Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Patta Act. Of these, Section 14
  • Section 34 of the Marwar Patta Act, 1921.
  • Section 14 of the Marwar Patta Act, 1921,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Patta Act. Of these, Section 14
  • Section 34 of the Marwar Patta Act, 1921.
  • Section 14 of the Marwar Patta Act, 1921,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application by Jaikishan under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari to quash an order passed in Patta proceedings relating to land in the area of the former State of Marwar.

The material facts, as stated in the opinion, are:

  • A small piece of State land is situated in Didwana town (a municipality).
  • Jhumarmal applied to the Municipal Board, Didwana, for a no-objection certificate (the municipal stage under rules framed under the Marwar Patta Act) so that he could obtain a Patta.
  • Jaikishan objected to the Municipal Board granting the no-objection certificate; the Municipal Board refused to issue the certificate by order dated 28-1-1955.
  • Jhumarmal appealed the refusal to the Government (Mehkma Khas). The Deputy Minister inspected and heard arguments and, in May 1955, dismissed Jhumarmal's appeal.
  • In June 1955 Jhumarmal applied for review of the Government's order; the review was accepted on 16-9-1955, the earlier order dismissing the appeal was set aside, and the Municipal Board was directed to grant the no-objection certificate.
  • Jaikishan challenged the Government's review order before this Court, contending that the Government had no jurisdiction to review its earlier decision and seeking certiorari to quash the review order dated 16-9-1955.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government had jurisdiction to review and set aside its own earlier order dismissing Jhumarmal's appeal (i.e., whether a power of review existed under the Marwar Patta Act).
  2. Whether the proceedings (Municipal Board decision, appeal to Government) were quasi-judicial in nature or merely executive, such that the rule against review (functus officio) would or would not apply.
  3. Whether the applicant (Jaikishan) had a sufficient interest in the land under the statute and rules to maintain an application for judicial review of the Government's review order.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's (Jaikishan) Arguments

  • The Government had no jurisdiction to review its earlier order dismissing the appeal; accordingly the order passed in review (16-9-1955) is subject to certiorari and should be quashed.

Opposite Party's (Jhumarmal) Arguments

  • It was contended that Section 34 of the Marwar Patta Act, 1921, authorised the Government to review the earlier order.
  • It was also contended that the proceedings culminating in the Government's order were executive in nature because the land belonged to the State; accordingly, Jaikishan had no proprietary right in the land and no standing to challenge executive action — his remedy, if any, lay in a civil court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nathulal v. Collector, Sawai Jaipur, ILR (1951) 1 Raj 47 (AIR 1952 Raj 36) The principle that when a matter is finally disposed of by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority, that authority becomes functus officio and, absent a statutory provision, has no inherent power to rehear and give a fresh decision on the merits (apart from correcting clerical mistakes or accidental slips). The Court applied this precedent to hold that because the Patta Act proceedings were quasi-judicial in character and there was no statutory provision (Section 34 did not provide for review by the Government of its own appellate decision), the Government had no jurisdiction to review and set aside its earlier order of May 1955; the Government's review order of 16-9-1955 was therefore without jurisdiction and was set aside.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in a stepwise fashion, applying statutory interpretation and prior authority strictly as follows:

  1. The Court first considered the Nathulal precedent which establishes that, in the absence of statutory authority, a judicial or quasi-judicial body is functus officio after finally disposing of a matter and cannot rehear the matter on merits.
  2. The Court examined whether Section 34 of the Marwar Patta Act conferred a power of review on the Government. Although the word "review" appears in Section 34, the Court concluded that the section contemplates revision (a supervisory revision) of orders passed by authorities subordinate to the Darbar or Government, not review by the Government of its own final appellate decision. Thus Section 34 did not supply authority for the Government to review its own decision in appeal.
  3. The Court then assessed the character of the proceedings (executive vs quasi-judicial). While acknowledging that the disposal of State property is ordinarily an executive matter, the Court found that the Patta Act and the 1928 rules create a specific statutory scheme that confers rights on persons interested in the land (including a right to object under Section 14 and the municipal rules), and provides a procedure including an appeal to Government. Because the statute gives interested third parties a right to object and provides for an appeal, the authorities dealing with such disputes must approach the matter in a judicial spirit.
  4. Given that the statute confers rights and prescribes a decision-making procedure between opposing parties (applicant for a no-objection certificate and objectors), the Court characterized these proceedings as quasi-judicial. Consequently, the Nathulal principle applied: final orders in such proceedings could not be reviewed by the same authority unless specific statutory power existed for such review.
  5. Applying these conclusions, and noting the absence of a statutory provision authorising Government to review its own final order in appeal, the Court held that the Government's review that set aside its earlier dismissal (the order dated 16-9-1955) was without jurisdiction.
  6. Finally, the Court addressed the standing issue: although Jaikishan had no proprietary interest in the land, Section 14 read with the 1928 rules conferred on him a statutory right to object (an interest "in the wide sense") because the land was near his house and its disposal affected him. Therefore he had standing to seek judicial review of the Government's ultra vires review.

The Court also observed that proceedings of this kind are not res judicata; the same parties may apply again if circumstances change, but an authority cannot, within the same proceedings, review a final order passed by it absent statutory power.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court's final decision was to allow the application. The Court set aside the Government's order dated 16th September 1955 (the review order) and allowed the writ of certiorari sought by Jaikishan. Costs were awarded against Jhumarmal only.

Implications and consequences:

  • The Government's review of its earlier appellate order was held to be without jurisdiction because the Patta Act proceedings were quasi-judicial in nature and there was no statutory power authorising the Government to review its own decision in these circumstances.
  • Jaikishan was held to have a sufficient statutory interest ("in the wide sense") under Section 14 and the 1928 rules to challenge the Government's review order by writ petition under Article 226.
  • The Court noted procedural consequence: such proceedings are not res judicata — parties can present the matter again if facts or circumstances change — but a final order passed by the authority cannot be reviewed by that same authority in the same proceedings absent statutory authority.

    Jai Kishan v. The State Of Rajasthan

    1. This is an application by Jaikishan under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari in connection with an order passed in Patta proceedings relating to an area in the former State of Marwar.

    2. The applicant's case is briefly this. There is a small piece of land situate in Didwana town which has got a municipality. Jhumarmal, opposite party, applied to the Municipal Board, Didwana, for grant of a no objection certificate so that he could obtain a Patta of this piece of land. The applicant objected to the grant of the no-objection certificate to Jhumarmal and the Municipal Board refused to give the certificate by its order dated the 28-1-1955. There was an appeal from this refusal to the Government by Jhumarmal. The Deputy Minister for Local Self Government inspected the site and heard arguments and thereafter, the appeal of Jhumarmal was dismissed in May 1955. In June 1955, Jhumarmal applied for review of the order of the Government.

    This review was accepted on the 16-9-1955 & the previous order dismissing the appeal was set aside and the Municipal Board was directed to grant a no-objection certificate to Jhumarmal. The applicant has come up to us against this order and his contention is that there was no jurisdiction in the Government to review the earlier order and, therefore, this Court should quash the order passed in review by a writ of certiorari.

    3. The application has been opposed by Jhumarmal and his contention is two-fold. In the first place, it is urged that such an order could be passed under Section 34 of the Marwar Patta Act, 1921. In the second place, the contention is that the proceedings culminating in the order of Government were executive proceedings and the applicant has no right in the land which is the subject of the no-objection certificate and as such, his application should be dismissed and he should be left to his remedy, if any, in the civil court.

    4. In 1921 the Marwar Patta Ordinance was passed by the then Ruler of the former State of Marwar. It has now become Marwar Patta Act, 1921. This law laid down the procedure for grant of Pattas of lands of which the State was the owner. It was judged from modern standards, a somewhat strange law as it placed fetters on the powers of the State to dispose of its own property. However, the law came into force from 1st of January 1922 and is still in force in the area covered by the former State of Marwar. In 1928, certain rules were framed under the Patta Act with respect to State lands within municipal limits.

    The rules provide that any person, desiring to obtain a Patta of any State land within municipal limits, shall, in the first instance, apply to the municipal board concerned. The municipal board is to take action, as provided by Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Patta Act. Of these, Section 14 may be referred to, as it provides for the issue of a proclamation calling upon all persons, having any objections to the grant of the Patta for the site in question, to file them within thirty days thereof. Thereafter, the Municipal Board is to take these objector's into consideration. If the municipal board refuses to grant a Patta (this later came to be known as no-objection certificate, for, the Patta could be granted only by some State official), there was a right of appeal to the Mehkma Khas i.e. the Government.

    5. It was in pursuance of these rules that Jhumarmal applied to the Municipal Board, Didwana, for the grant of a no-objection certificate with respect to this land. The certificate -was refused by the Municipal Board and thereafter, there was an appeal by Jhumarmal to the Government. That appeal was dismissed; but later, on review the order dismissing the appeal was set aside and the Government ordered the Municipal Board to issue a no-objection certificate. It is this order in review which is being challenged before us.

    6. Learned counsel for the applicant relies on Nathulal v. Collector, Sawai Jaipur, ILR (1951) 1 Raj 47: (AIR 1952 Raj 36) (A). In that case, it was held by this Court that when a matter is finally disposed of by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority, that authority, in the absence of any statutory provision, becomes functus officio and is left with no authority to rehear and give fresh decision unless such authority is given to it by law. If no such authority is given by the statute, it is clear that apart from correcting clerical mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission, there is no inherent power to review a final decision given on merits inter partes.

    7. The first question that immediately arises in view of the decision in Nathulal's case (A) is whether any such power of review is conferred by the Patta Act. Learned counsel for the opposite party, Jhumarmal, contends that such power of review is contained in Section 34 of the Act. It is not necessary to set out Section 34. It is enough to' say that though the word "re-view" appears in that section, it is clear beyond all doubt that what that section contemplates is revision either by the Darbar or by the Govemment of orders passed by authorities subordinate to the Darbar or the Government. It does not contemplate review of its own decision by the Government. There is, therefore, no provision in section 34 for review of a final order 'once passed in appeal by the Government.

    8. The next question is whether the proceedings in which the Government reviewed its order are quasi-judicial proceedings. If they are, ILR (1951) 1 Raj 47: (AIR 1952 Raj 36) (A) would fully apply and there could be no review by Government. The argument in this connection is that the land in dispute belongs to Government and the question whether the land should be given to anyone in Patta is a matter within the executive competence of Government and is not a quasi-judicial matter. Normally, that would be so. But, in the peculiar circumstances of the law as it prevails in the area, which was part of the former State of Marwar, the matter assumes a different form. Ordinarily, if the Government changes its mind in the matter of disposing of its own property, no one can have a right to challenge the change of mind; for, the property being Government's, it can do what it tikes with it and a person like the applicant, who has no right in the property, cannot object to the change of mind by Government.

    But the circumstances in the area comprised in the former State of Marwar are different. By passing the Patta Act, the Government put fetters on its own power to deal with its property in such manner as it thought fit and provided certain procedure for grant of Pattas of State lands. Under this procedure, where the land is situate in municipal areas, the person desiring to obtain a Palta has to apply to the municipality for a no-objection certificate. The municipality notifies such an application and people interested in the land have a right to object. Their objection is considered by the municipality which either grants the no-objection certificate or withholds it.

    If the municipality withholds the certificate, the person aggrieved has a right to appeal to Government. It is clear therefore that this Act confers rights on persons interested in the land for which a person makes an application to object to the grant of no-objection certificate and the matter is decided according to the public interest. The statute, therefore, confers a right on a person like the applicant to make an objection and to have that objection decided in the manner provided by the statute, even though he may have no interest in the land in the sense that he has no interest of a proprietary nature in it. When, therefore, the statute gives right to a person like the applicant, who may be interested in the land, though not in the sense that he has any proprietary interest in it and provides for the manner in which the objection of such a person shall be determined and also provides for an appeal in case the no-objection certificate is refused, it is, in our opinion, clear that these proceedings must be of a quasi-judicial nature.

    It is the duty of the authorities concerned, where there are two contending parties before it one asking for a no-objection certificate and the other objecting to it on grounds which must be in the public interest (which includes the interest of the person objecting also) to approach the matter in a judicial spirit. Therefore, in the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the area which was in the former State of Marwar, the right is conferred on all persons, if they have any interest in the wide sense, as distinguished from proprietary interest, in the land, to object to the grant of a no-objection certificate. Two parties thus contend before the authorities and considering that even an appeal is provided, it is but right that the matter should be decided with a judicial approach. In these circumstances, these proceedings become quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be no review of final orders passed in such proceedings unless there is a specific provision to that effect in the law. We have already held that in this law, there is no provision for review.

    Therefore, the decision in ILR (1951) 1 Raj 47: (AIR 1952 Raj 36) (A) fully applies and the Government had no right to review the order which had been passed by it in May 1955 and to set it aside in review later on. Therefore, the order of Government dated the 16th of September 1955 was without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside.

    9. It is urged finally that in any case, the applicant has no interest in the land and, therefore, we should not give him any relief. It is enough to point out that though the applicant may not have any kind of proprietary interest in the land, he is certainly interested in the land in a wide sense inasmuch as the land is just near his house and he is interested in its disposal. Section 14 of the Marwar Patta Act, 1921, read with the rules framed in 1928, gives a statutory right to the applicant to object to the grant of a no-objection certificate. This is, in our opinion, the interest that the applicant has in the matter of the disposal of this land and, therefore, he can ask us to intervene if the Government has acted in this quasi-judicial matter beyond its powers.

    10. We are, therefore, of opinion that this application should be allowed. We may, however, point out that the proceedings of this kind are not res-judicata and it is always open to the same parties to apply again and if the circumstances have changed, the authorities concerned can change their mind; but they cannot in the same proceedings review a final order passed by them.

    11. We, therefore, allow the application with costs against Jhumarmal only and set aside the order of Government dated the 16th of September 1955.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Jai Kishan v. The State Of Rajasthan
    (Sep 19, 1957)