AMICUS AI
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Neutral Citations
1989 INSC 152
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(k) of the Act
  • The 1983 Income Tax Act (not found in the text, but added as it was mentioned in the instructions)
  • Section 10(1) of the Act
  • Section 12(5) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • The Act
  • Section 10 of the Act
  • the 1983 Income Tax Act (not found in the text, but mentioned as a reference)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1989 INSC 152
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(k) of the Act
  • The 1983 Income Tax Act (not found in the text, but added as it was mentioned in the instructions)
  • Section 10(1) of the Act
  • Section 12(5) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • The Act
  • Section 10 of the Act
  • the 1983 Income Tax Act (not found in the text, but mentioned as a reference)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant union, Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh, represents about 900 convoy drivers who move newly manufactured vehicles from the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO) plant in Jamshedpur. By a demand letter dated 16 October 1986, the union claimed that these convoy drivers were workmen of TELCO and sought permanent status along with benefits available to other permanent employees.

The State Government had earlier (1973) opined that no master-servant relationship existed between TELCO and the convoy drivers. Relying on that opinion, the Deputy Labour Commissioner, by letter dated 26 February 1979, refused to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“the Act”).

The union filed a writ petition before the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court. A Single Judge dismissed the petition but granted liberty to pursue the matter afresh before the Government. The union again approached the Government; the Deputy Labour Commissioner on 6 November 1986 reiterated the refusal. A second writ petition was summarily dismissed by the High Court, prompting the present appeal.

During pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court, on 30 March 1989, directed the State of Bihar to reconsider referring the dispute. On 13 April 1989 the Government again declined, stating that convoy drivers were not TELCO workmen.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government, in refusing to refer the dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act, improperly adjudicated the merits by deciding that convoy drivers were not workmen of TELCO.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances, the Supreme Court should direct the Government to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The Government exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding the core dispute (status of convoy drivers) instead of merely forming an administrative opinion on the existence of an industrial dispute.
  • Section 10(1) mandates that such disputed questions be sent to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, not resolved administratively by the Deputy Labour Commissioner or the State Government.

Respondent TELCO’s Arguments

  • The Government is empowered to consider whether an industrial dispute “exists or is apprehended.”
  • Because the convoy drivers are not TELCO employees, no industrial dispute exists within Section 2(k) of the Act; the refusal to refer was therefore within jurisdiction.

State Government’s Position

  • Produced an order dated 13 April 1989 reiterating that convoy drivers are not TELCO workmen and maintaining the refusal to refer.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana (1985) 3 SCC 189 Government’s role under Section 10(1) is administrative; it cannot decide the merits. Relied upon to hold that the State wrongly adjudicated whether convoy drivers are workmen.
M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. State of M.P. (1985) 2 SCC 103 Government must be slow to refuse reference; only perverse or frivolous demands may be declined. Cited to show that the present dispute was not frivolous and required adjudication by a Tribunal.
Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (1978) 2 SCC 353 Distinction between administrative opinion formation and adjudication of disputes. Supported the conclusion that merits cannot be examined by the Government.
Sankari Cement Alai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam v. Government of T.N. (1983) 1 SCC 304 Supreme Court’s power to direct the State to make a reference when wrongly refused. Used as precedent for issuing a mandatory direction to refer the dispute.
Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab 1984 Supp SCC 407 Another instance where the Court compelled a reference after wrongful refusal. Reinforced the propriety of the directive issued in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court emphasised the settled law that forming an opinion under Section 10(1) is an administrative function. Determining whether an industrial dispute “exists or is apprehended” does not authorise the Government to decide substantive rights. The dispute here—whether convoy drivers are TELCO workmen—is precisely the question meant for adjudication by an Industrial Tribunal.

The Court noted that, except in exceptional cases of perverse or frivolous demands, the Government should avoid examining the merits. By repeatedly concluding that convoy drivers are not workmen, the State had usurped the Tribunal’s function, rendering Sections 10 and 12(5) nugatory.

Given the Government’s persistent refusal, despite an opportunity for reconsideration, and guided by earlier decisions where the Court compelled references, the bench concluded that justice required a direct order to refer the dispute.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the Patna High Court’s judgment and the State Government’s orders are set aside. The State of Bihar is directed to refer the dispute raised by the union’s letter dated 16 October 1986 to an appropriate Industrial Tribunal within one month.

Implications: The decision reinforces the boundary between the administrative screening role of the Government under Section 10(1) and the adjudicatory role of Industrial Tribunals. It provides immediate relief to the convoy drivers by ensuring their status claim is adjudicated, without establishing a new legal principle but affirming existing jurisprudence that Governments cannot decide disputes on merits while refusing reference.

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    Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh And Another v. State Of Bihar And Others

    M.M Dutt, J.— Special leave is granted. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

    2. The appellants, Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh, Jamshedpur, and another, have preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Patna High Court whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellants challenging the order of the State of Bihar refusing to make a reference of the disputes raised by the appellants to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”.

    3. The appellant Sangh represents about 900 convoy drivers. By a letter of demand dated 16-10-1986 addressed to the General Manager of the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd., Jamshedpur (for short “TELCO”), the Sangh demanded that permanent status should be given by the management to all the convoy drivers, and that they should also be given all the facilities as are available to the permanent employees of TELCO on the dates of their appointment. The said demand proceeds on the basis that the convoy drivers are all workmen of TELCO. The dispute that has been raised in the said letter of demand is principally whether the convoy drivers are workmen and/or employees of TELCO or not. In other words, whether there is relationship of employer and employees between TELCO and the convoy drivers.

    4. The Deputy Labour Commissioner by his letter dated 26-2-1979 informed the appellant Sangh that in view of the opinion of the Law Department of the year 1973 to the effect that there was no relationship of master and servant between TELCO and the convoy drivers, the demands of the convoy drivers did not come within the purview of the Act and, accordingly, it was not possible to take any action in regard to the dispute of convoy drivers under the Act. The appellant Sangh being aggrieved by the said refusal to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act, moved before the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court a writ petition praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the State of Bihar to refer the dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, who heard the writ petition, took the view that the letter of the Deputy Labour Commissioner only referred to the Law Department's opinion of the year 1973 without indicating in what context and under what circumstance, he rejected the demand for a reference. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge granted liberty to the Sangh to reagitate the matter before the appropriate Government and expressed the hope that the appropriate Government would consider the matter in a proper perspective in the light of the documents and the materials that would be placed by the Sangh, in accordance with law. The writ petition was dismissed subject, however, to the observation and direction mentioned above.

    5. Pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court, the Sangh made a representation to the Government for a reference of the dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act. The Deputy Labour Commissioner, Jamshedpur, by his letter dated 6-11-1986 gave the same reply and refused to make a reference.

    6. Again, the appellant Sangh moved a writ petition before the High Court and, as stated already, the High Court summarily dismissed the same holding that the appellants had failed to prima facie satisfy that they were employed either by TELCO or by the Telco Contractors' Association. Hence this appeal.

    7. It has been urged by Mr Pai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that the Government exceeded its jurisdiction in purporting to decide the dispute raised by the appellant Sangh in the said letter of demand. Counsel submits that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Government should have made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act for the adjudication of the dispute of the convoy drivers and should not have embarked upon the task of deciding the dispute on its merits through the Deputy Labour Commissioner.

    8. On the other hand, it has been vehemently urged by Mr Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of TELCO, that the Government has the jurisdiction to consider whether any industrial dispute exists or not and, in considering the same, as the Government found that the convoy drivers were not even workmen of TELCO or, in other words, there had been no relationship of master and servants between TELCO and the convoy drivers, the Government refused to make a reference of the dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act. It is submitted that the refusal by the Government to make a reference was perfectly within its jurisdiction inasmuch as, in the opinion of the Government, there was no existence of any industrial dispute.

    9. After conclusion of the hearing, we took the view that the Government should be given one more chance to consider the question of making a reference and, accordingly, we by our order dated 30-3-1989 directed the Government to reconsider the question of referring the dispute raised by the convoy drivers to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act, keeping the appeal pending before us.

    10. The learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the Government, has produced before us an order dated 13-4-1989 of the Government whereby the Government has, upon a reconsideration of the matter, refused to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act. In refusing to make a reference, the Government has adjudicated the dispute on its merits.

    11. It is true that in considering the question of making a reference under Section 10(1), the Government is entitled to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute “exists or is apprehended”, as urged by Mr Shanti Bhushan. The formation of opinion as to whether an industrial dispute “exists or is apprehended” is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on its merits. In the instant case, as already stated, the dispute is as to whether the convoy drivers are employees or workmen of TELCO, that is to say, whether there is relationship of employer and employees between TELCO and the convoy drivers. In considering the question whether a reference should be made or not, the Deputy Labour Commissioner and/or the Government have held that the convoy drivers are not workmen and, accordingly, no reference can be made. Thus, the dispute has been decided by the Government which is, undoubtedly, not permissible.

    12. It is, however, submitted on behalf of TELCO that unless there is relationship of employer and employees or, in other words, unless those who are raising the disputes are workmen, there cannot be any existence of industrial dispute within the meaning of the term as defined in Section 2 (k) of the Act. It is urged that in order to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, one of the factors that has to be considered by the Government is whether the persons who are raising the disputes are workmen or not within the meaning of the definition as contained in Section 2(k) of the Act.

    13. Attractive though the contention is, we regret, we are unable to accept the same. It is now well settled that, while exercising power under Section 10(1) of the Act, the function of the appropriate Government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function, and that in performing this administrative function the Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by Section 10 of the Act. See Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana (1985) 3 SCC 189, (1985) 3 SCR 686; M.P Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. State of M.P (1985) 2 SCC 103, (1985) 2 SCR 1019; Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, Jullundur (1978) 2 SCC 353, (1978) 2 SCR 793.

    14. Applying the principle laid down by this Court in the above decisions, there can be no doubt that the Government was not justified in deciding the dispute. Where, as in the instant case, the dispute is whether the persons raising the dispute are workmen or not, the same cannot be decided by the Government in exercise of its administrative function under Section 10(1) of the Act. As has been held in M.P Irrigation Karamchari Sangh case (1985) 2 SCC 103, (1985) 2 SCR 1019, there may be exceptional cases in which the State Government may, on a proper examination of the demand, come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference. Further, the Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to declining reference and courts will always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the Tribunal for adjudication of valid disputes, and that to allow the Government to do so would be to render Section 10 and Section 12(5) of the Act nugatory.

    15. We are, therefore, of the view that the State Government, which is the appropriate Government, was not justified in adjudicating the dispute, namely, whether the convoy drivers are workmen or employees of TELCO or not and, accordingly, the impugned orders of the Deputy Labour Commissioner acting on behalf of the Government and that of the Government itself cannot be sustained.

    16. It has been already stated that we had given one more chance to the Government to reconsider the matter and the Government after reconsideration has come to the same conclusion that the convoy drivers are not workmen of TELCO thereby adjudicating the dispute itself. After having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and having given our best consideration in the matter, we are of the view that the dispute should be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal and, as the Government has persistently declined to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act, we think we should direct the Government to make such a reference. In several instances this Court had to direct the Government to make a reference under Section 10(1) when the Government had declined to make such a reference and this Court was of the view that such a reference should have been made. See Sankari Cement Alai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam v. Government of T.N (1983) 1 SCC 304, (1983) 1 Lab LJ 460; Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana (1985) 3 SCC 189, (1985) 3 SCR 686; M.P Irrigation Karamchari Sangh v. State of M.P (1985) 2 SCC 103, (1985) 2 SCR 1019; Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab 1984 Supp SCC 407, (1984) 2 Lab LJ 396.

    17. In the circumstances, we direct the State of Bihar to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act of the dispute raised by the Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh by its letter dated 16-10-1986 addressed to the General Manager, TELCO (Annexure R-4/1 to the special leave petition), to an appropriate Industrial Tribunal within one month from today.

    18. The appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court and the impugned orders are set aside. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

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    Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh And Another v. State Of Bihar And Others
    (Apr 28, 1989)