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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition

dismissed

Attorney(S)
  • Veda Vyasa, Senior Advocate (S.K Kapur & Ganpat Rai, cates, with him)
  • N. Banerjee, Senior Advocate (P.C Agarwala, Advocate, with him)
Judges
  • Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar
  • Justice Bhuvneshwar Prasad Sinha
  • Justice K.N. Wanchoo
Acts
  • Sections 408, 477-A and 465 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 136
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition

dismissed

Attorney(S)
  • Veda Vyasa, Senior Advocate (S.K Kapur & Ganpat Rai, cates, with him)
  • N. Banerjee, Senior Advocate (P.C Agarwala, Advocate, with him)
Judges
  • Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar
  • Justice Bhuvneshwar Prasad Sinha
  • Justice K.N. Wanchoo
Acts
  • Sections 408, 477-A and 465 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 136
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

M/s Tika Ram & Sons Ltd. Oil Mills, Aligarh employed Bishamber Dayal as a Munim (accounts clerk) from 25 October 1948 to 31 August 1951. After taking five days’ leave starting 1 September 1951, the respondent did not return to work. During this period the employer discovered that entries relating to a bank draft of ₹1,422—received from its customer Shankar Das Durga Prasad—had been overwritten, allegedly to facilitate misappropriation. The appellant lodged a criminal complaint under Sections 408, 477-A and 465 IPC, but the Magistrate dismissed it on 21 April 1953 for want of evidence; a revision petition was also dismissed on 17 February 1954.

In April 1954 the respondent approached the Regional Conciliation Officer alleging wrongful termination, while the employer maintained that his services had ended for misconduct. Conciliation failed and the dispute was referred to an Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal found that no domestic enquiry or charge-sheet had preceded the dismissal and that the employer had produced no evidence either in the criminal case or before it. It ordered reinstatement with continuity of service, subsistence allowance and back wages. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the employer’s appeal, rejecting a limitation defence.

The employer obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and sought to adduce additional evidence—a 1959 judgment dismissing the respondent’s civil suit for malicious prosecution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Supreme Court should admit additional evidence (the 1959 civil judgment) at the appellate stage.
  2. Whether the industrial dispute was barred by limitation because the events had occurred more than three years before the reference.
  3. Whether the dispute, raised by an individual workman without a union, qualified as an “industrial dispute,” thus conferring jurisdiction on the Industrial Tribunal.
  4. Whether, on the merits, the Tribunals erred in ordering reinstatement with back wages and allowances.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Sought admission of the 1959 civil judgment to show the respondent’s claim of malicious prosecution had failed.
  • Asserted that a dispute raised by an individual employee, unaided by a trade union, could not be treated as an industrial dispute, thus depriving the Tribunal of jurisdiction.
  • Maintained that the respondent’s overwriting of the accounts justified dismissal.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Opposed the reception of additional evidence, stressing the employer’s repeated failure to lead evidence when it had the opportunity.
  • Denied any undue delay, noting that conciliation was sought shortly after the criminal revision concluded.
  • Maintained that the overwriting was done under instructions from the Managing Director’s son; hence dismissal was unjustified.
  • Contended that the jurisdictional objection had not been raised before the Industrial Tribunal and could not be introduced for the first time in the Supreme Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Additional evidence: The Court refused to admit the 1959 civil judgment. It emphasised that the appellant had declined to lead evidence in the criminal proceedings and before the Industrial Tribunal; allowing the document now would reward its earlier default. Moreover, the respondent’s admission of overwriting had always been accompanied by the allegation that he acted under instructions from management, an issue never tested by evidence.

Limitation: The Labour Appellate Tribunal had rightly treated the limitation argument as untenable. The criminal proceedings, protracted by the employer, had only concluded in February 1954, and the respondent approached the Conciliation Officer within two months. The Supreme Court saw no error in that finding.

Jurisdiction / nature of dispute: The Court declined to entertain the contention that an individual dispute is not an industrial dispute because the point was not raised before the Industrial Tribunal and was not shown to have been argued before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. No adequate affidavit substantiating the claim was filed.

Merits: The Tribunal’s factual conclusions were unassailable. The employer brought serious charges yet adduced no evidence, either criminally or industrially, and provided no domestic enquiry or charge-sheet. In those circumstances the direction for reinstatement with continuity of service, subsistence allowance and back wages was within the Tribunal’s discretion.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed the reinstatement order and refused costs to either side.

Immediate consequence: the respondent workman is reinstated with all monetary benefits specified by the Industrial Tribunal. The decision turns on procedural defaults rather than any new legal principle; it therefore sets no broad precedent beyond reiterating that parties must present their evidence at the appropriate stage and cannot raise new jurisdictional objections for the first time on special-leave appeal.

Show full summary ...

    Tika Ram Ltd. v. Workman (Bishamber Dayal) .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    P.B Gajendragadkar, J.— This appeal by special leave arises out of an industrial dispute between M/s Tika Ram & Sons Ltd. Oil Mills, Aligarh (hereafter called the appellant) and its workman Bishamber Dayal (hereafter called the respondent). The appellant had purported to terminate the services of the respondent, and at the instance of the respondent the dispute in regard to the said termination of his services was referred for adjudication. The tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal held that the appellant was not justified in dismissing the respondent and order has been passed directing the appellant to reinstate respondent in continuity of service and to pay him the subsistence allowance and pay as specified in the award. It is this order which is challenged before in the present appeal.

    2. It appears that the respondent was employed as a Munim (Accounts Clerk) by the appellant for 25-10-1948 to 31-8-1951. On 1-9-1951, the respondent took five day's leave but did not return to his job in spite of repeated calls. He was marked “on leave” on 1-9-1951 and treated as absent for one month thereafter. Meanwhile the appellant came to know that the respondent had made certain false entries in its books of account with a view to misappropriate a bank draft of Rs 1422 which was issued in favour of the appellant. Thereupon appellant filed a criminal complaint against the respondent and two others under Sections 408, 477-A and 465 of the Indian Penal Code. This complaint was dismissed by the learned Magistrate on 21-4-1953. The appellant moved learned Sessions Judge at Aligarh in revision but the said revisional application was also dismissed on 17-2-1954.

    3. On April 1954 the respondent moved the Regional Conciliation Officer for settlement of its dispute with the appellant. He alleged that the appellant had wrongfully terminated his services whereas according to the appellant the services had been terminated for misconduct shown by the falsification of accounts made by him. Since the Conciliation Officer was unable to settle the dispute, he made a report and thereafter the present fluent dispute was referred for industrial adjudication.

    4. According to the appellant it had dealings with Shankar Das Durga Prasad of Meerut and an amount of Rs 1422 was due from the said firm. A draft for the said amount was received from the said firm in favour of the appellant. It was in respect of this draft that false entries were made by the respondent in the appellant's books of account kept by the respondent. The relevant entries had been overwritten with the object of conveniently misappropriating the said amount.

    5. The tribunal held that the appellant had not held any enquiry against the respondent. No charge-sheet was given to him nor was any opportunity afforded to him to explain the charge. It is true that the appellant had filed a criminal complaint against the respondent but the records show that the appellant failed to appear in the witness box to support the said complaint. It had obtained several adjournments for the purpose of leading evidence but no evidence was in fact led and the complaint was dismissed for default. The Sessions Judge who was moved in revision by the appellant commented on this point and held that there was no force in its revisional application. In the opinion of the Tribunal this conduct of the appellant clearly proved that the appellant was not willing to substantiate its charge in the criminal court.

    6. It was urged before the Tribunal that the respondent had made its complaint before the Conciliation Officer after a long lapse of time but this contention was rejected by the Tribunal. It found that the criminal revision filed by the appellant was dismissed on 17-2-1954, and respondent had approached the Conciliation Officer within a couple of months thereafter. Thus there was no delay on the part of the respondent. The Tribunal also criticised the appellant for its failure to lead any evidence before it. Indeed nobody stepped into the box on behalf of the appellant nor was any order documentary evidence produced before it. That is why the Tribunal held in favour of the respondent and directed the appellant to reinstate him.

    7. When the matter was taken by the appellant before the Labour Appellate Tribunal an attempt was made to raise a point of law to justify the appeal and this point was that the award under appeal was without jurisdiction as it related to a matter which had arisen more than three years before the reference. The Appellate Tribunal has rejected this argument. It has referred the pendency of the criminal proceedings instituted by the appellant against the respondent and it has observed that these proceedings were deliberately protracted by the appellant itself; and that the appellant had failed to substantiate its charges in the said proceedings. Having held that the point of limitation thus raised was without any substance the Appellate Tribunal took the view that appeal was incompetent and so dismissed it. It is this decision that is challenged before us by the appellant.

    8. In this appeal an application has been made by the appellant for the admission of additional evidence. This evidence consists of judgement delivered on 26-2-1959 in a suit (Suit No. 323 of 1955) filed by the respondent to recover Rs 1200 as damages for his malicious prosecution by the appellant. We do not think that this additional evidence can be admitted. It is significant that neither in the criminal proceedings launched by the appellant nor in the industrial adjudication has any attempt been made by the appellant to produce any evidence and as we have just pointed out the Tribunal has severely commented against this conduct of the appellant. In such case we do not see how the appellant can be permitted to rely upon the dismissal of the respondent's claim for damages. It was its duty to adduce evidence at the proper stage and if it has not done so the judgment in the respondent's suit cannot be allowed to be produced at this late stage.

    9. Besides this judgment would hardly be of any assistant to the appellant on the merits of the appeal. The respondent has no doubt admitted that he overwrote the relevant entries but his case always has been that he did so under the directions of the son of the Managing Director of the appellant itself. In view of this specific allegation made by the respondent it was the duty of the appellant to lead evidence either in the criminal court or before the Industrial Tribunal. Its failure to do so leads inevitably to the inference that the appellant was afraid to face cross-examination by the respondent. Therefore the attempt to produce this evidence in the present appeal cannot succeed. Besides usually this Court does not admit additional evidence in appeals under Article 136.

    10. It is then urged that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute because the dispute is not an industrial dispute at all. It appears that the employees of the appellant had formed no union and the dispute had been raised at the instance of the respondent who is an individual workman. Mr Veda Vyas contends that it is now well settled that a dispute raised by an individual workman cannot be treated as an industrial dispute. We cannot allow this objection to be raised for the first time before us. It is clear that this objection was not raised before the Tribunal as it should have been; but it is suggested that it was raised before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. This suggestion is denied by the respondent. The judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal shows that only one point was raised by the appellant to justify its contention that the appeal raised a substantial question of law, and was therefore competent; and this question related to the point of limitation and no other. Prima facie it would be legitimate to infer that the question of jurisdiction had not been urged before the Appellate Tribunal; if it had been so raised the Appellate Tribunal would have dealt with it. Besides the allegation that this point was argued before the Labour Appellate Tribunal is not also properly made in the present petition. The petition no doubt has been sworn by the Chemist-in-Charge of the appellant who claims to be conversant with the facts of the case. It is not suggested that the chemist was present in the court when the matter was argued before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Neither the person who argued the matter nor anybody else who was present at the time of the argument on behalf of the appellant has made a specific statement on oath that this point was in fact urged before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The fact that along with other points this one was mentioned in a memo was wholly inconclusive. If the appellant wanted to urge that this point had been specifically argued before the Labour Appellate Tribunal it should have made a more specific and clearer affidavit in that behalf. In the absence of any such affidavit we do not think we would be justified in entertaining this objection for the first time in the present appeal. It would be relevant to recall that this point obviously was not mentioned before the Industrial Tribunal.

    11. On the merits it is difficult to see how the Tribunals could have come to any other conclusion. No doubt the appellant has made a serious allegation against the respondent; and the respondent has also admitted that he overwrote the relevant entries but the respondent's case consistently had been that this was done under the directions of the son of the Managing Director of the appellant. If the appellant wanted to prove its case against the respondent it was clearly its duty to lead evidence on the point; and it consistently and studiously refrained from leading any evidence in all the proceedings between the parties. Therefore we must hold that the Tribunals were justified in directing the reinstatement of the respondent. The propriety of the directions issued by the Tribunal in regard to the payment of subsistence allowance and back wages cannot be challenged in the present appeal because that clearly is a matter of discretion.

    12. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, there will be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Tika Ram Ltd. v. Workman (Bishamber Dayal) .
    (May 1, 1959)