CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ADARSH KUMAR GOEL
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR MITTAL
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
2. Whether to be referred to the reporters or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Present: Mr. M.K.Singla, Advocate for the petitioner.
M/S P.S.Khurana, V.K.Sandhir, S.S.Sidhu, Sukhjinder
Singh,P.S.Sekhon, C.L.Premi, Naiya Gill, Onkar Rai, O.S.Batalwi,
Jagmeet Singh, Sandeep Arora, Nandal Jindal, L.S.Sidhu, Vikram
Singh, P.S.Mirpur, Umesh Kumar, B.S.Makar and Manjeet Singh,
Advocates for petitioners in connected cases.
Mr. Rupinder Khosla, Addl.A.G.Punjab and
Mr. Rajesh Bhardwaj, Addl.A.G.Punjab.
Mr.R.K.Garg, Advocate for the caveator in CWP No.8249/2011.
Mr. Balbir Singh, Advocate for respondent No.5 in CWP 8351/11.
Adarsh Kumar Goel, ACJ.
1. This petition seeks quashing of the Punjab Panchayati Raj
(Amendment) Act, 2011 whereby Section 19 of the Punjab Panchayati Raj
Act, 1994 (for short, "the Act") has been deleted which was notified on
21.4.2011 with retrospective effect from 1.7.2010.
2. Case set out in the petition is that the Gram Panchayat Narike,
Block Malerkotla, District Sangrur was one of the Panchayats constituted
to which elections were held in the year 2008. Panches were elected
directly and they elected a Sarpanch. On an application for holding a
meeting to consider No Confidence Motion proposed against the Sarpanch,
under section 19 of the Act as applicable, a meeting was convened for the
purpose on 14.10.2010 and after consideration, No Confidence Motion was
passed by six out of the nine members of the Panchayat. The Sarpanch,
thus, stood removed from his office and alternative mechanism was put in
place as per statutory provisions. On 14.12.2010, Ordinance No.9 of 2010
was issued by the Governor of Punjab deleting Section 19 of the Act, which
was prospective. The Ordinance has now been replaced by the impugned
Act notified on 21.4.2011 which is retrospective from 1.7.2010. The Act is
a short one and is reproduced below:-
"1. (1). This Act may be called the Punjab Panchayati Raj
(Amendment) Act, 2011.
(2) It shall come into force with effect from 1st July, 2010.
Omission of section 19 of Punjab Act 9 of 1994
2. In the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, section 19 shall be
omitted.
3. The Punjab Panchayati Raj (Amendment Ordinance, 2010
Punjab Ordinance No.9 of 2010) is hereby repealed."
3. Statement of objects and reasons for the impugned Act is as
under:-
"1. The Sarpanches of a Gram Panchayat are elected by the
Panches of the Panchayat and Section 19 of Punjab Panchayati
Raj Act, 1994 empowers the Panches to remove them from the
office of Sarpanches by passing a resolution of No Confidence
against them after a period of two years.
2. The elections of Gram Panchayats were held in the year
2008 and since the statutory period of two years has been
passed, a large number of applications from the Panches
against their Sarpanches were received by the competent
authority and by this the focus of the elected representatives of
the people was shifted from development to the removal of
their Sarpanches.
3. That due to the village factionalism, the Panches want to
remove their Sarpanch to whom they have elected two years
earlier.
4. That for the smooth functioning of a Gram Panchayat, the
term of the Sarpanch should matched with the term of the Gram
Panchayat whereas such present legal provision is encouraging
the groupism in the village which is not good for the
development of the villages.
5. Accordingly, the deletion of section 19 of Punjab Panchayati
Raj Act, 1994 of the present Bill is being issued."
4. In support of challenge to the Amendment Act, it is submitted
that having regard to the constitutional objective of local self Government at
the panchayat level, it is necessary that Sarpanch should have confidence of
majority electing him and should be removable by a No Confidence Motion.
Scheme of No Confidence Motion is necessary not only for smooth
functioning of Panchayat but is also consistent with the constitutional value
of democracy. Under the Act, Chapter II deals with the panchayats, Chapter
VI deals with Panchayat Samitis for the blocks and Chapter VII deals with
Zila Parishads for the districts. Prior to the impugned amendment, Section
19 provided for No Confidence Motion against Sarpanch and there are
corresponding provisions for No Confidence Motion against Chairman/Vice
Chairman of Panchayat Samiti and Chairman/Vice Chairman of Zila
Parishad while provision for No Confidence Motion for Panchayat Samitis
and Zila Parishads, has been returned, provision for No Confidence Motion
against Sarpanch has been deleted which is discriminatory and arbitrary.
Provision for No Confidence Motion has to be implied as Sarpanch is
elected by the majority of Panches under Section 13A and an authority
competent to appoint has authority to remove as per General Clauses Act
incorporating the principle of common law. deletion of section 19 is
against the object of grass root democracy of giving authority to people's
elected representatives to appoint or remove a Sarpanch. Alternatively, it is
submitted that deletion of section 19 and thereby taking away power of
passing a No confidence Motion retrospectively from 1.7.2010 is arbitrary
as it affects removal already lawfully effected prior to the Act i.e. on
14.10.2010 and taking over of the functions of the Sarpanch as per Section
87(1). Thus, retrospectivity affects vested rights arbitrarily. It has been
stated by learned counsel for the parties that about 120 Sarpanches had been
removed in similar manner by No Confidence Motion after 1.7.2010 and
also before coming into force of the impugned Act and also before the
issuance of Ordinance dated 14.10.2010. Some other No Confidence
Motions were also pending. In some cases, fresh Sarpanches had been duly
elected and notified.
5. Notice was issued and served on the respondents but no reply
has been filed. It was stated that reply was not necessary as facts were not
in dispute and only legal question was involved.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. On behalf of the State, the impugned Act has been justified on
the ground that right to remove an elected representative has to be found in
a statute and could not be exercised in absence thereof. The legislature was
competent to legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. Deletion of
provision for No Confidence Motion was within the legislative competence.
If legislature could make a provision for No Confidence Motion, it could
delete the same. Requirement of a provision for No Confidence Motion was
not a constitutional mandate but only creation of a statute. The deletion
intends to achieve the object of smooth functioning of a panchayat and to
avoid groupism in the village and to promote unhampered development.
Even after deletion of provision for No Confidence Motion, a Sarpanch
could be removed under sections 20 and 21. Section 20 provides for
removal of Sarpanch by the Director for any misconduct specified therein
while Section 21 provides for cessation from the office of Sarpanch on
failure to deposit the amount as required under Section 216 for any loss
caused to the Panchayat. Similarly, Section 5 provides for cessation of
Sarpanch from the office for failure to hold two consecutive general
meetings. Thus, deletion of provision for No Confidence Motion does not in
any manner provide for arbitrary working of a Sarpanch. It being a matter
of legislative policy, the choice of the legislature has to prevail.
8. The questions to be determined are as under:-
(I) Whether legislature is competent to delete a provision
providing for No Confidence Motion?
(II) Whether deletion of the provision with retrospective
effect could be held to be beyond the legislative
competence or arbitrary?
Re: (I)
9. Main submission on behalf of the petitioner is that under the
Scheme of the Constitution, panchayats are basic units of self governance
and though initially, this mandate was manifested in Article 40 of the
Constitution, by way of a Directive Principle, by 73rd Amendment in the
year 1993, Part IX was added to the Constitution. Under Article 243B,
constitution of a panchayat is mandatory. The amended provisions also
provide for conferment of important powers and responsibilities on
panchayats, for imposition of taxes for raising funds for the panchayats and
for constitution of a Finance Commission to review the financial position.
The Panchayat has to plan for economic development and social justice and
implement schemes for such purposes as have been mentioned in Eleventh
Schedule to the Constitution. No doubt, the manner of election of Sarpanch
has been left to the State legislature, the Panches are to be directly elected
under Article 243C. Under the State law, Sarpanch is elected by Panches.
Reliance has been placed on following judgments:-
Ram Beti v. District To submit that provision for No
Panchayat Raj Adhikar, Confidence Motion is consistent
(1998) 1 SCC 680, para 6. with the principles of democracy.
Bhanumati and others v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010)
12 SCC 1, paras 52 to 58, 66,
67.
Bar Council of Delhi v. The To submit that even in absence of
Bar Council of India, AIR a provision, an authority
1975 Delhi 200 Para 11 competent to appoint was
competent to remove under the
Bindhya Charan Sinha v. common law.
State of WB, AIR 2004 Cal 27,
para 10
Mohan Chandra v. The ICA
of India, AIR 1972 Delhi 9,
para 43
Dr. Bool Chand v.
E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil To submit that arbitrariness was
Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 a facet of Article 14 and a
legislation could be questioned
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of on the ground of arbitrariness and
India, AIR 1978 SC 597 thus being violative of Article 14.
Harbilas Rai Bansal v. State To submit that even deletion of a
of Punjab and another, AIR provision so as to result in
1996 SC 857(1) discrimination could be set aside
to enforce Article 14.
Rai Ramkrishna and others v. To submit that even though
State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC legislature may have power to
1667 make a law retrospectively, the
retrospectivity could be
State of Gujarat and another questioned as arbitrary.
v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal
Soni and others, (1983) 2 SCC
10. On the other hand, submission on behalf of the State is that
provision for No Confidence Motion is not a creature of the Constitution
but of the statute and in such a situation, it is within the competence of the
State Legislature under Entry 5 of List II to make a provision or to delete
the provision on the subject. Learned counsel for the State mainly relied
upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohan Lal Tripathi v.
District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly and others, (1992) 4 SCC 80 to submit
that right of No Confidence Motion flows from a statute and the common
law principle must remain stranger to the enacted election law. Reliance
was also placed on judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay v.
State of Maharashtra and others, (2006) 6 SCC 289 to submit that a
legislation can be retrospective.
11. It will be appropriate to reproduce some of the observations on
which emphasis has been laid during hearing.
In Mohan Lal Tripathi, it was observed:-
"2. Democracy is a concept, a political philosophy, an
ideal practised by many nations culturally advanced and
politically mature by resorting to governance by
representatives of the people elected directly or
indirectly. But electing representatives to govern is
neither a 'fundamental right' nor a 'common law right'
but a special right created by the statutes,(N.P.
Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal
Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64; Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh & Others AIR 1954 SC 210), or a 'political right' or
'privilege' and not a 'natural', 'absolute' or 'vested right'
(American Jurisprudence, 2d, Vol.63, p.771). 'Concepts
familiar to common law and equity must remain
strangers to Election Law unless statutorily embodied.'
(Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982) 1 SCC 691; Arun
Kumar Bose v. Mohd. Furkan Ansari (1984) 1 SCC 91,
Right to remove an elected representative, too, must stem
out of the statute as 'in the absence of a constitutional
restriction it is within the power of a legislature to enact
a law for the recall of officers' American Jurisprudence,
2d, Vol.63, p.238). Its existence or validity can be
decided on the provision of the Act and not, as a matter
of policy. In the American Political Dictionary (Jack C.
Plano/Milton Greenberg), the right of recall is defined
as, 'a provision enabling voters to remove an elected
official from office before his or her term expired'.
American Jurisprudence explains it thus, 'Recall is a
procedure by which an elected officer may be removed at
any time during his term or after a specified time by vote
of the people at an election called for such purpose by a
specified number of citizens' American Jurisprudence,
2d, Vol.63, p.770). It was urged that 'recall gives
dissatisfied electors the right to propose between
elections that their representatives be removed and
replaced by another more in accordance with popular
will' (Modern Political Constitution, 8th Edn. By C.S.
Strong) therefore the appellant could have been recalled
by the same body, namely, the people who elected him.
Urged Shri Sunil Gupta, learned counsel, that since, 'A
referendum involves a decision by the electorate without
the intermediary of representatives and, therefore,
exhibits form of direct democracy' (Dictionary of
Political Thought by Roger Scrutton, 1982) the removal
of the appellant by a vote of no-confidence by the Board
which did not elect him was subversive of basic concept
of democracy. Academically the submission appeared
attractive but applied as a matter of law it appears to
have little merit. None of the political theorists, on whom
reliance was placed, have gone to suggest that an elected
representative can be recalled, only, by the persons or
body that elected him. Recall expresses the idea that a
"public officer is indeed a 'servant of the people' and can
therefore be dismissed by them" (Dictionary of Political
Science and Law by Rudolph Reimanson). In modern
political set up direct popular check by recall of elected
representative has been universally acknowledged in any
civilised system. Efficacy of such a device can hardly
admit of any doubt. But how it should be initiated, what
should be the procedure, who should exercise it within
ambit of constitutionally permissible limits falls in the
domain of legislative power. 'Under a constitutional
provision authorizing municipalities of a certain
population to frame a charter for their own government
consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws
of the State, and a statutory provision that in certain
municipalities the Mayor and members of the municipal
council shall be elected at the time, in the manner, and
for the term prescribed in the charter, a municipal
corporation has authority to enact a recall provision'
(American Jurisprudence, 2d, Vol.63, p.771). Therefore,
the validity or otherwise of a no-confidence motion for
removal of a President, would have to be examined on
applicability of statutory provision and not on political
philosophy. The Municipality Act provides in detail the
provisions for election of President, his qualification,
resignation, removal etc. Constitutional validity of these
provisions was not challenged, and rightly, as they do
not militate, either, against the concept of democracy or
the method of electing or removing the representatives.
The recall of an elected representative therefore, so long
it is in accordance with law cannot be assailed on
abstract notions of democracy.
xx xx xx xx xx
6. Another offshoot of the same submission was that
when removal was by a smaller body the legislature in
1949 provided a safeguard that a Chairman elected by
people removed by vote of no-confidence if re-elected
could not be removed again by a vote of no-confidence.
According to the learned counsel in absence of such
safeguard the provision in section 47-a, as it stands
now, becomes arbitrary and in absence of clear language
it should be held inapplicable to President elected by the
electorate. The approach does not appear to be sound.
Legislature's power to enact such provision is derived
from Entry 5 of List II of VII Schedule which is couched
in very wide terms. In absence of any challenge of
legislative competence, the omission of the proviso to
sub-section (5) of (sic of Section 47-A, as introduced by)
Act 7 of 1949, by amendment since 1955 can neither be
characterised as irrational nor arbitrary. Moreover
whether a President should be elected by the people
directly or by the Board was for the legislature to decide.
These are matters of policy which cannot be examined
by court. Legislature being the best judge of the needs of
the people it is for the legislature to decide which system
of electing representatives to the elective bodies and in
what manner they should be removed would be best
suitable for governance of the State. So long the policy is
not vitiated by any mala fide or extraneous consideration
the courts have neither jurisdiction nor are adequately
furnished with material to adjudicate upon its validity or
correctness."
In Bhanumati, it was observed:-
"48. The appellants have not challenged U.P. Act 20 of
1998 by which Section 15 of the 1961 Act was continued
in amended version. Therefore, the continuance of no-
confidence provision has not been challenged--what has
been challenged is the reduction of the period from "two
years" to "one year" and the requirement majority from
"not less than two-thirds" to "more than half". It is thus
clear that the statutory provision of no-confidence is not
contrary to Part IX of the Constitution.
xx xx xx xx xx
52. As noted above, the provision of no-confidence was
a pre-Seventy-third Amendment statutory provision and
that was continued even after the Seventy-third
Amendment in keeping with mandate of Article 243-N.
This continuance of the no-confidence provision, as
noted above was not challenged by the appellants. This
aspect has been noted by the High Court in the impugned
judgment. The High Court noted:
"The original Act of 1961 provides a block
period of 12 months for initiation of no-
confidence motion in reference to kshettra samiti/
panchayat, which was amended in the year 1965
by U.P. Act 16 of 1965 and the block period was
enhanced to 'two years' from '12 months'. Again
in the year 1990 the block period was reduced as
the words 'two years' were substituted by words
'one year' by U.P. Act 20 of 1990. In the year
1998 U.P. Act 20 of 1998 again amended Section
15 and the block period was again enhanced to
'two years'. In the year 2007 again by U.P. Act 44
of 2007 the term 'two years' was substituted by
'one year' by virtue of which the block period of
'two years' was reduced to 'one year'."
xx xx xx xx xx
57. It has already been pointed out that the object and the
reasons of Part IX are to lend status and dignity to
Panchayati Raj institutions and to impart certainty,
continuity and strength to them. The learned counsel for
the appellant unfortunately, in his argument, missed the
distinction between an individual and an institution. If a
no-confidence motion is passed against the Chairperson
of a panchayat, he/she ceases to be a Chairperson, but
continues to be a member of the panchayat and the
panchayat continues with a newly-elected Chairperson.
Therefore, there is no institutional setback or
impediment to the continuity or stability of the
Panchayati Raj institutions.
58. These institutions must run on democratic principles.
In democracy all persons heading public bodies can
continue provided they enjoy the confidence of the
persons who comprise such bodies. This is the essence of
democratic republicanism. This explains why this
provision of no-confidence motion was there in the Act
of 1961 even prior to the Seventy-third Constitution
Amendment and has been continued even thereafter.
Similar provisions are there in different States in India.
xx xx xx xx xx
66. Democracy demands accountability and transparency
in the activities of the Chairperson especially in view of
the important functions entrusted with the Chairperson in
the running of Panchayati Raj institutions. Such duties
can be discharged by the Chairperson only if he/she
enjoys the continuous confidence of the majority
members in the panchayat. So any statutory provision to
demonstrate that the Chairperson has lost the confidence
of the majority is conducive to public interest and adds
strength to such bodies of self-governance. Such a
statutory provision cannot be called either unreasonable
or ultra vires Part IX of the Constitution.
67. Any head of a democratic institution must be
prepared to face the test of confidence. Neither the
democratically elected Prime Minister of the country nor
the Chief Minister of a State is immune from such a test
of confidence under the Rules of Procedure framed under
Articles 118 and 208 of the Constitution. Both the Prime
Minister of India and Chief Ministers of several States
heading the Council of Ministers at the Centre and in
several States respectively have to adhere to the
principles of collective responsibilities to their respective
houses in accordance with Articles 75(3) and 164(2) of
the Constitution.
xx xx xx xx xx
86. Reliance was also placed on the Constitution Bench
judgment of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur
Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat( 2005)8SCC 534. Lahoti,
C.J. speaking for the Bench laid down in SCC p. 562,
para 39 of the Report that the legislature is in the best
position to understand and appreciate the needs of the
people as enjoined in the Constitution. The Court will
interfere in legislative process only when the statute is
clearly violative of the right conferred on a citizen under
Part III or when the Act is beyond the legislative
competence of the legislature. Of course the Court must
always recognise the presumption in favour of the
constitutionality of the statutes and the onus to prove its
invalidity lies heavily on the party which assails it."
12. It is clear that under the scheme of the Constitution, panchayats
are required to be constituted and its members are to be directly elected. The
election of Chair person is left by the Constitution to the State legislature.
A provision for No Confidence Motion has been held to be valid and within
the legislative competence. There is, however, no provision in the
Constitution compelling the State Legislature to incorporate a provision for
No Confidence Motion. A legislation can be struck down by the Court only
if the same is violative of any constitutional provision either on account of
lack of legislative competence under Articles 245 or on account of violation
of fundamental rights or otherwise. No doubt, the scope of Article 14 has
been expanded to cover any arbitrary action - administrative or legislative,
there is a presumption of validity of a legislation and also that the
legislature correctly understands the needs of the people. If a choice of
policy is available, the legislature may make such choice in absence of
compulsion of incorporating a provision. Mere fact that a provision for No
Confidence Motion may be valid, does not imply that absence of such a
provision or deletion of an existent provision for No Confidence Motion
would be beyond the legislative competence. Right of removing a Sarpanch
by passing a No Confidence Motion cannot be recognized as fundamental
right under Article 14 in view of Mohan Lal. Therein, it has been expressly
held that right to remove an elected representative must stem out of a
statute. Its existence or validity can be decided on the provisions of Act and
not as a matter of policy. This being the position, to hold that No
Confidence Motion provision cannot be deleted will be against the
principles laid down in Mohan Lal. As regards observations in Bhanumati,
the same are in the context of upholding a provision for No Confidence
Motion. A judgment is an authority for the proposition it lays down and not
what may logically appear to flow therefrom. Moreover, the said judgment
cannot be held to have reversed the view taken in Mohan Lal holding that
right of No Confidence Motion flows from a statute. Even if we find merit
in the contention that No Confidence Motion is desirable, it may not be
possible to give a direction for incorporation of such a provision or set
aside deletion thereof by a legislation. Accordingly, we are unable to hold
that the impugned Act to the extent it deletes the provision for No
Confidence Motion, unconstitutional.
13. We may now come to the question of retrospectivity.
Re: (II)
14. It is well settled that a plenary legislature is competent to make
law prospectively as well as retrospectively. At the same time, retrospective
legislation though may not per se be beyond legislative competence, can be
tested on the anvil of Article 14 and if having regard to a fact situation, it is
found that retrospectivity is arbitrary, the same can be struck down. In a
recent judgment in M/s Shiv Shankar Industries v. The State of Haryana
and others, CWP No.5957 of 2010, decided on 22.3.2011, this Court
observed:-
"8.It is well settled that a legislature has power not only to
legislate prospectively but also retrospectively. However, there
are certain inherent limitations in making retrospective
legislation. The limitations have been judicially recognized to
give effect to fundamental right under Article 14.
Retrospectivity is not permissible if it is unreasonable and
arbitrary. It has been held that a legislature cannot legislate
today with reference to a situation which obtained 20 years ago
ignoring the march of events and constitutional rights accruing
in the meanwhile. Whether or not retrospective amendment is
arbitrary is to be seen in the light of facts and circumstances
under which an amendment is made. (Ramanlal Keshav Lal
Soni, AIR 1984 SC 161, Lohia Machines Limited, (1985) 2
SCC 197, C.R.Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6 SCC 623 and
Virender Singh Hooda) AIR 2005 SC 137....."
15. In Ramanlal Keshav Lal, it was observed:-
"52.... Today's equals cannot be made unequal by saying that
they were unequal 20 years ago and we will restore that
position by making a law today and making it retrospective.
Constitutional rights, constitutional obligations and
constitutional consequences cannot be tampered with that way.
A law which if made today would be plainly invalid as
offending constitutional provisions in the context of the
existing situation cannot become valid by being made
retrospective. Past virtue (constitutional) cannot be made to
wipe out present vice (constitutional) by making retrospective
laws. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Gujarat
Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 is unconstitutional,
as it offends Articles 311 and 14 and is arbitrary and
unreasonable...."
16. In Virender Singh Hooda, it was observed:-
"69.....In considering the question as to whether the legislative
power to amend a provision with retrospective operation has
been reasonably exercised or not, it becomes relevant to
enquire as to how the retrospective effect of the amendment
operates.
70. In Chairman, Rly. Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah
((1997)6 SCC 623, the Constitution Bench while holding that
the rule which operates in future so as to govern future rights of
those already in service cannot be assailed on the ground of
retroactivity as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution, observed that a rule which seeks to reverse from
an anterior date a benefit which has been granted or availed of
e.g. promotion or pay scale, can be assailed as being violative
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to the extent it
operates retrospectively. (emphasis supplied)
17. What is stated above is summing up of principles laid down in
the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to therein and also in
the judgments relied upon behalf of the petitioner.
18. Applying the above principles to the present case, we are of the
view that Section 1(2) of the Act to bring into force the Amendment Act
from 1.7.2010 is arbitrary. The effect of the amendment would be to nullify
a lawfully passed No Confidence Motion and to remove a lawfully elected
Sarpanch if in his place any other arrangement may have been put in place
and operated for a period of more than six months. Only reason put forward
to justify retrospectivity is the smooth functioning of the panchayats. The
said reason cannot be held to be valid as a Sarpanch who had lost
confidence of 2/3rd members and was removed and substituted by another
arrangement in his place cannot be held entitled to be put back in the name
of smooth functioning. Putting him back will infact obstruct the functioning.
There is nothing to show on what basis it can be held that putting back
Sarpanch who had lost confidence of motion of 2/3rd members will be a
smooth functioning. Moreover, in Bhanumati, a similar contention was
considered and rejected in para 52 of the judgment. Retrospectivity ignores
the march of events which have gone by and arbitrarily affects rights which
have been crystalised.
19. Accordingly, we partly allow this petition and declare Section 1
(2) of the impugned Act to be ultravires the Constitution. It is made clear
that since the issue which has been dealt with may affect other similarly
situated persons, this order will apply to all such cases.