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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951
  • Section 22 of the Act
  • Section 26 of the Act
  • Section 4, Section 5 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951
  • Section 22 of the Act
  • Section 26 of the Act
  • Section 4, Section 5 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent instituted a suit under Section 8(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, seeking to set aside a revenue order dated 1 March 1955 that had declared “Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan, Mangrul-Dastagir” to be a public trust. The defendants were the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Registrar of Public Trusts, Amraoti. It is common ground that the plaintiff gave no prior notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

The Additional District Judge dismissed the suit on 26 March 1957 for want of the mandatory Section 80 notice. A single-judge appeal failed, but a subsequent Letters Patent Appeal was referred to a Full Bench, which reversed the lower courts and held that Section 80 CPC did not apply to suits brought under Section 8 of the Public Trusts Act. The State obtained a certificate of fitness, and the present appeal was heard by the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit filed under Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, to set aside an order of the Registrar of Public Trusts is subject to the mandatory notice requirement of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants/Appellants (State of Madhya Pradesh and Registrar)

  • The suit was not maintainable because the plaintiff had failed to serve the mandatory two-month notice under Section 80 CPC on the Government and the Registrar, a public officer acting in his official capacity.

No detailed arguments of the plaintiff/respondent were recorded in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand v. Union of India, (1966) 1 SCR 986 Notice under Section 80 CPC is necessary before challenging administrative orders such as attachment or sale. Invoked to support the proposition that analogous actions to set aside an official order cannot proceed without prior notice.
Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council, AIR 1967 SC 148 Section 80 CPC is explicit, express, and mandatory; applies regardless of good faith or bad faith. Cited to emphasise the mandatory character of the notice requirement and its applicability to acts of public officers.
Prasaddas v. Bennerjee, ILR (1930) 57 Cal 1127 The phrase “act purporting to be done in official capacity” covers non-feasance, misfeasance, and illegal omissions. Relied upon to show that Section 80 extends to any challenge to a public officer’s official acts or omissions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by analysing the scheme of the Public Trusts Act. Under that Act, the Collector functions as the Registrar of Public Trusts and enjoys wide supervisory powers, making him indisputably a “public officer.” The suit in question sought to set aside the Registrar’s order—a quintessential act done in his official capacity.

Section 80 CPC expressly requires that no suit be filed against either the Government or a public officer in respect of an act purporting to be done in an official capacity unless two-months’ prior notice is served. The jurisprudence in Bhagchand Dagadusa and Prasaddas confirms that the requirement is both mandatory and broad, extending to acts done illegally, in bad faith, or by omission. Moreover, Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand illustrates that courts have consistently required notice before permitting challenges to administrative actions.

Given that (i) the Registrar is a public officer, (ii) the order under challenge was issued in official capacity, and (iii) no Section 80 notice was served, the Court held that the suit was incompetent. Accordingly, the Full Bench of the High Court erred in concluding that Section 80 had no application to suits under Section 8 of the Public Trusts Act.

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed; judgment of the High Court set aside. Parties to bear their own costs.

Immediate Impact: The plaintiff’s suit is rendered non-maintainable for want of the statutory notice. Broader Implication: The decision re-affirms that the mandatory notice requirement of Section 80 CPC applies even when special statutes (such as the M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951) permit civil suits against administrative findings, thereby reinforcing procedural safeguards for governmental and public officers.

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    State Of Maharashtra And Another v. Chander Kant (Shri) .

    A.N Ray, C.J— This appeal by certificate is from the judgment dated June 16, 1966 of the High Court at Bombay (Nagpur Bench).

    2. The respondent filed this suit against the State claiming that the order dated March 1, 1955 in revenue case declaring Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan of Mangrul-Dastagir to be a public trust be set aside. The plaint was filed under Section 8(1) of the Public Trusts Act (M.P Public Trusts Act, 1951) against the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Registrar of Public Trusts, Amraoti.

    3. It is admitted by the parties that no notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was given. The defendants took the plea that the suit was liable to be dismissed by reason of no notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure having been given.

    4. The Additional District Judge by his order dated March 26, 1957 held that a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was necessary and the suit was not maintainable and ordered the dismissal of the suit.

    5. The respondent filed an appeal. The learned Single Judge agreed with the view of the Additional District Judge.

    6. A letters patent appeal was filed. The matter was placed before a Full Bench. The Full Bench held that the provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure had no application to a suit filed under Section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

    7. This Court in Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand v. Union of India (1966) 1 SCR 986, 1966 SC 1068 held that notice under Section 80 is necessary for setting aside orders of attachment and sale of property.

    8. The provisions contained in Section 8 of the Act indicate that the suit contemplated there is against the public officer in his official capacity within the meaning of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    9. The provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure are express, explicit and mandatory. See Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council AIR 1967 SC 148.

    10. The Registrar in the present case held it to be a public trust. The declaration sought for in this suit is that this is not a public trust. The High Court was wrong in holding that the suit under Section 8 of the Act cannot be regarded as a suit against the Government.

    11. The Full Bench held that neither the Government nor the Registrar was competent to give any relief to any person who felt aggrieved by the order of the Registrar.

    12. The following provisions of the Act are important to be noticed. The Collector shall be the Registrar of Public Trusts in respect of every public trust the principal office or the principal place of business of which is situate in his district. Within three months from the date on which Section 4 comes into force in any area or from the date on which a public trust is created, the working trustee of every public trust shall apply to the Registrar having jurisdiction for the registration of the public trust. On receipt of an application the Registrar shall make an inquiry as contemplated in Section 5 of the Act. The Registrar then shall record his finding with reasons. The Registrar shall cause entries to be made in the register. Any person aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar may within six months from the date of the publication of the notice institute a suit in a civil court to have such finding set aside or modified. In every such suit, the civil court shall give notice to the State Government through the Registrar, and the State Government, if it so desires, shall be made a party to the suit. All monies belonging to a public trust shall be kept in a scheduled bank. No sale, mortgage, exchange or gift of any immovable property and no lease for a period exceeding seven years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building belonging to a public trust, shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Registrar. The budget of every public trust where the gross annual income of which exceeds one thousand rupees shall be submitted to the Registrar. The Registrar shall have powers to enter on and inspect or cause to be entered on and inspected any property belonging to a public trust, or to call for any return, statement, account or report as contemplated in Section 22 of the Act. If the Registrar finds any defects in the administration of the public trust the Registrar may require the working trust to submit an explanation. The Registrar has power as contemplated in Section 26 of the Act to direct the trustee to apply to court for directions in certain cases. If the trustee fails to do so the Registrar shall himself make an application. The State Government may make rules for the purposes mentioned in the Act.

    13. These provisions indicate that the Registrar is a public officer. The words “act purporting to be done in official capacity” have been construed to apply to non-feasance as well as to misfeasance. The word “act” extends to illegal omissions. See Prasaddas v. Bennerjee ILR (1930) 57 Cal 1127. No distinction can be made between acts done illegally and in bad faith and acts done bona fide in official capacity. See Bhagchand Dagadusa case AIR 1967 SC 148. Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure therefore is attracted when any suit is filed against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity.

    14. The language of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that a notice is to be given against not only the Government but also against the public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done in his official capacity. The Registrar is a public officer. The order is an act purporting to be done in his official capacity.

    15. In the present case, the suit is to set aside the order made by a public officer in respect of an act done in the discharge of his official duties. Therefore, notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was required.

    16. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.

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    Comments

    State Of Maharashtra And Another v. Chander Kant (Shri) .
    (Oct 29, 1976)