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  • Section 25-B(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Section 25-B(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 25-B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Standard Motor Products of India Limited closed its factory on May 22, 1970. In the 12 months preceding the closure, the workmen were on strike during two periods: September 12, 1969 to November 6, 1969 and February 12, 1970 to February 26, 1970. The strike was illegal from September 19, 1969 to November 6, 1969 and from February 12, 1970 to February 26, 1970 because the Government of Tamil Nadu had issued an order under Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act on September 19, 1969 prohibiting the strike.

After closure, a settlement was reached on February 15, 1971, under which the closure was accepted “as a fact,” and the factory resumed work as a new unit on January 22, 1971. Former employees were taken back as new employees, with an agreement that their previous service would be counted for gratuity purposes.

Two hundred and seventeen workers filed petitions under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act seeking closure compensation under Section 25-FFF. The Labour Court dismissed the petitions. Two writ petitions were filed in the High Court of Madras as test cases; both were allowed. The management appealed to the Supreme Court after obtaining a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the workmen were entitled to closure compensation under Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, specifically whether they satisfied the requirement of “continuous service” of not less than one year immediately before closure in light of interruptions due to illegal strikes.
  2. For calculating “actually worked” days under Section 25-B(2), whether Sundays and other holidays for which wages were paid should be excluded when determining if the 240-day threshold is met.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Management's Arguments

  • The workmen were not entitled to closure compensation under Section 25-FFF because they had not been in continuous service for at least one year immediately before closure.
  • Continuous service was broken by the two periods of illegal strike; since Section 25-B(1) includes only strikes “which are not illegal,” an illegal strike creates a break in continuity.
  • The 240-days “actually worked” requirement under Section 25-B(2) would not be met if Sundays and other holidays (though paid) were excluded.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management (1985) 4 SCC 71 The method of counting “days actually worked” for purposes of the 240-day threshold (including the treatment of Sundays and other paid holidays). The Court treated the management’s contention about excluding Sundays and other paid holidays as already answered in this precedent and applied that answer to reject the contention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the management’s argument that the illegal strikes broke “continuous service” under Section 25-B(1), which includes uninterrupted service but only permits interruption by a strike that is not illegal. The Court accepted that this argument would have had force if the statute ended with Section 25-B(1), but held that Section 25-B(2) is decisive.

Under Section 25-B(2), even where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Section 25-B(1) for a year, the workman is deemed to be in continuous service for a year if, during the twelve calendar months preceding the relevant date, the workman has “actually worked” for not less than 240 days. The Court held that, even excluding the period of illegal strike, the days actually worked would exceed 240 days. Therefore, the workmen had to be treated as being in continuous service for one year immediately before closure, satisfying the eligibility condition for closure compensation.

The Court further rejected the submission that Sundays and other holidays for which wages were paid should be excluded from the 240-day computation, stating that this contention had already been answered in its just-pronounced judgment in Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED with costs.

The dismissal upheld the High Court’s view allowing the workmen’s claims for closure compensation under Section 25-FFF, on the basis that they were deemed to be in continuous service for one year by meeting the 240-day “actually worked” criterion under Section 25-B(2), notwithstanding interruptions due to illegal strikes. The opinion applied existing law and an already-decided precedent on counting days worked, and does not indicate that any new precedent was set beyond this application.

    Management Of Standard Motor Products Of India Limited v. A. Parthasarathy And Another

    O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.— The Standard Motor Products of India Limited closed down their factory on May 22, 1970. During the 12 months preceding the date of closure, the workmen were on strike from September 12, 1969 to November 6, 1969 and February 12, 1970 to February 26, 1970. The strike was illegal from September 19, 1969 to November 6, 1969 and from February 12, 1970 to February 26, 1970 as the Government of Tamil Nadu had made an order under Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act on September 19, 1969 prohibiting the strike. After the closure on May 22, 1970, there was a settlement between the management and the workmen on February 15, 1971. Under the terms of the settlement, it was agreed that the closure should be accepted as a fact, with the necessary legal consequences to follow. The factory resumed work as a new unit on January 22, 1971. The erstwhile employees were taken back as new employees, but it was agreed that their previous services were to be taken into account for the purpose of gratuity. Two hundred and seventeen workers filed petitions under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claiming closure compensation under Section 25-FFF. The petitions were dismissed by the Labour Court. Two writ petitions were filed before the High Court of Madras as test cases and both of them were allowed by the High Court. The Management of Standard Motor Products of India Limited has come up in appeal having obtained a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution.

    2. Shri G.B Pai, learned counsel for the appellant Management submitted that the workmen were not entitled to any closure compensation under Section 25-FFF as they had not been in continuous service for not less than one year in the undertaking immediately before such closure. His submission was that the continuity of service was broken by the two periods of illegal strike and therefore, the workmen could not be said to have been in service for not less than one year. There is no force in this submission. Section 25-B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act says that a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted by a strike which is not illegal. According to Shri Pai, since the strike in the case was illegal, there was a break in the continuity of service. There would be force in the submission of Shri Pai if Section 25-B(2) did not exist. Under Section 25-B(2), where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year, if the workman, during the period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than two hundred and forty days. In the present case, even if the period of illegal strike is excluded, the number of days during which the workman actually worked under the employer wculd be found to be more than 240 days. That being so it has to be held that the workmen were in continuous service for a period of one year immediately before the date of closure. The further submission of Shri Pai that the number of days on which the workmen actually worked under the employer would be less than 240 days if Sundays and other holidays for which the workmen were paid wages were excluded has already been answered by us in the case of Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management (1985) 4 SCC 71 in which judgment has just been pronounced by us. In the circumstances, both the appeals are dismissed with costs.

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    Management Of Standard Motor Products Of India Limited v. A. Parthasarathy And Another
    (Aug 28, 1985)