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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Government) Rules, 1963,
  • Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1954,
  • sub-section (4) of section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
  • sub-section (2) of Section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
  • section 30 E (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
  • Section 30-DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
  • ARTICLE 39 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 183
  • Rajasthan Tenancy Act or the Rules
  • rule 22 of the Rules of 1963,
  • Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Government) Rules, 1963,
  • Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1954,
  • sub-section (4) of section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
  • sub-section (2) of Section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
  • section 30 E (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
  • Section 30-DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
  • ARTICLE 39 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 183
  • Rajasthan Tenancy Act or the Rules
  • rule 22 of the Rules of 1963,
  • Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These two special appeals (Nos. 47 and 49 of 1977) were preferred by Nand Lal and Ganesh Lal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, against the order delivered in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 1507 and 1508 of 1976 (dated October 26, 1977) which had dismissed writ petitions challenging the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated August 27, 1976.

The factual matrix in the opinion is as follows: the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Kota, by order dated July 12, 1976, refused to recognise transfers of land in favour of the appellants because the sale-deeds were executed after December 31, 1969, and held that Khatedar Major Bakhtawar Singh was liable to surrender 339.76 standard acres as surplus land. Bakhtawar Singh was given an option to select land within the ceiling limits to retain. While exercising that option, the Khatedar included among the fields to be surrendered certain plots (Khasra No. 39 in village Chatinda and Khasra No. 38 in village Bhojpura) alleged to have been transferred to the petitioners. The petitioners objected before the SDO without success, and their appeal to the Revenue Appellate Authority also failed.

Instead of pursuing revision before the Board of Revenue, the petitioners approached the Rajasthan High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Both writ petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The present appeals arise from that dismissal and have been heard together because they involve common questions of law and fact.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the legal effect of the petitioners' failure to avail themselves of the alternative statutory remedy (revision before the Board of Revenue)?
  2. Whether the petitioners (as transferees) had any right to receive notice or to be heard in relation to the acceptance of the option exercised by the Khatedar-tenant, Major Bakhtawar Singh, in the ceiling proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Revenue Appellate Authority erred in not interfering with or reversing the SDO's order accepting the land surrendered by the Khatedar and thereby accepting encumbered land.
  • Under the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, where some lands held by a person are encumbered and others unencumbered, the unencumbered lands should, so far as may be, be surrendered in preference to encumbered lands; consequently the option exercised and accepted was improper.
  • No notice was issued to the petitioners (transferees) at any stage of the proceedings; the failure to give notice violated principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) and thereby infringed their property rights.
  • Reliance was placed on Harnek Singh v. State of Punjab for the proposition that transferees are entitled to adequate opportunity to safeguard their interests in such proceedings.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent/state's adversarial arguments; the judgment mainly addresses the appellants' contentions and the court's analysis of statutory scheme and precedent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harnek Singh v. State of Punjab Authority for the proposition that transferees should be given an opportunity to safeguard their interests (interpreting Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1954). The court (following the Single Judge) held Harnek Singh was decided on the special facts and on a different statutory provision (Section 32-FF of Pepsu Act) and that there was no corresponding provision in Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955; accordingly Harnek Singh was of no avail to the appellants.
Smt. Dal Kanwar Bai v. Ram Singh and State of Rajasthan Demonstration that a Single Bench of the Board of Revenue had set aside an SDO order accepting the surrender of encumbered land. The court relied on this to conclude that a revision remedy before the Board of Revenue could have been effective and that the appellants were not justified in bypassing the statutory remedy under the Act.
Jai Hanuman Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax Construction of Article 226(3) (post-42nd Amendment) limiting entertainment of writ petitions where alternative remedies exist under other laws. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that Article 226 should not be used to substitute statutory remedies and that the High Court is precluded from entertaining petitions when an alternative statutory remedy exists.
Union of India v. J.N. Sinha Principle that if a statutory provision specifically or by necessary implication excludes application of principles of natural justice, courts must give effect to the statutory mandate and cannot read in those principles. The court quoted and applied this principle to conclude that Chapter III-B and the Rules of 1963 exclude by necessary implication the transferees' right to be heard in ceiling proceedings, so the principles of natural justice could not be invoked to defeat the statutory scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in a series of constrained, textually grounded steps:

  1. The Single Judge had dealt exhaustively with the arguments; the appellate court found no error in that approach and accepted the Single Judge's view that Harnek Singh was not on point because it interpreted a different statutory provision (Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy Act) and therefore was inapplicable to Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.
  2. The court observed that Section 30-DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act recognises transfers made up to December 31, 1969, in favour of agriculturists meeting specified conditions; transfers made after that date cannot be recognised for ceiling purposes. Accordingly, the SDO's refusal to recognise the transfers to the petitioners (sale-deeds executed after December 31, 1969) was correct on that statutory basis.
  3. The court framed two key questions: (1) the effect of not availing the alternative remedy provided by the Act; and (2) whether the petitioners had any right to notice in relation to the Khatedar's exercise of option accepted by the SDO.
  4. On the first question, the court relied on Smt. Dal Kanwar Bai to show that the Board of Revenue had power to set aside similar SDO orders; it emphasized that the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is a self-contained code providing a comprehensive machinery for redress and that resort should be had to that machinery rather than to Article 226. The court further relied on the effect of the 42nd Amendment and Article 226(3) (as explained with citation to Jai Hanuman) to conclude that where an alternative remedy exists under statute, the High Court ought not to entertain a writ petition as if exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction.
  5. On the second question (right to be heard), the court reasoned from the statutory scheme of Chapter III-B and the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Government) Rules, 1963:
    • Chapter III-B and the Rules contain no provision requiring issuance of notice to transferees in the ceiling proceedings.
    • Section 30-E(2) casts a duty on a person holding land in excess of the ceiling to report and surrender such excess land; Section 30-E(4) deems a person retaining possession after April 1, 1966, of excess land to be a trespasser liable to ejectment and penalty.
    • Where a transfer is not recognised for ceiling purposes, the land is treated as the Khatedar's land; transferees are purchasers pending proceedings and are bound by the result of the pending ceiling proceedings.
    • By necessary implication the legislative scheme excludes transferees' entitlement to be heard; instead transferees have a statutory route to reimbursement (including claim under rule 22 of the Rules of 1963 and compensation under Section 30-G).
    From this statutory structure the court concluded that principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) cannot be read into Chapter III-B to confer a transferee right to be heard, because that would defeat the statutory objective of expeditious acquisition and redistribution of surplus land.
  6. The court reinforced this statutory analysis by citing Union of India v. J.N. Sinha to the effect that where statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes application of natural justice, courts must not import those principles.
  7. Taken together, these conclusions led the court to find no infirmity in the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petitions and to reject the appellants' contentions about lack of notice and violation of natural justice.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED IN LIMINE

Holding (direct effect): The two special appeals were dismissed in limine. The court upheld the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petitions and agreed that the transfers effected after December 31, 1969, could not be recognised for the purposes of determining surplus land; the SDO's refusal to recognise such transfers was proper and the Revenue Appellate Authority's non-interference was not shown to be erroneous.

Implications:

  • Transferees of land where the sale-deeds were executed after December 31, 1969, have no right (under Chapter III-B and the Rules of 1963) to be given notice or to be heard in the ceiling-surrender proceedings; such transfers are to be ignored for the purpose of determining surplus land.
  • The Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the Rules provide a complete statutory machinery (including revision before the Board of Revenue and reimbursement/compensation mechanisms such as rule 22 and Section 30-G) and litigants are expected to resort to those remedies rather than approach the High Court under Article 226 when an alternative remedy is available.
  • The court applied the principle that where a statutory scheme excludes application of natural justice by necessary implication, the courts must apply the statute as enacted and cannot import audi alteram partem to defeat legislative purpose (as illustrated by the citation to Union of India v. J.N. Sinha).

The opinion did not announce a novel legal precedent beyond the application of the existing statutory scheme and cited authorities; it affirmed the existing legal position that the statutory remedy must be pursued and that transferees in the circumstances described have no statutory right to be heard in ceiling proceedings.

    Nandlal v. State Of Rajasthan

    Shrimal, J.:— These two special appeals Nos. 47 and 49 of 1977, preferred by Nand Lal and Ganesh Lal, under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, are directed against the order, delivered in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 1507 of 1976and 1508 of 1976 on October 26, 1977, rejecting the writ petitions challenging the validity of the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority, dated August 27, 1976, holding that the transfers of the surplus land, transfer of which was made after December 31, 1969, had no right of hearing and consequantly the appeals filed by then were not maintainable.

    2. The facts giving rise to these special appeals are that the Sub Divisional Officer, Kota, (vide his order, dated July 12, 1976) refused to recognise the transfer of land made in favour of the appellants as the sale-deeds were executed after December 31, 1969 and the Sub-Divisional Officer further held that Bakhtawar Singh was liable to surrender 339.76 standard acres of land, being surplus land. He was given an option to select for himself and his sons land within the ceiling limit which he wanted to retain. It was urged that the Khatedar-tenant while exercising the option given to him included in the list of the fields to be surrendered, Khasra No. 39, measuring 29 Bighas and 1 Biswa, situate in village Chatinda, as also Khisra No. 38, measuring 13 Bighas and 1 Biswa of land, situate in village Bhojpura, alleged to have been transferred to petitioners Nandlal and Ganeshlal respectively. The petitioners raised an objection before the Sub-Divisional Officer, but without any success. The appeal filed before the Revenue Appellate Authority also resulted in fiasco. Aggrieved of the impugned orders, the petitioners instead of filing revision petitions before the Board of Revenue, straightway approached this Court, seeking redress under Article 226 of the Constitution. But both the writ petitions Nos. 1507 and 1508 of 1976 were dismissed by the learned Single Judge.

    3. As both these appeals emerge out of the same order and as common questions of law and facts are involved, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

    4. The contention of learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, is that the statutory authority, namely, the Revenue Appellate Authority, has acted in contravention of law in not interfering with or in not reversing the order of the Sub-divisional Officer, accepting the encumbered land. Learned counsel further urged that the requirement of the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, is that where the person, surrendering excess lands, holds lands of which some are encumbered and some are not encumbered, the unencumbered lands shall so for as may be, be surrendered in preference to encumbered lands. It has also been submitted that at no stage of the proceedings any notice had been issued to the petitioners. Nongiving of the notices to the transferee-petitioners violates the principles of natural justice. Placing reliance on Harnek Singh v. State of Punjab (1) learned counsel argued that the petitioners were entitled to adequate opportunity to safe guard their interest under the proceedings, which culminated in adversely effecting their right to property.

    5. The arguments advanced before the learned Single Judge were reiterated before us. All these points, raised before us, have been exhaustively dealt with by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the decision in, Harnek Singh's case (1) (supra) dealt with the interpretation of Section 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1954, and that there is no corresponding provision contained in Chapter III B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. It is a decision passed on the special facts of that case and is of no avail to the appellants. A perusal of Section 30-DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, reveels that the transfers made upto December 31, 1969, in favour of agriculturists, domiciled in Rajasthan of in favour of Khatedars' sons or brothers, intending to take the profession of agriculturists and capable of cultivating lands personally and who had attained the age of majority on or before the said date, could be recognised. The Sub divisional Officer has rightly refused to recognised the transfers made in favour of the petitioners vide his order, dated July 12, 1976. The appellants have no grievance against the above order, Their grievance relates to the manner of exercise of option by the Khatedar tenant and its acceptance by the Sub-divisional Officer and non-interferencs in the said order by the Revenue Appellates Authority.

    6. Now the questions, which need to be determined, are (1) what is the effect of not availing of the alternative remedy available to the petitioners; and (ii) whether the petitioners had any right of notice against accepting the option exercised by the Khatedar-tenant, Major Bakhtawar Singh.

    7. In Smt. Dal Kanwar Bai v. Ram Singh and State of Rajasthan (2) a Single Bench of the Board of Revenue had set aside a similar order of the Sub-divisional Officer, accepting the surrender of land which was encuabered and as such the petitioners cannot be said to be correct in their submission that no useful purpose would have been served by filing a revision petition. The Rajasthan Tenancy Act is a self contained Code. It provides for a complete machinery and recourse must be had to that machinely for redress and not to a petition under Articlc 226 of the Constitution. It is not the object of Article 226 of the Constitution to convert this Court into an appellate or a revisional Court. Whenever a litigant feels that revisional Court will not give him appropriate relief, there should be something more in a case to warrant the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, something to show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to ask the transferee to adopt a remedy provided by the Act. The effect of 42nd amendment of the Constitution is that the High Court previously had the freedom to issue a high prerogative writ notwithstanding the existerce of an alternative remedy, but it is now precluded from doing so because Article 226(3) of the Constitution provides that “no petition for redress of any injury referred in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for vhe time being in force.” Reference in this connection may be made to Jai Hanuman Trading Co., Pvt., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (3).

    8. As regards petitioners' right to be heard, suffice it to say, that the transfers of the lands made by a Khatedar-tenant after December 31, 1969, cannot be recognised and they are rendered ineffective against the State Government. For the purpose of determining surplus land of the Khatedars, sucb transfers are required to be ignored. Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, and the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Government) Rules, 1963, made thereunder do not provide for the issuance of a notice to the transferees. Under section 30 E (2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, a duty has been cast on the person holding land in excess of the ceiling area to make a report of such possession and surrender such excess land to the State Government and place it at the disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land is situate. Under sub-section (4) of section 30-E of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, the person (i.e the Khatedar) retaining the possession of the land after April 1, 1966, in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, is deemed to be a trespasser liable to ejectment from such excess land and to pay penalty in accoidance with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 183 of the Rajasthan Tecancy A at, 1955. The petitioners are purchasers pending proceedings. They were bound by the result of the pending celling proceedings, between Khatedar Bakhtawar Singh and State Government, at the time of the alleged sale by the Khatedar in favour of the purchasers. Where a transfer is not recognised, the land coveted by such transfer has to be treated as land of the Khatedar, whose land is being acquired. Thus, it is manifest that the legislature by necessary implication excludes the right of transferee-purchasers to be heard. The transferees are entitled to be reimbursed and the transferor is bound to restore to them the advantage obtained by him. They can also claim reimbursement under rule 22 of the Rules of 1963, out of the compensation amount paid by the State Government to the transferor in respect of such land under Section 30-G of the Act. Thus, under the scheme of Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, the Legislature, by necessary implication, excludes the application of the principles of natural justice regarding Audi Alteram Partem in favour of the transferees. In sum, they have no right of being heard.

    9. In the Union of India v. J.N Sinha (4), the question regarding the principles of natural justice came up for consideration while dealing with the fundamental rule No. 56 J. Their Lordships, repelling similar contention, raised by the respondent in that case, observed as under:—

    “…It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the Courts should do so brcausp it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principales of natural justice, Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power.”

    10. A series of legislation has been gradually adopted and provided for land reforms and for acquisition of right, title and interest in land from the land holders and intermediaries. The motive behind the present Act is to ensure equitable distribution of agricultural land for securing the odject that the ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed, as best to subserve the comman good, as enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution of India State acquires land under this Act under the ceiling provisions not for making profit but for fair distribution of land amongst landless agriculturists and other deserving persons with a view to remove the disparity in the holdings of agricultural land and to increase agricultural products. That is why the legilature, in order to acquire expenditiously the surplus land, did not make any provision under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or the Rules made thereunder regarding giving an opportunity of being heared to the transferees, of the land whose transfers have not been recognised under the law of the land for ceiling purposes. The principle of natural justice cannot be stretched to defeat the very purpose and object of the Act itself. We find no infirmity in the orders of the learned Single Judge.

    11. The two special appeals, being bereft of merits, are hereby dismissed in limine.

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    Nandlal v. State Of Rajasthan
    (Feb 4, 1978)