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  • section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Code.
  • rupees.6. Sub-section (3) of this section
  • provisions of section 96(3) of the Code
  • section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872),
  • rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code
  • Order XXIII, rule 3-A of the Code.
  • Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Code,
  • section 96 (3) of the Code
  • Order XXIII, rule 3
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Code.
  • rupees.6. Sub-section (3) of this section
  • provisions of section 96(3) of the Code
  • section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872),
  • rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code
  • Order XXIII, rule 3-A of the Code.
  • Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Code,
  • section 96 (3) of the Code
  • Order XXIII, rule 3
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Pritpal Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Ram Rakha was the owner of the property in dispute consisting of a 1/12th share in land measuring 12 Kanals, 3 Marlas, together with a residential house, a workshop and a Bara situate in village Lohgarh alias Fidde, district Ropar. On his death his daughter, Smt. Raksha Rani, filed a suit for possession claiming to be the sole heir. The suit was opposed by Ram Lal (the defendant), a nephew of the deceased, who alleged that the property had been bequeathed to him by a registered will dated 12 April 1978. The trial Court framed several issues on the pleadings. After statements of two witnesses for the defendant were recorded on 29 January 1981, the parties reached a settlement and their statements recording the terms of compromise were recorded and signed.

The defendant's recorded statement (summarised in the judgment) set out that he accepted the will as correct, that he would give the plaintiff half of the land he had inherited (making her the absolute owner of that half, subject to a right of first refusal if she intended to sell), and that the house, Bara and workshop would remain his property. A decree was passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff for possession of a 1/24th share; the remainder of the suit, concerning the house, workshop and Bara, was dismissed.

The plaintiff (Smt. Raksha Rani) appealed against the consent decree. The Additional District Judge, Ropar (the lower appellate Court) held that the consent decree was not appealable and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff then filed a second appeal (to the High Court). At the motion stage before the High Court, the appellant relied on Ashwani Kumar Kaushik v. Ram Rattan (1980 R.L.R. 670) to contend that an appeal is maintainable against a consent decree if the trial Court did not pass it strictly on the basis of the compromise. The High Court admitted the second appeal for reconsideration of the single-judge decision in Ashwani Kumar Kaushik by a Division Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies against a decree passed by a Court with the consent of the parties (a consent decree), particularly where it is alleged that the decree was not passed strictly in accordance with the compromise reached between the parties.
  2. Whether statements of the parties recorded and signed before the Court satisfy the requirement in Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a compromise be "in writing and signed by the parties."
  3. Whether an appeal against a consent decree may, in substance or procedure, be treated or converted into a revision if the trial Court is alleged to have acted illegally or in excess of jurisdiction in passing the consent decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on the single-judge decision in Ashwani Kumar Kaushik v. Ram Rattan (1980 R.L.R. 670), which had held that an appeal is maintainable against a consent decree when the trial Court does not pass a decree strictly on the basis of the compromise and adds something more thereto.
  • The appellant's counsel also contended that, if an appeal was barred, the Court might convert the appeal into a revision to obtain relief.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's opposing legal arguments in the higher proceedings beyond the lower appellate Court's conclusion that the consent decree was not appealable and the trial Court's recording of the compromise statements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashwani Kumar Kaushik v. Ram Rattan (1980 R.L.R. 670) The single-judge held that an appeal is maintainable against a consent decree when the trial Court does not pass the decree strictly on the basis of the compromise and adds something more thereto. The Division Bench disagreed with and overruled this view: section 96(3) of the Code categorically bars appeals from consent decrees, and therefore a consent decree remains non-appealable even if the trial Court erroneously includes terms not strictly in accordance with the compromise.
Pyara Singh v. Gurcharan Singh (1984 Cur. L.J. 442) An observation by a Single Judge suggested that where a plaintiff challenges a compromise decree as illegal or fraudulent, the "proper course" might be to file an appeal against the compromise decree. The Court found that the observation was not informed by consideration of section 96(3) and overruled that observation: an appeal is barred by section 96(3) and a separate suit may be competent when fraud is proved; the remark that appeal was the proper course is therefore incorrect.
Dalip Singh v. Raj Mall (1981 P.L.J. 298) Addressed whether the requirements of Order XXIII, Rule 3 (compromise "in writing and signed by the parties") were satisfied where only some statements were signed. The Court held that Dalip Singh is irrelevant to the present case because in that case the compromise statements were not signed by all parties; the present case involved signed statements by the parties, thus satisfying Rule 3.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by reproducing section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, emphasizing sub-section (3): "No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties." The Court construed section 96(3) in categorical and unambiguous terms: the only reasonable interpretation is that no appeal lies against a consent decree under any circumstances. Even if a trial Court erroneously passes a consent decree that is not strictly on the basis of a compromise, the decree remains a consent decree and is therefore not appealable. Any error by the Court in passing such a decree must be corrected, if at all, in revisional jurisdiction and not by way of an appeal under section 96.

On that basis the Court expressly disagreed with and overruled the view taken in Ashwani Kumar Kaushik which permitted appealability where the decree was not strictly in accordance with the compromise.

The Court then considered the single-judge observation in Pyara Singh suggesting that the proper course might be an appeal. The Court noted that the observation was not based on discussion nor on consideration of section 96(3), and accordingly it overruled that observation.

Addressing the appellant's alternative prayer to convert the appeal into a revision, the Court rejected this as "utterly futile" because there was no demonstration that the trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally or with material irregularity in passing the consent decree. The Court referred to Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code (which requires that a lawful agreement or compromise be in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the subject-matter) and analyzed whether the requirements were met in the present case.

The Court concluded that the trial Court had complied with Rule 3: the statements of the parties recording the terms of the compromise were recorded by the trial Court and were signed by the parties. The Court analyzed the meaning of "in writing and signed by the parties" and relied on the definition of "document" in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act to hold that statements recorded in writing before the Court and signed by the parties fall within the requirement. The Court rejected any technical distinction between separate paper signed by the parties and statements recorded in writing and signed in Court.

The Court examined Ashwani Kumar Kaushik on these points and noted that the earlier judge's conclusion that Rule 3 requirements were not fulfilled appeared to be based on an admission that there was no compromise in writing and signed; it was not ascertainable from that judgment whether the statements had been signed. Thus that earlier decision offered no assistance on the scope and requirement of Rule 3.

The Court also examined Dalip Singh v. Raj Mall and found it inapposite because, in that case, not all parties had signed the statements relied upon; hence the Rule 3 requirements were not fulfilled there, unlike in the present case.

Having found that Rule 3 was satisfied by the signed statements and that section 96(3) barred appeal from a consent decree, and having rejected the conversion to revision since no jurisdictional illegality was shown, the Court concluded that the appeal had no merit.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The second appeal filed by the plaintiff (Smt. Raksha Rani) was dismissed; the trial Court's consent decree for a 1/24th share in the land in dispute stands and the rest of the suit (concerning the house, workshop and Bara) remains dismissed as before.
  • The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Broader legal implications as articulated by the Court (based on the opinion):

  • The Court held that under section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a decree passed with the consent of parties is not appealable in any circumstances; this view led the Court to overrule the earlier single-judge decision in Ashwani Kumar Kaushik v. Ram Rattan (1980 R.L.R. 670) to the extent that it held such a consent decree might be appealable when not strictly in accordance with the compromise.
  • The Court also overruled the observation in Pyara Singh v. Gurcharan Singh that suggested appeal was the "proper course" in such circumstances, observing that the remark was not consonant with section 96(3).
  • The Court confirmed that statements recording the terms of a compromise, when recorded in writing before the Court and signed by the parties, satisfy the "in writing and signed by the parties" requirement of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code (and supported this view by reference to the definition of "document" in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act).
  • The Court indicated that errors by a trial Court in passing a consent decree should be corrected, if appropriate, by revisional jurisdiction rather than by appeal — but in the present case no jurisdictional excess or illegality was shown to justify revision.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not incorporate information beyond the text of that opinion.

    Smt. Raksha Rani Rakha Devi v. Ram Lal .

    Pritpal Singh, J.:— Ram Rakha was owner of the property in dispute consisting of 1/12th share in land measuring 12 Kanals. 3 Marlas, a residential house, a workshop and a Bara situate in village Lohgarh alias Fidde, in district Ropar. On his death his daughter Smt. Raksha Rani filed a suit for possession of this property claiming to be the sole heir of the deceased. The suit was opposed by Ram Lal defendant, nephew of the deceased, on the plea that the property in dispute had been bequeathed in his favour by the deceased on the basis of a registered will dated 12th of April, 1978. Some other objections were also taken regarding the maintainability of the suit. On the pleadings of the parties a number of issues were framed by the learned trial Court. Statements of two witnesses of the defendant Ram Lal were recorded by the trial Court on 29th of January, 1981. At that stage Smt. Raksha Rani and Ram Lal arrived at a settlement and their statements were recorded which were signed by them. The statement made by the defendant Ram Lal is as follows:—

    “My will Exhibit D-1 has has been accepted to be correct by the plaintiff. Since we are brother and sister, therefore, the land which I have inherited from Rakha Ram, half share thereof I am prepared to give to the plaintiff of which she would be the absolute owner but if she intends to sell that land then she will have to sell it to me. The house, Bara and workshop belonging to Rakha Ram would remain my property and the plaintiff would have no right in respect of the same. The decree may be passed in accordance with this for half share of the land. The decree may be passed for 1/24th share.”

    2. Thereafter the statement of plaintiff Raksha Rani was recorded in the following terms:—

    “I have heard the statement of the defendant. Order be passed in accordance with the same. Statement of the defendant is correct.”

    3. In view of the statements of the parties, a decree for possession of 1/24th share in the land in dispute was passed in favour of the plaintiff. The rest of he suit regarding residential house, workshop and Bara was dismissed. Against this consent decree an appeal was filed by the plaintiff Smt. Raksha Rani which was heard by the Additional District Judge, Ropar. The lower appellate Court held that the consent decree was not appealable and consequently the appeal was dismissed.

    4. In the Second appeal filed by the plaintiff Smt. Raksha Rani, before this Court, reliance was placed at the motion stage on a judgment of this Court in Ashwani Kumar Kaushik v. Ram Rattan . 1980 R.L.R 670., wherein a learned Single Judge held that an appeal is maintainable against a consent decree when trial Court does not pass a decree strictly on the basis of compromise and adds something more thereto. It was ruled that once it is held that the decree is not in accordance with the compromise or strictly there is no compromise as such between the parties, such a decree is appealable. The Motion Bench doubted the correctness of this view and, therefore, admitted the second appeal for reconsideration of Ashwani Kumar Kaushik's case (supra) by a Division Bench. It is in these circumstances that this case has come up before up for consideration.

    5. To appreciate the legal issue which is before us for determination it is necessary to reproduce section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), which runs as follows:—

    “96. Appeal from original decree.— (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeal from the decisions of such Court.

    (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex-parte.

    (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.

    (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees.”

    6. Sub-section (3) of this section is categoric in its terms. It lays down in unambiguous words that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. The only reasonable interpretation of this provision is that against a consent decree no appeal is maintainable in any circumstances. Even when the trial Court erroneously passes a consent decree which is not strictly on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties it remains a consent decree and is not appealable. The error if any crept in at the instance of the Court passing the decree can be corrected by a competent Court in its revisional jurisdiction, but one thing is clear that in view of section 96 (3) of the Code no appeal can be filed against that decree. We, therefore, respectfully disagree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Ashwani Kumar Kaushik's case (supra) that a consent decree becomes appealable when it is not passed strictly in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties. This view of the learned Single Judge is, therefore, overruled.

    7. Our attention was then drawn by the learned appellant's counsel to a later Single Bench judgment of this Court in Pyara Singh v. Gurcharan Singh . 1984 Cur. L.J 442.. In that case a consent decree was passed by the trial Court in terms of the statements of counsel for the partie's. The plaintiffs filed a suit to challenge the compromise decree on the ground that it was illegal and fraudulent. The defendants contested the suit on the plea that the compromise was duly arrived at between the parties and there was no illegality or fraud. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the compromise was duly arrived at between the parties and no fraud was proved. In the second appeal filed by the plaintiffs the learned Single Judge held that if the plaintiffs had proved that the earlier compromise decree was obtained by fraud then a separate suit was competent to set aside the decree. But since no fraud had been proved a separate suit was barred under Order XXIII, rule 3-A of the Code. An observation was, however, made that under the circumstances the proper course for the plaintiffs was to file an appeal against the compromise decree. This observations is not based on any discussion and it is manifest that attention of the learned Single Judge was not drawn to the provisions of section 96(3) of the Code which bars the filing of an appeal against a compromise decree. We, therefore, overrule the aforesaid observation of the learned Single Judge that the proper course for the plaintiffs was to file an appeal against the compromise decree.

    8. Confronted with the situation in which the consent decree passed by the trial Court has inevitably to be considered non-appealable under section 96 (3) of the Code, the learned appellant's counsel contended that this appeal may be converted into a revision. This prayer seems utterly futile because the trial Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in passing the consent decree nor in any manner acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Code, which reads as under, deals with compromise of suits:—

    “3. Compromise of suit.— Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit.

    Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no a djournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the questi on, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.

    Explanation.— An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.”

    9. In the instant case we comprehend no violation of the requirements of this provision of law. All that the first part of the rule visualises is that a lawful agreement or compromise arrived at by the parties should be in writing and signed by them. Admittedly, statements of the parties were recorded by the trial Court containing the terms of the compromise which were duly signend by them. Can it then be said the compromise should not be considered to be in writing and signed by the parties? Should terms of the compromise scribed on a piece of paper and signed by them be given preference to their categoric statements made in writing before the Court which they duly signed? In our candid opinion, the requirement of the first part of rule 3 are adequately satisfied when the parties make statements before the Court in writing and sign the same. Such signed statements are covered by the definition of “document” given in section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therein “document” has been defined as under:—

    “‘Document’ means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter.”

    10. A plain reading of the definition would show that any matter expressed or described, upon any substance, by writing is a document. The first illustration given under the definition of “document” also clarifies that “a writing is a document.” Thus, by no stretch of reasoning the statements of the parties recorded by the trial Court and signed by them can be considered to be violating the requirement of “in writing and signed by the parties” mentioned in the first part of rule 3.

    11. No doubt in the case of Ashwani Kumar Kaushik the parties to the litigation had given statements containing the terms of compromise and yet it was held that the requirement of rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code were not fulfilled. However, this conclusion of the learned Judge was based on the admission of the parties that there was no compromise in writing and sighed by them. It is not ascertainable from the judgment whether the statements of the parties had been signed by them or not. In such circumstances this judgment on the scope and requirement of Order XXIII, rule 3 is of no help.

    12. The learned appellant's counsel then placed reliance on Dalip Singh v. Raj Mall . 1981 P.L.J 298.. A perusal of the judgment would show that it is entirely irrelevant for our purposes. In that case two separate suits filed by the plaintiff with regard to agricultural land measuring 341 Kanals. 3 Marlas were dismissed by the trtal Court. The plaintiffs appealed against the judgments and decrees of the trial Court. The Additional District Judge in whose Court the appeals were pending fixed 12th of March, 1980, for hearing. A few days before the date of hearing the Additional District Judge took up these appeals at the request of the counsel for the parties on the plea that the matter had been compromised. Besides the statements of the counsel for the parties only the statement of one of the defendants was recorded. On the basis of these statements the appellate Court decreed one of the suits and dismissed the appeal in other suit. In the second appeal before this Court it was contended that the lower appellate Court had decreed the plaintiffs' suit in derogation of the provisions of Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Code. This plea was rightly accepted by the Court because the parties to the litigation except one defendant had not signed the statements on the basis of which the appellate Court had passed the decree. The requirement of rule 3 was manifestly not fulfilled and consequently the impugned cannot possibly render any help to the present appellant.

    13. In the light of what is stated above, we find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

    S.P Goyal, J.:— I agree.

    R.M.S
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Smt. Raksha Rani Rakha Devi v. Ram Lal .
    (May 27, 1986)