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  • section i.e Section 13(2)(v) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • SECTION 114 A EVIDENCE ACT
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  • section i.e Section 13(2)(v) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • SECTION 114 A EVIDENCE ACT
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — S.S. Sudhalkar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Darbari Lal (respondent-landlord) filed an eviction petition under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 against respondent-tenants (including the present petitioner, Prem Sagar). The stated grounds in the rent petition included arrears of rent, that the tenants "ceased to occupy the rented premises for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause" (non-user), and that acts had been committed likely to materially impair the value and utility of the premises. The Rent Controller passed an ejectment order on the ground of non-user, and that order was affirmed by the appellate authority.

The tenant (petitioner) challenged the eviction order by way of this revision petition. The tenant denied non-user, asserting that the premises were not locked and that the tenant's labourers resided in the factory premises. The tenant also challenged the landlord's sole-ownership assertion, pointing out the landlord was a co-owner and that the premises had been leased to M/s Bajrang Metal, Jagadhri. The rent petition and evidence were considered by the courts below and, after those courts' findings, the revision petition was dismissed by the High Court.

Notable chronological points appearing in the opinion: the ejectment petition was filed in 1991; deposition of the landlord's attorney (AW-1) was recorded in 1997.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the courts below erred in holding the eviction petition (based on non-user under Section 13(2)(v) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973) to be legal and proper.
  2. Whether the landlord (a co-owner) could maintain a rent petition for eviction without joining all co-owners as applicants.
  3. What is the burden of proof with respect to non-user and who must prove that labourers of the tenant were residing in the premises?
  4. Whether testimony of the landlord's power of attorney (attorney witness) suffices for discharging the landlord's evidentiary burden, or whether the landlord's personal testimony was required.
  5. Whether the Local Commissioner’s un-notified visits and verbatim reports could be relied upon or should be treated as created/irreliable evidence.
  6. Whether the pleadings alleging non-user were sufficiently specific (particularly as to period) to sustain an ejectment order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • The premises were not unused; labourers of the tenant were living in the factory premises, so non-user was not established.
  • The property was not solely owned by Darbari Lal; he was a co-owner and the tenancy involved M/s Bajrang Metal, so naming/nature of the tenant was disputed.
  • The landlord did not personally enter the witness box; only his power of attorney was examined, and authority was cited suggesting an attorney cannot testify on behalf of the party in place of the principal.
  • It was argued that the landlord had the burden to prove premises were not being used and that unless the landlord disproved the tenant's claim about labourers, the eviction should not have been granted.
  • The Local Commissioner(s) visited without giving notice and produced verbatim reports; such reports were argued to be unreliable or akin to "created" evidence.
  • Pleadings on non-user were alleged to be vague (merely repeating statutory language) and did not specify the precise period during which the tenant ceased occupation, thus inadequate to support ejectment.

Respondent-Landlord's Arguments

  • A co-owner can file a rent petition for possession; there is no requirement to join other co-owners as party-applicants for entitlement to eviction relief.
  • The rent note (Ex. PE) did not clearly make M/s Bajrang Metal the tenant and, in any event, heirs of the alleged owners of the rolling mill were joined as respondents; therefore naming did not prejudice the landlord's case.
  • Although initial onus to prove eviction grounds lies on the landlord, where the tenant asserts a fact peculiarly within the tenant's knowledge (that labourers reside there), the tenant must prove it; a party in possession of best evidence should produce it.
  • Testimony of the landlord's attorney (Anil Kumar Gupta, examined as AW-1) could not be discarded merely because he was an attorney; his evidence was admissible and relevant where landlord's personal knowledge was not required.
  • The Local Commissioner was properly appointed without prior notice to prevent alteration of the site; the Commissioner recorded facts as observed and did not "create" evidence; the reports were consistent across visits and not objected to by the tenant.
  • The pleadings reasonably stated non-user (alleging premises locked, closed for 4–5 years and in dilapidated condition) and the deposition evidence did not contradict the pleadings in any material way.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chander Kishore v. Kampa Wati The initial onus to prove the ground for ejectment lies on the landlord. The court acknowledged the landlord bears the initial burden but emphasized that where the tenant alleges facts peculiarly within the tenant's knowledge (e.g., labourers residing on site), the tenant must prove them; thus the tenant's assertion required proof.
M.R.M Duraippa Nadar v. P. Thirupursasundrimmal (1989 2 Rent L.R. 494) The ground of ceasing to occupy alone is not sufficient; it must be shown that it was without reasonable cause. The court reproduced the statutory provision (Section 13(2)(v)) and relied on the principle that non-user must be without reasonable cause; it considered whether that was established on evidence.
Gopal Krishani Kethar v. Mohammed Haji Latif A party who is in possession of best evidence should produce it; failure to produce such evidence may attract an adverse inference for suppression. The court applied this principle to hold that the tenants, who specifically asserted that labourers lived in the premises (a fact within their knowledge), had the obligation to produce evidence; absence of such evidence could lead to adverse inference against the tenants.
Ram Prasad v. Hari Narain (Parshad v. Hari Narain) A power of attorney-holder's authority does not necessarily permit the attorney to act as the party's witness on matters requiring the principal's personal knowledge; attorney can testify only in his personal capacity regarding his own knowledge. The court considered the case but concluded it did not go against the landlord here because the issues did not require the landlord's personal knowledge; the attorney's evidence as AW-1 remained admissible and relevant to the matters in issue.
Ishwar Bhai C. Patel v. Harihar Behera An adverse presumption may be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act if a party with peculiar knowledge of facts does not enter the witness box to contradict adverse assertions. The court distinguished that precedent: where a party alone has particular knowledge, non-appearance is significant. Here, because the tenants claimed facts within their knowledge, the court held tenants had to prove them; non-appearance of the landlord personally did not attract the same adverse inference.
Hukam Chand v. The Financial Commissioner, Haryana, Chandigarh Local Commissioner visits may be conducted without notice if notice would defeat the purpose (allowing alteration of the site); the Commissioner records observations and does not "create" evidence. The court accepted that appointment of the Local Commissioner without notice was justified to prevent tampering, and the Commissioner's reports were admissible as observational records rather than fabricated evidence.
Puran Singh Tailor Master v. Ram Murti A landlord must specify in pleadings the period during which the tenant ceased to occupy the premises; mere repetition of statutory language is insufficient. The court noted this authority but found no material discrepancy between the pleadings and deposition in the present case (petition filed in 1991, AW-1 deposition in 1997), and therefore did not accept that pleadings were fatally vague here.
Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram; Smt. Manjushri Raha v. B.L. Gupt; Parmatma Kaur v. HUF Rajinder Parshad and Sons Where it is pleaded that the tenant has ceased to occupy premises without sufficient cause, there may be no reason to deprive the landlord of an ejectment order. The court relied on these authorities to support the proposition that properly pleaded non-user, demonstrating cessation without reasonable cause, can warrant ejectment; the combined authorities supported upholding the orders below in the present circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of legal inquiries closely tied to the evidence and pleaded facts:

  1. Co-ownership and locus standi: It was undisputed that Darbari Lal was a co-owner. The court applied established law that a co-owner may file a rent petition for possession, and held that absence of other co-owners as applicants did not defeat the landlord's entitlement to seek eviction.
  2. Identity of the lessee: The court examined the rent note (Ex. PE) and the arguments about whether M/s Bajrang Metal was the tenant. It concluded the rent note did not clearly show M/s Bajrang Metal as tenant in a manner that prejudiced the landlord's case, particularly as heirs and owners were on record as respondents; therefore the naming did not affect entitlement.
  3. Burden of proof on non-user: The court affirmed the general principle (from authorities like Chander Kishore) that the initial onus to prove eviction grounds is on the landlord. However, where the tenant specifically pleads facts that are peculiarly within the tenant's own knowledge (for example, that labourers are residing in the premises), the tenant is obliged to produce the relevant evidence; failure to do so can attract adverse inference (following Gopal Krishanji Kethar).
  4. Evidence and the landlord's witness: The landlord's case was presented through his attorney (Anil Kumar Gupta) examined as AW-1. The court considered precedents which restrict the role of a power-of-attorney as a witness when the principal alone has the requisite personal knowledge, but concluded that here the landlord's personal knowledge was not critical to the issues before the court. Thus the attorney's evidence could not be summarily discarded and did not defeat the landlord's case.
  5. Local Commissioner's reports: The tenant criticized the Local Commissioner's un-notified visits and the verbatim similarity of reports. The court accepted the landlord's explanation that notice would have allowed the tenant to alter the state of the premises and frustrate inspection. The Commissioner's role was treated as observational — noting what was found — and because no objection had been taken to those reports, and because subsequent visits showed the same condition, the reports were considered reliable and not "created" evidence.
  6. Sufficiency of pleadings: The court engaged with authority holding that pleadings must specify the period of non-user (Puran Singh), and examined the pleadings which alleged the premises were locked/closed for four to five years and in dilapidated condition. It compared pleadings and AW-1's deposition (which stated closure for 10–12 years) and, noting the petition was filed in 1991 and deposition recorded in 1997, found no material discrepancy that would vitiate the order.
  7. Overall assessment and conclusion: Weighing the evidence, the court found no reason to disturb findings of the lower courts. Given the tenant's failure to produce evidence of labourers residing on the premises (a fact within the tenant's knowledge), the consistency of Local Commissioner reports finding closure, and the adequacy of landlord's evidence through his attorney for the matters in issue, the court concluded the eviction order was properly granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition was dismissed and the orders of the courts below upholding the eviction were left undisturbed. The court's core ruling can be expressed as: DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed on appeal stands as between the parties — the eviction based on non-user (under Section 13(2)(v) of the Act) remains effective in this dispute.
  • The decision emphasizes that while the landlord bears the initial burden to prove eviction grounds, tenants asserting facts peculiarly within their knowledge (such as occupancy by labourers) must produce evidence of those facts, else an adverse inference may be drawn.
  • The judgment accepts that a co-owner may maintain an eviction petition and that testimony of a power-of-attorney witness is admissible where the landlord's personal knowledge is not essential to the issues in question.
  • The court relied on Local Commissioner reports as valid observational evidence where appointment without notice was justified to prevent alteration of the premises; consistent, unchallenged inspection reports were accorded weight.
  • The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle; it applies existing authorities to the facts and upholds the orders below. No broader or new precedent was articulated beyond the application of established principles to the circumstances of this case.
Result: Petition dismissed.

    Prem Sagar v. Darbari Lal And Another

    S.S Sudhalkar, J.:— This petition has been filed by Prem Sagar tenant challenging the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller as also affirmed by the appellate authority. Darbari Lal respondent-landlord has filed the eviction petition against the respondent-tenants on the ground that they have ceased to occupy the rented premises for a continuous period of four months without any reasonable cause. The case of the landlord is that the premises belongs to him and the respondent-tenant had taken the same on rent. The petition before the Rent Controller for eviction was filed on the ground of arrears of rent; that the tenants have ceased to occupy the premises for a continuous period of four months without any reasonable cause and that they have committed acts which are likely to impair materially the value and utility of the premises in dispute. It may be mentioned here that the ejectment order was passed on the ground of non-user as mentioned above.

    2. The case of the respondent-tenant regarding non-user is that the contention regarding non-user are not true and that the premises are not remaining locked and that the labourers of respondent No. (before the Rent Controller) are living in the factory premises (rented premises). They had also taken a stand that the ownership of the rented premises is not of Darbari Lal alone and that the property in question was leased out to M/s Bajrang Metal, Jagadhri and that it has been carrying on its business in the premises in question.

    3. Regarding Darbari Lal-respondent not being the only owner, it is not in dispute that the said respondent is a co-owner of the premises in question. Now if the petition is filed by the co-owner, it is not shown as to how he will not be entitled to get the eviction order in his favour if the other co-owner is not joined as party-applicant. It is well settled law that the co-owner can file a rent petition for possession of the premises against the tenant.

    4. Regarding the question as to who was the lessee, learned counsel for the respondent has drawn my attention to Ex. PE which is Hindi version of the rent note. Learned-counsel for the respondent-landlord argued that in the rent note the present petitioner's father Rameshwar Dass and Raghunandan Lal father of respondent No. 5 are shown to be owners of M/s Bajrang Metal Rolling Mills. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 argued that owners of the rolling mill is only a description of the tenants and, therefore, there is no mistake committed in naming of the tenant in the rent petition. Moreover, he has also argued that even if it is held that the tenant was M/s Bajrang Metal Rolling Mills, then also the heirs of both the owners of Bajrang Metals and Rolling Mills have been joined as respondents in the rent petition and hence the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the present petitioner cannot be accepted. There is a force in his argument. The rent note does not specifically show that M/s Bajrang Metal is a tenant and even if it so mentioned, the owners of Bajrang Metal and Rolling Mills are on record as respondents and hence it does not make any difference so far as present petition is concerned.

    5. The question that remains for consideration is that whether the courts below have erred in holding that the eviction petition passed against the petitioner is legal or proper.

    6. The relevant section i.e Section 13(2)(v) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) can be reproduced as under:

    “that where the building is situated, in a place other than a hill station, the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause.”

    7. The first argument advanced on this point by learned counsel for the petitioner is that it is not proved by the landlord that the premises are not being used. It is his case that his workers are staying in the rented premises and, therefore, the possession could not have been ordered under this provision of the Act. In the written statement it is mentioned that:

    “(ii) That sub-para (ii) of the application is wrong and hence denied. It is denied that the premises are lying locked. The labour of respondent No. 1 are living in the factory … …”

    8. Therefore, the consideration of the question narrows down to the point as to whether labourers of the tenant are residing in the premises or not and if so whether the premises can be said to be under non-use or not. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that it was for the landlord to prove that the contention of the respondent that the labourers are not residing in the premises is wrong. In support of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he has cited various authorities. He has cited the case of Chander Kishore v. Kampa Wati,1 wherein it has been held that the initial onus to prove the ground for ejectment lies on the landlord and not on the tenant.

    9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the ground of ceasing to occupy the rented premises only is not sufficient ground for eviction and it is to be shown that the same is without any reasonable cause. He has cited the case of M.R.M Duraippa Nadar v. P. Thirupursasundrimmal 1989 2 Rent L.R 494.

    10. There is no dispute that the initial onus to prove the ground for eviction is on the landlord. In the present the landlord has filed the rent petition for ejectment and the respondent-tenants have filed the written statement taking a specific plea that they are using the premises for the residence of their labourers. In case of Gopal Krishani Kethar v. Mohammed Haji Latif,3 it has been held that a party in possession of best evidence, should produce the same and if it is not produced even if the burden of proving the same is not on the party, adverse inference against that party has to be drawn because of the suppression of the material evidence. In the present case the tenants, as mentioned above, have come forward with a specific case that their labourers are staying in the premises in dispute and thus it is for them to prove the same. Moreover, if there was any reason for the non-user and not the landlord, and they were having the best evidence regarding the same.

    11. Learned counsel for the present petitioner has argued that the landlord has not entered into the witness box and he has examined his power of attorney holder and, therefore, the landlord has not discharged his burden. In the present case, the landlord has examined Anil Kumar Gupta his attorney, who has filed the present petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited before me the case of Ram, Parshad v. Hari Narain.4 In the said case, it was held by the Rajasthan High Court that power of attorney and the word “acts” in the power of attorney does not include act of power of attorney holder to appear as witness on behalf of a party. It is also held in the said case that the attorney of a party can appear only as a witness in his personal capacity and whatever he has knowledge about the case, he can state on oath but he cannot appear as a witness on behalf of the party in the capacity of that party. In the present case in whatever capacity Anil Kumar Gupta, attorney of landlord has stepped into the witness box as AW-1, the question is regarding the appreciation of evidence that comes out from his deposition. Therefore, only because Anil Kumar Gupta is power of attorney holder, his evidence cannot be discarded on that account. If the landlord has to prove his personal necessity and certain questions are required to be put to the landlord, if power of attorney does not have personal knowledge thereof, then the landlord's not entering the witness box will assume importance. Here, the question regarding specific personal knowledge of the landlord is not there. It is also not a case here wherein the non-payment of rent has been alleged and it has been contended by the tenant in the written statement that he had paid the rent to the landlord and the landlord only will have personal knowledge regarding the same, if the rent is paid to him in the absence of anybody else. Therefore, the case of Ram Prasad v. Hari Narain, does not go against the respondent-landlord in this case.

    12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also cited before me the case of Ishwar Bhai C. Patel v. Harihar Behera.5 It has been held therein that if a party to suit not entering in witness box, either to prove its own case or to state against case of opposite party, adverse presumption has to be drawn against such party. The facts of that case appear in para 15 of the judgment of that case. They are as under:

    “Admittedly defendant No. 1 had an account of the Central Bank of India Limited, Sambalpur Branch which his father, namely respondent No. 2, was authorised to operate. It is also an admitted fact that it was from this account that the amount was advanced to the appellant by respondent No. 2. It has been given out in the statement of respondent No. 2 that when the appellant had approached him for loan of Rs. 7,000/- he had explicitly told him that he had no money to lend whereupon the appellant had himself suggested to advance the loan from the account of respondent No. 1 and it was on his suggestion that the respondent No. 2, issued the cheque to the appellant which the appellant, admittedly encashed. This fact has not been controverted by the appellant who did not enter the witness box to make a statement on oath denying the statement of defendant (respondent) No. 2 that it was at his instance that respondent No. 2 had advanced the amount of Rs. 7,000/- to the appellant by issuing a cheque on the account of defendant (respondent) No. 1. Having not entered into the witness box and having not presented himself for cross-examination, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against him on the basis of principles contained in illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act.”

    13. Therefore, it can be found that in the case of Ishwar Bhai C. Patel v. Harihar Behera (supra), respondent No. 2 has stated in his deposition that when the appellant had approached him for a loan of Rs. 7,000/-, he had explicitly told him that he had no money to lend whereupon the appellant had himself suggested to advance the loan from the account of respondent No. 1 and it was on his suggestion that the respondent No. 2 issued the cheque to the appellant and this fact was not controverted by the appellant who did not enter into the witness box. So in the facts of that particular case, the non-appearance of the appellant into the witness box assumed importance. If a party alone has a particular knowledge of the fact, it has to appear in the witness box and it cannot delegate his power to appear in the witness box to his attorney. In the present case, there is a specific case that the petitioners are using the premises for the residence of their labourers and if that is so, it is a fact which is in the knowledge of the tenant and it is for the tenant to prove the same. In the present case if the landlord did not enter into the witness box, no adverse inference can be drawn against him. On the contrary, the principles laid down in the case of Gopal Krishanji Kethar v. Mohammed Haji Latif (supra) shall be more applicable to the facts of the present case.

    14. The next point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in this particular case, Local Commissioner was appointed and firstly, the Local Commissioner did not give him notice and, secondly, the Local Commissioner cannot be appointed to create evidence. Regarding the first point, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has argued that the Local Commissioner was appointed to see that what is the position of the site in question and if a notice was given to the tenant, the position could have been changed by the tenant. I agree with this contention. Learned counsel for the landlord has cited the case of Hukam Chand v. The Financial Commissioner, Haryana, Chandigarh,6 in which it has been held that “the learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly contended that in case a notice had been issued by the Local Commissioner, the tenant would have easily managed to remove the sign board and the purpose of the visit of the Local Commissioner would, thus, have been frustrated. The evidence of the Local Commissioner was also relied upon in that case. Regarding the second point, it cannot be said that the Local Commissioner has created evidence. He has only noted and narrated as to what he found.

    15. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the reports of the Local Commissioner are verbatim the same and, therefore, the same should not be relied upon. As against this, it has been argued that no objection was taken to the reports of the Local Commissioner. Moreover if the facts are the same, that is, if there is no change in the position, and if the same language is used by the Local Commissioner in his reports, there is no reason to discredit the report on this point. According to the reports of the Local Commissioner, when he visited the site, he found the same lying closed and that it appeared that the gate was not opened for a number of years. The Local Commissioner also noticed various other facts that gave him reason to say that the premises are lying closed for the last many years. When this position did not change during his subsequent visits, as mentioned earlier, the reports of the Local Commissioner cannot be discarded as being verbatim. To repeat, it may be mentioned that, learned counsel for the landlord has argued that no objection was taken to the reports of the Local Commissioner and this argument has not been controverted.

    16. Next point argued by learned counsel for the present petitioner is that the pleadings regarding non-user are not proper and, therefore, the ejectment order should be quashed. The pleadings on this point in para 4(ii) of the rent petition, which are as under:—

    “That the respondents have ceased to occupy the premises in dispute for a continuous period of more than 4 months without reasonable cause and in fact the premises in dispute are lying locked and closed for the last more than 4-5 years with the result that the premises in dispute now stands in a very highly dilapidated condition and as such rendered unsafe for human inhabitation. The exact position of the premises in dispute in so far as its present condition is concerned cannot be explained as the premises in dispute stands locked and closed for the last more than 4/5 years.”

    17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also cited the case Puran Singh Tailor Master v. Ram Murti.7 In that case, learned Single Judge of this Court has held that the landlord was under obligation to specify in the pleadings the period during which the tenant ceased to occupy such buildings and that the allegations made in the application were quite vague as no period during which the tenant ceased to occupy the premises was mentioned therein and mere repetition of the language of the section is not a sufficient compliance of the provision and was not sufficient to warrant the order of ejectment. In the present case, the pleadings of non-user of the premises, as mentioned above, are mere repetition of law. It is mentioned that the premises are not being used for the last 4-5 years. Moreover, relying on the case of Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram,8 and Smt. Manjushri Raha v. B.L Gupt,9 this Court has held in the case of Parmatma Kaur v. HUF Rajinder Parshad and Sons,10 that when it is pleaded that the tenant has ceased to occupy the premises without sufficient cause, there is no reason to deprive the landlord of the order of ejectment which he had obtained.

    18. Regarding the factual aspect, learned counsel for the present petitioner argued that in his deposition AW-1 has stated that the premises had lying closed for the last 10-12 years while in the rent petition, it is stated that the premises was lying closed for the year 4-5 years. It can be seen that ejectment petition was filed in the year 1991 and the deposition of AW-1 was recorded in the year 1997. Therefore, there appears to be no discrepancy between the pleadings and the deposition.

    19. In view of the above reasons, there appears to be no reason for disturbing the findings of the Courts below. Hence, this revision petition deserves to be dismissed.

    20. In the result, this petition is dismissed.

    R.M.S
    Petition dismissed.

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    Prem Sagar v. Darbari Lal And Another
    (Sep 27, 1999)