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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1984 INSC 78
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 9(3) of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Act
  • Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 4(1) of the Act
  • Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894)
  • Section 9(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 17(4) of the Act
  • Section 9(1) of the Act
  • Section 17(1) of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1984 INSC 78
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 11 of the Act
  • Section 9(3) of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Act
  • Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 4(1) of the Act
  • Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894)
  • Section 9(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 17(4) of the Act
  • Section 9(1) of the Act
  • Section 17(1) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification dated 8 January 1980 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire approximately 41.46 acres comprising about 60 plots in Kheragarh and Nagala Udaiya villages, Agra District, for construction of a Market Yard for the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kheragarh. Invoking Section 17(4), the State dispensed with the landowners’ right to object under Section 5-A, and on 9 January 1980 it issued a Section 6 declaration coupled with a Section 17(1) order authorising the Collector to take possession before the award. Possession of the land was thereafter taken.

In June 1982, the Collector served notices under Section 9(3) to determine compensation. Three landholders—Hari Singh (Appellant 1), Pooran Chand (Appellant 2) and Munna Lal (Appellant 3)—filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8397 of 1982 in the Allahabad High Court challenging the acquisition of six specific plots (Nos. 249, 250, 252, 261, 133 and 134). They obtained an interim order on 9 September 1982 restraining dispossession, but the High Court summarily dismissed the petition on 17 January 1983 with a one-word order, “Rejected.”

The appellants invoked Article 136 of the Constitution and appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the writ petition, filed more than two and a half years after the acquisition notifications, was barred by laches.
  2. Whether the State’s invocation of Section 17(4) dispensing with objections under Section 5-A was legally sustainable given the alleged absence of urgency.
  3. Whether disputed questions of title and the alleged existence of a house on Plot No. 249 could invalidate the acquisition in writ proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • They had no knowledge of the January 1980 notifications until receipt of Section 9(3) notices in June 1982.
  • Section 17(4) was improperly invoked; no genuine urgency existed because no construction had commenced for nearly two years.
  • For Plot No. 249, the presence of a house and a flour mill took it outside the scope of Section 17(4).
  • Relied on State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 to contend that the Court should quash acquisitions tainted by illegality or mala fides.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The writ petition was hopelessly delayed; official acts are presumed regular, and publication in the locality was properly effected.
  • Many other landowners had accepted the acquisition, indicating the appellants’ awareness.
  • Appellant 1 was only a co-tenure holder and other co-owners had not challenged the acquisition; existence of a house on Plot No. 249 was denied on the basis of revenue records.
  • Appellant 2 purchased Plot No. 261 after the notifications; Appellant 3’s title to Plot No. 133 was disputed.
  • Some construction had already begun, evidencing urgency and public interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 Court may strike down land acquisitions vitiated by mala fides or illegality. The Court held the decision inapplicable because no allegation or evidence of mala fides was present in the instant case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Laches: The Court treated the delay of approximately 2½ years as fatal. The appellants neither pleaded nor proved absence of local publication as required by Section 4(1). In a small town like Kheragarh, the acquisition would have been common knowledge, and only two petitions were filed out of many landowners. Interference after such delay would cause public prejudice; hence the writ was liable to dismissal on this ground alone.

2. Merits: Even assuming the petition was timely, the appellants failed to establish any illegality:

  • They restricted their challenge to Plots 249, 261 and 133, abandoning the rest.
  • Ownership of each plot was disputed: Appellant 1 was only a co-tenure holder; Appellant 2 purchased after the notifications; Appellant 3’s title was denied. Such disputed facts are unsuited to adjudication in writ proceedings.
  • Alleged structures on Plot 249 were refuted by revenue records; resolving the contradiction would require evidence outside the writ jurisdiction.
  • Invoking Section 17(4) was not shown to be mala fide; some construction had commenced, substantiating urgency.

The reliance on Gurdial Singh was misplaced because no mala fides were alleged here.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s summary dismissal of the writ petition. Consequently, the acquisition proceedings remain undisturbed, and construction of the Market Yard may proceed. The judgment turns primarily on delay and the absence of demonstrable illegality; it sets no new precedent beyond reaffirming settled principles on laches and limited writ review where disputed facts exist.

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    Hari Singh And Others v. State Of U.P And Others

    E.S Venkataramiah, J.— About 45 plots of land of Kheragarh village and about 15 adjoining plots of land of Nagala Udaiya village situated in the district of Agra were notified under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for acquisition for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of the Market Yard of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kheragarh under a notification dated January 8, 1980 issued by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh. As the plots of land in question which were agricultural lands were urgently required for the aforesaid purpose and the Government was of the view that it was necessary to direct that Section 5-A of the Act should not apply to the said acquisition proceedings, it simultaneously made an order under Section 17(4) of the Act directing that Section 5-A would not apply to the said proceedings and incorporated the said order also in the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. The notification was published in the Official Gazette dated January 9, 1980. This was followed by a notification dated January 9, 1980 under Section 6 of the Act published in the Official Gazette dated January 10, 1980. That notification contained an order made under Section 17(1) of the Act authorising the Collector to take possession of the plots on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act though no award under Section 11 of the Act had been made. The above said plots of land which were in all about 60 in number belonged to a number of persons. The total extent of land proposed to be acquired was about 41.46 acres. The possession of all the plots of land was also taken in the course of the said acquisition proceedings. In or about June, 1982, notices were issued by the Collector to various persons having interest in the said plots under Section 9(3) of the Act for the purpose of determining the compensation payable to them. After the issue of the said notices, three persons Hari Singh (Appellant 1), Pooran Chand (Appellant 2) and Munna Lal (Appellant 3) filed a writ petition in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8397 of 1982 on the file of the High Court of Allahabad questioning the validity of the acquisition proceedings as regards 6 plots of land in Kheragarh village out of the total of about 60 plots of land which had been acquired by the State Government in the above said proceedings. Appellant 1 claimed to be the owner of Plots Nos. 249, 250 and 252. Appellant 2 claimed to be the owner of Plot No. 261 and Appellant 3 claimed to be the owner of Plots Nos. 133 and 134. Appellant 1 pleaded that there was a house situated on Plot No. 249 and that he had also installed a flour mill on it. They all pleaded that they had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and were prejudiced by the order made under Section 17(4) of the Act exempting the operation of Section 5-A of the Act in the case of these proceedings. They further pleaded that there was no urgency sufficient in law to sustain the order made under Section 17(4) of the Act as nothing had been done on the lands for nearly two years. Appellant 1 also pleaded that Section 17(4) of the Act would not be applicable because on a part of his land there was a house. They also applied for an interim order restraining the Collector from dispossessing them from the plots in question. On September 9, 1982 the High Court made an interim order restraining the respondents from dispossessing the appellants from the plots until further orders, unless they had already been dispossessed. But on January 17, 1983, the High Court rejected the writ petition at the stage of admission after hearing the advocates for both the parties. This appeal by special leave is filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order of the High Court.

    2. The High Court has not given any reasons for its order dismissing the writ petition. The order reads: “Rejected”.

    3. We have been taken through the writ petition, counter-affidavits and other papers filed in the High Court and in this Court.

    4. At the outset we are of the view that the writ petition filed in July 1982 questioning the notification issued in January 1980 after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. It is no doubt true that the appellants have pleaded that they did not know anything about the notifications which had been published in the Gazette till they came to know of the notices issued under Section 9(3) of the Act but they have not pleaded that there was no publication in the locality of the public notice of the substance of the notification as required by Section 4(1) of the Act. It should be presumed that official acts would have been performed duly as required by law. It is significant that a large number of persons who own the remaining plots have not challenged the acquisition proceedings. The only other petition in which these proceedings are challenged is Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11476 of 1982 on the file of the High Court filed subsequently by Amar Singh and four others. Moreover in a small place like Kheragarh where these plots are situate, the acquisition of these lands would be the talk of the town in a short while and it is difficult to believe that the appellants who are residents of that place would not have known till July 1982 that the impugned notification had been published in 1980. Any interference in this case filed after two and a half years with the acquisition proceedings is likely to cause serious public prejudice. This appeal should, therefore, fail on the ground of delay alone.

    5. Now even on merits there appears to be no substance in the case of the appellants.

    6. At the hearing of this appeal, the appellants have confined their case to Plots Nos. 249, 261 and 133 and have given up their case in regard to Plots Nos. 250, 252 and 134.

    7. Appellant 1 claims to be the owner of Plot No. 249. On behalf of the respondents it is urged that Appellant 1 is recorded only as a co-tenure holder along with five others and they have not impeached the notifications. With regard to the allegation about the existence of a house on this plot, it is seen that the said fact is denied. The respondents rely upon some statements recorded by the Revenue Authorities suggesting that there was no house on this plot on the date of the notification. This is a disputed question of fact. Appellant 2 who claims to be the owner of Plot No. 261 is stated to have purchased it on November 17, 1980 after the impugned notifications were published. The title of Appellant 3 to Plot No. 133 is denied by R.K Kannaujia, Secretary, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kheragarh. In this state of affairs where there are disputed questions of fact it cannot be said that the appellants have made out any case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    8. On behalf of the appellants reliance is, however, placed on a decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, AIR 1980 SC 319, (1980) 1 SCR 1071. In that decision the main point made out was that the acquisition proceedings had been engineered mala fide by a State Minister. We do not have any such allegation in the present case. In the circumstances of this case we do not find that there is any ground to hold that the order made under Section 17(4) of the Act exempting the operation of Section 5-A of the Act is bad in law even though there appears to be some administrative delay in commencing the construction of the Market Yard. Some photographs of the land produced before us, however, show that the work of construction has already been commenced.

    9. We do not, therefore, find that there is any ground to interfere with the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    Hari Singh And Others v. State Of U.P And Others
    (Apr 6, 1984)