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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 24(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act.3.
  • Section 38(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act,
  • Section 7(2)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act.
  • Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act
  • Section 8(3) of the Hindu Minority, and Guardianship Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 24(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act.3.
  • Section 38(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act,
  • Section 7(2)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act.
  • Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act
  • Section 8(3) of the Hindu Minority, and Guardianship Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision application was filed by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 challenging an appellate order of the Additional District Judge, Ganganagar, which held that the Civil Judge, Ganganagar had jurisdiction to try a suit instituted in 1967 by Tej Singh and Gurucharan Singh, sons of Narendra Singh. The suit sought a declaration that a sale-deed dated 18-7-57, by which their father transferred 2 squares of agricultural land to the defendants for Rs. 24,000/-, was not binding on them, along with possession of the land and mesne profits. The suit was initially instituted in the Civil Judge’s court but was returned for presentation to the Senior Civil Judge’s court due to a jurisdictional objection. The Additional District Judge set aside that order on appeal, holding that the suit was one for declaration and possession with court-fee payable under Section 24(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is substantially one for cancellation of the sale-deed and thus requires court-fee and valuation under Section 38(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act.
  2. Whether the Civil Judge, Ganganagar has jurisdiction to try the suit or whether it lies exclusively before the District Judge based on the valuation of the suit.
  3. The proper computation of court-fee and valuation for jurisdictional purposes in a suit challenging the validity of a sale-deed executed by a natural guardian on behalf of minors.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The suit is essentially for cancellation of the sale-deed, not merely for declaration.
  • Court-fee is payable under Section 38(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, which applies to suits for cancellation of documents affecting rights in property.
  • The Civil Judge lacks pecuniary jurisdiction as the valuation based on the property’s value (Rs. 24,000) exceeds the Civil Judge’s limits.

Court's Observations (Plaintiffs' Position)

  • The suit was instituted for declaration and possession with valuation under Section 7(2)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act.
  • The Additional District Judge held that court-fee was payable under Section 24(a) for declaration and possession suits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sukhlal v. Devilal, 1954 Raj LW 136 (AIR 1954 Raj 170) Distinction between suits for cancellation of an instrument and suits for declaration that an instrument is not binding; substantive nature of suit determines proper classification and court-fee. The Court applied this precedent to hold that the present suit was substantially for cancellation of the sale-deed, not merely for declaration, thus attracting court-fee under Section 38(1)(a) and affecting jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the suit and the legal effect of the sale-deed executed by the plaintiffs’ father when they were minors. It relied on the principle that when a plaintiff cannot establish title without removing an insuperable obstacle like a binding sale-deed, the suit is substantively for cancellation of that deed, even if framed as a declaration. The Court noted that the sale-deed was executed by the natural guardian without the required court permission under Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, making the sale voidable under Section 8(3) of the same Act. Since the sale-deed is voidable, cancellation must precede entitlement to possession. The Court further held that only a civil court can grant cancellation, not a revenue court, confirming the suit’s civil nature. Consequently, the valuation for court-fee and jurisdiction must be based on the property value (Rs. 24,000), making the suit beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge and triable only by the District Judge. Therefore, the appellate order allowing the suit in the Civil Judge’s court was set aside, and the plaint was to be returned for presentation to the proper court.

Holding and Implications

Revision allowed.

The appellate order holding that the Civil Judge, Ganganagar had jurisdiction was set aside. The plaint is to be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation before the proper court, i.e., the District Judge, as the suit’s valuation exceeds the pecuniary limits of the Civil Judge. The Court’s decision clarifies that suits substantially for cancellation of documents executed by natural guardians on behalf of minors must be valued on the property’s full value for court-fee and jurisdictional purposes. No broader precedent beyond the parties is established as the ruling applies the existing principles to the facts at hand.

    Lal Singh And Others v. Tejsingh And Another

    1. This is a revision application by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 against an appellate order of the Additional District Judge, Ganganagar, holding that the Civil Judge, Ganganagar has jurisdiction to try the present suit.

    2. The suit was instituted by Tej Singh, and Gurucharan Singh sons or Narendra Singh in 1967 for a declaration that the sale-deed dated 18-7-57 by which their father Narendra Singh transferred 2 squares of agricultural land in Chack 51 GG for Rs. 24,000/- to the defendants is not binding on them and for possession over the land sold under the sale-deed. Mesne profits were also claimed. The rent of the agricultural land over which possession was claimed is Rs. 1.62 per Bigha and the area is 50 Bighas. The suit for possession was valued at Rs. 2,031.25 under Section 7(2)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act. A sum of Rs. 430/- was claimed as mesne profits. The valuation of the suit was thus Rs. 2,461.25. It was instituted in the court of the Civil Judge, Ganganagar. On an objection by the applicants the learned Civil Judge returned the plaint for presentation to the court of the Senior Civil Judge. This order was set aside by the learned Additional District Judge on appeal. He held that the suit was one for declaration and possession and court-fee was payable under Section 24(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act.

    3. On behalf of the applicants it is contended that the suit is substantially one for the cancellation of the sale-deed and that court-fee is payable under Section 38(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, which runs as follows:—

    “38. Suits for cancellation of decrees etc.— (1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be—

    (a) if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed.”

    4. Reliance is placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sukhlal v. Devilal, 1954 Raj LW 136 : (AIR 1954 Raj 170). The appellants were the defendants in the trial court. The plaintiffs-respondents were the sons of respondent Bakhtawarlal who was impleaded as defendant No. 5 in the suit. The plaintiff's case was that their father Bakhtawarlal and the plaintiffs were members of a joint Hindu family, and that Bakhtawarlal sold certain property to defendants Nos. 1 to 4 namely Sukhlal, Hukmichand, Kastoorchand and Gahrilal by a sale-deed dated 10th June, 1944 for a sum of Rs. 800/-, and that the said property was ancestral property of the family and had been sold to the vendees above named without the consent of the plaintiffs and without any family necessity. It was observed as follows:—

    “There is a difference between a suit for the cancellation of an instrument and one for a declaration that the instrument is not binding on the plaintiff. When the plaintiff seeks to establish a title in himself and cannot establish that title without removing an insuperable obstacle such as a decree or a deed to which he has been a party or by which he is otherwise bound, then quite clearly he must get that decree or deed cancelled or declared void in toto and his suit is in substance a suit for the cancellation of the decree or deed notwithstanding the fact that the suit may have been framed as a suit for a declaration. On the other hand, when the plaintiff is seeking to establish a title and finds himself threatened by a decree or transaction between third parties, he is not in a position to get that decree or deed cancelled in toto. The proper remedy in such a case is to get a declaration that the decree or deed is invalid so far as he himself is concerned and therefore, he may sue for a declaration to that effect and not for the cancellation of the decree or the deed. In this case it is obvious that it would be impossible for the plaintiffs to establish their title to the property in question unless they sued to remove an obstruction which would otherwise be insuperable because the sale made by the father would be binding upon the sons, unless it is set aside. We therefore hold that the present suit of the plaintiffs was substantially a suit not for a declaration that a certain sale-deed was inoperative against them, but for the cancellation of the said sale-deed in toto.”

    5. Having heard the learned counsel for the plaintiffs I am of the opinion that the above decision is applicable to the facts of the present case. The sale-deed in the present case was executed by the father of the plaintiffs when they were minors. It was executed on their behalf. The plaintiffs cannot get possession over the property in suit till the sale-deed executed by their father on their behalf is cancelled.

    6. The suit is based on three grounds. One is that the sale-deed was without consideration. Another is that it was executed without obtaining the permission of the Court as required by Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and the last ground is that the sale was not for the benefit of the minors or their estate. Section 8(3) of the Hindu Minority, and Guardianship Act provides that any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is voidable at the instance of the minors.

    7. If a sale-deed is voidable then it is necessary to get it cancelled before one can be entitled to the property disposed of by it. The relief of cancellation of a sale-deed or a decree can only be granted by a civil court and not by revenue court. The suit therefore lies in the civil court.

    8. As the suit is substantially one for cancellation of the sale-deed dated 18-7-57 court-fee shall be computed under Section 38(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Court- fees and Suits Valuation Act on the value of the property for which the sale-deed was executed namely Rs. 24,000/. The valuation for purposes of jurisdiction will be the same. The suit is therefore beyond the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge. It is only triable by the District Judge.

    9. I accordingly allow the revision application, set aside the appellate order or the learned Additional District Judge and direct that the plaint shall be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation to proper Court.

    10. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of this revision application.

    11. Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Lal Singh And Others v. Tejsingh And Another
    (Dec 22, 1971)