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  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 1, Rule 9
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 1, Rule 9
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was filed by Ismail and three others (the plaintiffs) against Noora (defendant No. 1) and Hardeva (defendant No. 2). The plaintiffs alleged that they owned one-half share in Khasra No. 204 (19 Bighas 7 Biswas) in village Nuhand, Tehsil Rajgarh, while defendant No. 1 (Noora) owned the other half. The field had not been partitioned and the plaintiffs and Noora were in joint possession. It was alleged that Noora sold the entire field to defendant No. 2 by a sale-deed dated 17 October 1962 (registered 26 October 1962) showing a fictitious consideration of Rs. 2,000. Plaintiffs claimed a declaration that they owned half the share and sought a decree for pre-emption of that half share.

Defendant No. 2 denied the plaintiffs' title and right of pre-emption. During the suit Noora died (11 April 1963). The plaintiffs applied to bring Noora's legal representatives on record (application filed 19 July 1963). Defendant No. 2 opposed that application on the ground that it was barred and that the suit had abated. The trial Court held the application barred by limitation but concluded the suit had not abated in its entirety and proceeded after striking Noora's name.

Defendant No. 2 filed a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that because the suit had abated in its entirety the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed. The learned single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench, expressing doubt about the correctness of the Court's ruling in Poonamchand v. Motilal (ILR (1955) 5 Raj 77 = AIR 1954 Raj 287). The Division Bench, considering the importance of the points, referred the case to a Full Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revision application lies against an order of the trial Court holding that defendant No. 1 (who died during the pendency of the suit and whose legal representatives were not brought on the record in time) was not a necessary party and that the suit would proceed without impleading the legal representatives.
  2. Whether the transferor (vendor) of an immovable property is a necessary party to a suit filed by a third person who claims the property as his own.
  3. Whether a vendor is a necessary party to a suit for pre-emption.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Position

  • The plaintiffs asserted title to one-half share in the disputed field and claimed a right of pre-emption to acquire the vendor's share.
  • After Noora's death, the plaintiffs applied to bring Noora's legal representatives on record to continue prosecution of the suit.

Defendant No. 2 (Revision Applicant) Position

  • Denied the plaintiffs' allegations of title and pre-emption rights.
  • Contended that the plaintiffs' application to bring legal representatives on record was barred (presumably by limitation) and that the suit had abated.
  • On revision, argued that if the suit had abated in its entirety then the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed; advanced authority (including Umed Mal v. Chand Mal) to support that certain absent persons (e.g., mortgagor or vendor in some contexts) are necessary parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Poonamchand v. Motilal, ILR (1955) 5 Raj 77 = AIR 1954 Raj 287 Held that the transferor (vendor) was a necessary party where plaintiff attacked a sale by the vendor. The Full Bench stated that Poonamchand's rule is not sound on its facts: where the vendor has sold all rights and delivered possession, the vendee is the proper defendant and the vendor is not a necessary party. The Court declined to follow Poonamchand.
Bhairon Bux v. Hazarimal, ILR (1960) 10 Raj 305 Cited in relation to vendor-necessary-party question (a Judge had refused to follow Poonamchand). Noted as an instance where a Judge refused to follow Poonamchand, illustrating conflicting authorities on whether vendor is necessary.
Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1947 All 18 (Full Bench) Laid down two tests for necessary party: (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved; (2) it should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such party. The Court applied these tests and concluded that an effective decree could be passed in the absence of Noora on the facts (vendor had transferred entire rights and possession), so Noora was not a necessary party.
Bherawan Estate v. Rama Krishna Narain, AIR 1953 SC 521 (Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi, in charge Court of Wards) Supreme Court approval of the Allahabad Full Bench tests for necessary party. The Full Bench relied on the Supreme Court's approval to reinforce the two-test framework for determining necessary parties.
Ramgopal v. Jhau Lal, AIR 1963 All 126 Referential authority in which Poonamchand was discussed and dissented from by a learned Judge. Referred to show judicial disagreement with Poonamchand and support for the Full Bench approach adopted by the Court.
Subbaraya Sastri v. Seetha Rama-swami, AIR 1933 Mad 664 Example of cases where owner/vendor is a necessary party because defendant claims only a limited right under the owner. Cited as one of several authorities that must be distinguished from facts in the instant case where the vendor had transferred whole interest and possession to the vendee.
Rahima Bi v. Vellore Municipal Council, AIR 1954 Mad 495 Example authority on necessary-party principles where owner must be joined. Listed among cases distinguishing situations where the owner is necessary from the present case.
Brojanath Bose v. Durga Prosad Singh, (1907) ILR 34 Cal 753 Historical precedent cited in the context of necessary-party jurisprudence. Included among authorities illustrating instances in which absence of the owner prevents effective decree; distinguished from present facts.
Narahari Mohanti v. Ghanshyam Bel, AIR 1963 Orissa 186 Case cited in the group illustrating owner as necessary party in some circumstances. Used to draw a distinction with the instant facts where the vendor had transferred full rights.
Chenthiperumal Pillai v. D. M. Devasahayam, AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 181 (Full Bench) Authority showing circumstances where absent owner is necessary. Grouped with other cases to delineate instances requiring joinder of owner; distinguished on the facts here.
Chandra Nath Sarma v. Guna Ram Kalita, AIR 1949 Assam 21 Another example where the owner may be necessary. Cited as part of the set of authorities which are distinguishable from this case.
Umed Mal v. Chand Mal, AIR 1926 PC 142 Held that a mortgagor (or similar party) may be a necessary party where the very question is whether that person conveyed or included the land in the instrument; absence is material irregularity. The Full Bench regarded Umed Mal as distinguishable on its facts from the present case and therefore not controlling; it was relied on by defendant No. 2 but the Court found it inapposite.
Ram Sarup v. Sital Prasad, (1904) ILR 26 All 549 Authority cited regarding pre-emption suits and parties. Referenced in support of the proposition that a vendor is not necessarily a necessary party to a pre-emption suit where vendor has transferred all rights.
Harbans Tewari v. Tota Sahu, (1910) ILR 32 All 14 Another authority on pre-emption and party joinder. Used to support the Court's conclusion that a vendor need not be a necessary party in a pre-emption suit in the facts of this case.
B. Brij Narain v. B. H. K. Dhaon, AIR 1942 Oudh 366 Case cited in the context of pre-emption and vendor joinder. Cited as part of the judicial support for the view that vendor is not necessarily a necessary party in pre-emption suits of the present character.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench first addressed the second issue (whether the transferor/vendor is a necessary party). It reviewed the Division Bench decision in Poonamchand v. Motilal and concluded that Poonamchand's rule — treating the vendor as a necessary party in circumstances like those — was unsound when the vendor has transferred the entire right and delivered possession to the vendee.

The Court grounded its analysis in two related principles:

  • Order 1 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code: no suit should be defeated for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties and the Court may decide rights so far as they concern parties before it.
  • The two-test formulation of the Allahabad Full Bench in Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das (approved by the Supreme Court in Bherawan Estate): (a) there must be a right to some relief against the absent party in respect of the matter involved; and (b) it must be impossible to pass an effective decree in the absence of that party.

Applying these principles to the record facts, the Full Bench observed that when a vendor has sold all rights and put the vendee in possession, the vendee is the sole owner and an effective decree can be passed against the vendee without the vendor being before the Court. Therefore the vendor is not a necessary party in such circumstances, though he may be a proper party (someone who can be joined).

The Court distinguished classes of cases where the owner is a necessary party — specifically those where the defendant in the suit claims only a limited right derived from the owner (so that without joining the owner no effective relief can be granted). A list of authorities showing such situations was cited and explicitly distinguished from the instant facts.

The opinion also considered and distinguished Umed Mal v. Chand Mal (Privy Council), where the essential issue was whether a particular person had included land in a mortgage; that decision was held to be factually different and thus not controlling.

The Court discussed the vendor's practical interest in the result (e.g., warranty-of-title consequences and a right of the vendee to seek reimbursement of sale price), and noted procedural mechanisms (in India: the vendee can apply to have the vendor joined as a proper party unless the Court concludes the application was only to delay or harass). The Bench referenced comparative practice (Freeman on Judgments) to illustrate how notice to the vendor operates in other jurisdictions, but confined its holding to Indian procedural law.

Finally, the Full Bench emphasized that although a vendor may be a proper party, a subordinate Court's decision to try a suit in the absence of a truly necessary party would be an illegality susceptible to revision. That caveat preserved the availability of revision where the missing party is truly necessary.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench held that Noora (the deceased vendor) was not a necessary party to the suit either for a declaration of plaintiffs' one-half share or for a decree for pre-emption. Consequently, the revision application filed by defendant No. 2 failed and was dismissed with costs.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The trial Court did not err in striking Noora's name and proceeding with the suit against the vendee (defendant No. 2) where the vendor had transferred all rights and delivered possession.
  • The decision clarifies that where the vendor has divested himself of all rights and possession, an effective decree can be passed against the vendee in the vendor's absence; the vendor may be a proper party but is not, as a rule, a necessary party in such circumstances.
  • The Full Bench disapproved (on these facts) the earlier view in Poonamchand v. Motilal and aligned its approach with the two-test framework from Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das and its Supreme Court approval.
  • The Court reiterated that an order trying a suit in the absence of an actually necessary party would constitute an illegality and could be the subject of revision; the present revision failed because the absent person (Noora) was not necessary on the facts of this case.

Final Disposition: The revision application is dismissed with costs.

    Hardeva v. Ismail

    1. This revision application arises out of a suit filed by Ismail and three others against Noora and Hardeva, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 respectively alleging that in field Khasra No. 204 measuring 19 Bighas 7 Biswas in village Nuhand, Tahsil Rajgarh, the plaintiffs had 1/2 share and the other half belonged to Noora defendant No. 1. The field had not been partitioned and the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 were in joint possession thereof. Defendant No. 1 sold the entire field to defendant No. 2 on 17th October, 1962, under a sale-deed showing a fictitious amount of Rs. 2000 as consideration and got it registered on 26th October 1962. The plaintiffs further alleged that they were prepared to purchase share of defendant No. 1 and that they had asked defendant No. 1 to sell the field to them after taking Rs. 1000 but the said defendant refused to do so. The plaintiffs claimed for a declaration that they were owners of half share in the said field and also a decree for pre-emption of half share of Noora. This suit was contested by defendant No. 2 who denied the case set up by the plaintiffs that they had half share in the field or that they had a right of pre-emption. During the pendency of the suit, Noora died on 11th April, 1963, and the plaintiffs filed an application on 19th July, 1963, praying that his legal representatives be brought on record. Defendant No. 2 contested the application on the ground that it was barred and that the suit ad abated. The trial Court held that the application for bringing the legal representatives of Noora was barred by limitation but held that the suit had not abated in its entirety and proceeded to try the suit after striking down the name of Noora.

    2. Defendant No. 2 filed a revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this Court praying that as the suit had abated in its entirety, the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the suit. The learned single Judge referred the case to a Division Bench as in his opinion, the ruling of this Court in Poonamchand v. Motilal, ILR (1955) 5 Raj 77. = (AJR 1954 Raj 287), required reconsideration. The case was argued before the Division Bench. The following three questions were argued before the Division Bench :-

    (1) Whether a revision application lies against the order of the trial Court holding that defendant No. 1 who died during the pendency of the suit and whose legal representatives were not brought on the record in time were not necessary parties to the suit and the suit would proceed without the legal representatives being impleaded?

    (2) Whether the transferor of an immovable property is a necessary party to a suit filed by a third person claiming property as his own?

    (3) Whether a vendor is a necessary party to the suit for pre-emption?

    The Division Bench in view of the importance of the points raised considered it proper to refer the case to a Full Bench. In this way the case has come before the Full Bench.

    3. We first take up the second point for consideration. On this point, Poonamchand's case, TLR (1955) 5 Raj 77 = (AIR 1954 Raj 287), is against the plaintiffs. The facts in that case were that Motilal had sold certain immovable property to the father and grandfather of one Gulabdas. There was a decree against Gulabdas in which the property was put to sale and purchased by Daudas and one another. Poonamchand plaintiff claimed in the suit filed by him that the property belonged to him as it had fallen to his share on a partition between plaintiff and Motilal. The question arose whether Motilal was a pro forma defendant. It was held that Motilal was not a pro forma defendant but was a necessary party to the suit as the plaintiff was attacking the sale by Motilal and another in favour of Gulab-das's father and grandfather of the plaintiff. This authority was cited before Bapna J. in Bhairon Bux v. Hazarimal, ILR (1960) 10 Raj 305, but he refused to follow this authority and held that the vendor is not a necessary party where a third person claims both against the vendor and the vendee and institutes a suit to safeguard his rights against the vendee.

    4. With great respect, we are of the view that the law laid down by the Division Bench in Poonamchand's case, ILR (1955) 5 Raj 77 = (AIR 1954 Raj 287), is not sound. When the vendor has sole his property and has delivered the possession of the property to the vendee, the vendee becomes the sole owner of the property and it is upto the vendee to defend his title against any person who claims any right in the property. The vendor may be a proper party, but he is not a necessary party inasmuch as an effectual decree can be passed in favour of third person against the vendee. It cannot be said that the constitution of the suit is bad and no relief can be granted to the plaintiff against the vendee in the absence of vendor. Order 1, Rule 9 lays down that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The injunction of the law is not to dismiss a suit as incompetent if it is possible for a Court of law to proceed with the trial of the suit and determine the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. In a case in which a vendor has lost his right or interest in the property by reason of transfer and all rights, title and interest in the property have vested in the vendee, it cannot be said that the suit cannot proceed against the vendee.

    Two tests have been laid down by the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1947 All 18 (FB) for determining the question who is a necessary party to a proceeding and these two tests are firstly there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question and secondly it should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi, in charge Court of Wards, Bherawan Estate v. Rama Krishna Narain, AIR 1953 SC 521, approved of the law laid down by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in this respect. This principle is enunciated in Rule 9 (10?) of Order 1 Civil P. C. and in the instant case it cannot be said that no effective decree can be passed in favour of the plaintiffs in the absence of Noora. Poonamchand's case, ILR (1955) 5 Raj 77 = (AIR 1954 Raj 287) supra, was referred by Dwivedi J. in Ramgopal v. Jhau Lal, AIR 1963 All 126 and was dissented from by the learned Judge in view of the Full Bench authority of the Allahabad High Court and the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

    5. We may however point out that a case in which a plaintiff files a suit against a defendant who is not the full owner of the property but claims limited right in the property from the owner stands on a different footing. In such a case, it may be successfully urged that the owner is a necessary party as no effectual decree could be passed against the defendant as he claims under some other person who is the owner of the property and without the owner being brought on the record, the Court should not have decided the case. Such cases are Subbaraya Sastri v. Seetha Rama-swami, AIR 1933 Mad 664; Rahima Bi v. Vellore Municipal Council, AIR 1954 Mad 495, Brojanath Bose v. Durga Prosad Singh. (1907) ILR 34 Cal 753, Narahari Mohanti v. Ghanshyam Bel, AIR 1963 Orissa 186, Chenthiperumal Pillai v. D. M. Devasa-hayam, AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 181 (FB), and Chandra Nath Sarma v. Guna Ram Kalita, AIR 1949 Assam 21. Such cases must be distinguished from a case in which the allegations of the plaintiffs are that the vendor has sold all his rights in the property to the vendee and that he had delivered possession of the property to him and has not kept anything with him.

    6. Learned counsel for defendant No. 2 has relied on Umed Mal v. Chand Mal, AIR 1926 PC 142. In that case the plaintiffs claimed certain land under a mortgage from one Mst. Fatima and asked for a declaration of title and for possession. In the suit Mst. Fatima was not made a defendant. The main question was whether Mst. Fatima had included that land in the mortgage-deed, it was held that Mst. Fatima was a necessary party. It was further observed that there were suits of a class in which a decree for possession might be passed in the absence of mortgagor for what it is worth, but the suit before the Privy Council was not of such a class as the very question to be tried was whether Mst. Fatima ever conveyed the land to the alleged mortgagee and it was held that it was material irregularity to decide it in the absence of Mst. Fatima. This case is clearly distinguishable on facts.

    7. It may be urged that the sale of a property by a vendor ordinarily involves a warranty of title and if the vendee loses in a case filed by a third party, he has a right to recover back the sale-price paid by him to the vendor and in this way the vendor is interested in the result of the suit. This is true. But this does not mean that a person who claims title in the property cannot file a suit for recovery of the property or for declaration of his right therein against the vendee. In spite of the fact that the vendor is interested in the result of the suit to the extent that he may be liable to refund the amount of consideration received by him, it cannot be said that the person claiming the property as his own cannot recover it from the vendee on proving that the vendor had no right, title or interest in the property. The vendor may or may not be bound by the decree passed in such a suit, but the person who has filed the suit can recover back the property from the vendee. In America the proper procedure which may be adopted by the vendee in order that the vendor may be bound is that he may give notice of the suit to the vendor. In this connection we may refer to the following passage in 'Freeman on Judgments Vol. I page 970' :--

    "But, in accordance with the general rule governing the proceedings and judgment against an indemnitee or covenantee, the purchaser, or any subsequent vendee, upon being sued for the property, in trover or replevin, or in any action involving the title, may give notice of the pendency and nature of the suit, to the original vendor, or require him to defend or to assist in defending the same, and after such notice the vendor, whether he defends or not, cannot, in subsequent litigation with the vendee, question the finding of title involved in the judgment. This rule is based upon the existence of an express or implied warranty of title."

    8. In India, the proper procedure is for the vendee to make an application that vendor is also a proper party to a suit and he may be made a party to it and the Court may unless it comes to the conclusion that such application, was made to delay the proceedings or for causing harassment to the plaintiff may make vendor a party to the suit. But if he is not a necessary party, he is a proper party.

    9. Thus from all aspects of the matter, Noora was not a necessary party to the suit for declaration, that half of the share in the field belonged to the plaintiff.

    10. The second part of the relief claimed by the plaintiff was for a decree for preemption and the question to be determined is whether the vendor was a necessary party to the suit. In our humble opinion, the vendor is not a necessary party in a suit for decree for pre-emption precisely for the same reasons as mentioned above for a suit for declaration. This is the view taken in a number of cases. Reference may be made in this connection to Ram Sarup v. Sital Prasad, (1904) ILR 26 All 549, Harbans Tewari v. Tota Sahu, (1910) ILR 32 All 14, B. Brij Narain v. B. H. K. Dhaon, AIR 1942 Oudh 366.

    11. We are, therefore, of opinion that Noora was not a necessary party either for granting declaration or for granting a decree for preemption.

    12. We may, however, point out that a revision application would be maintainable against an order of a subordinate Court holding that a suit would proceed for trial even in the absence of a necessary party because in trying a suit in the absence of necessary party, the Court will be committing an illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

    13. The revision application fails and is dismissed with costs.

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    Hardeva v. Ismail
    (Dec 5, 1969)