8. It is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused.

    9. In the instant case there is no averment against the Chief Editor except the motive attributed to him. Even the motive alleged is general and vague. The complainant seems to rely upon the presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (‘the Act’). But Section 7 of the Act has no applicability for a person who is simply named as ‘Chief Editor’. The presumption under Section 7 is only against the person whose name is printed as ‘Editor’ as required under Section 5(1). There is a mandatory (though rebuttable) presumption that the person whose name is printed as ‘Editor’ is the Editor of every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced. Section 1(1) of the Act defines ‘Editor’ to mean ‘the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper’. Section 7 raises the presumption in respect of a person who is named as the Editor and printed as such on every copy of the newspaper. The Act does not recognise any other legal entity for raising the presumption. Even if the name of the Chief Editor is printed in the newspaper, there is no presumption against him under Section 7 of the Act. [See State of Maharashtra v. Dr R.B Chowdhary (1967) 3 SCR 708, AIR 1968 SC 110, 1968 Cri LJ 95; D.P Mishra v. Kamal Narain Sharma (1970) 3 SCC 558, (1971) 3 SCR 257, AIR 1971 SC 856; Narasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra Mohanty (1974) 3 SCC 680, (1974) 2 SCR 39, AIR 1974 SC 47 and Haji C.H Mohammad Koya v. T.K.S.M.A Muthukoya (1979) 2 SCC 8, (1979) 1 SCR 664, AIR 1979 SC 154.]

    10. It is important to state that for a Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence as against the Chief Editor, there must be positive averments in the complaint of knowledge of the objectionable character of the matter. The complaint in the instant case does not contain any such allegation. In the absence of such allegation, the Magistrate was justified in directing that the complaint so far as it relates to the Chief Editor could not be proceeded with. To ask the Chief Editor to undergo the ∼trial of the case merely on the ground of the issue of process would be oppressive. No person should be tried without a prima facie case. The view taken by the High Court is untenable. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside.

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    K.M Mathew v. State Of Kerala And Another
    (Nov 19, 1991)