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Judgment Summary: Sachin Gaur v. Punjabi University & Ors. (C.W.P. Nos. 9979, et al. of 1995)

Factual and Procedural Background

Sachin Gaur filed C.W.P. No. 9979 of 1995 under Article 226 seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus directing respondents to consider and admit him to the degree engineering course at Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering & Technology (SLIET) on the basis of his high merit (stated as 8th position in the Entrance Test). Several other writ petitions (C.W.P. Nos. 9926, 9943, 10038, 10416, 10928, 11663 and 12061 of 1995) raised identical claims; the court dealt with them together and took facts from C.W.P. No. 9979.

The petitioner had completed diploma examinations (final examination taken in May 1995) from an institute affiliated to the U.P. Board of Technical Education; his final result had not been declared by the prescribed admission date. On the basis of his application stating that he had taken the final examination (result awaited), he was allowed to appear in the SLIET Entrance Test and obtained a high rank (petitioner claimed 8th; respondent disputed and said 11th). The interview was scheduled for July 17, 1995. Admission was refused solely because the petitioner's qualifying exam results had not been declared by the date of admission.

The petitioner sought provisional admission and attempted to have the diploma institute expedite results. During the writ proceedings the court initially ordered one seat be kept vacant (motion hearing on July 14, 1995). The academic schedule showed classes were to start August 1, 1995 but were postponed and actually started September 2, 1995; the petitioners' results were declared on August 31, 1995 and certificates were handed over to SLIET during pendency of the writs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Institute was obliged to admit candidates who secured high merit in the Entrance Test, even though those candidates had not produced certificates of passing the qualifying examination by the specified admission date in the prospectus (i.e., whether refusal to admit violated the promise of selection "strictly on the basis of merit" in Clause 3.5).
  2. Whether the cut-off date for production of qualifying certificates provided in the Prospectus-cum-Information Brochure was arbitrary or required extension because the commencement of classes was postponed (i.e., should the last date of admission be extended to accommodate high-merit candidates whose qualifying results were delayed).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Denial of admission violated Clause 3.5 of the Prospectus, which requires selection "strictly on the basis of merit determined in the SLIET Entrance Test" (petitioners high in merit should therefore be preferred).
  • The cut-off date for production of qualifying examination results was arbitrary and repugnant to Clause 3.5; because the start of classes had been postponed by about a month, the authorities ought to have extended the last date of admission so meritorious candidates could be accommodated.

Respondent-Institute's Arguments

  • The writ petitions are not maintainable; there is no violation of Article 14.
  • The petitioner had not passed the qualifying examination by the admission date (July 17, 1995). Clause 3.3 of the Prospectus permits provisional appearance in the Entrance Test but expressly conditions admission on production of the certificate of passing before the admission date; failure to do so causes candidature to be deemed cancelled.
  • Only candidates who produced passing certificates at the time of admission could be admitted.
  • The vertical mobility system for students of the Institute differs from direct entry; vertical entrants have different bridge course and timing, so the institute's internal result delays are not equivalent to delaying the cut-off for direct-entry candidates.
  • The respondent contested the petitioner's claimed rank (contended petitioner secured 11th position rather than 8th).
  • The respondent cited authority: Deepak Gudwani v. Union of India (AIR 1995 Punj & Har 78) to support refusal to quash condition of producing results on the date of admission.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deepak Gudwani v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Punj & Har 78 Upheld that the condition of production of the result of the qualifying examination on the date of admission cannot be quashed as arbitrary or illegal in the circumstances of those cases. The Division Bench's reliance on this decision demonstrated that similar challenges to non-admission had been repelled; the Court treated the decision as covering the present matters and considered it persuasive in holding that the cut-off date requirement could not be struck down. The opinion also records that this Division Bench judgment was confirmed by the Apex Court in SLP (C) No. 21084 of 1994.
Amardeep Singh Sahota v. State of Punjab, (1993) 2 (104) Pun LR 212 The eligibility for admission must be determined according to the prospectus issued before the Entrance Test; instructions in the prospectus have the force of law. The Court relied on this Full Bench precedent to support the proposition that prospectus-prescribed eligibility conditions (including cut-off dates and documentary production requirements) are binding and cannot be disregarded merely because a candidate obtained a high merit in the Entrance Test.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the prospectus provisions, particularly Clause 3.3 (eligibility/provisional appearance subject to production of the qualifying certificate before the admission date) and Clause 3.5 (selection strictly on the basis of merit in the Entrance Test followed by interview). The court made the following analytical steps, based solely on the opinion's content:

  1. Interpretation of Prospectus Terms: The court treated the prospectus as binding on both the institution and candidates; instructions issued in the prospectus carry the force of law (relying on Amardeep Sahota and prior Division Bench reasoning).
  2. Necessity of a Cut-off Date: The court accepted that an institution must fix a cut-off date for admission to enable finalisation of admissions; non-fixation or changing the date indefinitely would prevent finalising admissions. This practical necessity was acknowledged and uncontroverted during arguments.
  3. Nationwide Practicalities: The court noted that direct-entry seats are competed for by candidates from many states/universities whose examination calendars differ; it is not feasible to synchronise schedules or indefinitely delay admissions to accommodate the varied timelines of other institutions.
  4. Consequences of Changing the Cut-off: The court reasoned that changing the last date of admission after results of various universities are known could disrupt admissions elsewhere — students may have already secured admission in other institutions based on other entrance tests and would lose those seats if the cut-off were shifted; this would unfairly affect third parties not before the court.
  5. Difference Between Vertical and Direct Entry: The court analyzed the programme structure and observed that vertical-entry students undergo a shorter bridge course and thereby join the degree cohort later; hence, the fact that SLIET's own students' results were delayed did not equate to a rationale for changing the direct-entry cut-off which controls nationwide competition.
  6. Practical Attempts to Accommodate: The court stated that it explored permutations to accommodate petitioners but found no practical method consistent with fairness to other candidates and the necessity of a cut-off date.
  7. Limited Relief for Exceptional Fact Patterns: While dismissing the petitions generally, the court identified one petition (C.W.P. 10416/1995) where the result had been declared before the prospectus cut-off but the candidate could not produce the certificate in time; the court recommended the Institute find ways to accommodate that student because non-production of the certificate in that circumstance was beyond the student's control.
  8. Administrative Guidance: The court recommended that, for future admissions, the Institute minimize the gap between the cut-off date and the commencement of classes so as to better accommodate meritorious candidates in similar situations.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The writ petitions (including C.W.P. No. 9979 of 1995 and the batch of identical petitions) were dismissed for lack of merit.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The petitioners challenging non-admission despite high merit were not granted admission by the court; the institute's requirement to produce proof of passing the qualifying examination by the admission date was upheld.
  • One specific petitioner (C.W.P. 10416 of 1995) was identified by the court as meriting special administrative consideration because his result had been declared before the prescribed cut-off but he could not produce the physical certificate in time; the court strongly recommended that the respondent-Institute find ways to accommodate that student.
  • Parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Broader legal implications: The decision reaffirmed that prospectus conditions (including cut-off dates and documentary requirements) are binding and that practical administrative considerations and fairness to all applicants justify strict adherence to such cut-off dates. The court did not fashion any new legal precedent beyond applying existing authority; it offered administrative guidance to reduce the gap between cut-off date and class commencement to reduce future hardships for meritorious candidates.

Disposition: Petition(s) dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.

    Sachin Gaur v. Punjab University, Patiala And Others

    1. Sachin Gaur through present writ petition (bearing C.W.P. No. 9979 of 1995) filed by him under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to consider his candidature and admit him in Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering & Technology, Longowal in degree course in Engineering in on the basis of his high merit, i.e. 8th Position in the Entrance Test that was conducted for admission to the course in question. The claim of other petitioners in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 9926, 9943, 10038, 10416, 10928, 11663 and 12061 of 1995 is absolutely identical. Obviously, common questions of law and fact are involved in all these petitions and, therefore, we propose to deal with and decide all the writ petitions by a common judgment. The facts have, however, been extracted from Civil Writ Petition 9979 of 1995 (Sachin Gaur v. Punjabi University).

    2. Petitioner, it appears, has brilliant academic record. He did his 10+2 examination from Digamber Jain Inter College, Baraut after which he joined Kanhiya Lal Bahudandi Institute, Rurkee for doing his diploma in Electronic Engineering. The said institute is affiliated to the U.P. Board of Technical Education at Lucknow. The petitioner secured 711 marks out of 1000 i.e. 71.1% in the first year and in the second year be secured 785 marks out of 1100 which is about 72%. He had taken the final examination in deploma in May, 1995 and was expecting his result in time. Desirous of seeking admission in degree in Engineering, he applied to Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering & Technology, Longowal, District Sangrur -- respondent No. 2 herein, in the form specified clearly mentioned that he had taken his final examination result whereof was awaited. On the basis of the information given by him in the form with regard to his educational qualifications as also that he had already taken the final examination of the diploma, he was permitted to appear in the Entrance Test which, concededly, is prescribed for securing admission to do degree in Engineering with the respondent-institute. In the Entrance Test, petitioner secured 8th position and was entitled to be admitted to the course in Electronic and Communication Engg. The interview, which was only a formality and wherein only relevant certificates had to be shown, was slated for July 17, 1995. The petitioner did appear for interview was not given admission on the sole ground that the result of final year of diploma course that he had taken in Uttar Pradesh had so far not been declared. It is the case of the petitioner that due to the Uttrakhand agitation in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the examinations took place a little late and the results were expected to come around August, 1, 1995. The petitioner in terms explained his difficulty to the Director of the respondent-Institute and requested that he may be atleast considered for provisional admission in the course under contention. In support of his plea, as aforesaid, petitioner also pleaded with the Dirctor of the Institute that there was every reason to accommodate him particularly when the results of the students of respondent-Institute itself had also not been declared. In that regard, it was pleaded that there would be no student seeking vertical entry into the course, from the institute itself on the date when the petitioner appeared for interview or even for that matter when the classes would start and, therefore, there was no logic in denying admission to him on the sole ground that the result of his qualifying examination had so far not been declared. Peti-.tioner had even approached the Principal of K. L. Polytechnic College, Roorkie from which institution he had taken his final examination of diploma requesting him that results should be declared without much delay. However, when the petitioner, despite his entreaties as mentioned above, was unable in secure admission in spite of his merit in the Entrance Test, he approached this Court through present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for the relief as mentioned above.

    3. When the matter came up for motion hearing before the Division Bench on July 14, 1995, it was ordered that one seat be kept vacant till further orders. In all the writ petitions but for C.W.P. Nos. 10928, 11663 and 12061, interim, orders to the effect mentioned above, were passed. During the course of arguments at motion stage, learned counsel representing the respondent-Institute cited before the Bench, a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Deepak Gudwani v. Union of India, AIR 1995 Punj & Har 78 and prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions as similar challenge to the non-admission of students similarly situate in the last academic year had failed. No doubt, the Division Bench of this Court in Deepak Gudwani's case (supra) did repel the challenge to non-admission of the students similarly situate but merit of the petitioners in the Entrance Test, the sole criteria for admission in the degree course of Engineering as per the relevant clause of the Prospectus-cum-Information Brochure, guided the Division Bench, dealing with the matter, to refer it to the Full Bench with a view to find out some logical way, if possible, to accommodate the petitioner, of this casse, and others so that the purpose of conducting Entrance Test, in other words, the purpose of recognising and preferring merit and merit alone, could be protected.

    4. The matter has been contested by the respondent-Institute and in the written statement filed by it, it has been pleaded that the writ is not maintainable as there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In fact, the petitioner did not pass the qualifying examination on the admission date i.e. July 17, 1995. Petitioner was provisionally allowed to sit in the Entrance Test as per Clause 3.3 contained in the Prospectus-cum-Information Brochure which reads as follows :--

    "The eligibility conditions for admission to the certificate, disploma and degree programmes are given in sections 21.1(a), 2.2(a) and 2.3(a) respectively. Candidate, appearing in the qualifying examination before June, 1995, may be considered provisionally to appear in the Entrance Test. Their admission is subject to production of certificate of their having qualified the qualifying examination, before the admission date, failing which their candidature shall be deemed to have cancelled"
    .

    On the strength of the aforesaid, it is further the case of respondent-Institute that only those candidates could be admitted who produced certificates of having passed the qualifying examination at the time of admission. The facts of the case, as have been reproduced above, have not been disputed but for that the petitioner did not secure 8th position but he secured 11th position in the Entrance Test. Insofar as the contention of the petitioner with regard to non-declaration of the results of the students for the qualifying examination from the respondent-Institute is concerned, it is pleaded that there is vertical mobility system for the students of the respondent-Institution which is entirely dif ferent and it has no connection with the direct entry system. In vertical mobility system, 50% students of one Module are entitled for promotion to the higher module as per the merit list whereas in direct entry system, any body, who fulfills the eligibility conditions as laid down in clause 3.2(a) can compete and get admission in the degree course.

    5. From the pleadings of the parties and arguments that have been addressed before this Court, it is thus apparent that as per the Prospectus-cum-Information Brouchure, the last date for receipt of completed applications was May 24, 1995 whereas date of Examination of Certificate Diploma was June 17, 1995 and for degree course the examination was to be conducted on June 18, 1995. The result of the degree-course was to be announced by July 1, 1995 and the interview was to be held on July 17, 1995 and the classes were to start from August, 1 1995. The classes could not be started in time and the same had to be postponed to September 1, 1995 and actually strated on September 2, 1995. It is also correct that during the pendency of the writ petition results of the petitioners were declared on August 31, 1995 and a copy of the certificate/marks-sheet was handed-over to the respondent-Institute.

    6. Before we deal with the various points raised by learned counsel for the petitioners, justifying the right of admission in the course under contention, it will be useful to see relevant provisions of the Prospectus-cum-Information Brouchure issued by the respondent-Institution. Clause 2 deals with Programme Structure. It recites that the Institute offers modular pattern of education at Certificate, Diploma and Degree levels in emerging technical subjects, and that each module consists of two years. Higher level programmes may be introduced at a later stage on need basis. It also recites that there would be vartical linkage between various modules which would be as illusterated in Table-I. It is also mentioned that there would be vertical mobility of 50% of the students from Certificate to Diploma and Diloma to Degree with suitable bridge course and suitable bridge course would be provided in science at different levels to overcome the deficiency required for vertical movement and for direct entry after Diploma. Bridge courses on techinical subjects would be provided for the direct entry to Diploma after 10+2 and Degree after 10+2+3. Extensive industrial training would be arranged throughout the country for outgoing students at various levels for acquiring practical experience in industries through practice schools. Table-I, reference whereof has been given in Clause 2, reads under:--

    " ENTRY QUALIFICATION AND PROGRAMME DURATION OF VARIOUS LEVELS AS APPROVED BY ALL INDIA CONNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION:

    Entry Level Years spent during Certificate Course Bridge Course Diploma Bridge Degree 10+2

    10+2+3

    Sub-clause (b) Clause 2.3 deals with duration of degree course for the one who seeks direct entry into the said course. For him, the duration is three years including bridge course of one year.

    Clause 3.1, which is general, deals with the admission for the session commencing from August 1, 1995 and distribution of seats for disploma and degree programme for the students who come from vertical entry as also for the students who come by direct recruitment. Suffice it to say here that in each discipline there are 30 seats and the quota of students of the Institute itself is 50%, obviously other 50% seats are for the students who secure direct entry. Clause 3.3, as has been reproduced above, deals with qualifying examination and the eligibility. Clause 3.5 deals with criteria for selection. The same reads thus:--

    "Selection for admission will be made strictly on the basis of merit determined in the SLIET Entrance Test conducted separately for Certificate. Diploma and Degree Programmes followed by an interview. Details of the scheme of the test are given in Appendix-I."

    Clause 4 is with regard to general information. Clause 4.1 gives Academic Calendar wherein it is stated that the academic session of the Institute is from August 1, 1995 to June, 1996 comprising three trimesters each of 14 weeks duration. A tentative calendar of Session 1995-96 has been given in the said clause.

    7. From the various clauses, noted above, one thing that needs immediate notice is that whereas a students from the Institute, who has sought vertical entry in the degree course, has to necessarily pass 10+2 and also to do 1/2 year bridge course followed by two years diploma course. After he has secured Certificate in Diploma, he has to do 1/2 year bridge course which is followed by two years course for obtaining degree in Engineering. A person who seeks direct entry into the degree course i.e. through Entrance Test, for him the course is of three years; duration including one year bridge course. In other words, a student who has sought vertical entry needs to put in only 2 1/2 years to do decree course out of which 1/2 year is meant for bridge course whereas a student seeking direct entry has to put in three years out of which one year is for bridge course.

    8. The two fold contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in various writs is that by denying admission to the petitioners, respondent-Institute has clearly violated Clause 3.5 which in terms talks of selection for admission strictly on the basis of merit determined in the Entrance Test. As a natural corollary to the afore-stated contention, it is being argued that the cut of date given for admission in the Prospectus-cum-Information Brouchure is wholly arbitrary and is repugnant to the purpose which is sought to be achieved by Clause 3.5, reproduced above. The second contention of learned counsel is that once the testudy programme, as scheduled in the Prospectus-cum-Information Brouchure, has not been adhered to and for one reason or the other, the classes could not be started in time and where in fact postponed for more than a month, the authorities concerned ought to have extended the last date of admission so that the students so high in merit, as the petitioners, could be admitted.

    9. The first contention, noted above, was also pressed into service before the Division Bench which decided (Deepak Gudwani's case (AIR 1995 Punj & Har 78) (supra). As mentioned above, it did not carry conviction with the Division Bench dealing with the matter. It was held that "the condition of production of result of the qualifying examination on the date of admission cannot, in the facts and circumstances of these cases, be quashed as arbitrary and illegal." For holding so, reliance was placed upon Full Bench judgment of this Court in Amardeep Singh Sahota v. State of Punjab, (1993) 2 (104) Pun LR 212 wherein it was held that "the eligibility for admission had to be seen according to the prospectus issued before the Entrance Test and the instructions issued in the prospectus had the force of law." During the course of arguments, we have been told that Division Bench judgment of this Court in Deepak Gudwani's case (supra) has been confirmed by the Apex Court in SLP (C) No. 21084 of 1994.

    10. As mentioned above, Deepak Gudwani's case (AIR 1995 Punj & Har 78) was cited before the Division Bench at motion stage and there was no dispute at any time that the same covers the matter against the petitioners but it was the anxiety of the Court to find out some legitimate ways and means to accommodate the petitioners, who are so higher in merit that the matter was referred to the Full Bench. With the assistance of learned counsel for the parties, we have considered the matter afresh and tried various permutations and combinations to accommodate the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the case. We are of the considered view that nothing substantial can be done by which the petitioners may secure admission. !! is even conceded by learned counsel for the petitioners that an institution has necessarily to fix a cut of date for admission as non-fixation thereof would result in non-finalisation of admissions for an indefinite period. This cut of date for admissions, it has again remained un-controverted, has to be fixed keeping in view the tentative date when the classes have to start. In the entrance Test, for direct entry, the competition is open, of course for 50%, to the students spread all over the country. Indifferent Slates, located all over the country, and in different Universities, the study and examination programme is not and can not be the same. It is not even possible either for the authorities or for that matter even for the Court to fix the same programme of studies and examinations of different Universities located all over the country and, at the most, it can be said that the authorities concerned should endeavour that the examinations should be held and results should be announced/published within and about the same time frame. However, if it is not possible to start the classes and hold the examinations and declare results thereof simultaneously, situations like the one, confronted by the petitioners in the present case, would be a natural consequence as, a particular Institution, like Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering and Technology, in the present case, has necessarily to fix time schedule for start of classes which is always dependent upon the examinations held by it or by the University to which it is affiliated. If the time-frame fixed by a particular Institution for admissions or for that matter the last date of admission, is changed or is required to be changed, for the changed, for the reason that the Universities located in other parts of the country have so far not declared the results of the qualifying examination, as mentioned above, the admissions would never be finalised. It is an admitted position that the students try their luck for admission to various technical and other courses in as many Entrance Tests that they can possibly take as on account of various circumstances as also reservation extending almost to 50%, added there to the admission on the basis of capitation fee, it leaves little scope for a student to be sure to qualify and get admission if he is to appear only in one entrance Test. In a given case, it can happen that a student, who has competed for more than one Entrance Test for the same course, on the dint of his merit in one Entrance Test has secured admission in some institution and even though he is entitled to admission, again based upon his merit in the other Entrance Test, he gives up the same, having been already admitted. If the last date of admission is changed, such a student would not, obviously, have admission in either of the University or Institution, as the case may be. Such examples can be multiplied and after considering all such examples, this Court is of the confirmed view that there has to be a cut of date provided for admissions and the same cannot be changed afterwards. As mentioned above, it has been conceded during the currency of arguments that such cut of date is absolutely essential. That being so, providing of ou! of date in the Prospectus cum-Informa-tion Brochure cannot be styled to be arbitrary or repugnant to clause 3.5. No doubt, by strictly adhering to the time-frame set up in the prospectus, some students, like petitioners, would be deprived of admission despite their higher merit in the Entrance Test but such an outcome, as mentioned above, is impossible to be prevented.

    11. Coming now to the second contention of learned counsel for the petitioners, it shall be seen from various clauses of the Pro-spectus-cum-Information Brochure, reproduced above, that a student from the Institute who has sought vertical entry in diploma has to do 1/2 year bridge course which is followed by 2 years course for obtaining decree in Engineering whereas a student, who seeks entry to the degree course through Entrance Test, has to do the course which is of three years' duration including one year bridge course. A student, who has thus come through vertical entry has to do 1/2 year bridge course whereas a student, who has come through direct entry, has to do one year bridge course. When both, i.e. the one who has come through vertical entry and the one who has come through direct entry, complete their bridge course, they are put together to do two years degree course and it is only then that the classes held for them are the same. No doubt, the results of the students, who appeared in the qualifying examination from the respondent-Institute itself had not been declared till such time the arguments were heard in this case but the same would not make much difference as the students from the Institute have to undergo bridge course of only 1/2 year and they would start classes with those, who have sought admission through direct entry six months after the said students, i.e. the students who have been admitted through direct entry. There could be some substance in the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that the authorities ought to have considered the change of out of date for admission provided in the Prospetus-cum-Information Brochure as the start of classes had been postponed for about a month but, as mentioned above, that course, if adopted, is likely to up set the admissions of others, who, as referred to above, might have secured admission on the dint of their merit in other Entrance Tests and such a course, in considered view of this Court, should not be adopted particularly when such students, who have not been arrayed as party-respondents, have not been heard.

    12. For the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in these writ petitions and the same are dismissed.

    13. However, before this Court may part with this judgment, it would like to suggest to the authorities concerned and which suggestion, the Court hopes and wishes, would be followed for future admissions and the same is that between the cut of date for admission and start of classes there should be as little gap as possible. In other words, the authorities concerned should consciously consider the minimum period required by it to finalise the admission and the start of classes from that date should be in immediate future. By reduction of this gap, it will be possible to accommodate the meritorious students like the petitioners, insofar as it may be possible.

    14. In Civil Writ Petition 10416 of 1995, it is the positive case of the petitioner that the result of his qualifying examination had since been declared before the cut of date prescribed in the Prospectus-cum-Information Brochure and he had passed the said examination in first division. It is his further positive case that this information was duly brought to the notice of the Interview Board but in the very nature of things it was not possible for him to have produced the certificate of his having passed the examination as it was to be obtained from Maharashtra. We would strongly recommend the respondent-Institute to find out ways and means to accommodate this student as it was absolutely beyond his control to have produced the certificate, even though it is a fact that he had passed the qualifying examination and result thereof had also been declared before the last date that had been prescribed for admission in the prospectus-cum-Information Brochure. Parties to bear their own costs.

    15. Petition dismissed.

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    Sachin Gaur v. Punjab University, Patiala And Others
    (Oct 12, 1995)