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  • Section 174(3), Cr.P.C. 1973 and Rules 6.36 and 6.46 of the Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965.
  • Rule 17, Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules
  • Section 11(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • Section 110-D, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Section 110C, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • SECTION 35 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Section 302, I.P.C.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 174(3), Cr.P.C. 1973 and Rules 6.36 and 6.46 of the Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965.
  • Rule 17, Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules
  • Section 11(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • Section 110-D, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Section 110C, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • SECTION 35 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Section 302, I.P.C.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was filed under Section 110-D, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Banswara dated April 29, 1988 which had awarded the claimant-respondents Rs. 1,19,000/- as compensation (the award noted interest at the rate of 12% per month). The factual matrix set out in the opinion is as follows:

  • On December 10, 1982, the deceased Manilal (described as 28 years old in the factual narrative and later recorded as 32 years old by the Tribunal on post-mortem material) was a passenger in Bus No. RRM 6708 owned by appellant No. 1, travelling from Banswara to Bhrinthor.
  • At about 7:30 p.m., while alighting at Bhrinthor his 'dhoti' became stuck in the bus door; the bus started before the 'dhoti' could be unfastened, Manilal was dragged, received serious injuries and died on the spot.
  • Manilal was said to be employed as a carpenter earning Rs. 25-30 per day.
  • The appellants and respondent No. 6 filed a joint written statement admitting ownership and that respondent No. 6 was driving the bus on the relevant date, but denied that any accident occurred with the bus at Bhrinthor or that any accident resulted from rash or negligent driving; they also raised other defenses in the written statement.
  • The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal framed issues, recorded evidence, and after hearing awarded Rs. 1,19,000/- to the claimants. The present appeal challenges that award and aspects of the Tribunal's findings and procedures.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of Manilal was accidental or homicidal.
  2. Whether the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver.
  3. Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal (Rs. 1,19,000/-) was excessive or unsupported.
  4. Whether the claim petition was barred by limitation (i.e., whether the petition was time-barred).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Tribunal erred in concluding that the accident involved Bus No. RRM 6708 and that Manilal received fatal injuries in that accident.
  • The claimants were not entitled to Rs. 1,19,000/-; the award lacks evidentiary basis.
  • The Tribunal admitted the post-mortem report without recording the testimony of the doctor who performed the post-mortem.
  • There was no movement of the bus after Manilal's 'dhoti' got stuck and therefore the death could not have arisen as narrated; it was argued that the evidence shows Manilal was murdered.
  • It was contended that the deceased Manilal was not living with the claimants and therefore dependency was overstated.
  • The claim petition was time barred (limitation challenge).

Claimant-Respondents' Position

  • The claimant-respondents' counsel supported the judgment and award of the Tribunal (the opinion records that they "duly supported the judgment and award under appeal").

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Top Kanwar v. L.I.C., 1975 RLW 161 Bed-head tickets of Government hospitals are public documents. Used to support the admissibility of hospital/post-mortem related certified documents without calling the author as a witness.
Ramani Bala Devi v. Kanai Lal Mulaker, AIR 1965 Tripura 17 (1965 (1) Cri LJ 600) A discharge certificate issued by a public hospital is a public document. Supported the proposition that hospital certificates/reports (public documents) are admissible as certified copies.
Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361 (1981 Cri LJ 1) A certified copy of an entry made by an official in discharge of official duties is admissible under Section 35, Evidence Act; the prosecution need not examine the official who made the entry. The court relied on this to hold that the certified post-mortem report could be taken into account without calling the doctor who prepared it.
P. C. Purushothama v. S. Pirumal, AIR 1972 SC 608 If a document is a certified copy of a public document it need not be proved by calling a witness. Cited to justify reliance on the certified post-mortem report and related official documents.
Zeenath Tej v. Prince of Wales Medical College, Patna, AIR 1971 Pat 43 There is a presumption that public officials perform their duties regularly; burden lies on those who assert otherwise. Applied to treat the official post-mortem and investigation records as reliable absent evidence to the contrary.
Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, Criminal Writ Petition No. 270 of 1988, AIR 1989 SC 2039 (1989 SVLR 137) Courts should not summon medical professionals unnecessarily; evidence of medical professionals should be sought only when necessary to avoid harassment and delay. Used to support that the doctor need not be summoned where certified reports and clear facts suffice for adjudication.
N.K.V. Brothers v. M. Karumai Ambal, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC) Tribunals should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes in claim matters. Relied upon to justify a pragmatic and summary approach by the Claims Tribunal in disposing of claim cases.
Grendleys Bank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 606 (1981 Lab IC 155) When statute provides that a tribunal shall follow such procedure as it thinks fit, the words confer wide power to devise procedure suited to justice of the case. Applied to support the Claims Tribunal's summary procedure powers under the Motor Vehicles Act provisions to mitigate technicalities and not strictly follow the Evidence Act.
K. Gopal Krishna v. Shanker Narain, 1969 ACJ 34; Pandit Ramaswaroop v. Balveer Singh, 1987 (2) Accidents & Compensation cases 358 (Delhi) Propositions cited in support that strict provisions of the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable before certain tribunals and that summary procedures may be adopted. Cited to reinforce that the Claims Tribunal could act on certified copies and summary forms of evidence without strict formal proof.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by addressing the central issues in sequence and applying evidentiary principles and precedent cited in the record:

  1. Determination of cause of death (accidental vs. homicidal):
    • The court placed significant weight on eyewitness testimony, especially that of Meghji P.W. 3, who was travelling in the same bus and gave a detailed account that Manilal's 'dhoti' got stuck in the bus door while alighting, the bus moved despite cries, and Manilal was subsequently injured and died on the spot. Nothing damaging emerged in cross-examination of this witness.
    • Other witnesses (Manilal's brother Devilal P.W. 1 and his widow Pushpa P.W. 2) also deposed that death occurred in an accident.
    • The police found the ticket of the disputed bus in the deceased's pocket; the post-mortem report, inquest report and Panchnama corroborated the eyewitness account. The court observed these documents supported the claimants' version rather than the appellants'.
    • The court noted inconsistent or false averments in the appellants' written statement (e.g., denial of any criminal case) and observed that the driver Ishaq Mohammed (D.W. 1) admitted in cross-examination that a criminal case was pending against him arising from the accident and that he had not disclosed in the written statement that such a case existed.
    • The court observed that there was no material on record to support the appellants' contention that Manilal was murdered; police investigation concluded death resulted from injuries sustained while alighting from the bus.
  2. Whether the accident resulted from rash and negligent driving:
    • The court relied primarily on the eyewitness account of Meghji P.W. 3 which stated the bus moved while Manilal was still getting down and did not stop despite cries. The court reasoned that normally a passenger's 'dhoti' would not get caught in the door absent some abnormality in the door or improper handling.
    • The court inferred that the bus started before passengers had properly alighted and that the driver and conductor were not sufficiently vigilant; absence of evidence that the conductor was near the door when the bus started supported this finding.
    • On these facts and circumstances the court concluded there was no doubt that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the bus.
  3. Evidentiary admissibility of the post-mortem and related official records:
    • The court acknowledged that the doctor who conducted the post-mortem was not examined, but held that the certified copy of the post-mortem report (paper No. C17/2-3), the inquest report and Panchnama were admissible as public documents. The court relied on cited authorities discussing admissibility of certified public documents and the general presumption that public officials discharge their duties.
    • The court also invoked authority cautioning that tribunals created to adjudicate such claims should not be overburdened by technicalities and need not strictly follow the formalities of the Evidence Act when summary procedures are contemplated by statute and rules.
    • Accordingly, the court held that the Tribunal rightly considered the certified post-mortem report without examining the doctor who prepared it.
  4. Quantum of compensation and dependency:
    • The Tribunal, on evidence, held the deceased's monthly income at Rs. 750/- and allowed Rs. 300/- per month for his personal expenses with Rs. 450/- per month deemed available to the claimants (dependency calculated at Rs. 5,400/- per annum). The Tribunal multiplied this figure by twenty and added Rs. 5,000/- for the spouse (claimant No. 2) for deprivation of marital life and Rs. 6,000/- for claimants Nos. 3 to 5 for loss of love and affection, arriving at the aggregate award of Rs. 1,19,000/-.
    • The court reviewed the evidence on living arrangements and dependency, observed that contentions that the deceased lived separately from family were not pleaded or supported in cross-examination, and found no merit in the appellants' challenge to the quantum; the amount was not excessive in the court's view given the facts and Tribunal's methodology.
  5. Limitation (time-bar) challenge:
    • The accident occurred on December 10, 1982; the claim petition was filed on July 4, 1983. The District Judge's court (Claims Tribunal) had been closed for summer vacation from June 4, 1983 to July 3, 1983.
    • The court held that delay in filing was condonable in any view because the Tribunal itself was closed, and therefore the limitation challenge failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS

Implications:

  • The Tribunal's award of Rs. 1,19,000/- in favour of the claimant-respondents is upheld (including the Tribunal's findings that Manilal died in an accident involving Bus No. RRM 6708 and that the accident resulted from the rash and negligent driving of the bus).
  • The court affirmed the admissibility of certified copies of official documents such as the post-mortem report, inquest report and Panchnama without requiring examination of the official/doctor who prepared them, where such reliance is permissible and supported by precedent and statutory scheme for summary procedure.
  • The delay in filing the claim petition was condoned because the Tribunal's closure for summer vacation rendered the filing timely for the purposes of limitation.
  • No novel legal principle or binding new precedent was articulated by the court; the decision applies established authorities and statutory rules to the facts and results in affirming the Tribunal's decision and award.

    Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Devilal

    1. This appeal has been filed under Section 110-D, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Banswara dated April 29, 1988 by which the claimant-respondents have been awarded Rs. l,19,000/-as compensation with interest at the rate of 12% per month. The facts of the case giving rise to this appeal may be summarised thus.

    2. On December 10, 1982, the deceased Manilal (husband of the respondent No. 2, father of the respondents Nos. 3,4 and 5 and brother of the respondent No. 1), 28 years old, was travelling as a passenger in Bus No. RRM 6708 belonging to the appellant No. 1. He was going from Banswara to Bhrinthor. At about 7.30 p.m., the bus reached at Bhrintor. His 'dhoti' got stuck with the door of the bus while he was getting down therefrom and the bus started before the 'dhoti'could be unfastened. As a result thereof, he was dragged for some distance and received serious injuries and died on the spot. He was earning Rs. 25-30 per day as a Carpenter. The appellants and the respondent No. 6 filed their joint reply admitting that the said Bus No. RRM 6708 was owned by the appellant No. 1 and on December 10, 1982, it was being driven by the respondent No. 6. It was pleaded by them that no accident took place with the bus when it stopped at Bhrinthor. In the alternative, it was also stated that no accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the bus driver. Necessary issues were framed and evidence of the parties was recorded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Banswara. After hearing them, the learned Tribunal held that the accident took place with the bus of the appellants, the deceased received fatal injuries in the accident, he was 28 years old and awarded compensation to the extent of Rs. 1,19,000/-.

    3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellants-non-petitioners that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal seriously erred in holding that the accident took place with the Bus No. RRM 6708, in the said accident Manilal received fatal injuries and the claimants are entitled to get Rs. 1,19,000/- as compensation. He further contended that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has awarded compensation without any evidence on record, post-mortem report has been read in evidence without recording the statement of the doctor who performed the post-mortem examination on the dead duty of Manilal, there was no question of movement of the bus after the 'dhoti' of Manilal got stuck with the bus and it was well proved from the evidence on record that Manilal was murdered. He also contended that the deceased Manilal was not living with the claimants. He lastly contended that the claim petition was time barred.

    4. The learned counsel for the claimant- respondents duly supported thejudgment and award under appeal,

    5. The first question for consideration in this appeal is whether the death of Manilal was accidental or homicidal. Manilal's brother, Devilal P.W. 1, has deposed that Manilal died in an accident. So are the statements of his widow Pushpa P.W. 2 and the eye witness Magji P.W. 3. Magji P.W. 3 was travelling with the deceased Manilal in the same bus. He has deposed that he was knowing deceased Mainilal, he belonged to the village Bari Saredi, about 6-7 years age, he boarded the bus along with deceased Manilal and Ratanlal from Banswara for Bhrinthor, all of them purchased tickets, the bus stopped at Bhrinthor, he got down from the bus, then Ratanlal and lastly, Mainilal, his 'dhoti' got stuck with the door of the bus while he was getting down from it, the bus moved, it was not stopped despite hue and cry for the same and as a result thereof, Manilal received injuries and died on the spot. Nothing damaging could be elicited out in his cross-examination. His testimony cannot be discarded simply on the ground that he was not examined by the police. It may be mentioned here that the ticket of the disputed bus was found in the pocket of the deceased by the police. The injuries found on the dead body of the deceased and duly noted in the postmortem report, paper No. C17/2-3, and inquest report and Panchnama, paper NOC17/10-11, fully corrorborate the statement of Megji P.W. 3. Bus driver Ishaq Mohammed D.W. 1 has shown his total ignorance on this point. In their joint written-statement, the non-petitioners have averred that police has not registered any case either against the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation or against the driver Ishaq Mohammed. Contrary to it, Ishaq Mohammed D.W. 1 had admitted in his cross-examination that a criminal case is pending in the Court of Munsiff-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Banswara against him in respect of the said accident and he is regularly appearing before the Court in the said case. He has further admitted that he did not disclose there that the accident did not take place with his said bus. It may be mentioned here that this written statement was filed on December 3, 1985 and the challan was filed in the Court of the Munsiff-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Banswara in the year, 1982, the certified copies of various documents filed with this challan were issued in the year, 1983. It is thus clear that the said averment in the written-statement is incorrect and false. It can safely be said that the non-petitioners have no regard for the truth.

    6. It is correct that the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of Manilal was not examined by the Tribunal and the certified copy of the post-mortem report, paper No. C17/2-3, has been taken into consideration. The postmortem examination was conducted under Section 174(3), Cr.P.C. 1973 and Rules 6.36 and 6.46 of the Rajasthan Police Rules, 1965. It has been held in Smt. Top Kanwar v. L.I.C., 1975 RLW 161 at pages 166-167,that a bed-head ticket of the Government hospital is a public document. Similarly it has been held in Ramani Bala Devi v. Kanai Lal Mulaker, AIR 1965 Tripura 17 : (1965 (1) Cri LJ 600) that a discharge certificate issued by a public hospital as a public document. In Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1981 Cri LJ 1 : (AIR 1981 SC 361) (Supreme Court) para 3, it has been observed as follows (at page AIR 1981 SC 361):--

    "There is yet another document, viz. Ex. PD, a certificate copy of the relevant entry in the birth register which shows that Saroj Kumari, who according to her evidence was known as Ramesh during her childhood, was born to Lajwanti wife of Daulat Ram on 11-11-1957. Mr. Hardy submitted that in the absence of the examination of the officer/ chowkidar concerned who recorded the entry, it was inadmissible in evidence. We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his officials duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author."

    Reference of P. C. Purushothama v. S. Pirumal, AIR 1972 SC 608 para 21, may be made here. It has been observed in Zeenath Tej v. Prince of Wales Medical College, Patna, AIR 1971 Pat 43 at p. 48, para 7, as follows :--

    "There is a presumption that every person whether in his private or official character does his duty and unless the contrary is proved, it is presumed that all things are rightly and regularly done. This presumption applies with greater force to official acts, Further it can hardly be controverted that the burden of proof is on the person who maintains that the apparent state of things is not the real state of things."

    1963 SC 1633, that if a document is a certified copy of a public document, it need not be proved by calling a witness. In Criminal Writ Petition No. 270 of 1988, (AIR 1989 SC 2039) Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India." decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in 1989 (Volume III) SVLR 137, it has been observed as under (at page 2045 of AIR) :--

    "We also hope and trust that our law courts will not summon a medical professional to give evidence unless the evidence is necessary and even men in this profession are not made to wait and waste time unnecessarily and it is known that our law courts always have respect for the men in the medical profession and they are called to give evidence when necessary and attempts are made so that they may not have to wait for long. We have no hasitation in saying that it is expected of the members of the legal profession which is the other honourable profession to honour the persons in the medical profession and see that they are called to give evidence so long as it is not necessary. It is also expected that where the facts are so clear it is expected that unnecessary harassment of the members of the medical profession either by way of requests for adjournments or by cross-examination should be avoided so that the apprehension that the men in the medical profession have which prevents them from discharging their duty to a suffering person who needs their assistance utmost, is removed and a citizen needing the assistance of a man in the medical profession received it."

    8. Tribunals have been established for the prompt disposal of claim cases. The limitation for filing claim cases is six months. Fixed court-fee of Rs. 10/- is required to be paid. Rule 17, Rajasthan Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules contemplates disposal of claim cases in one hearing. It has been observed in N.K.V. Brothers v. M. Karumai Ambal, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC) at page 436, that the Tribunal should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. Section 110C, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provided that in holding enquiry under Section 110B of the Act, the Claims Tribunal would follow such summary procedure as it thought fit. While interpreting similar words used in Section 11(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it has been observed in Grendleys Bank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1981 SC 606 at page 608: (1981 Lab IC 155) para 7, as under:--

    "The words 'shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other party may think fit' are of the widest amplitude and confer ample power on the Tribunal and other authorities to devise such procedure as justice of the case demands."

    It has further been observed in para 8 that object of giving such wide power is to mitigate the rigor of the technicalities of the law and to achieve the object of the effective investigation and settlement of disputes, strictly speaking, the provisions of the evidence act are not applicable before the Tribunal. Reference of K. Gopal Krishna v. Shanker Narain, 1969 ACJ 34 para 31 and Pandit Ramaswaroop v. Balveer Singh, 1987 (2) Accidents & Compensation cases 358 (Delhi), may be made here. Thus the certified copy of the post-mortem report, paper NO. C17/2-3, has rightly been taken into consideration by the Tribunal without examining the doctor who prepared. It is correct that on the report of one Bakhat Rai, police registered a case under Section 302, I.P.C. and not under section 304a, i.p.c. on its basis, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that in fact Manilal was murdered. There is no material on record in support of this contention. Even the report of Bakhat Rai is not on record. After necessary investigation, police came to the conclusion that Manilal was not murdered but he died due to fatal injuries received by him while he was alighting from the said bus.

    9. For the same reasons, inquest report, paper No. C-17/9, and Panchnama, Paper No. C-17/10-11, are admissible in evidence. They also support the claimants' version and not that of the non-petitioners. It is thus well proved that Manilal died in the said accident.

    10. The second question for consideration in this appeal is whether the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus by the driver. The eye-

    witness Meghji P.W. 3 has categorically stated on oath that the 'dhoti' of Manilal got stuck with the door of the bus while he was getting down from it, the bus moved, it was not stopped despite hue and cry for stopping it and as a result thereof Manilal received injuries and died on the spot. As already observed above, nothing damaging was elicited out in his cross-examination. In the normal course, 'dhoti' of passengers do not stuck with door of a bus. There must have been something abnormal in the door of the said bus. Despite hue and cry for stopping the bus, it was not stopped. It is clear from his statement that the bus started before all the passengers properly alighted from it. If it would not have been so, Manilal would not have been dragged by the bus. It also shows that the driver and conductor were not vigilant enough when the bus was started. There is nothing on the record to show that the conductor was near the door when the bus started. These facts and circumstances leave no doubt that the said accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus.

    11. The learned counsel for the appellants has also challenged the quantum of compension. On the basis of the said post-mortem report, the Tribunal has held that the age of the deceased at the time of the accident was 32 years. It is well proved from the claimants' unrebutted evidence that the deceased was a Carpenter and was earning Rs. 25-30 per day. There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the deceased was living separately from his family for more than one reason. Firstly, it has not been so pleaded in the written-statement. Secondly, no such suggestion in the cross-examination of Devilal P.W. 1 and Pushpa P.W. 2 was put. Pushpa P.W. 2 has disclosed in her examination-in-chief that her husband used to give his entire earnings of the day to her and she used to meet the expenses therefrom to maintain the family. She was not cross-examined on this point. It is correct that Devilal, P.W. 1 and Meghji P.W. 3 have deposed that deceased Manilal was living separately from his family. From these statements, it cannot be said that the deceased Manilal was living separately from his wife and children and he might have been living separately from his mother, -father and brothers.

    12. The Tribunal has held that the monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 750/- and he was spending Rs.300/- per month upon himself and remaining Rs. 450/-were being spent on the claimants. Accordingly, their dependency has been calculated at the rate of Rs. 5,400/ - per annum. This figure has been multiplied by twenty. The Tribunal has awarded Rs. 5,000/- to the claimant No. 2 Pushpa for being deprived of the marital life and Rs. 6,000/ - to claimants Nos. 3 to 5 for being deprived of the love and affection of their father. As such a total amount of Rs. 1,19,000/- has been awarded. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, this amount cannot be said to be excessive or exhorbitant.

    13. There is also no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the claim petition was time barred. The accident took place on December 10, 1982, claim petition was filed on July 4, 1983 and the Court of the District Judge, Banswara (Claims Tribunal, Banswara) was closed due to summer vacations from June 4, 1983 to July 3, 1983. In any view of the matter, the delay in filing the claim petition is condonable as the Tribunal itself was closed.

    14. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Devilal
    (Sep 18, 1989)