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  • provisions of Section 244 and 245 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act)
  • SECTION 29 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • sub-section 2 in section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939,
  • sub-section (2) of Section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939.
  • Article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939
  • sub-section (2) in Sec. 180,
  • sub-section (2) of Sec. 245,
  • U.P Tenancy Act, 1939,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • provisions of Section 244 and 245 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act)
  • SECTION 29 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • sub-section 2 in section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939,
  • sub-section (2) of Section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939.
  • Article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act
  • Section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939
  • sub-section (2) in Sec. 180,
  • sub-section (2) of Sec. 245,
  • U.P Tenancy Act, 1939,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Sixteen separate suits for possession of agricultural land in village Gadarmala (also known as Bhopalgarh) were instituted by sixteen plaintiffs in the Court of the Civil Judge, Bhilwara. Each plaintiff alleged ancestral possession of specific plots and averred that the common defendant began encroaching in Kartik Samwat 2010 and ultimately ploughed the fields with a tractor in Kartik Samwat 2011. A dispute arose and the police, Bhilwara, instituted proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The Magistrate attached the disputed lands during enquiry and subsequently restored possession to the defendant. Each plaintiff sought a decree directing restoration of possession to himself.

The defendant contested the suits and raised, among other objections, that the suits were exclusively triable by a revenue court and therefore the civil court lacked jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that jurisdictional objection, holding that each suit was based on title and so within civil jurisdiction. The defendant filed these revision applications challenging the trial court's order denying the jurisdictional objection. Because the facts are similar across the sixteen suits and the legal question common, they were heard together.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suits are triable exclusively by a Revenue Court under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (in particular Section 183 and the Third Schedule) and therefore the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to try the suits.
  2. Whether the revision applications under Section 115, CPC are competent in view of the Full Bench decision in Swaroop Narain v. Gopinath (and the availability of challenge under Section 105, CPC), or whether the special provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (Sections 244–245) alter that conclusion.
  3. Whether proceedings and an order under Section 145 CrPC (by which the Magistrate restored possession to the defendant) operate to oust revenue jurisdiction or otherwise affect the nature of remedies available (including limitation) under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The civil suits were wrongly instituted because the plaintiffs' claims in substance amount to claims that are of the nature specified in the Third Schedule of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and are therefore within exclusive revenue jurisdiction (relying on Sections 88, 89 and particularly Section 183 of the Act).
  • The plaintiffs' pleadings, although avoiding explicit language such as "declaratory decree" or the word "trespasser," in substance seek a determination that plaintiffs hold Bapidari tenancy and seek ejectment of the defendant for unlawful possession; such relief is available in the revenue court and barred to other courts by Section 207 of the Act.
  • All plaintiffs allege trespass beginning Samwat 2010 and final trespass in Samwat 2011, and therefore their suits fall squarely within Section 183 (ejectment of trespasser) and the Third Schedule (Serial No. 23).

Non-Petitioners' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • A preliminary objection: the revision applications themselves are incompetent because, under the Full Bench decision in Swaroop Narain v. Gopinath, orders passed during the pendency of a suit that can be challenged under Section 105, CPC in appeal from the final decree should not be the subject of revision under Section 115 CPC.
  • Substantively, plaintiffs argued that although defendant trespassed, the Magistrate's proceedings under Section 145 CrPC resulted (after evidence) in a finding that the defendant was in possession at the date of the preliminary order and thus the Magistrate restored possession to the defendant; accordingly Section 183(1)(a) (liability of trespasser who has taken or retained possession without lawful authority) does not apply.
  • Plaintiffs further relied on the nature of Section 145 CrPC proceedings to support the view that once the Magistrate restored possession, the civil court should be competent to try the suit rather than the revenue court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Swaroop Narain v. Gopinath, ILR (1953) Raj 483; AIR 1953 Raj 137 (Full Bench) Where an order passed during the pendency of a case can be the subject of a ground under Section 105 CPC in an appeal to the High Court from the final decree, revision under Section 115 CPC is not the competent remedy (i.e., such interlocutory orders should be challenged by appropriate grounds in appeals under Section 105). The court examined this principle but concluded that the special provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (Sections 244–245) distinguish the present situation; because those provisions govern objections that suits were instituted in the wrong court and prescribe appellate disposal as if instituted in the right court (and the appellate court's duties), the Swaroop Narain principle did not render the present revision applications incompetent.
D.N. Rege v. Kazi Muhammad Haider, AIR 1946 All 379 Interpreted Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act (1939) — distinction drawn between ordinary civil suits against trespassers and suits under the tenancy statute; the presence of subsection (2) in Section 180 (creating accrual/consequences) influenced the decision. The court considered this authority but distinguished it on the ground that Section 180(2) in the U.P. Act (which created special consequences) has no counterpart in Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The court therefore declined to adopt the restrictive view from D.N. Rege and held Section 183 of the Rajasthan Act covers all ejectment suits of trespassers in agricultural land irrespective of the defendant's plea (tenant or proprietor).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main stages: preliminary competence of revision, and substantive determination of jurisdiction between civil and revenue courts.

1. Competence of Revision (Preliminary Objection)

The court considered the Full Bench decision in Swaroop Narain concerning the interplay between revision (Section 115 CPC) and appellate review under Sections 104–105 CPC. It explained the general principle from that case: where an interlocutory order can be effectively challenged by taking a ground under Section 105 in a first or second appeal, revision should not lie.

However, the court held that the special statutory regime created by Sections 244 and 245 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act modifies the analysis. Section 244 requires that an objection that a suit was instituted in the wrong court be taken in the court of first instance where an appeal lies to a civil court; Section 245 provides that where the appellate court has all material necessary it shall dispose of the appeal as if the suit were instituted in the right court, and, if not, may remand or transfer to a competent court. Because the jurisdictional objection in these cases had in fact been taken in the court of first instance, and because Sections 244–245 govern appellate treatment of such objections, the court concluded the Swaroop Narain rule did not render the present revision applications incompetent, and the revision could be heard in view of the particular provisions of the Act.

2. Substance — Whether Suits Fall Within Section 183 and Section 207/Third Schedule

The court examined Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the Third Schedule to determine whether the suits are "of the nature" specified therein and thereby within exclusive revenue jurisdiction. It emphasized statutory language: Section 207(1) vests exclusive jurisdiction in revenue courts for suits and applications of the nature specified in the Third Schedule and Section 207(2) prevents any other court from taking cognizance of suits or applications based on causes of action for which relief can be obtained in the revenue court.

The court analyzed Sections 88 and 89 (relating to declarations about tenancy and boundaries) and concluded those sections were not applicable to the present framed suits (plaintiffs had not asked for declaratory relief). The decisive provision was Section 183, which deals with ejectment of trespassers and prescribes remedies (ejectment and penalties) and is matched by Serial No. 23 of the Third Schedule, identifying Assistant Collector as the proper forum, with a 12-year limitation.

The court carefully reviewed the plaintiffs' pleadings and found the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had "taken or retained possession of any land without lawful authority" (i.e., trespass), with specified dates of alleged trespass. On that basis, the suits in substance were for ejectment of a trespasser and therefore fall within Section 183 and the Third Schedule.

3. Effect of Section 145 CrPC Proceedings

The plaintiffs had argued that, because the Magistrate in Section 145 CrPC proceedings restored possession to the defendant after finding him in possession at the relevant date, Section 183(1)(a) could not apply. The court rejected that contention. It explained that Section 145 proceedings are summary measures aimed at prevention of breach of the peace and restoration/maintenance of possession as at the date of the preliminary order; the Magistrate is not deciding title. In particular, if a party (including a trespasser) has been in possession for more than two months prior to the preliminary order, the Magistrate may maintain that possession to prevent breach of the peace. Such a procedural restoration or maintenance of possession does not alter the substantive nature of the possession nor bar the aggrieved proprietor from pursuing statutory remedies (including suits under Section 183) in the appropriate (revenue) forum. Thus Section 145 orders do not oust revenue jurisdiction.

4. Limitation Issue (Article 47 vs Section 183)

The court addressed the plaintiffs' concern about limitation: suits under Section 183 have a 12-year limitation (Third Schedule), whereas Article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act prescribes a three-year limitation for suits by a person bound by an order respecting possession made under Section 145 CrPC. The court applied Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act: where a special/local law prescribes a different period of limitation, that special period applies. The court held the 12-year period under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act governs suits under Section 183 and does not deprive revenue courts of jurisdiction; the special local law's limitation governs (principle: generalia specialibus non derogant).

5. Consideration of U.P. Authority (D.N. Rege)

The court considered D.N. Rege (construing Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act) which had drawn a distinction between ordinary civil suits against trespassers and tenancy ejectment suits. The court found that the earlier case's reasoning relied significantly on the presence of subsection (2) of Section 180 (which had special consequences). Because Section 183 of the Rajasthan Act lacks a corresponding subsection, the court declined to adopt the restrictive interpretation and held that Section 183 comprehensively covers ejectment suits of trespassers in agricultural land irrespective of whether the defendant asserts proprietary title or tenancy.

6. Procedure When Proprietary Question Arises

The court noted that if a question of proprietary right arises in a revenue suit under Section 183 and that question has not been previously determined by a competent civil court, the revenue court should frame an issue on proprietary right and submit the record to the competent civil court for decision under Section 239 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Thus, the revenue court remains the proper forum, with a statutory mechanism to refer substantive title questions to the civil court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the revision applications. It set aside the trial court's order holding that the Civil Court had jurisdiction. The court held that the present suits are not triable by the Civil Court but should have been instituted in the revenue court under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (Serial No. 23 of the Third Schedule). The plaints were ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs to be instituted in the proper revenue court. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in both courts.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The trial court's jurisdictional ruling was reversed; the sixteen suits must be refiled in the competent revenue forum (Assistant Collector as indicated in the Third Schedule).
  • Jurisdictional principle: A suit that in substance seeks ejectment of a trespasser from agricultural land falls within Section 183 and the Third Schedule and is within exclusive revenue jurisdiction, regardless of whether the defendant claims proprietary title or tenancy, because the Rajasthan Act lacks the subsection present in the U.P. provision that produced a different result in prior U.P. authority.
  • Procedural interaction: Orders under Section 145 CrPC restoring possession do not change the substantive character of possession for purposes of revenue remedies and do not deprive revenue courts of jurisdiction; statutory mechanisms (Section 239) exist for revenue courts to refer proprietary issues to civil courts.
  • Limitation: Where a special local law prescribes a different limitation period, that period governs (Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act); consequently the 12-year limitation in the Third Schedule applies to suits under Section 183.

The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying the statutory scheme of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act to the facts before it; it resolved the jurisdictional question by statutory interpretation and application of existing authorities.

AD/K.S.B

Disposition: Case remanded; revision applications allowed; plaints to be returned to plaintiffs for institution in the proper revenue court. Parties to bear their own costs.

    Pratap Singh v. Madho Sunar And Others Non-Petitioners.

    1. These are sixteen applications in revision by the same defendant against whom sixteen plaintiffs have brought separate suits for possession of agricultural lands in the court of the learned Civil Judge, Bhilwara. The facts of these cases are quite similar and since only one common question of law is involved in all of them, they are disposed of together. Each one of the plaintiff non-petitioner has averred in his plaint that he was in possession of a particular plot of agricultural land in village Gadarmala (which is also known as Bhopalgarh) from the time of his ancestors. Each one has given a description of his field in dispute and it need not be mentioned here. It has been averred by all the plaintiffs that the defendant started making unlawful encroachment on their fields in the month of Kartik Samwat 2010 and ultimately in the month of Kartik Samwat 2011, he unlawfully ploughed their fields with a tractor.

    2. This led to a dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendant and the police, Bhilwara started proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr PC against both the parties. The Magistrate attached the fields in dispute pending the enquiry and later on restored their possession to the defendant. It was asserted that the fields in dispute were their “Bapi” and they were in their possession from the time of their ancestors and, therefore, each one of the plaintiffs prayed for a decree against the defendant directing him to restore the possession of the disputed field to him.

    3. The defendant contested the plaintiffs' claims and one of his objection in each case was that the suit was triable exclusively by the Revenue court, and so the Civil court had no jurisdiction to try the same. This objection was turned down by the trial court on the ground that each suit was based on title and, therefore, it had jurisdiction to entertain and try it. The petitioner has challenged the correctness of this order passed by the trial court in each case. It would thus appear that the only point for determination in each one of the above noted cases before the court is “whether the suit is triable exclusively by a Revenue Court and, therefore, the Civil court has no jurisdiction to try the same?”

    4. A preliminary objection has been raised by learned counsel for the non-petitioners to the effect that the revision application does not lie in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Swaroop Narain v. Gopinath, ILR (1953) Raj 483 : (AIR 1953 Raj 137). In that case, it was decided that where it is open to a party to raise a ground of appeal in High Court under Section 105 of the CPC from the final decree or order with respect to any order which has been passed during the pendency of the case it should be held that an appeal in that case lies to the High Court within the meaning of the term “in which no appeal lies thereto” appearing in Section 115 of the CPC.

    5. The result is that revision would not be competent against an order passed during the pendency of suit or proceeding if such order can be challenged in High Court under Section 105 of the CPC in first or second appeal (to High Court) from the final decision of the suit or the proceedings. It is only when the order in question cannot be challenged in High Court whether in first or second appeal or even by way of a ground under Sec. 105 in appeal from the final decision of the case that it can be said that no appeal lies to the High Court and it should, therefore, exercise its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC. On the basis of the above views it has been urged by learned counsel for the non-petitioners that the question regarding jurisdiction of the civil court can be agitated before this Court in second appeal by virtue of Section 105 of the CPC and, therefore, the present revision applications are incompetent. I have given due consideration to this argument and I think it is not tenable in view of the provisions of Section 244 and 245 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act) which run as follows:

    “244. Plea in appeal that suit was instituted in wrong court. — When in a suit instituted in a civil or revenue court an appeal lies to a civil court, an objection that the suit was instituted in the wrong court shall not be entertained by the appellate court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance and the appellate court shall dispose of the appeal as if the suit had been instituted in the right court.”

    “245. Procedure when objection was taken in the court of first instance. — (1) If in any such suit an objection was made in the court of first instance and the appellate court has before it all the material necessary for the determination of the suit, it shall dispose of the appeal as if the suit had been instituted in the right court.

    (2) If the appellate court has not before it all such material and remands the case or frames issues and refers them for trial, or requires additional evidence, to be taken, it may direct its order either to the court in which the suit was instituted, or to such court as it may declare to be competent to try the same.

    (3) No objection shall be taken or raised in appeal or otherwise to any such order on the ground that it has been directed to a court not competent to try the suit.”

    6. It would appear from a perusal of Sec. 244 that according to its provisions, an objection to the effect that the suit has been instituted in the wrong court must be taken in the court of first instance if it is a suit in which an appeal lies to a civil court. If such objection is not taken in the court of first instance, the appellate court will dispose of the appeal as if the suit had been instituted in the right court. In the present case, this objection has been taken in the court of first instance and, therefore, it can be agitated in the appellate court.

    7. But Sec. 245 lays down that if there is a suit of the nature indicated in Sec. 244, then, even though such objection might have been taken in the court of first instance, if the appellate court has before it, all the material necessary for the determination of the suit, it must dispose of the appeal as if the suit were instituted in the right court. It is clear from this provision that the objection about jurisdiction becomes infructuous if the appellate court can dispose of the appeal on merits and if it has all the material necessary before it for the determination of the suit. This would clearly indicate that even if an objection is raised before this court in second appeal, it would be meaningless.

    8. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners has urged that under sub-section (2) of Sec. 245, the appellate court has the authority to send the case to the court in which a suit ought to have been properly instituted. This argument is correct to the extent that the appellate court while remanding the case may send it to a court which is competent to try the same, but this can be done only if the appellate court has not before it all the material necessary for the determination of the suit and if it has to frame new issues or additional evidence is required. In other words, if a remand is not necessary such an order need not be passed. The reasons given in Purohit Swaroop Narain's case, ILR (1953) Raj 483 : (AIR 1953 Raj 137 (FB)) would not, therefore, apply to the present case and to my mind, the revision application is not incompetent.

    9. Now coming to the petitioner's contention it has been urged by learned counsel that although the non-petitioners have not specifically asked for a declaratory decree about their rights as tenants, what they actually mean is to get a decision from the Civil court that they had Bapidari tenancy in the disputed lands. Similarly, although they have not mentioned the petitioner as a trespasser in their lands, their allegation in fact is that the petitioner had trespassed on the lands without any right and, therefore, they want to get him ejected. It is pointed out that, their claim is thus covered by Secs. 88, 89 and 183 of the Act, that they can get all the relief which they want from the revenue court and that the suit is therefore, not maintainable in the civil court because of the provisions of Section 207 of the Act.

    10. Section 207 of the Act runs as follows:

    “207(1) All suits and applications of the nature specified in the third Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court.

    11. No court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application.”

    12. It is clear from the wordings of this section that it vests exclusive jurisdiction in the revenue court to hear and determine all suits and applications of the nature which are specified in the Third Schedule thereof. The words “of the nature” used in sub-section (1) further show that if a suit or application is in substance of the nature specified in the Third Schedule, then they should be heard and determined by a revenue court. The legislature has not stopped short by saying suits and applications specified, but it has also added the words “of the nature”, so that the court should look to the substance and not merely to the form of the suit or application.

    13. Then, sub-section (2) further makes it clear that if the suit or application is based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief can be given by means of that particular suit or application, then no court other than a revenue court should take cognizance of such suit or application. A further explanation has been added to sub-section (2) to clarify the doubts about those causes of action in respect of which a relief may he granted partly by a revenue court and partly by a civil court. It has been laid down that if the cause of action is such a one that a revenue court is able to grant relief in respect thereof, then if does not matter if the relief asked for from the Civil court is greater than or additional to, or not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted.

    14. We have, therefore, to see whether the suit in the present case is of a nature which comes within the ambit of any provision made in the Third Schedule and whether the suit is based on a cause of action in respect of which the plaintiffs can obtain relief from a revenue court.

    15. Learned counsel for petitioner has referred to Ss. 88, 89 and 183 for which the corresponding serial Nos. in the Third Schedule are 5, 6 and 23. Sec. 88 deals with suits for declaration of the plaintiff's right as a tenant or as a tenant of khudkasht or as a sub-tenant or for a share in a joint tenancy. Sec. 89 provides for suits for declaration as to the class of tenancy, areas or boundaries of holdings etc. In the present case, the plaintiffs have not asked for any declaration. Whether they should have asked for a declaration or not is not a point for determination before this Court, because the matter has come in revision and the only question for decision is about the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain and decide the suits.

    16. This court is, not called upon to decide at present whether the plaintiffs should have also asked for declaration or not. Therefore, it would suffice to say that Secs. 88 and 89 of the Act are not applicable to the suits as they are framed at present. The only question for determination which therefore remains is whether these suits are covered by Section 183 of the Act and serial No. 23 of the Third Schedule. Sec. 183 and serial No. 23 read as follows:

    “183.(1) A trespasser shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any provision of this Act be liable.

    (a) If he has taken or retained possession of any land without lawful authority, to ejectment on the issue of a notice by the Tehsildar in case of land held directly from the State Government and in other cases on the suit of the person or persons entitled to admit as tenant and also to pay as penalty for each agricultural year during the whole or any part whereof he has been in such possession a sum which may extend to six times the annual rent, and

    (b) If he has prevented any other person from Occupying land duly let out to such person, to ejectment on the suit of such person and also to pay damages which may extend to six times the annual rent.

    17. In either case such trespasser shall, upon payment of the penalty or damages, as the case may be, have the right of tending, gathering and removing any ungathered crops.”

    THE THIRD SCHEDULE

    Serial No. Section of Act. Description of suit, application or appeal. Period of limitation. Time from which period begins to run. Proper court-fee. Court officer competent to dispose of. 23 183 Suit for ejectment of trespasser. 12 years. When the cause of action arises. 8 as. Asstt. Collector.

    18. It would appear from the perusal of the language of Sec. 183 that it deals with suits for ejectment of trespassers. It is further clear from serial No. 23 of the Third Schedule that the limitation provided for such suits is 12 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action and if the suit comes within Sec. 183, it should be instituted in the court of the Assistant Collector and it is exclusively triable by a revenue court.

    19. Learned counsel for petitioner has pointed out that all the plaintiffs have alleged in their plaints that they were “Bapidars”. that they were in possession of the disputed lands for a long time, that the defendant had started trespassing on their lands from Kartik, Samwat 2010, that he had finally trespassed on their lands in Kartik, Samwat 2011 and the cause of action arose in the month of Kartik, Samwat 2011.

    20. It is contended by him that the plaintiffs' allegation against the defendant is that the defendant had taken possession of their lands without any lawful authority and they want his ejectment for that reason. It is further argued that although the plaintiffs have avoided the use of the word “trespasser” in their plaints, their real allegation is that the defendant is a mere trespasser, that the suits are thus covered by Section 183 of the Act and they should have been filed in a revenue Court. Learned counsel for non-petitioners (plaintiffs) contends, on the other hand, that although the defendant had trespassed on the plaintiffs' land in Kartik Samwat 2010 and Kartik Samwat 2011, but that trespass led to a dispute between the parties and the Magistrate had to take proceedings against, both the parties under Section 145 of the Cr PC.

    21. The Magistrate had also attached all the lands in dispute during those proceedings. Then, after going through the evidence of both the parties the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the defendant was in possession of the disputed lands on the date of the preliminary order and so, he restored the possession of the lands to the petitioner. The possession of the lands having been given to the petitioner by the Magistrate, it could not be said that the petitioner had taken or retained possession of the lands without lawful authority and, therefore, Sec. 183(1)(a) does not come into play.

    22. I have given due consideration to these arguments and, in my opinion the contention raised by learned counsel for the non-petitioners is not tenable. If his argument is accepted, then it would mean, that a landlord, on whose land a trespass is made by some person without lawful authority can file a suit in a revenue court if proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr PC in respect of the disputed land are not taken by the Magistrate, but if such proceedings are taken by the Magistrate, then the revenue court looses its jurisdiction and only a civil court can entertain the suit thereafter.

    23. Such intention on the part of the legislature is not borne out by the language of Sec. 183. It may be observed that in proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr PC a Magistrate is only required to give a finding as to which of the disputed parties was in possession of the immovable property on the date of the preliminary order. If the Magistrate finds that a party was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months prior to the date of the preliminary order, then he may treat that party as being in possession of the disputed land at the date of the preliminary order and may restore the possession of the land in dispute to that party.

    24. But these proceedings are taken by the Magistrate only to prevent breach of the peace and maintain law and order. He is not concerned with the title of the parties about the land Similarly, he cannot help declaring even a trespasser entitled to possession of the disputed land or disputed immovable property, if he finds that the trespasser has been in possession of that property for more than two months prior to the date of the preliminary order.

    25. In other words, he has to maintain the possession even of a trespasser if he happens to remain in possession of the disputed property for more than two months prior to the date of the preliminary order. The Magistrate's order under Section 145 of the Cr PC, therefore, does not change the nature of the possession of a trespasser and a party approaching a civil or revenue court may still contend in spite of the Magistrate's order under Section 145 of the Cr PC that the opposite party had taken or retained possession of the disputed property without lawful authority and thus trespassed on the plaintiff's property. Section 145(6) of the Cr PC lays down that if the Magistrate declares any party to be entitled to possession, he should also declare that it will not be evicted therefrom except in due course of law.

    26. The aggrieved party can take the course of law either in a civil court or in a revenue court as the remedy is provided by statute. That is to say, Section 145 of the Cr PC does not lay down that the aggrieved party must go to a civil court and that it cannot approach a revenue court. It may be pointed out that the non-petitioners have in their respective claims still stated in spite of the Magistrate's order under Section 145 of the Cr PC that the defendant had started trespassing on their lands in Samwat 2010 and that he had finally trespassed on them in Samwat 2011. Their allegation against the defendant is certainly that of a trespasser, and since they have filed their respective suits for ejectment of the trespasser, their suits do come within Section 183 of the Act.

    27. Learned counsel for non-petitioners has urged that if the present suits are held maintainable under Section 183 of the Act, a serious question of limitation may arise, because the limitation for a suit under Sec. 183 is 12 years while the limitation for a suit under Article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act by a person, bound by an order, respecting the possession of immovable property made under Section 145 of the Cr PC, is three years from the date of the final order in the case. In my opinion, this objection is also not tenable in view of the provisions of section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act.

    28. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 29 lays down that if any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule. This sub-section embodies the general principle enunciated in that well known maxim — “generalia specialibus non-derogant”, which means that general provisions do not derogate from the special. The period laid down in suits under Section 183 under the Act i.e, for suits relating to agricultural land will be 12 years from the date of the accrual of cause of action while suits which will be filed in civil courts about other kinds of immovable property and to which Article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act would be applicable, would be 3 years from the date of the final order. The mere fact that a different period of limitation is given in Article 47 of the Indian Limitation Act would not take away the jurisdiction of the revenue courts to entertain and decide the suits filed under Section 183 of the Act.

    29. Learned counsel for non-petitioners has urged in the end that Section 183 of the Act corresponds to section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act (Act No. 17 of 1939) and the view which prevails in U.P about this section is different from that suggested by petitioners learned counsel. Learned counsel has referred to D.N Rege v. Kazi Muhammad Haider, AIR 1946 All 379 in this connection. In that case, it was held:

    “that the distinction between an ordinary suit against a trespasser in a civil court and a suit under Section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939 is, that the plaintiff in the first case alleges that the defendant is setting up a title against his proprietary interest whereas in the second case the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is setting up a title to hold the land as a tenant.”

    30. The said view was taken on the ground that in the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, there was sub-section (2) in Sec. 180, which ran as follows:

    “(2) If no suit is brought under this section or a decree obtained under this section is not executed the persons in possession shall on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be become a hereditary tenant of such plot or plots.”

    31. Referring to this sub-section, it was observed that “this sub-section applies to persons who are setting up a claim to an interest in the land as tenants and not to persons who are setting up an interest as proprietors. The legislature could surely not have intended that a person who never claimed to be a tenant at all, should, by the failure of the proprietor to sue or to execute a decree for ejectment under Sec. 180, obtain the rights of an hereditary tenant.” It is, thus, clear that the learned Judges were led to adopt the view which they took, in the above case, on account of the presence of sub-section 2 in Section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, and it is doubtful if they would have taken the same view, if sub-section (2) were not present in Sec. 180.

    32. This doubt is confirmed, because when the learned Judges were faced with an argument, whether the jurisdiction of a court would depend upon the defence set up after the suit is instituted, they proceeded to say that the jurisdiction of a court does not depend upon the defence which is set up after the suit is instituted, but upon the state of affairs which existed before the institution of the suit.

    33. They further proceeded to absolve the difficulty by observing that the plaintiff should, as far as possible, ascertain the facts before he files a plaint and if he has reason to believe that the defendant was setting up a proprietary title, he would rightly institute a suit in the civil court. With respect, it may be submitted that it is not difficult to visualise the situation in which the defendant may not disclose, in spite of a notice to him whether he sets up the proprietary title or takes the plea of tenancy or any other plea to support the trespass alleged against him.

    34. In such a case, the plaintiff would be in a fix whether to file a suit in a civil court or a revenue court. Happily, that difficulty has been removed by the legislature of this State in enacting Sec. 183, because there is no provision therein corresponding to sub-section (2) of Section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939. I have not been referred to any other provision on account of which it may be necessary to hold that Sec. 183 would apply only for ejectment of those trespassers, who set up a title to hold the land as tenant and not against those, who set up a title against the plaintiff. To my mind, all suits for ejectment of trespassers in respect of agricultural land are according to the provisions of Sec. 183 triable by a revenue court irrespective of the fact whether the defendant sets up his own proprietary title or he sets up his possession as a tenant.

    35. In case, a question of proprietary right in respect of the land forming the subject of dispute arises in such a suit, and if such a question has not been previously determined by a civil court of competent jurisdiction, the revenue Court should frame a issue on that question of proprietary right and submit its record to the competent civil court for the decision of that issue under Section 239 of the Act. The Civil Court would not take cognizance of such suit on account of the provisions of Section 207 of the Act and the suit will have to be heard and determined by the revenue court only.

    36. In the view which has been taken above, the present suits are not triable by the Civil Court and they should be instituted in a revenue court. The revision applications are, therefore, allowed, the order of the trial court in each case about its jurisdiction be set aside, the cases be returned to the trial court with the direction that the plaints should be returned to the plaintiffs to be instituted in the proper revenue court. In view of the fact that the question of jurisdiction was not free from difficulty, the parties are left to bear their own costs in both the courts.

    AD/K.S.B

    37. Case remanded.

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    Pratap Singh v. Madho Sunar And Others Non-Petitioners.
    (Feb 27, 1959)