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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sub-sections (1) and (2), Income Tax Act
  • Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 54 of the Income Tax Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 54, Section 65 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 54, Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sub-sections (1) and (2), Income Tax Act
  • Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 54 of the Income Tax Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 54, Section 65 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 54, Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Gurupada Ghosh, filed Suit No. 41 of 1953 in the 6th Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore (District 24-Parganas, West Bengal) seeking a money decree for Rs 32,132-12-3 against the appellant, Charu Chandra Kundu. Ghosh alleged that on 11-5-1949 he had advanced Rs 30,000 to the appellant by cheque, of which only Rs 5,500 had been repaid. The appellant admitted the advance but asserted that he and his wife had already repaid Rs 37,000, whereupon the original promissory note and deposited title deeds were returned to them.

To substantiate his defence of repayment, the appellant sought a summons compelling the Commissioner of Income Tax to produce an original statement allegedly made by the respondent on 22-2-1950 during the appellant’s income-tax assessment proceedings. Citing Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, the Commissioner refused. Both the Subordinate Judge and, on revision, the Calcutta High Court upheld the Commissioner’s objection. The present appeal challenges those orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act absolutely prohibits a civil court from compelling a public servant to produce original statements or records from income-tax proceedings.
  2. Whether the prohibition in Section 54 can be nullified by waiver of the privilege by the assessee whose assessment is involved.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 54 protects only the assessee; therefore, if the assessee waives the privilege, the statutory bar should not apply.
  • The requested statement was made by a third party (the present respondent) and not by the assessee; hence it falls outside the intended scope of confidentiality.
  • Reliance was placed on Buchibai v. Nagpur University (1947) 15 ITR 150 and allied cases, which, according to counsel, recognise an assessee’s right to waive confidentiality.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Buchibai v. Nagpur University (1947) 15 ITR 150 Suggested that an assessee may waive confidentiality under Section 54 and that certified copies of income-tax records might be admissible. The Court distinguished the case, noting it addressed admissibility of certified copies, not the compulsory production of originals, and therefore did not control the present issue.
Katikineni Venkata Gopala Narasimha Rama Rao v. Chitluri Venkataramayya (1940) 8 ITR 450 Same principle on admissibility of certified copies and waiver. Held to have no application; the present appeal concerns the statutory bar against summoning originals.
Suraj Narain v. Seth Jhabhu Lal (1945) 13 ITR 13 Admissibility of certified copies from income-tax records. Similarly found irrelevant to the compulsory-production question.
Sm. Banarsi Devi v. Sm. Janki Devi, AIR 1959 Pat 172 Admissibility of certified copies from income-tax records. The Court expressly declined to examine its correctness, stating it had no bearing on the issue at hand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Shah analysed Section 54 of the Income-tax Act in detail:

  • Sub-section (1) declares that all particulars contained in statements, returns, documents, evidence, or records of assessment proceedings “shall be treated as confidential.”
  • The same sub-section, overriding the Indian Evidence Act, explicitly prohibits any court from requiring a public servant to produce such material or give evidence about it, “save as provided in the Act.”
  • Sub-section (2) imposes criminal penalties on public servants who contravene this confidentiality.
  • Only the categories enumerated in sub-section (3) are exempt; the statement sought by the appellant was not within those exceptions.
  • The legislative language imposes an absolute bar. There is no textual basis—express or implied—for an exception based on the assessee’s waiver.
  • The precedents cited by the appellant dealt with the admissibility of certified copies when voluntarily produced, not with compelling production of originals; therefore, they did not undermine the statutory prohibition.

Accordingly, the trial court and the High Court correctly refused to summon the Income-tax authorities.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

Immediate Effect: The appellant cannot compel production of the respondent’s statement from income-tax records; the suit in the Subordinate Judge’s court proceeds without that evidence.

Broader Implication: The judgment reaffirms that Section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act establishes an absolute, non-waivable bar on judicial compulsion for original income-tax records or testimony by tax officials, thereby reinforcing strict confidentiality of assessment proceedings. No new precedent is created, but the existing statutory protection is emphatically upheld.

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    Charu Chandra Kundu v. Gurupada Ghosh .

    Shah, J.— Gurupada Ghosh respondent to this appeal filed Suit No. 41 of 1953 in the 6th Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore, District 24 Parganas, West Bengal, for a money decree against the appellant — Charu Chandra Kundu — for Rs 32,132-12-3 claiming that he had advanced to the appellant on 11-5-1949, “by way of temporary accommodation loan” Rs 30,000 by a cheque drawn upon Comilla Union Bank, Calcutta, and that the appellant had in two instalments repaid Rs 5500 out of the amount advanced and the balance of Rs 24,500 with interest remained due and payable by the appellant. The appellant pleaded by his written statement that a loan of Rs 30,000 was advanced by the respondent to him and his wife Chapalabala and a promissory note was in consideration thereof executed by the borrowers in favour of the respondent and as collateral security for the loan, title deeds of certain immovable properties belonging to the said Chapalabala were deposited with the respondent and that thereafter between 7-9-1949 and 13-4-1953 the appellant had repaid an aggregate amount of Rs 37,000 and the respondent having relinquished a sum of Rs 235-7-0 on account of interest on such repayment the debt was discharged and in acknowledgment thereof, the promissory note and the title deeds of the immovable properties lodged with the respondent were returned. The appellant also raised other pleas which are not material for the purposes of this appeal. On the pleadings, the burden of proving repayment lay upon the appellant.

    2. The appellant applied to the Subordinate Judge for the issue of a summons to the Commissioner of Income Tax directing that officer to arrange to produce “through a competent officer the original file and depositions given ‘by the respondent' before the Income Tax Officer I(2) Division in the assessment of Charu Chandra Kundu”. The Commissioner of Income Tax informed the court that having regard to the prohibitions imposed by Section 54 of the Income Tax Act, he was unable to produce any of the statements, returns, accounts, documents or records of assessment proceedings under the Income Tax Act or to give evidence in support thereof. The appellant then applied that the objection of the Commissioner of Income Tax be overruled and that the Income Tax Officer or any other competent officer be directed to produce the statement made by the respondent and recorded on 22-2-1950, in the proceedings for assessment of the income of the appellant. In that petition, by para 10, the appellant submitted that “on a true construction of Section 54 of the Indian Income Tax Act, the exemption from disclosure and production relate only to the evidence or deposition made by an assessee himself and not to depositions or evidence of other witnesses. In any event, the disclosure and production etc. prohibited by Section 54 of the Income Tax Act being in the interest of the assessee only, the assessee himself can waive this special protection and privilege” and that the appellant waived his right to the protection and privilege under Section 54 of the Income Tax Act.

    3. It was the case of the appellant that in certain proceedings relating to assessment of income tax of the appellant for the year 1949-50, the respondent had on 22-2-1950, made a statement before the Income Tax Officer, and to support his defence in the suit he desired that the statement be produced before the court. The trial court upheld the objection raised by the Commissioner of Income Tax that in view of Section 54, he could not be required to produce the statement he was summoned to produce, and the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure confirmed that view.

    4. Section 54 of the Income Tax Act by the first sub-section declares all particulars contained in any statement made, return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of the Income Tax Act or in any evidence given, or affidavit or deposition made, in the course of any proceedings of any assessment proceedings under Chapter VIII, or in any record of any assessment proceedings or any proceeding relating to the recovery of a demand prepared for the purposes of the Act, shall be treated as confidential. The sub-section then proceeds to state that notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no court shall, save as provided in the Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return, accounts, documents or record or any part of any such record or to give evidence before it in respect thereof. By sub-section (2), a public servant disclosing any particular contained in any such document, return, accounts, documents, evidence, affidavit, deposition or record, is liable to be punished with imprisonment which may extend to six months and also with fine. These provisions however do not apply to certain documents specified in clauses (a) to (p) of sub-section 3.

    5. It is manifest that disclosure of information given to public servants in the course of income tax proceedings has by a comprehensive provision been prohibited. The Income Tax authorities are directed by the provision to treat the information disclosed, evidence given, and documents produced as confidential; the courts are prohibited from requiring any public servant to produce the documents or the records and even to give evidence in respect thereof, and the public servants disclosing the particulars of the evidence, documents or record are penalised. The statement alleged to be made by the respondent in the assessment proceedings is not of the nature described in sub-section (3) of Section 54, and is therefore not exempt from the operation of sub-sections (1) and (2). There being an express interdict against the court requiring production of the document, the Subordinate Judge was right in declining to accede to the request of the appellant.

    6. Mr Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the appellant contends that Section 54 is enacted only for the protection of the assessee, and if the assessee waives the privilege enacted for his protection, the prohibition contained therein will be inoperative. But there is no such exception, express or implied, in the language used by the legislature. The prohibition imposed against the court by Section 54 is absolute: its operation is not obliterated by any waiver by the assessee in whose assessment the evidence is tendered, document produced or record prepared.

    7. Mr Chatterjee relied upon Buchibai v. Nagpur University (1947) 15 ITR 150 in support of his contention that an assessee is entitled to waive the privilege which confers protection upon him by Section 54. In that case, however, the only question which fell to be determined was whether certified copies of statements recorded or orders passed by the Income Tax authorities were admissible in evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to prove the contents of those documents. The court in that case observed:

    “The direction that such document (documents described in Section 54) shall be treated as confidential is a direction to officials of the Income Tax Department, and in our opinion it is open to an assessee to waive that right and to give evidence, if he desires, or particulars contained in such a record, as was held in Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya (1940) 8 ITR 450. There is nothing in Section 54 which prohibits the giving of such evidence; the section merely directs officials of the Income Tax Department to treat such documents as confidential and prohibits the court from requiring public servants to produce such documents or to give evidence about such documents.”

    8. But the question whether a certified copy of the statement made by the respondent before the Income Tax Officer is admissible does not fall to be determined in this appeal. The Subordinate Judge expressly recorded in the proceeding dated November 18,1955 that he did “not mean to say that certified copy of the document will not be admissible in evidence at the time of the trial of the suit if the said certified copy is otherwise found to be admissible in evidence”. Buchibai case (1947) 15 ITR 150 is a decision about the admissibility of a certified copy of the statement made by one Laxminarayan to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax: it did not decide that the court could require production by summons of the original statements from the records of the Assistant Commissioner.

    9. A similar view as to admissibility of certified copies of statements made before the Income Tax authorities was also expressed in Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya (1940) 8 ITR 450, Suraj Narain v. Seth Jhabhu Lal (1945) 13 ITR 13 and Banarsi Devi v. Janki Devi AIR 1959 Pat 172. We may observe that we are not called upon to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of these decisions. Suffice it to say that they have no application to the question to be determined in this appeal.

    10. The appeal fails and is dismissed.

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    Comments

    Charu Chandra Kundu v. Gurupada Ghosh .
    (May 5, 1961)