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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — R. Balia, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arises from a fatal bus accident in which Kana Ram (son of Shri Achala Ram, resident of village Batadu) died on 19/5/1989 in a collision with a Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation bus near village Kawas, District Barmer. Respondents No.1 to 5 (including the widow, mother, father and a minor brother) filed a claim for compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in or about July 1989, after the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the New Act) had come into force.

The claimants sought an immediate award of Rs. 25,000 by invoking the 'no fault liability' provision in section 140 of the New Act. The Corporation contested, asserting that because the accident occurred on 19/5/1989 (prior to the commencement of the New Act), the lesser 'no fault' limit under section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the Old Act), namely Rs. 15,000, applied.

The Tribunal (Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Barmer) rejected the Corporation's contention by order dated 8.12.1989. An appeal to the Single Judge of this Court resulted in an order dated 10.04.1990 upholding the Tribunal. The Corporation challenged the Single Judge's order in this Special Appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when fixing the quantum of compensation on the 'no fault liability' principle in a death or permanent disability arising from a motor accident, the quantum should be governed by the law as it stood on the date of the accident (date of death) or by the law in force on the date when the quantum of compensation is determined (date of award).
  2. Whether section 6 of the General Clauses Act requires that compensation limits fixed by a repealed Act (here, section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) govern awards for accidents that occurred before the commencement of the New Act even when the claim and the award occur after commencement of the New Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Corporation / Petitioner)

  • The appellant's principal contention was that section 6 of the General Clauses Act requires the quantum stated in the repealed Act to govern awards where the accident occurred prior to the New Act, even if the claim was made after commencement of the New Act.
  • The appellant relied on this Court's earlier decision in Yashoda Kumari v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Mani Gupta v. Mohammed Ibrahim to support the proposition that section 140 of the New Act is not retrospective and therefore the lower quantum under the Old Act should apply.

Respondents' / Tribunal's Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The Tribunal and the Single Judge rejected the Corporation's contention and applied the enhanced 'no fault' quantum under section 140 of the New Act (Rs. 25,000). The opinion summarizes the Tribunal's and Single Judge's outcome but does not recite a detailed separate pleading by respondents beyond seeking the New Act quantum.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Yashoda Kumari v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Relied upon by appellant to argue section 140 of the New Act is not retrospective and therefore old Act limits should apply. The Court held Yashoda Kumari inapplicable on the facts: that case dealt with accidents and adjudications occurring before insertion of section 92-A, so it does not assist the appellant in the present factual matrix.
Ram Mani Gupta v. Mohammed Ibrahim Relied upon by appellant (Allahabad High Court decision) to support non-retrospective application of new provision. The Court distinguished Ram Mani Gupta: there the accident and claim resolution occurred before the relevant statutory provision came into force, whereas in the present case the claim and award were after the New Act's commencement.
M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty Supreme Court observation that the Rs.15,000/7,500 limits had become unrealistic because of inflation and should be raised. The Court relied on this observation to explain legislative purpose: Parliament acted on the suggestion by raising the quantum in the New Act, which was intended to make the right realistic.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padmavathy (Kerala High Court) Held that section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not impede enforcement of section 140 of the New Act in relation to accidents occurring prior to the New Act because Parliament manifested a different intention. The Court cited and followed this decision as supportive authority for the conclusion that the New Act's Chapter X provisions (including the enhanced quantum) apply to claims and awards made after commencement of the New Act.
Kanhaiya Lal v. Kailash Devi Support for liberal construction of benevolent provisions (section 92-A/section 140) and view that enhancement of the amount is procedural to make the provision effective. The Court cited this case to demonstrate that the intention behind the enhancement was procedural and benevolent, supporting award of the enhanced quantum under the New Act.
R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel (Inhabitants) (1848) 12 Q.B. 120 Principle that a statute may be prospective even if part of its requisites are drawn from a time antecedent to its passing; not necessarily retrospective. The Court quoted this authority to support the proposition that statutes can operate prospectively despite depending on antecedent facts, and applied that principle to the temporal effect of the New Act's provisions.
Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra (Supreme Court) Approving the principle in R. v. St. Mary when considering applicability of Finance Act to income earned before commencement of the Finance Act. The Court relied on this approval to reinforce the view that the presence of antecedent facts does not automatically render a provision retrospective.
Sree Bank Ltd. v. Sarkar Dutt Roy & Co. Illustration that a prospective provision measured by antecedent facts is not necessarily retrospective; cited authorities include Master Ladies Tailors Organisation. Used to support the statutory construction approach that the New Act's provisions can operate prospectively when claims/awards occur after commencement even if the accident preceded it.
Master Ladies Tailors Organisation v. Minister of Labour and National Service (1950-2 All ER 525) Authority cited for the proposition that a future benefit measured by antecedent facts is not necessarily retrospective. Quoted in support of the same principle; applied in the Court's reasoning regarding forward operation of statutory benefits.
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India Proposition that liberalising provisions may be retroactive in a narrow sense but are generally prospective; a statute drawing on antecedent facts need not be retrospective. Cited to reinforce the construction that the New Act's enhanced quantum is a prospective benefit dependent on antecedent events but not retrospective in operation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the central question by a combined statutory-construction and contextual analysis, proceeding in the following steps:

  1. Interpretation of section 6 of the General Clauses Act: The Court read section 6 as not establishing an absolute or abstract rule mandating application of repealed enactments in every case. Instead, section 6 must be read in light of the legislature's dominant intention, the object of the new legislation, and the circumstances under which it was passed.
  2. Historical and structural context of 'no fault' compensation: The Court recounted that the Old Act first modified common-law tort principles by introducing chapters (Secs. 90-A to 90-E) providing no-fault compensation. The New Act retained that modification (Secs. 140–144, Chapter X) and enhanced the quantum. The Court characterized this as a modification (not a repeal or replacement of a fundamentally different right) intended to provide immediate, minimum compensation to alleviated dependents.
  3. Nature of 'no fault' compensation within the compensatory scheme: The Court observed that no-fault compensation remains part of the ultimate compensation scheme. It is bifurcated from the fault-based compensation, is adjustable against the final fault-based award, and functions as a minimum assured payment. Sections 140 and 141 together effectuate this scheme, and section 144 grants Chapter X overriding effect over other provisions or laws.
  4. Legislative purpose in enhancing quantum: The Court relied on the Supreme Court's suggestion in M.K. Kunhimohammed that prior fixed sums had become unrealistic due to inflation. Parliament accepted that suggestion and increased the quantum under the New Act. The Court viewed the enhancement as intended to make the right realistic — not as creation of an entirely new right.
  5. Effect of section 144 of the New Act: Section 144 was interpreted as a clear legislative manifestation of a different intention — that Chapter X's provisions (including enhanced quantum) should prevail notwithstanding other laws, thereby limiting the reach of section 6 of the General Clauses Act where a contrary intention is discernible.
  6. Precedential and statutory construction support: The Court relied on the Kerala High Court decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padmavathy and its own previous decision in Kanhaiya Lal v. Kailash Devi to support the reading that the New Act's Chapter X governs awards made after its commencement. The Court also invoked established authorities (R. v. St. Mary, Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra, Sree Bank Ltd., Master Ladies Tailors Organisation, D.S. Nakara) to emphasize that statutes may operate prospectively even when they depend on antecedent facts and that such operation does not make them retrospectively effective.
  7. Temporal point for determining quantum: Crucially, the Court held that because the no-fault claim requires an independent, separate award that is to be disposed of first, the critical date for determining the applicable quantum is the date on which the Tribunal or Court is required to award the no-fault compensation. Thus, if the claim and award happen after commencement of the New Act, the enhanced quantum fixed by the New Act governs, even if the accident occurred earlier.
  8. Application to the present facts: In the present case the claim for no-fault compensation was made after commencement of the New Act, and the Tribunal was required to award such compensation after commencement. Therefore the enhanced Rs. 25,000 limit under section 140 of the New Act applied.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Special Appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed that where an application for 'no fault' compensation is made and the Tribunal is required to pass the no-fault award after the commencement of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the quantum prescribed by the New Act (section 140) governs the amount payable even if the accident occurred prior to the commencement of the New Act.

Consequences for the parties: The direct effect is that the claimants are entitled to the enhanced 'no fault' quantum prescribed by the New Act at the time the Tribunal or Court is required to award such compensation (here, Rs. 25,000 as per the New Act), and the Special Appeal against the earlier orders was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The opinion reasons that the enhancement in quantum was remedial and procedural to make an existing benevolent right realistic and that section 144 manifests a legislative intention contrary to a mechanical application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The Court does not purport to announce any novel principle beyond resolving the temporal question in the context of the statutory scheme described.

    Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Ogam & Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    R. Balia, J.:— The short question which is raised in this Special Appeal is that while fixing the quantum of compensation on ‘no fault liability’ principle by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in a case of death or permanent disability in a motor accident, whether the provisions as they existed on the date of death or the law as in force on the date when such quantum of compensation is determined, will be applicable.

    2. Brief and undisputed facts which led to this Special Appeal are that one Kana Ram son of Shri Achala Ram resident of village Batadu died in a Bus accident near village Kawas District Barmer on 19/5/89. The accident took place with a bus of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. Respondents No. 1 to 5 who include widow, mother, father and minor brother of the deceased Kana Ram filed a claim for compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal some where in July, 1989 after the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter referred to as ‘the New Act’ had come into force. The claimants had made a claim for immediate award of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation on the ground of ‘no fault liability’ as fixed by sec. 140 of the New Act. This claim of the claimants was contested by the Corporation on the ground that since accident has taken place on 19/5/89 before the commencement of the New Act, the limit of ‘no fault compensation’ payable shall be only to the extent provided under section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Old Act’ which was in force on the date when accident took place. The amount of compensation on the ground of ‘no fault liability’ under the repealed provisions of the Old Act was Rs. 15,000/- in the case of death.

    3. The contention of the Corporation was rejected both by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Barmer vide its order dated 8th Dec. 1989 and then by the learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 10.04.1990 passed in the appeal filed against the order of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The order passed by the learned Single Judge has been challenged in this Special Appeal.

    4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

    5. The only contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that by virtue of section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1987, the amount of compensation stated in the repealed Act will govern the award of amount payable as compensation on principle of ‘no fault liability’ in a case where accident has occurred prior to commencement of the New Act notwithstanding the fact that claim has been made after the commencement of the New Act. Learned counsel places reliance on a decision of this Court in Yashoda Kumari v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur (1) and a decision of Allahabad High Court in Ram Mani Gupta v. Mohammed Ibrahim (2) in support of his contention that the provisions of Section 140 under the New Act are not retrospective in effect.

    6. In our opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted.

    7. The relevant provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act reads as under:—

    “6. Effect of report:— Where this Act, or any regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears”

    8. A bare reading of section 6 makes it abundantly clear that it is not an abstract and absolute principle to be applied in the case of every repeal but in all cases, intention of the legislature has to be gathered with reference to dominant intention of the legislation, the object indicating the nature of rights affected and circumstances under which the statute is passed.

    9. The general principle governing the award of compensation on account of injury caused in the Motor Accident has its foundation in action for tort and usual common law principle is that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for death or permanent disablement, caused on account of a motor accident.

    10. Under the Old Act a modification in the common law rule was first made by inserting section 90-A to 90-E under Chapter VII-A. It provided for the first time to award compensation even in case no negligence is proved. While new Act was framed, this modification was retained under Chapter X through Secs. 140 to 144. The provisions contained in Chapter VII-A under the Old Act (Secs. 90-A to 90-E) corresponding to Chapter X of the New Act (Secs. 140 to 144) have been enacted by the legislature as a modification and not as abrogation of the above principle to help all destitutes who are affected by motor accidents to speed up the payments of minimum amount as compensation on ‘no fault liability’ principle. The provisions of section 92-A/140 are beneficial legislation provided for an immediate aid to the claimant on account of death of permanent disablement in an accident.

    11. It is no doubt true that the provisions of award of ‘no fault compensation’ is a departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor accident at the end of proceedings. Nonetheless a close scrutiny of the provisions leaves no room of doubt that it remains part of compensation. As a matter of fact, what was payable to a person at the close of the proceedings by way of compensation has been bifurcated into two parts; one depending upon the establishment of the fault of the owner or driver of the vehicle and another the minimum compensation payable irrespective of the establishment of fault. In totality of the scheme, it remains part of the ultimate compensation, inasmuch as in case of determination of fault of the owner or driver of the vehicle, the compensation payable for ‘no fault liability’ is not in addition to compensation payable on the basis of the fault liability but is adjustable against the final compensation determined subject to one rider that ‘no fault liability’ compensation remains the minimum compensation payable.

    12. This is the effect of combined reading of sections 140 and 141 of the entire scheme envisaged under Chapter X of the New Act. Section 144 of the New Act gives an over riding effect to the provisions of this Chapter in the matter.

    The amendment in minimum amount so fixed-up is intended to make the right realistic. The quantum fixed for award of compensation on ‘no fault liability’ principle was an amount of Rs. 15000/- in the case of death, and 7500/- in the case of permanent disablement. That was in the year 1982. However, looking to the inflationary pressure and consequent loss of power of the purchase of rupee, the quantum fixed under the provisions of sec. 92-A became unrealistic and required a step towards enhancement. This fact is apparent from the observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court in M.K Kunhimohammed v. P.A Ahmedkutty (3) which reads as under:—

    “Having regard to the inflationary pressures and the consequent loss of purchasing power of the rupee, we feel that the amount of Rs. 15,000/- and the amount of Rs. 7500/- in the above provisions appear to have become unrealistic. We, therefore, suggest that the limits of compensation in respect of death and in respect of permanent disablement, payable in the event of there being no proof of fault, should be raised adequately to meet the current situation.

    13. The said suggestion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was given due respect by the Legislature and while framing the new Act, Parliament while retaining the right of compensation of ‘no fault principle’ conferred through Chapter 7-A of the Old Act had enhanced the quantum of amount to be awarded as compensation on that ground. The difference in the quantum of amount of compensation is only to make such right realistic and at par with the earlier fixed amount looking to the inflationary pressures and fall in the purchasing power of the rupee with the passage of time. Therefore, viewed from this angle, no new right or liability under section 140 has been created and merely the quantum of compensation to be awarded by the Court on ‘no fault principle’ has been enhanced.

    14. By enacting Sec. 144, the legislature further made its clear intention that after the commencement of the Act provisions of Chapter X will hold the field for governing the award of compensation by the Courts on the basis of ‘no fault liability’ principle. Section 144 of the New Act reads as under:—

    “144 Overriding effect:— The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstandin ganything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.”

    15. Thus, a contrary intention is clearly spelt out. Viewed from this angle, provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not impede grant of the enhanced compensation under the provisions, of section 140 even in case where accident has occurred prior to the commencement of the New Act.

    16. This conclusion finds support from a recent decision of Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padmavathy (4) wherein it has been observed as under:—

    “11. The said suggestion of the Supreme Court was given due respect by the law making machinery when the Bill was finally introduced in Parliament. This fact can be discerned from the statement of objects and Reasons prefaced in the New Act. Therefore, in effect the Parliament has only retained the same right which was conferred on the victims through Chapter VII-A of the repealed Act. The difference in the quantum of compensation is only intended to make the right realistic and at par with the earlier fixed amount. Hence section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not impede the enforcement of Sec. 140 of the New Act in relation to an accident which occurred prior to the coming into force of the New Act.

    12. For yet an other reason, we can support the said conclusion. section 6 of the General Clauses Act permits switching over to the repealed Act only if a different intention does not appear in the new statute. Such a different intention can be discerned from the New Act. It is in Chapter X of the New Act that provisions regarding ‘no fault liability’ have been included. The Chapter starts with section 140 and ends with Sec. 144. The last section reads as follows: “The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.” The different intention manifested in the New Act is that provisions in Chapter X should get predominance over all other laws. The provisions contained in that Chapter must be given effect to not-withstanding any contrary provision in any other law including section 6 of the General Clauses Act. All other provisions, therefore, must yield to the provisions contained in Chapter X of the New Act. This is the legislative intention manifested through sec. 144 of the New Act.”

    17. Somewhat similar view has been expressed by this Court also in Kanhaiya Lal v. Kailash Devi (5) wherein the learned Chief Justice observed as under:—

    “This Court has to bear in mind that Sec. 92-A, so also section 140, are benevolent provisions and by the rule of construction applicable to such provisions the Tribunal had to place a liberal interpretation on them so as to the decision reached is a just one. The Legislature provided for payment of ‘no fault compensation’ by sec. 92-A as it was realised that a litigation for compensation may take unduly long time and the dependents of the deceased do not have the capacity to suffer the consequences of death, with which they unfortunately are faced with for long. Same is the basis of providing ‘no fault compensation’ to a person who suffered permanent disablement. Under Sec. 92-A, the provision was for payment of Rs. 15000/-. It is this amount which has been enhanced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, obviously because of the fact that value of money has considerably fallen since the enactment of Sec. 92-A The intention behind sec. 92-A is the same as under section 140. The payment of ‘no fault compensation’ is regarding procedure, which an Accident Claims Tribunal has to follow. Enhancement of normal compensation from Rs. 15,000/- to Rs. 25000/- is only a procedural matter. This provision is a departure from the usual case in which a claimant should establish his negligence on the part of the owner or driver before claiming any compensation that the death or permanent disablement caused on account of the motor vehicle accident. As the parliament felt that the amount of Rs. 15000/- previously provided by section 92-A of the 1939 Act, had lost its efficacy due to inflation it raised the amount to Rs. 25000/-. The Tribunal was right in holding that Rs. 25000/- was awardable.”

    18. Yashoda Kumari's case (Supra) has no application to the controversy raised in the present case. That was a case in which not only the accident had occurred prior to the commencement of the Chapter VII A under the Old Act but the claim petition itself was decided on 09.2.72 much before the sec. 92-A was inserted. In that view of the matter, the decision rendered in the aforesaid case is of no assistance to the petitioner. Rammani Gupta's case (supra) relied on by the counsel for the petitioner is also distinguishable on the facts. That was also a case where accident had taken place on 2.2.1977 and the claim of the claimants was also rejected prior to coming into force of sec. 92-A of the repealed Act. Moreover, both the cases were dealing with a situation where the amendment in law has created altogether a new right whereas the case in hand is not a case of creation of new right for awarding compensation on ‘no fault principle’. It is merely a case of determining quantum to be awarded as compensation when a claim for such award had been filed. Therefore, the question as to what should be the quantum to be awarded for ‘no fault liability’ was not at all in issue in the two cases relied on by the counsel for the petitioner.

    19. In R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel (Inhabitants) (6), the question related to the provisions made under the Removal Act, 1846 protecting the removal of poor widows from the parish within twelve months of the death of her husband. In a case where husband had died before the commencement of the Act, the removal of the widow from the parish was sought to be protected on the ground that the Act is not retrospective and was not applicable to the widows whose husbands had died before the commencement of the Act. Lord Denman, C.J observed as under:—

    “It was said that the operation of the statute is confined to persons who have become widows after the Act passed and that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended supported this construction. But we have before shown that the statute is in its direct operation prospective as it relates to future removals only and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing.”

    20. This principle was quoted with approval by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra (7) while examining the issue of applicability of Finance Act to the income earned before the commencement of the Finance Act. Their lordships of the Supreme Court again observed in Sree Bank Ltd. v. Sarkar Dutt Roy & Co. (8) as under:—

    “It could be said that even then the first sub-section would not have a retrospective operation but would only apply prosepectively to a banking company being wound up on a petition presented before the Act. This may be illustrated by two cases. In R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel (Inhabitants). (1848) 12 Q.B 120 at p. 127, Lord Denman C.J said that “a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing”. Again in Master Ladies Tailors Organisation v. Minister of Labour and National Service, 1950-2 All ER 525 at p. 517, it was observed, “The fact that a prospective benefit is in certain cases to be measured by or depends on antecedent facts does not necessarily…make the provision retrospective.”

    21. It was further reiterated in D.S Nakara v. Union of India (9) while construing the liberalised pension scheme that any liberalisation would protanto be retroactive in the narrow sense of the term. Otherwise it was always prospective. A statute is not properly called a retroactive statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.

    22. It is well known principle of constructing statute that rule against retrospective construction is not applicable to Statute merely because part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.

    23. Relevant provisions of sections 140, 141 and 168 of the New Act for the present purposes reads as under:—

    “Section 140, Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.

    (3). In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the onwer or onwers of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

    (4). A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permnent disablement.

    Sec. 141. Provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or permanent disablement—

    (1). The right to claim compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to any other right (hereafter in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.

    (2). A claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under section 140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place.

    (3). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay compensation under sec. 140 is also liable to pay compensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall pay the first mentioned compensation and—

    (a) if the amount of the first mentioned compensation is the less than the amount of the second mentioned compensation, he shall be liable to pay (in addition to the first mentioned compensation) only so much of the second mentioned compensation as is equal to the amount by which it exceeds the first mentioned compensation;

    (b) if the amount of the first mentioned compensation is equal to more than the amount of the second mentioned compensation, he shall not be liable to pay the second mentioned compensation.

    “Sec. 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal-(1) On receipt of an application made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application, to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:

    Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.”

    24. Viewed from the principle stated above, the provisions in question, if read together lead to an irresistible conclusion that the award of compensation for ‘no fault liability’ in order to be enforceable depends upon making an independent claim on that ground and the Tribunal is required to dispose of that claim by passing a separate award even before the normal compensation is determined. Therefore, the crucial date of determining the quantum of compensation to be awarded as ‘no fault liability’ is the date on which the Tribunal or the Court is required to award compensation for ‘no fault liability’ though the event for which compensation is to be measured has taken place on an antecedent date. Provisions relating to quantum of that day will only govern the amount of quantum to be awarded on ‘no fault liability’ principle.

    25. In the present case, the application for grant of compensation on ‘no fault liability’ principle was made after the commencement of the New Act and the Tribunal was required to pass an award of compensation on ‘no fault liability’ principle only after the commencement of the New Act and, therefore, the Tribunal was under an obligation to award that amount as compensation which stood prescribed on that date. The provisions under consideration confer prospective measure of benefit which is dependent on antecedent event of accident having taken place resulting in death or permanent disability. No question of retrospective operation of the provisions of New Act really arises in the present case.

    26. Thus, viewed from any angle, we find no force in this special appeal and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

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    Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Smt. Ogam & Others
    (Dec 16, 1991)