Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act
  • Amending Act No. 104 of 1976,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act
  • Amending Act No. 104 of 1976,
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition was filed by Smt. Mohan Bai challenging the order of the District Judge, Udaipur dated 10 March 1986, which dismissed her application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) dated 29 June 1982 seeking to set aside a final decree. The final decree arose out of a suit for redemption originally instituted by Jai Kishan (since deceased) on 21 November 1975 in respect of a house mortgaged on 16 May 1953 for a loan of Rs. 2,999.00. The plaintiff alleged certain expenditures by the defendant (petitioner) and sought redemption; the trial court passed a preliminary decree requiring deposit of specified amounts by the plaintiff, which were deposited.

The defendant (Mohan Bai) appealed to the District Judge in First Appeal No. 109 of 1981. During that appeal a compromise petition was filed and signed by the plaintiff and his counsel and, for the defendant, by her advocate Mr. Bansilal. The District Judge recorded the compromise and decreed the suit on 12 March 1982. Mohan Bai challenged that compromise decree in a Civil Second Appeal (No. 101/83 (82?)) before the High Court on the sole ground that the compromise was not signed personally by her but only by her advocate. The High Court dismissed the second appeal on 2 January 1983 (reported 1983 Rajasthan LR 365; AIR 1983 Raj 240).

Thereafter Mohan Bai moved an application under Section 151 C.P.C. in the First Appellate Court to set aside the compromise decree. That application was dismissed by the District Judge, and Mohan Bai filed the present revision petition against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a compromise petition signed only by an advocate (and not by the party personally) is valid and can be acted upon by the Court under Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C., as amended by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976, or whether a party's personal signature is required.
  2. Whether an application under Section 151 C.P.C. (inherent powers) is a competent remedy to set aside a final/consent (compromise) decree that has attained finality, or whether other remedies (such as a suit under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act) are the appropriate route when consent is alleged to have been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation.
  3. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, Mohan Bai was precluded from seeking relief under Section 151 C.P.C. because she had already challenged (and lost) the matter in a Regular Second Appeal without raising an allegation that she had given instructions forbidding compromise or had withdrawn the advocate's authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Smt. Mohan Bai) Arguments

  • The compromise decree recorded by the First Appellate Court was invalid because the compromise petition was not signed by her personally but only by her advocate, Mr. Bansilal; under the amended Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. (Amending Act No. 104 of 1976) a compromise must be signed by the party himself.
  • Relied upon the decision in Ramkaran v. Shrikishan (AIR 1976 Raj 130) to support the contention that where there is no authority in an advocate to compromise, the compromise is invalid.
  • Moved an application under Section 151 C.P.C. in the First Appellate Court seeking cancellation of the compromise decree.

Non-Petitioners'/Respondent's Arguments (as addressed by the Court)

  • The advocate representing the defendant (Mr. Bansilal) had implied authority to file and sign a compromise on behalf of his client; established authorities recognize the implied power of counsel to compromise subject to limitations (good faith, benefit to client, and absence of contrary instructions).
  • The petitioner did not assert in the Second Appeal that she had given instructions forbidding compromise or had withdrawn authority from her advocate; therefore the Second Appeal could have (but did not) attack the decree on those grounds and, having failed there, the compromise decree attained finality and operates as res judicata.
  • If the petitioner sought to challenge a consent decree on grounds such as fraud or misrepresentation, the proper remedy lies under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act by initiating a separate suit for cancellation; inherent powers (Section 151 C.P.C.) or review are not competent to set aside a compromise decree on such a ground.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1930 PC 158 (Privy Council) Recognized authority/demarcation of counsel's power to act; cited in discussing implied authority of pleader to compromise. Referred to as one of the authorities supporting the proposition that a counsel can have implied authority to compromise on behalf of a client.
Jiwi Bai v. Ramkuwar, AIR 1947 Nagpur 17 (FB) Authority on counsel's power to settle/compromise and surrounding principles. Used by the court as precedent supporting the view that counsel may have implied authority to compromise.
AIR 1968 Kerala 213 (Kerala High Court) (FB) Bench decision cited on the issue of counsel's authority to compromise. Invoked (with other authorities) to support the implied authority principle adopted by higher courts.
Jamila Bai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand, AIR 1975 SC 2202 Supreme Court recognition of implied authority of legal practitioner to compromise subject to two overriding considerations (good faith/benefit and prudence to consult client). Applied as key authority: the court relied on it to hold that counsel may sign a compromise and the Court may act upon it, provided the two limiting considerations are satisfied.
Employers Manoharbahal Colliery, Calcutta v. K.N. Mishra, AIR 1975 SC 1632 Supreme Court authority cited in the context of the implied powers of counsel to compromise. Referred to among other decisions to buttress the conclusion that a compromise signed by counsel can be valid.
Ramkaran v. Shrikishan, AIR 1976 Raj 130 Discussed for the proposition that if an advocate lacks authority to act for certain parties, any compromise effected by him may be void. Distinguished on facts: the court explained that Ramkaran involved a total lack of authority by the advocate for certain respondents, unlike the present case where Mr. Bansilal did represent the petitioner.
1983 Rajasthan LR 365 : AIR 1983 Raj 240 (Judgment of Justice D.P. Gupta dismissing Second Appeal No. 101/83) The High Court's own decision on the validity of the compromise signed by counsel and the scope of Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. The court relied on and applied that decision to hold that the petitioner's Second Appeal had been dismissed, that the compromise decree had attained finality and operated as res judicata, and that she could not reopen the matter under Section 151 C.P.C.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds through multiple, interrelated legal points, applying precedent and procedural doctrine strictly to the facts before it.

  1. The Court first examined what grounds were raised in the Second Appeal: the sole ground was that the compromise was not signed by the defendant personally but only by her advocate. The Court noted that the Second Appeal did not allege that the defendant had instructed her counsel not to compromise or that she had withdrawn authority from the counsel. Because such a contention was not raised in the Second Appeal, the defendant lost the opportunity to have the compromise set aside on that ground in that proceeding.
  2. The Court reviewed binding and persuasive authority (including the Supreme Court in Jamila Bai and Employers Manoharbahal Colliery, Privy Council and various High Court decisions) establishing that a counsel possesses implied authority to compromise a civil case on his client's behalf, subject to two overriding qualifications: (a) the counsel must act in good faith and for the client's benefit; and (b) where practicable, the counsel should consult and obtain the client's consent; and if there is any contrary instruction or withdrawal of authority the implied power fails.
  3. Applying those principles, the Court concluded that there was neither a shown withdrawal of authority nor an allegation of contrary instruction to the advocate in the Second Appeal. Consequently, once this Court dismissed the Second Appeal (on 2 January 1983), the compromise decree attained finality and operated as res judicata.
  4. The Court distinguished the petitioner's reliance on Ramkaran v. Shrikishan, observing that in that case there was a complete lack of authority in the advocate to act for several respondents — facts materially different from the present case where Mr. Bansilal indisputably represented the petitioner.
  5. The Court further explained the limits of a court's power to set aside a consent decree: neither review nor inherent powers (Section 151 C.P.C.) provide a competent remedy to cancel a compromise decree on grounds that consent was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. Instead, Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act provides the appropriate remedy — a separate suit for cancellation of a void or voidable instrument (which includes a decree) causing serious injury. The petitioner had not instituted such a suit.
  6. The District Judge's factual findings after examining evidence were that the compromise was signed by Mr. Bansilal with the petitioner's consent and that no other property had been improperly included in the redemption decree. The High Court found these factual findings sound and not susceptible to interference on revision.
  7. On these bases — procedural finality/res judicata, the correctness of factual findings as to consent and representation, and the inapplicability of Section 151 C.P.C. to disturb a consent decree that could only be challenged by an appropriate suit — the Court held the application under Section 151 C.P.C. to cancel the compromise decree to be not maintainable and an abuse of process.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition filed by Smt. Mohan Bai is dismissed. The Court ordered costs of Rs. 300/- in favour of the non-petitioners. The opinion concludes with the succinct order: "Petition dismissed."

Implications:

  • The compromise decree recorded by the First Appellate Court and upheld in the High Court remains final and operates as res judicata; it cannot be set aside in the present proceedings under Section 151 C.P.C.
  • The petitioner was precluded from re-litigating the validity of the compromise by relying on Section 151 C.P.C. after the Second Appeal had been dismissed where she did not assert withdrawal of authority or contrary instructions to her advocate.
  • The Court emphasized procedural propriety: where a party alleges that consent or a decree was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, the appropriate remedy is a separate suit (under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act) seeking cancellation; inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C. is not an appropriate substitute for that statutory remedy.
  • No broader novel legal principle was announced by this opinion beyond applying established authorities on the implied authority of counsel to compromise and on the limits of Section 151 C.P.C.; the order resolves the parties' dispute by applying settled law and upholding the findings of fact made by the lower court.

Petition dismissed.

    Smt. Mohan Bai v. Smt. Jai Kishan And Others

    1. This is a revision petition by Smt. Mohan Bai against the order of the District Judge, Udaipur dt. Mar. 10, 1986, dismissing the application filed by the petitioner u/S. 151 of the Civil P.C on 29th June, 1982 in his Court for setting aside the final decree, which had been passed by the District Judge, Udaipur in the suit for redemption which had been filed by Jai Kishan since dead and represented by the non-petitioners.

    2. Facts leading to the filing of this revision petition are that Jaikishan had instituted a civil suit on Nov. 21, 1975 against the petitioner for redemption of mortgage of certain house property which had been usufructuarily mortgaged by him on May 16, 1953 after borrowing a sum of Rs. 2999/- from the petitioner. In the redemption suit, the plaintiff Jai Kishan had stated that he had allowed Smt. Mohan Bai, petitioner to expend amount to the extent of Rs. 2100/- in the said house. It was stated that the petitioner did not make additions in the number of rooms in the property mortgaged, but she dismantled a latrine and started using “owari” in the house as latrine. Thereupon, Jaikishan asked the petitioner and her husband to redeem the mortgaged property from mortgage after taking the mortgage amount and further amount, if any, expended by her. Since the petitioner did not re-deliver the property after redeeming the mortgage, Jaikishan filed the suit for redemption. In that suit, petitioner admitted the factum of mortgage. However, she alleged that she had incurred an amount of about Rs. 7615.85 in making additions in mortgaged property and claimed that amount in addition to the mortgage amount before redemption. A preliminary decree was passed by the trial Court on May 16, 1953 for redemption of mortgaged property on deposit of payment by the plaintiff of the amount of Rs. 2999/- as mortgage money and Rs. 3997.45/- as the amount incurred by the mortgagee in certain constructions or repairs in the mortgaged property. The plaintiff deposited this amount in the trial court. Aggrieved by the preliminary decree, Smt. Mohan Bai defendant filed First Appeal No. 109 of 1981 in the Court of the District Judge, Udaipur. During the course of that appeal, a compromise was filed which was signed by the plaintiff Jai Kishan and his counsel and on behalf of Smt. Mohan Bai, defendant, the compromise was signed by her advocate, Mr. Bansilal. The compromise was verified by the District Judge, Udaipur on Mar. 12, 1982 and the suit of Jai Kishan was decreed in accordance with the compromise.

    3. As against the compromise decree dt Mar. 12, 1982 passed by the District Judge, Udaipur in Civil Appeal No. 109/81, Mohan Bai filed Civil Second Appeal No. 101/83(82?) before this court. In that Second Appeal, the counsel for Mohan Bai, defendant-petitioner challenged the compromise decree on the ground that the compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed, was not signed by the defendant Mohan Bai and was signed only by her advocate Mr. Bansilal. It was urged in the Second Appeal that according to the provisions of O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C as amended by the Amending Act No. 104 of 1976, before a compromise can be given effect to by the Court under O. 23, R. 3, C.P.C, it should be signed by the party himself and a compromise cannot be acted upon by the Court if it is signed merely by the Advocate of the party. The second appeal was dismissed by the Hon'ble Justice Shri D.P Gupta on Jan. 2, 1983. The judgment of His Lordship is reported in 1983 Rajasthan LR 365 : (AIR 1983 Raj 240). It would appear from para 5 of the reported judgment that his Lordship did not accept the contention of defendant Mohan Bai that the amended provision of O. 23, R. 3 C.P.C indicated that the compromise petition signed only by the advocates of the parties would not be given effect to by the Court and after referring to the decision of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1930 PC 158 and to the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Jiwi Bai v. Ramkuwar, AIR 1947 Nagpur 17 (FB) and further a Bench decision of the Kerala High Court reported in AIR 1968 Kerala 213 (FB), which were cited with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jamila Bai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand, AIR 1975 SC 2202 and also yet another decision of the Supreme Court in Employers Manoharbahal Colliery, Calcutta v. K.N Mishra, AIR 1975 SC 1632, his Lordship recognised that a counsel for the party had implied authority to compromise a civil case on behalf of his client and there was no lack of authority in the action of the counsel. In para 9, his Lordship concluded that neither O. 23, R. 3 C.P.C debars a counsel from signing a compromise petition nor it interferes with his inherent right to enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his client and that the Court can act upon the compromise petition which is signed only by counsel for the parties and had not been signed by the parties personally. Then his Lordship referred to the observations of their Lordships of Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankerlal Gulabchand (supra) wherein their Lordships uphold the implied authority of legal practitioner to act by way of compromising a case in which he was engaged without specific consent from his client subject to two overriding considerations. Firstly, the counsel must act in good faith and for the benefit of his client, otherwise the power fails and secondly, that it is prudent and proper to consult his client and take his consent, if there is time and opportunity. If there is any instruction to the contrary or withdrawal of authority, the implicit power to compromise in the pleader will fall to the ground.

    4. It is here pertinent to note that in the second appeal filed by Mohan Bai defendant against the compromise decree, she challenged the compromise decree only on the ground that compromise was not signed by the defendant and was only signed by her counsel, the same could not be acted upon by the Court and no compromise decree on its basis could be passed. The defendant or his counsel in Civil Second Appeal No. 101/82 which had been filed by the defendant against the compromise decree, did not contend that she or her husband had instructed their counsel Mr. Bansilal to take adjournment in the case for some other date or directed him not to compromise the case. The defendant could challenge the compromise decree on this ground in the second appeal, but she did not attack the compromise decree on this ground and as a result of the dismissal of her second appeal by this court on Jan. 2, 1983 (reported in AIR 1983 Raj 240), the compromise decree had attained finality and operated as res judicata. She is debarred from raising such plea in any proceedings which she chose to initiate u/s. 151 of the Civil P.C The observations of the learned single Judge in Second Appeal No. 101 of 1983 while dismissing the second appeal that the application filed before First Appellate Court to set aside the compromise shall be considered by the Court on its own merits have to be read in the context in which these observations were made. When the learned single Judge, after having come to the conclusion that the counsel for the defendant had power to enter into compromise on behalf of the defendant and court could act upon the compromise signed by the counsel, was going to dismiss the appeal, it was the counsel for the defendant Mohan Bai, who of his own accord, stated that he had filed an application in the First Appellate Court for setting aside the compromise and the learned single Judge, accordingly left it to be decided on its own merits. As has already been stated, there was nothing to preclude Mohan Bai defendant to attack the compromise decree in Second Appeal No. 101 of 1983 on the ground that the defendant had given instructions to her counsel not to compromise the suit before the first appeal court or that he had withdrawn authority of the counsel to compromise. She, having not chosen to attack the compromise decree on that ground in Second Appeal No. 101 of 1983, cannot attack it by means of an application under S. 151 C.P.C before the First Appellate Court. This is one aspect of the matter.

    5. The other aspect is that it is well settled that the Court is not competent either in review or under its inherent powers to set aside the compromise decree on the ground that the consent of the parties or any of them was obtained by fraud or that the compromise decree was obtained by misrepresentation. The consent decree is contract between the parties and suit for adjudging it void and/or setting aside a decree on the ground of its having been obtained through misrepresentation or fraud lies under S. 31 of the Specific Relief Act whereunder a person against whom a void or voidable instrument, which includes a decree, and which causes serious injury can file a suit in Civil Court to get it cancelled. The petitioner did not file any such suit.

    6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a single Judge decision of this Court in Ramkaran v. Shrikishan, reported in AIR 1976 Raj 130. This decision is very much distinguishable on facts. It has to be borne in mind that every decision on a point of law cannot be divorced from the facts and circumstances of the case in which it was given and to which the law laid down by it was applied. In Ramkaran's case, Mr. C.L Aggarwal had filed Vakalatnama signed by only one respondent Hardev. The other respondents neither signed any Vakalatnama in favour of Mr. C.L Aggarwal nor they a uthorised him to act or plead on their behalf. Mr. C.L Aggarwal had not produced any evidence to explain how he signed the reply on behalf of respondents when he was engaged by Hardev alone. Since Mr. C.L Aggarwal did not hold any vakalatnama in the writ petition from other six respondents except Hardev, he had no authority to enter into the agreement on behalf of six respondents from which he did not hold Vakalatnama before the Board of Revenue to which the case had been remanded by the High Court in the writ petition. Thus in Ramkaran's case, there was total lack of authority in Mr. C.L Aggarwal to make any compromise or to enter into an agreement with the counsel of Ram Karan to get the decree passed from the Board of Revenue on 19th Mar., 1963 in accordance with the compromise. In such circumstances, in the second appeal against compromise decree, the learned single Judge of this Court held that since the compromise decree was passed under a mistaken belief or impression that Mr. C.L Aggarwal was empowered to act and plead on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents, the lower Court had rightly held that respondents were not bound by the compromise-decree passed by the Board of Revenue. It may be stated that in Ram Karan's case after the compromise decree had been passed, respondents (excluding Hardeo) had instituted a regular suit for grant of declaration that the agreement dt. 130th Aug., 1962 arrived at between Mr. P.N Datta and Mr. C.L Aggarwal on the basis of which the decree of the Board of Revenue dt. 19th Mar., 1963 was passed may be declared void, illegal and inoperative. Petitioner, in the instant case, neither attacked the compromise decree in the Regular Second Appeal No. 101 of 1983 which he had filed against that decree in this Court nor by way of separate suit for declaration of the decree as ineffective or for the cancellation of the decree. In Ram Karan's case, there was complete lack of authority in Mr. C.L Aggarwal to enter into an agreement and to get the compromise decree passed from the Board of Revenue in accordance with the agreement.

    7. In case of Jamila Bai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal Gulabchand, (AIR 1975 SC 2202) (supra) also the tenant, after the passing of the compromise decree on 21st April, 1965, had instituted a Regular Suit No. 922/66 for declaration that the decree passed on the basis of a compromise entered into by his pleader without authority was not binding on him and, consequently, he was not liable to be dispossessed. Thus, in the above Supreme Court case also the compromise decree was challenged by a separate suit.

    8. The petitioner in the instant case is in a worst position. Neither she challenged the compromise decree in this Regular Second Appeal No. 101 of 1983 against the consent decree nor by way of a regular civil suit for declaration of the decree as void or for cancellation of the decree with which she was otherwise bound because Mr. Bansilal, Advocate undoubtedly represented the petitioner as her counsel in the redemption suit.

    9. In this view of the matter, the application filed by the defendant petitioner u/s. 151 of the Civil P.C for cancelling the compromise decree was not maintainable. This petition was more in an abuse of the process of the Court rather than to prevent the abuse. It would be travesty of justice if a decree which had attained finality even from the High Court can be cancelled by the First Appellate Court on an application under S. 151 of Civil P.C The remedy pursued by the defendant-petitioner of moving an application u/s. 151 of the Civil P.C was ill-advised and misconceived.

    10. Apart from that, the District Judge, Udaipur, after carefully examining the evidence produced before him, has correctly found a fact that the compromise was signed by Mr. Bansilal, Advocate with the consent of the petitioner and that it was entirely wrong that any other property was included in the redemption decree than that for which suit for redemption was filed by Jai Kishan, I have carefully gone through the reasoning given by the District Judge, Udaipur in this regard and without repeating the reasonings, I may state that the reasonings given are quite sound and his findings of fact cannot be interfered in revision.

    11. Thus revision petition filed by Smt. Mohan Bai has no merit in it and it is hereby dismissed with costs to the non-petitioners which I assess at Rs. 300/-.

    Petition dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Smt. Mohan Bai v. Smt. Jai Kishan And Others
    (Feb 11, 1987)