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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • sec. 7/3 of the Essentital Commodities Act read with rule 3
  • Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 7/3 of the Essentital Commodities Act read with rule 3
  • Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Concise narrative of events and procedural history drawn from the opinion.

On 28 May 1971 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Parbatsar) sent a report to the Station House Officer indicating that Ramchandra and Suraj Narain of Jaipur had entertained 500 to 600 persons on 27 and 28 May 1971 in contravention of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965. The Station House Officer investigated and on 29 May 1971 submitted a report requesting cognizance under sec. 7/3 of the Essential Commodities Act read with rule 3 of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered registration of the case and issued warrants of arrest against Ramchandra and Suraj Narain on 14 June 1971. The petitioners challenged the cognizance by way of revision before the Sessions Judge, Merta, who rejected the revision petition on 12 October 1971. The petitioners then filed the present revision petition before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether proceedings taken under the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965 can be continued or whether they ipso facto terminate after the Order was rescinded by Notification No. S.O. 29 dated 9 September 1971, where that rescinding notification contains no saving clause.
  2. Whether, in the absence of a saving provision in the rescinding notification, accused persons can be prosecuted under a temporary enactment for acts committed before rescission but prosecuted after the expiry of the temporary enactment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The primary contention advanced by the petitioners (Ramchandra and Suraj Narain) was that the Sessions Judge failed to take into account that the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965 was rescinded by Government Notification No. S.O. 29 dated 9 September 1971 (published in the Rajasthan Gazette of that date), and that because the rescission contained no saving clause, pending proceedings under that temporary Order could not be maintained after its expiry.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any opposing or respondent arguments in this text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Craies on Statute Law (Fifth Edition, pp. 577–578) Authoritative statement of the general rule that, unless a temporary statute contains a contrary provision, proceedings under it terminate on expiry. Used as a textbook authority to state the general principle that temporary enactments cease to have effect after expiry and pending proceedings terminate in absence of saving provision.
S. Krishnan v. State of Madras Affirmation of the general rule that proceedings under a temporary statute terminate ipso facto on expiry unless there is a special provision to the contrary. Cited to support the proposition that, without a saving clause, proceedings pending under a temporary statute terminate upon its expiry.
Krishna Chadra v. Sushila (Full Bench, Orissa High Court) Held that after expiry of a statute, absent a provision to the contrary, no proceedings can be taken on it and proceedings already taken ipso facto determine. Relied upon as a supporting authority for the court's statement of the general rule concerning expiry of temporary statutes.
Rabindra Nath v. Gour Mondal (Full Bench, Calcutta High Court) Stated the ordinary rule that no action can be taken under a temporary statute after expiry and proceedings pending at expiry terminate automatically, but noted the possibility of contrary provision indicating residual operation. Quoted to illustrate the ordinary rule and the caveat that the statute itself may indicate an intention to remain alive for certain purposes.
Tarak Chandra v. Ratan Lal (Full Bench, Calcutta High Court) Reiterated the general rule that a temporary Act ceases to have effect after expiry and that pending proceedings terminate automatically absent contrary provision. Used as an additional authority confirming the settled rule relied upon by the Court.
Gopichand v. Delhi Administration (Supreme Court) Observed that where an impugned Act lacks an appropriate saving section, an appellant may contend that after expiry of the Act the procedure laid down in it could no longer be invoked in pending cases. Applied to show that, in the absence of a saving clause in the rescinding notification, the petitioners are entitled to challenge continuation of proceedings under the expired Order.
Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions (House of Lords) Illustrated an exception: where the temporary Act contains a provision (sec. 11(3) of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939) preserving operation as to things previously done, prosecutions after expiry may be valid. Referenced to demonstrate that prosecutions after expiry can stand only if the temporary statute contains an appropriate saving provision; since the Rajasthan rescission lacked such a clause, the exception did not apply.
Spenser v. Hooton; R. v. Ellis Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union Authorities holding that special jurisdiction conferred by certain temporary statutes ceases absolutely on expiry to the detriment of pending proceedings. Referred to as English authorities reinforcing that, where no saving provision exists, jurisdiction and pending proceedings under temporary statutes terminate upon expiry.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise constitutional and statutory manner, applying established principles concerning temporary enactments:

  • It accepted as admitted that the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965 was a temporary enactment and that the State Government rescinded it by Notification No. S.O. 29 dated 9 September 1971.
  • It noted that the rescinding notification contained no saving clause to preserve cases pending at the time of rescission.
  • Relying on established authorities and doctrinal statements (Craies on Statute Law and multiple judicial decisions cited), the court restated the general principle that, unless a contrary provision exists, a temporary statute ceases to have effect upon expiry and proceedings pending under it terminate ipso facto.
  • The court contrasted that general rule with situations where the temporary statute itself contains a saving provision (illustrated by Wicks v. DPP and sec. 11(3) of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939), which can preserve the validity of prosecutions or proceedings after expiry. It concluded that no such provision applied here.
  • Applying the rule to the facts, the court held that because the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965 was rescinded without a saving clause, the procedure under that Order could no longer be invoked in cases pending when it ceased to exist, and therefore prosecution under its provisions could not be maintained against the petitioners.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is allowed. The orders under challenge are quashed: the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order dated 14 June 1971 and the Sessions Judge, Merta's order dated 12 October 1971 are set aside, and the accused (Ramchandra and Suraj Narain) stand discharged.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The accused cannot be prosecuted under the provisions of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965 for the matters then pending after the rescission by Notification No. S.O. 29 dated 9 September 1971, because that rescission contained no saving clause. Consequently, the pending prosecution terminated and the accused are discharged; they are on bail and need not surrender to it.
  • Broader precedential effect: The opinion applies and reiterates the established principle (as supported by cited authorities) that temporary statutes, absent a saving provision, cease to authorize proceedings after expiry. The opinion does not indicate creation of a novel legal principle beyond applying this settled law.

    Ram Chandra v. State Of Rajasthan

    Mehta, J.:— The brief facts of this case are that on May 28, 1971, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parbatsar, sent a report to the Station House Officer. Parbatsar, to the effect that he had come to know that Ramchandra and his in Suraj Narain of Jaipur had entertained 500 to 600 persons on May 27 and 28, 1971, against the provisions of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965 and, therefore, proceedings should be started against the guilty persons. On receipt of the above complaint the Station House Officer went to the spot and investigated the matter. He then submitted his report on May, 29, 1971, requesting she court to take cognisance of the offence under sec. 7/3 of the Essentital Commodities Act read with rule 3 of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965. On receipt of that report the Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered to register the case under the aforesaid provisions of law and issued warrants of arrest against accused Ramchandra and Suraj Narain on 14-5-1971. The petitioners went up in revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Merta, against the cognisance of the alleged crime having been taken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Mr. S.C Calla, Sessions Judge, Merta, rejected the revision-petition on October 12, 1971.

    2. Aggieved by the above order of learned Sessions Judge, Merta, Ramchandra and Suraj Narain have taken this revision-petition before this court. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Sessions Judge has gone wrong in not taking into consideration the fact that the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965, was rescinded by the Government by their Notification No. S.O 29, dated September 9, 1971, published in the Rajasthan Gazette of the same date.

    3. It is an admitted position that the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965, published in the Rajasthan Gazette, extra-ordinary part IV, dated the 12th September 1965, was a temporary enactment. There is also no controversy that temporary statute was rescinded by the State Govenment by its Notification No. S.O 29 dated September 9, 1971. Further, there is no dispute that in the above Notification no saving clause has been inserted, providing that the cases which were pending on September 9, 1971, would remain unaffected.

    4. As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act expires no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect. Therefore, offences committed against temporary enactments have to be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires, and as soon as the Act expires any proceedings which are being taken against a person will ipso facto terminate. In this connection a reference is made to Craies on Statute Law, Fifth Edition, pages 577 and 578. In S. Krishnan v. State of Madras (1), it has been observed by his Lordship Patanjali Sastri:

    “This general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision, to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires.”

    The matter also received consideration of a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Krishna Chadra v. Sushila (2). In that case it was held:

    “After the expiry of a statute, in the absence of a provision to the contrary, no proceedings can be taken on it and proceedings already taken ipso facto determine.”

    Likewise, in a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, reported in Rabindra Nath v. Gour Mondal (3), it was laid down:

    “Ordinarily, no action can be taken under a temporary statute after it has expired and all proceedings pending at the date of its expiry terminate automatically. But there may be provision to the contrary in the Act itself. And it has to be seen whether it contained any provisions indicating an intention that even after its expiry it would remain alive for certain purposes.”

    In another Full Bench decision of the same High Court in Tarak Chandra v. Ratan Lal (4), it has been observed:

    “The general rule is that unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, a temporary Act ceases to have any further effect after it has expired. No proceedings can be taken under it any longer and proceedings already taken and pending terminate automatically as soon as it expires.”

    There is also a later decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reported in Gopichand v. Delhi Administration (5). In that case his Lordship Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for the court, observed:

    “Since the impugned Act does not contain an appropriate saving section the appellant would be entitled to contend that, after the expiry of the Act, the procedure laid down in it could no longer be invoked in the cases then pending against the appellant,”

    Here, as an illustration, I may also refer to a decision in Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions (6). In that case an offence against the Defence (General) Regulations made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, was committed during the currency of the Act and the offender was prosecuted and convicted after the expiry of the Act. A contention was raised before the House of Lords on behalf of the offender that his prosecution and conviction were invalid because at the relevant time, the temporary act had ceased to exist. That plea was rejected in view of the provisions of sec. 11 sub-sec. (3) of the Act. That sub-sec. had provided that the expiry of the Act would not affect the operation thereof as respects things previously done or omitted to have been done. The authorities relating to expiry of temporary statutes are few in number in England. Apart from Wicks' case (supra), there is another citation reported in Spenser v. Hooton (7) and R. v. Ellis Ex-parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (8) In both these authorities it has been held that a special jurisdiction conferred by certain temporary statutes ceases absolutely on their expiry to the detriment of the pending proceedings.

    5. In the present case the Notification No. S.O 29, dated September 9, 1971, rescinding the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965, does not contain an appropriate saving clause and, therefore, the accused are well within their right to contend that after the expiry of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965, the procedure laid down in it would no longer be invoked in the case then pending against them. Such being the settled law, the petitioners Ramchandra and Suraj Narain cannot now be prosecuted under the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Guest Control Order, 1965.

    6. I accordingly accept this revision petition and quash the order of learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parbatsar, dated June 14, 1971, as also that of learned Sessions Judge, Merta dated October 12, 1971. The accused stand discharged. They are on bail and they need Dot surrender to it.

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    Comments

    Ram Chandra v. State Of Rajasthan
    (Apr 6, 1972)