G.S SANDHAWALIA, J. (Oral)

The present revision petition has been filed against the concurrent findings recorded by the Authorities under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short ‘the Act’) whereby, the petition under Section 13 of the Act has been allowed on the ground of non-payment of rent and personal necessity of the tenanted premises by the Rent Controller, Panchkula on 21.01.2013 The said order has been upheld in appeal on 23.10.2013 by the Appellate Authority.

A perusal of the paper book would go on to show that the respondent-society filed the petition on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent from 01.02.2003 to 30.09.2008 @ Rs. 85/- per month and for personal necessity alongwith the fact that the premises have become dilapidated being an old barrack house. The case of the respondent-society was that it wanted to construct a stadium, play ground for the co-curricular activities of the students of two adjacent schools and was in dire need of the land in question.

The petitioner-tenant took the plea that the society was not the owner and landlord of the house in question and he was an occupier from the last 27 years. Accordingly, the right to recover the rent was also disputed. The following issues were framed by the Rent Controller:-

“1. Whether the respondent is entitled for eviction from the suit property, on the grounds as alleged? OPP

2. Whether the present petition is not maintainable in the present form? OPR

3. Whether the petitioner has no cause of action to file the present suit? OPR

4. Whether the petitioner has no locus-standi to file the present suit? OPR

5. Relief.”

The Society examined Ram Chander as PW-1 whereas the petitioner examined Baljinder Singh, Patwari as RW-1, Amar Nath, Estate Officer of the society as RW-2 and himself as RW-3. On issue no. 1 that whether the tenant was entitled for eviction on the grounds as alleged, the Rent Controller noticed that the society was owning 21 acres situated in the urban area of village Kharag Mangoli, Sector 1, Old Panchkula, District Panchkula where two schools were existing in 4 acres of land. It was noticed that the land stood released by the State of Haryana in favour of the society and the tenant had no locus standi to hold out and say that the society was not the owner of the property or is not the landlord. A resolution dated 27.10.2002 (Ex. P-2) had been passed to institute petitions against the tenants and the President and the Secretary namely Hira Lal Jain and V.K Jain were authorized to take necessary steps for conducting such proceedings. The Secretary had further delegated the power to Ramesh Chander, Assistant of the Society to appear and conduct cases and all matters connected with the cases of the society (Ex. P-3). It was noticed that earlier, a decision had been taken by the Committee in its meeting held on 06.10.1991 to get the barrack type houses in block K, J & I vacated from the tenants and to file a suit after getting the tenancy terminated. Proceedings had been filed but due to change in law, permission had been sought from this Court to withdraw the suits and it was accordingly noticed that any technicality should not come in the way and the rent petition was maintainable. The fact of non-payment of rent after 19.04.2010 also weighed with the Rent Controller and the fact that the society was wanting to raise a stadium and play ground in the land owned by as per the copy of resolution attached alongwith the scaled site plan. The Rent Controller also noticed that the petitioner had started the construction of the work of the stadium and that it was a welfare society imparting education and accommodation to those persons whose parents were victims of terrorists and natural disasters and required the land in question for raising a stadium and a play ground. Accordingly, the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the tenant was not a person who could dictate how the landlord requires the premises for his bona fide and personal use. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal., (2002) 5 SCC 397; Kewal Singh v. Smt Lajwanti, (1980) 1 SCC 290 and Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan (1979) 1 SCC 273. It was further noticed that the entire vacant land was needed for setting up Mahavir University and ejectment on the ground of personal necessity was accordingly held to be bona fide and the petition was accordingly allowed.

The Appellate Authority has also examined the factual matrix and held that a person can appear as a witness if he is well aware of the facts of the case and PW-1 had been given the authority to depose on behalf of the society vide the resolution. The society being a juristic person had to act through its agents and, therefore, it found no irregularity on account of Ram Chander contesting and pursuing the litigation. It was also noticed that Amar Nath, the Estate Officer had been summoned by the tenant himself and he had admitted that the Municipal Council was not passing the site plan on account of the dispute of the tenant and the landlord. Accordingly, the findings of the Rent Controller were upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

Counsel for the petitioner-tenant has now vehemently submitted that initially the requirement was of a stadium and a play ground and now case set up is of setting up of a University as per the amended pleadings and in the absence of any such resolution on record, there was no bona fide necessity proved. The second submission is that there was no proper authorization and in such circumstances, the Courts below were not justified in ordering eviction since the President and the Secretary of the society had not stepped into the witness box.

Mr. Adarsh Jain, Advocate, counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that as many as 85 tenants had vacated the premises or had been ejected and the bona fide necessity was sufficiently proved on account of the fact that the tenant himself had appeared and stated that the construction of the stadium had started.

After hearing counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the submissions made by counsel for the tenant are not justified. It is a matter of fact that the society is wanting eviction of the tenants in question since 1991. Initially, the suits had been filed which were withdrawn on account of the Rent Act coming into operation regarding the premises in question. During the long period of litigation, the requirement of the society can always change. Initially, if the premises were required for a stadium or a play ground for the ancillary purposes of the school and now if the requirement is to set up a University in the premises in question which are part of the large area of 21 acres situated in the urban area, the bona fide necessity is not a mere desire. Due to litigation between the petitioner and the landlord and other tenants, the society may not be in a position to utilize its land due to their occupation and would face various hindrances in getting the site plan sanctioned and clearances from authorities which are required for the purposes of setting up of the University as it has to show availability of land for the purpose of setting up of the University. In such circumstances, if over the period of time, the requirement has changed which is ancillary usage of the area in question to the primary purpose of education no fault can be found in the orders passed by the authorities below whereby, ejectment has been ordered.

The second argument which has been raised that the authorization was only to the President and the Secretary is also without any basis. It is settled principle that the corporate bodies are juristic persons and have to act through their agents and officers. Admittedly, way back on 16.07.1995 (Ex.P-4), a decision had been taken by the Managing Committee that the one room tenements constructed for refugee orphan boys on partition of India and later rented out to the persons like the petitioner were to be demolished after getting them vacated from the tenants and to use the same for educational campus. The initial resolution is in favour of the President and the Secretary and the Secretary has further delegated the power to Ramesh Chander, who is an Assistant working with the society. In such circumstances, no fault can be found if the said official has appeared and deposed in favour of the society regarding the need for personal necessity of the property in question for the reasons as noticed above. In such circumstances, the challenge laid that the said person did not have any authority is without any basis.

Even otherwise, this Court is not to go into the detailed matrix of facts and is only to exercise the revisional jurisdiction under the Act. The Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, 2014 (9) SCALE 657 has specifically held that the correctness and legality of the order impugned have only to be seen and whether the Courts had jurisdiction. The facts which have been summarized above would go on to show that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have exercised their power within their limitations and nothing could be pointed out that they had acted beyond their jurisdiction or their decision suffered from any error of law. The relevant observations of Hindustan Petroleum's case (supra) read thus:-

“We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.

Accordingly, keeping in view the above settled principles of law and the discussion, this Court is of the opinion that there is no scope for interference in the well reasoned orders passed by the authorities below and the present revision petition is dismissed.