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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.P. Goyal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents owned land measuring 16 kanals, 6 marlas (Khasra Nos. 3 and 4, rectangle No. 77) and instituted a suit for possession alleging that the petitioner was a trespasser. The decree-sheet records the suit as instituted on March 21, 1970, though the body of the record shows presentation on July 15, 1967. Prior to that, the petitioner had applied under Section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act claiming to be the tenant and seeking purchase of the land; the Assistant Collector Grade I (Fatehabad) allowed that application by judgment dated November 13, 1967 (Exhibit JDM/1).

In the pending civil suit the parties entered into a compromise whereby the petitioner would become owner on payment of Rs. 3,000 in four equal instalments payable on specified dates (December 15, 1970; June 15, 1971; December 15, 1971; and June 15, 1972), in addition to amounts previously ordered by the Revenue Authority. The decree-sheet recorded that the Assistant Collector's order permitting the petitioner's purchase would have no effect on the respondents' rights if the instalments were not paid on the stipulated dates and that in such event the suit would be deemed decreed in favour of the respondents.

The petitioner alleges that he paid the whole Rs. 3,000, but two last instalments were not paid within the stipulated times. The respondents initiated execution proceedings to recover possession per the terms of the decree which provided for possession after refunding amounts received. The petitioner opposed execution, pleading the decree lacked jurisdiction, that he had paid the total consideration, and that any default was inadvertent and unintentional. The executing Court overruled these objections and issued a warrant of possession. After failing in appeal before the Senior Sub Judge, the petitioner filed this revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order passed by the Assistant Collector under Section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act — together with payment of the first instalment (and later deposits) — vested ownership in the petitioner and thereby precluded a civil suit challenging that order (i.e., the interplay of Section 18(4)(b) and Section 25 of the Act).
  2. Whether the petitioner, claiming to be a tenant, could be ejected only under Section 9 of the Act and whether a consent decree that did not satisfy the requirements of Section 9 would be without jurisdiction and unenforceable.
  3. Whether a clause in a consent decree which permits recovery of possession on non-payment of instalments at stipulated times operates as a penal/forfeiture clause, and if so, whether the court can relieve the judgment-debtor from its rigours (including by extending time under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Assistant Collector's order dated November 13, 1967, allowing the petitioner to purchase the land and the payment of the first instalment meant the petitioner was deemed to have become owner by virtue of Section 18(4)(b) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act; consequently a civil suit was not competent to challenge that order due to Section 25 of the Act.
  • As a tenant, the petitioner could be ejected only in accordance with Section 9 of the Act, and a consent decree that did not comply with Section 9 would be without jurisdiction and unenforceable.

Respondents' Position

  • The respondents instituted the suit and later sought execution based on the compromise/decree which provided that in the event of non-payment of instalments on stipulated dates they were entitled to possession after refunding amounts received. They acted to enforce that clause when the petitioner defaulted on the timing of the last two instalments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khazan Singh v. Dalip Singh, 1969 P.L.J. 459 That a Civil Court is competent to examine whether conditions required under Section 18 existed and that the relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be finally determined by the Assistant Collector under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act or the Punjab Tenancy Act. The Court relied on this authority to reject the petitioner's contention that the Assistant Collector's order and Section 25 barred civil-court scrutiny; it held the civil court could hold the Assistant Collector's order void if the petitioner was not a tenant.
Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ram Narayan, 1978 1 SCC 58 In cases where landlord-tenant relationship was admitted and ejectment proceedings were before the Rent Controller, an ejectment order would not bind the tenant unless the statutory grounds for ejectment were proved or admitted. The Court distinguished these Supreme Court authorities on the facts: since in the present case the relationship of landlord and tenant was not admitted, those decisions did not preclude civil-court inquiry here.
Chandirka Misir v. Bhaiyalal, 1973 2 SCC 474 Same principle as above concerning admitted relationship and requirements for ejectment orders to be binding. Distinguished on the basis that the landlord-tenant relationship was not admitted in the present case, so the principle did not bar civil-court review.
Srimathi Kaushalya Devi & Others v. Shri K.L. Bansal, 1969 1 SCC 59 Same principle as the other two Supreme Court decisions regarding admitted relationship and ejectment orders. Distinguished for the same reason: not applicable where tenant relationship is contested and suit is based on title/trespass.
Chattar Singh v. Khetu, 1966 C.L.J. 665 Affirmed the principle that a consent decree is a contract and the court has power to relieve the defaulting party from consequences of default, especially where a clause effects a forfeiture or penalty. Used to support the proposition that the clause entitling respondents to possession on non-payment was penal/forfeiture in nature and that relief could be granted to the petitioner against such a clause.
Jwala Ram v. Mathara Dass, AIR 1931 Lah 696 Earlier authority approving the dictum that consent decrees stand on the same footing as the underlying agreement and the court can relieve against forfeiture/penalty arising from default under such agreements. Relied upon (through Chattar Singh) to justify relief against the forfeiture clause in the consent decree.
Hukumchand v. Bansilal, AIR 1968 SC 86 Held that when time for payment of mortgage money is fixed with the parties' consent, the court cannot extend that time without consent and Section 148 CPC would not apply to enlarge such a period. The Court acknowledged this authority but distinguished it on facts and did not follow it for the present case (i.e., it did not preclude extension under Section 148 here because the situation was different from Hukumchand).
Jadabendra Nath Mishra v. Smt. Manorama Debya, AIR 1970 Cal 199 Where a compromise contains a penal clause providing forfeiture on default, the court can extend time (under Section 148 read with Section 141 CPC) to relieve the judgment-debtor from the penal consequence. The Court followed this approach and extended the time for payment of the delayed instalments, deeming deposits made within fifteen days as within the stipulated time.
Marketing and Advertising Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Telerad Private Ltd., AIR 1969 Bom 323 Support for relieving a judgment-debtor from a penal clause in a compromise by granting extension of time so as to avoid forfeiture. Followed as a consonant authority with Jadabendra Nath Mishra to justify relief against the penal clause and to extend time for payment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two linked strands of analysis corresponding to the petitioner's primary contentions and the question whether relief could be afforded despite the compromise.

First, on the petitioner's objections that the Assistant Collector's order and Section 18/Section 25 precluded civil-court review, and that ejectment could only be under Section 9: the Court rejected both contentions. Relying on Khazan Singh v. Dalip Singh, the Court concluded that authorities under the Act may determine tenant-landlord relationship for certain statutory purposes but such decisions are not final and are open to challenge before civil courts which possess plenary jurisdiction to determine title. The Court therefore held a civil suit to challenge the order under Section 18 was competent; the civil court could hold the Assistant Collector's order void if it found the petitioner was not a tenant. The three Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the petitioner (Smt. Nai Bahu; Chandirka Misir; Srimathi Kaushalya Devi) were distinguished because in those cases the landlord-tenant relationship had been admitted and ejectment proceedings had been before the Rent Controller; those facts gave rise to a different rule which did not apply here.

Second, addressing the consequences of the compromise/decree and whether the respondents could obtain possession for delayed payment: the Court analyzed the legal character of a consent decree. Following Chattar Singh (which approved Jwala Ram), the Court treated the consent decree as a contract carrying the Court's seal and held that the Court has power to relieve a defaulting party from consequences of default where the decree enforces a forfeiture or penalty. On the facts here, the petitioner had secured an order under Section 18 and had deposited six out of the ten instalments fixed by the Assistant Collector prior to the compromise; thus the respondents were not entitled to claim more than the price fixed by the Assistant Collector. The compromise required the petitioner to pay an additional Rs. 3,000, but it did not constitute an admission by the petitioner that he was not the tenant or that the revenue order was void. The clause in the compromise permitting recovery of possession on non-payment at stipulated times operated as a penal/forfeiture clause.

The Court then considered whether relief could be granted by enlarging the time for payment under Section 148 CPC. It distinguished Hukumchand v. Bansilal (which barred extension where time for payment of mortgage money was fixed by consent) and preferred the approach in Jadabendra Nath Mishra (Calcutta Division Bench) and Marketing and Advertising (Bombay) which allowed extension of time where no statutory provision fixed the time and the clause operated as a penal forfeiture. Applying that principle, and noting that the 3rd and 4th instalments had been deposited within fifteen days after the stipulated dates, the Court extended the time and deemed the late deposits to have been made within the stipulated time.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final disposition is summarized as follows: THIS REVISION IS ALLOWED; THE IMPUGNED ORDER IS SET ASIDE; THE EXECUTION APPLICATION IS DISMISSED.

The Court specifically (consistent with its reasoning) extended the time for payment of the delayed instalments under Section 148 CPC and held that the deposits made within fifteen days of the stipulated dates would be deemed to have been made within the stipulated time. The clause in the compromise permitting recovery of possession on non-payment at the stipulated time was characterized as a penal/forfeiture clause and held not binding in the circumstances.

Implications: The direct consequences are that the petitioner will not be dispossessed by execution under the impugned decree; the execution application has been dismissed and the parties were directed to bear their own costs. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new binding precedent beyond following and applying the cited authorities; it explicitly adopts the approach of certain High Court decisions (Jadabendra Nath Mishra and Marketing and Advertising) on relief against penal clauses and distinguishes contrary authority (Hukumchand) on its facts.

Petition Allowed. (Signature line in the original: H.L.S)

    Mehru v. Mohan Lal And Others

    S.P Goyal, J.:— The respondents, owners of the land in dispute measuring 16 kanals, 6 marlas, comprised of Khasra Nos. 3 and 4, rectangle No. 77 instituted a suit for its possession alleging that the petitioner was a trespasser and in its occupation without any right. This suit according to the decree-sheet produced on the record was instituted on March 21, 1970 though in the main body the date of presentation is stated to be July 15, 1967. The petitioner prior thereto moved an application under Section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (hereinafter called the Act) for purchase of the said land claiming himself to be its tenant which was opposed by the respondents but allowed by the Assistant Collector Grade I. Fatehabad, vide Judgment dated November 13, 1967, Exhibit JDM/1. In the suit pending in the Civil Court, the parties entered into a compromise whereby the respondents stipulated that Mehru petitioner would become owner of the land in dispute on payment of Rs. 3000/- in four equal instalments payable on December 15, 1970, June 15, December 15, 1971 and June 15, 1272, in addition to the amount ordered to be paid by the Revenue Authority. It is further stated in the decree-sheet passed on the basis of the compromise that the order of the Assistant Collector Grade I, permitting the purchase by the petitioner shall have no effect on the rights of the respondents if the instalment amount was not paid on the the stipulated date and the suit shall be deemed to have been decreed. It is not disputed that whole of the amount of Rs. 3000/- has been paid by petitioner but because the two last instalments were not paid within the time stipulated, the respondents instituted execution proceedings to recover possession of the said land in accordance with the terms of the decree which provided that in case the instalments are not paid as scheduled, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to obtain possession of the said land after refunding the amount received. The petitioner opposed the application and pleaded that the decree was without jurisdiction, that the whole of the amount had been paid and that the default was inadvertant and unintentional. The executing Court over-ruled hit objections and ordered the issuance of warrant of possession. Having failed in the appeal before the Senior Sub Judge, he has come up in this revision.

    2. The learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the correctness of the impugned order on two grounds. Firstly, that the order having been passed by the Assistant Collector Grade I on November 13, 1967, allowing the petitioner to purchase the land in dispute and the first instalment having been paid, he was deemed to have become owner of the land by virtue of the provisions of Section 18(4)(b) of the Act and no civil suit was competent to challenge its validity as provided in Section 25 of the Act. Secondly, it was contended that the petitioner being a tenant his ejectment could be sought only in accordance with the provisions of Section 9 and a content order which does not satisfy the requirements of the aforementioned section would be without jurisdiction and unenforceable. None of the two contentions, however, has any merit. The authorities under the Act though may be competent to determine the question of relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties for purpose of section 18 but the decision is not final and is open to challenge in the civil Court which only have plenary jurisdiction to determine the question of title. This matter stands concluded by a Division Bench of this Court in Khazan Singh v. Dalip Singh . 1969 P.L.J 459. wherein it was held that a Civil Court is competent to go into the question that the conditions required to be established before the Assistant Collector can exercise jurisdiction under section 18 of the Punjab Security of Lands Tenures Act, did or did not exist and that the question of relationship of landlord and tenant which is a question of status of the parties, cannot be finally decided by the Assistant Collector either under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act or under the Punjab Tenancy Act. The suit filed by the decree-holder to challenge the order passed under section 18 in favour of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was not in possession of the land in dispute as tenant was, therefore, competent and the Court could hold the said order as void and without jurisdiction if it was found that the petitioner was not holding the land in dispute as tenant. The second contention as well has to be overruled on the same reasoning because unless the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted between the parties the provisions of section 9 of the Act would not come into play. In all the three decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ram Narayan . 1978 1 SCC 58, Chandirka Misir v. Bhaiyalal . 1973 2 SCC 474 and Srimathi Kaushalya Devi & Others v. Shri K.L Bansal . 1969 1 SCC 59, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted between the parties and proceedings for ejectment had been instituted before the Rent Controller. On these facts, it was ruled that the order of ejectment passed on the basis of relationship between the parties would not be binding on the tenant unless it was shown that any ground for ejectment as envisaged by law was available and proved on the record or acceded to by the tenant. In the present case, the suit had been filed before the Civil Court for possession of the land in dispute on the basic of title alleging the petitioner to be a trespasser. The decree suffered by the petitioner for possession thus did not offend any provision of law which could render it void or without jurisdiction. Both the contentions raised by the learned counsel, therefore, have to be overruled.

    3. However, the petitioner can be relieved of the rigoros of consent decree on another ground. It is well-established that a consent decree is nothing but a contract between the parties with a seal of the Court superimposed thereon and as such can be avoided on any ground on which the contract can be avoided under the provisions of the Contract Act. If the contract or consent decree passed thereon contains a forfeiture or penalty clause, the court can give relief to the judgment debtor by virtue of the provisions of section 74 of the said Act Reference in this connection may profitably be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Chattar Singh v. Khetu . 1966 C.L.J 665. which approved the dictum laid down in the earlier case, Jwala Ram v. Mathara Dass . AIR 1931 Lah 696. in the following terms:

    “Where a decree is passed as a result of an agreement between the parties it does not stand on a higher footing than the agreement which preceded it, and therefore the Court has the power to relieve the defaulting party from the consequences of the default; but the Court does not possess unrestricted power in the matter in as much as it cannot interfere with the effect of default if as a result thereof the decree holder seeks merely to take away a concession which he had given to the judgment-debtor. If, on the other hand, as a result of the default, the decree-holder is attempting to realize more than was really doe to him, in other words, if he is enforcing a penalty then the Court is entitled to step in and give relief to the judgment-debtor against the forfeiture.”

    4. In the present case, the petitioner had successfully secured the order under section 18 of the Act to acquire preprietory rights in the land in dispute and was deemed to have become its owner on the deposit of first instalment of the price determined by the Assistant Collector. By the time the compromise had been entered into, he had deposited the amount of six out of the total ten instalments the respondents were not entitled to claim anything more than the price fixed by the Assistant Collector but in the compromise, the petitioner agreed to pay Rs. 3,000/- more over and above the said amount. So, the respondent was not entitled to the possession of the land in dispute unless the Civil Court had found that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. By the compromise also the petitioner never conceded that he was not the tenant of the land in dispute or that the order passed by the Revenue authorities was void and without jurisdiction. A clause in the compromise entitled the decree holder to recover possession of the land in dispute in case of non-payment of the instalment at the stipulated time was, therefore, in the nature of penalty and forfeiture clause and as such the executing Court was fully competent to give relief to the petitioner against the aforementioned clause. The time of the payment of the instalments could in no way in the circumstances of the case be said as the essence of the contract and whole of the amount at agreed to between the parties under the compromise having been paid the tenant had substantially complied with the terms of the compromise. The clause entitling the decree-holder to recover possession in case of non-payment of the instalments on the date fixed being in the mature of penalty clause is held to be void and not binding on the petitioner.

    5. Relief can be given to the petitioner by extending the time fixed for the payment of the instalments under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables the court to enlarge from time to time any period fixed or granted by the court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. Though the Supreme Court in Hukumchand v. Bansilal . AIR 1968 SC 86. held that the time fixed for payment of the mortgage money with the consent of the parties could not be extended by the court without their consent and the provisions of section 148, Civil Procedure Code, would not apply in such circumstances, but this case was distinguished in a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jadabendra Nath Mishra v. Smt. Manorama Debya . AIR 1970 Cal 199., on the ground that where there is no statutory provision under which time is fixed, it can be extended to relieve the party of the forfeiture which was to result on default of the payment within time. In Jadabendra Nath Mishra's case (supra) a compromise was entered into between the parties which provided that if certain amount was paid within certain time, ex parte decree was to be set aside and the suit restored to the file but if payment was not made within the time specified, ex parte decree would stand confirmed. The said clause was held a penal clause and the judgment-debtor was relieved of its rigors by extending the time of deposit of the amount settled under section 148 read with section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On similar considerations, the judgment-debtor was relieved of the penal clause by the Bombay High Court in Marketing and Advertising Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Telerad Private Ltd. . AIR 1969 Bom 323. Although a discordant note has been struck in the decisions of some other High Courts but the view expressed in Jadabendra Nath Mishra and Marketing and Advertising Associate's cases (supra) being more in consonance with the justice and equity. I prefer to follow the same and hold that the court is empowered to relieve the judgment-debtor of the rigors of penal clause which provides the forfeiture of property and other valuable rights in case of default of payment according to the time stipulated in the consent decree. In the present case the amount of the 3rd and 4th instalment was deposited within fifteen days after the stipulated time. The time for the said instalments is accordingly extended and the deposit made shall be deemed to have been made within the stipulated time.

    6. For the reasons recorded above, this revision is allowed, the impugned order set aside and the execution application dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

    H.L.S
    Petition Allowed.

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    Mehru v. Mohan Lal And Others
    (Nov 9, 1984)