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  • SECTION 4 LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • Order 1 rule 10, read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 1 rule 10, read with section 151 of the Code.
  • Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 1 rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • 1 Rule 10 C.P.C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • SECTION 4 LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
  • Order 1 rule 10, read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 1 rule 10, read with section 151 of the Code.
  • Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 1 rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • 1 Rule 10 C.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

An application under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure was filed by Messrs Saluja Spinning and Weaving Mills Private Limited (the "Spinning Mill") seeking to be impleaded as a respondent in Civil Writ Petition No. 1818 of 1982. The writ petition had been filed by Messrs Kulbhushan Kumar & Co., who claimed to be owners in possession of land acquired by the State Government for the alleged public purpose of expanding Saluja Spinning and Weaving Mills to manufacture cotton yarn. The writ petition challenged the notifications under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The central procedural history relevant to this opinion is that a Full Bench of this High Court in Indo Swiss Time Ltd v. Umrao had earlier considered whether a company for whose benefit land was acquired is a "person interested" entitled to be impleaded; the Full Bench (by majority) held that such a company was not a "person interested" and an application under Order 1 Rule 10 to be impleaded was not legally maintainable. Subsequent to that Full Bench decision, a short order of the Supreme Court in Punjab United Pesticides & Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran Singh (Jan 11, 1982) appeared to reaffirm an earlier Supreme Court view in Himalaya Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. that a company for whose benefit land is acquired is an interested person. Because of that apparent conflict, the matter was referred for consideration by a larger Bench.

This opinion records the consideration by the referring Bench (including the Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawalia) of whether the Full Bench ratios in Indo Swiss Time Ltd still govern the field in light of the later Supreme Court observations and orders, and concludes by answering the reference and directing further procedural action (remitting the matter back to the Division Bench for decision on merits in accordance with the Full Bench ratio).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Saluja Spinning and Weaving Mills Private Limited (the company for whose benefit the acquisition was made) can be permitted to be impleaded as a respondent in the writ petition under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC.
  2. Whether the Full Bench ratio in Indo Swiss Time Ltd v. Umrao (which followed Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and held that a company for whose benefit land is acquired is not a "person interested") remains authoritative, in view of subsequent Supreme Court orders/observations in Himalaya Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. and Punjab United Pesticides & Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran Singh.
  3. Whether a short order of the Supreme Court (including an ex parte allowance based on Himalaya Tiles) or an agreed compromise order in a Special Leave Petition proceeding can be treated as overruling or abrogating the Full Bench ratio laid down in Indo Swiss Time Ltd.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant (Saluja Spinning and Weaving Mills Private Limited)

  • The Spinning Mill sought impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151, CPC so it could participate in the writ proceedings, particularly on matters such as quantum of compensation.
  • The Spinning Mill relied on a recent Supreme Court order in Punjab United Pesticides & Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran Singh (Jan 11, 1982), which had referred to and affirmed the earlier Supreme Court view in Himalaya Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. that a company for whose benefit the land is acquired is an "interested person" and entitled to be added as a party.

Respondent / Writ Petitioners (Messrs Kulbhushan Kumar & Co.)

  • The application by the Spinning Mill was opposed on behalf of the writ petitioners. The opinion records only that the application was opposed; no detailed grounds of the opposition are set out in the text.
  • The opinion also notes that before the Court, the learned counsel for the petitioners did not challenge the correctness of the Full Bench ratio in Indo Swiss Time Ltd's case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Indo Swiss Time Ltd v. Umrao (Full Bench of this Court; 1981 83 PLR 335) Laid down five propositions regarding conflicting co-equal Benches and held that where conflict exists a court below should follow the view laying down law more correctly; majority held a company for whose benefit acquisition is made is not a "person interested" and cannot be impleaded. The court treated the Indo Swiss Full Bench ratio as authoritative in this High Court and held that those ratios "still hold the field". The Division Bench is to follow that ratio and the matter was remitted back for decision on merits accordingly.
Himalaya Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Courtinnom (AIR 1980 SC 1118; (1980) 3 SCC 223) Supreme Court decision holding that any company for whose benefit land is acquired is an "interested person" and entitled to be added as a party to proceedings (contrary to Municipal Corporation decision). The court analyzed that the Supreme Court's Himalaya Tiles view was in conflict with Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad; it acknowledged that Punjab United Pesticides relied on Himalaya Tiles but held that the latter did not, by the short order in Punjab United, implicitly overrule the Full Bench ratio.
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chunan Lal Shamlal Das Patel (1970 (1) S.C.W.R 183) Earlier Supreme Court authority (and supported by a long line of High Court precedent) holding that a company for whose benefit the land is acquired is not a "person interested" for purposes of impleadment. The Full Bench in Indo Swiss preferred this view; in the present opinion the court reaffirmed the continuing force of Municipal Corporation's ratio and treated it as the correct view which the High Court should follow in preference to the Himalaya Tiles view.
Punjab United Pesticides & Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran Singh (C.A. Nos. 71–82 of 1982; order dated Jan 11, 1982) Short Supreme Court order which, referring to Himalaya Tiles, allowed the appeal and held the company to be an interested person entitled to be added; directed remittal for quantum of compensation to be fixed by District Judge after notice. The court analyzed this short order and concluded that it did not expressly or impliedly overrule the Full Bench in Indo Swiss because the Full Bench decision was not canvassed before the Supreme Court, the order was by a two-Judge Bench, and the Municipal Corporation case was not even referred to; accordingly Punjab United's order did not obliterate Indo Swiss.
Indo Swiss Time Ltd. v. Chhelu Ram (1982 P.L.J. 407) Special Leave Petition decided by compromise/agreement in which parties agreed that the Company for whose benefit acquisition was made may be impleaded; the SLP order recorded the agreed outcome. The court held that an agreed order or compromise does not abrogate or obliterate the ratio of a Full Bench; the compromise allowing impleadment did not wipe out the precedential value of the earlier Full Bench decision.
Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1967 SC 997) Cited for the principle that concessions of law by parties or counsel, without more, do not affect the ratio of existing precedent. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a joint concession or agreed order cannot obliterate a precedent's reasoning or ratio.
Venkanna Narasinha v. Laxmi Sannappa (AIR 1951 Bom 57) Authority cited for the same principle that concessions do not displace precedent. Used to support the conclusion that compromise/agreement does not negate earlier judicial reasoning.
Pramod C. Bhat v. Kanwar Raj Nath (AIR 1954 Bom 518) Another High Court authority cited on concession/agreement principles. Referred to in support of the proposition that concessions/orders by agreement do not affect precedent.
State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (AIR 1968 SC 647) (following Quinn Leather) Referred to for the proposition that the ratio of a judgment is the reasoning and logic and not merely the conclusion; ratio can be displaced only by conclusive contrary findings by a superior court. The court invoked this line of authority to explain why the reasoning of the Full Bench in Indo Swiss cannot be displaced by the later short orders or by parties' compromise without an express overruling by a superior court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise, principle-driven manner, strictly referencing what occurred in prior proceedings and the limits of what those prior orders accomplished:

  1. The Court first identified that the Full Bench in Indo Swiss had articulated five clear propositions: (i) where co-equal Benches conflict, courts below must follow the judgment which lays down law more correctly; (ii) timing (earlier or later) of a conflicting judgment is irrelevant; (iii) the Municipal Corporation and Himalaya Tiles decisions were irreconcilably in conflict; (iv) the Full Bench majority preferred the Municipal Corporation view as more correct; and (v) accordingly a company for whose benefit land is acquired was not a "person interested" for impleading purposes.
  2. The Court then examined the subsequent developments relied upon by the Spinning Mill: (a) a short Supreme Court order in Punjab United Pesticides that referred to Himalaya Tiles and allowed the appeal ex parte, and (b) an agreed compromise order in the Supreme Court in Indo Swiss Time Ltd v. Chhelu Ram in which parties agreed the company could be impleaded.
  3. With respect to Punjab United Pesticides, the Court observed that the Supreme Court's short order did not indicate that the correctness of the Full Bench's Indo Swiss ratio had been argued before the Supreme Court; in fact, the Municipal Corporation case (which underpinned the Full Bench majority) was not referred to. The Court emphasised established principle that a Full Bench judgment cannot be presumed to have been overruled where it was not even referred to or canvassed before the superior court. Therefore the Court concluded that the Punjab United short order was not an express or implied overruling of Indo Swiss.
  4. The Court further noted that Punjab United's order was by a two-Judge Bench and that mere repetition or reaffirmation of an earlier judgment by a co-equal Bench does not resolve an existing conflict between co-equal Benches. The Court underscored that the existing conflict between Municipal Corporation and Himalaya Tiles remained, and the Municipal Corporation ratio (and the line of High Court precedents on which it rested) could not be overruled by a co-ordinate Bench.
  5. Regarding the agreed compromise order in Indo Swiss Time Ltd v. Chhelu Ram, the Court held that an agreement of parties (or a compromise) which results in an order allowing impleadment does not obliterate the logic or reasoning of the earlier Full Bench. The Court relied on authorities establishing that concessions or agreements do not affect the ratio of existing precedent; the ratio is the reasoning and logic and can be displaced only by a conclusive contrary finding by a superior court.
  6. On these bases the Court concluded that neither the Punjab United short order nor the compromise order operated to overrule or abrogate the Full Bench ratios in Indo Swiss Time Ltd. Consequently, the Court held that the ratios in Indo Swiss "still hold the field" and that the Division Bench is bound by that Full Bench ratio.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the ratios in Indo Swiss Time Limited's Full Bench decision "still hold the field" and that they have not been overruled by the subsequent Supreme Court short order in Punjab United Pesticides & Chemicals Ltd. or by the compromise order in Indo Swiss Time Ltd. v. Chhelu Ram. The reference is therefore answered in favour of the view that the Indo Swiss Full Bench ratio remains authoritative.

Implications:

  • The Division Bench is bound to apply the Full Bench ratio in Indo Swiss Time Ltd's case when deciding the Spinning Mill's application for impleadment; accordingly the matter was directed to go back to the Division Bench for decision on merits.
  • The Court rejected the contention that a short Supreme Court order, which did not canvass or refer to the conflicting Full Bench authority, or a consent/compromise order between parties in a Special Leave Petition, amount to either an express or implied overruling of a Full Bench ratio.
  • The direct practical effect on the parties is that the Division Bench must decide the application in light of the Indo Swiss ratios; no order in this opinion itself impleads the Spinning Mill or disposes of the writ petition on merits.
  • As to precedent, the Court reaffirmed the existing Full Bench authority of this High Court (Indo Swiss) and held that its ratio continues to be binding on co-ordinate benches of this High Court unless and until it is expressly overruled by a superior Court in a manner that addresses the considered ratio itself.

Final notation from the opinion: The bench recorded agreement among the other Judges and concluded: "Reference answered." The matter was directed back to the Division Bench for decision on merits in accordance with the Full Bench ratio.

    Kulbhushan Kumar & Co. v. The State Of Punjab And Another

    Surinder Singh, J.:— The prayer made in this application under Order 1 rule 10, read with Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure filed by Messrs Saluja Spinning and Weaving Mills Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Spinning Mill) is that the said Firm may be impleaded as a respondent in Civil Writ Petition No. 1818 of 1982. The Writ Petition was filed by Messrs Kulbhushan Kumar & Co., who claimed to be the owners in possession of the land which was acquired by the State Government for setting up of the Spinning Mill, for the manufacture of cotton yarn. The petitioner in the Writ Petition challenged the validity of the Notifications as per which the land was acquired, on several grounds which are, however, not material for the purpose of the disposal of the application under Order 1 rule 10, read with section 151 of the Code. The question for consideration is, as to whether the Spinining Mill can be permitted to be impleaded as a respondent in the Writ Petition. The point came up for consideration before a Full Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of this Court in Indo Swiss Time Ltd v. Umrao . 1981 83 PLR 335.. Two contrary views of the Supreme Court as expressed in two authorities were considered by the Bench. According to the view in Himalaya Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Continhom AIR 1980 SC 1118., the Company for whose benefit the land is acquired, was an interested person and had a right to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings. However, as per the other view propounded by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chunan Lal Shamlal Das Patel . 1970 1 S.C.W.R 183., such a Company could not claim a right to be impleaded as a party. The Full Bench of this Court, as per majority judgment accepted the dictum laid down in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra) and consequently held that an application under Order 1 rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, for being impleaded as a party, by the Company for whose benefit the acquisition is made, is not legally maintainable. It was further held by the Bench that such a Company is not an interested person so as to give it a right to become a party to the proceedings in reference before the District Judge.

    2. In view of the above Full Bench decision, the application filed by the Spinning Mill could have been disposed of in terms of the ratio of the Bench decision. However, the learned counsel for the Spinning Mill has produced before us another decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 71 to 82 of 1982 (Punjab United Pesticides & Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran Singh . C.A Nos. 71 to 82 of 1982. rendered on January 11, 1982), in which their Lordship's reaffirmed their earlier decision in Himalaya Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. case (supra). The above decision was rendered in appeal against the Letters Patent Appeal dismissed in limine relying upon the Full Bench decision in Indo Swiss Time Ltd. case (supra). Indeed it is not indicated if the contrary view in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra) was before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, or not. However, it is obvious that the affirmance of the view by the Supreme Court of its decision in “Himalaya Tiles” in a very recent case raises the question as to whether the Full Bench decision of this Court is to be followed as a correct view of the proposition of law, or not.

    3. Viewing the matter from this angle, we feel that it would be appropriate that the point involved is considered by a larger Full Bench of five. Hon'ble Judges. We accordingly direct that Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1279 of 1982 in Civil Writ Petition No. 1818 of 1982 be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for obtaining orders for constituting a Full Bench of five Hon'ble Judges for this purpose.

    Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.:— I agree.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:— Would one of the ratios in the Full Bench judgment of Indo Swiss Time Limited v. Umrao, still hold the field-is the significant question that has necessitated this reference to the larger Bench.

    4. To appreciate the aforesaid question in its correct perspective, a somewhat detailed notice of the facts is called for. Messrs Kulbhushan Kumar & Co - the writ petitioners, had challenged the acquisition proceedings initiated by a notification (annexure P/3), under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’), for the public purpose of the expansion of Saluja Spinning and Weaving Mills for the manufacture of cotton yarn, and the subsequent decleration under Section 6 of the Act vide notification (annexure P/5), dated March 17/18, 1982. Later M/s Saluja Spinning and Weaving Mills Private Limited, for whose benefit the acquisition was to be made, filed the present application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for being impleaded as a respondent in the Civil Writ petition. This application was opposed on behalf of the writ petitioners. Undoubtedly, the matter was concluded against the applicants by the Full Bench in Indo Swiss Time Ltd's case (supra). This was indeed so noticed by the learned Judges of the referring Bench in the following terms:—

    “In view of the above Full Bench decision, the application filed by the Spinning Mill could have been disposed of in terms of the ratio of the Bench decision”.

    5. However, reliance on behalf of the Spining Mills was sought to be placed on a short observation of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition No. 5389 of 1981 (Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited v. Puran Singh) decided on January 11, 1982. In view of the affirmance therein of the earlier judgment in Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Limited v. Francis Victor Courtinnom the refering Bench observed that a question had arisen, whether on the specific point, the Full Bench decision in Indo Swiss Time Limited's case (supra) was to be followed as a correct view of the proposition of law and therefore, suggested an authoritative consideration of the matter by a larger Bench.

    6. Inevitably, one must first advert to the true ratio of the Full Bench in Indo Swiss Time Limited's case (supra). Therein, after an exhaustive consideration, five clear-cut propositions were laid down. It was unanimously held:—

    (i) Where two co-equall Benches of a superior court were in headlong conflict, it is incumbent for the courts below to examine and follow that judgment which lays down the law more correctly and accurately;

    (ii) the fact that one or the other of the conflicting judgments have been rendered earlier or later, was irrelevant and extraneous to the issue;

    (iii) that the ratio of the judgments of the co-equal Benches of their Lordships in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chanau Lal Shamal Das Patel, 1970 (1) S.C.W.R 183; and the Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Limited v. Francis Victor Courtinnom, (1980) 3 SCC 223 : AIR 1980 SC 1118, were directly in conflict with each other and were irreconcilable;

    7. Further, it was held by majority—

    (iv) that the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) was in consonance with the earlier long line of precedent in the High Courts and laid down the law more accurately and correctly and the same should be followed in preference to the view in Himalaya Tiles and Marbles Ltd., and

    (v) that the company or the firm for whose benefit the land was sought to be acquired under the Act was not a ‘person interested’ and an application on its behalf for being impleaded as a party to the proceeding was not legally maintainable.

    8. For clarity's sake, it must be pointed out that only propositions Nos. (iv) and (v) aforesaid are in issue and the threshold question is—whether these considered ratios of the Full Bench in Indo Swiss Times Limited's case (supra) stand over-ruled by the brief observation in Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited's case (supra). In the said case whilst granting Special Leave to Appeal, their Lordships in order to avoid any further delay in the matter allowed the appeal ex parte because no oppearance or opposition had been raised on behalf of the respondents. All that was recorded in the order was as under:—

    “Nobody appears from the other side despite service. As the case is concluded by our decision in Himalaya Tiles & Marbles (P) Limited v. Francis Victor Countinho (dead) by LRS, 1980 (3) S.C.R 235, in which it was clearly held that any Company for whose benefit the land is acquired is undoubtedly an interested person, hence the petitioner had a right to be added as a party to the proceedings and the L.P.A Bench was wrong in rejecting the prayer of the petitioner in limine. In view of the decision referred to above, the petitioner being an interested party is entitled to participate on the question of quantum of compensation in the proceedings before the District Judge. To avoid any further delay we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to the District Judge who shall fix the quantum of compensation after hearing the petitioner. The District Judge will decide the case after issuing notice to the parties. No costs.”

    9. It would thus be manifest and is otherwise the admitted position that in the Punjab United Pesticides and Chemical Limited's case (supra), the Special Leave Petition and the appeal were directed against a limine order of dismissal by a Letters Patent Bench of this High Court. The aforequoted short observations of their Lordships make it plain that the correctness or otherwise of the Full Bench in Indo Swiss Time Limited's case (supra) was not even remotely canvassed before their Lordships. Indeed, even the barest reference thereto is conspicuous by its absence and obviously it was never brought to their Lordships notice. It is well-settled that a Full Bench judgment cannot be presumed to have been expressly overruled, which far from being considered has not been even referred to by the superior Court. Consequently, we do not consider the order of their Lordships in Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited's case (supra) as either an express or implied overruling of the Indo Swiss Time Limited's case (supra).

    10. It then calls for pointed notice that the order in Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited's case (supra) was again passed by a Bench of two Judges only. It has to be recalled that in the Indo Swiss Time Limited's case (supra), it was categorically held that in the case of a conflict of co-equal Benches of a Superior Court, the fortuitous circumstance of a judgment having been rendered earlier or later does not in any way add to its weight or makes it more binding by the accident of time. Therefore, the basic question of the conflict of ratios in the co-ordinate Benches of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmsdabad (supra) on one side and that in the Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Limited's case (supra) on the other, continued to exist. It is common ground that the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra), was neither considered or referred to in the Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Limited's case (supra) or even remotely in the Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited's case (supra). Consequently the ratio of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra) (and the long line of the High Court precedents on which it was rested), could not be either overruled or overridden by co-equal Benches. It appears to me as axiomatic that merely following or reiterating an earlier judgment by a co-ordinate Bench does not in any way enhance its weight or its binding nature in the event of its patent conflict with a hierarchy of co-equal Benches. For these added reasons also we are inclined to hold that the observations in Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited's case (supra), have neither overridden nor obliterated the earlier ratio in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra) and equally that of the majority view in Indo Swiss Time Limited's case (supra), which in express terms had followed the same.

    11. Yet again, it deserves highlighting that the reference order herein was rendered on May 28, 1982 and was rested entirely on the observation in Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited's case (supra). However, the learned counsel for the parties brought to our notice that nearly one year earlier a Special Leave Petition against the Full Bench judgment was decided by compromise before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Indo Swiss Time Ltd. v. Chhelu Ram . 1982 P.L.J 407.. Therein, the short order recorded was in the following terms:—

    “It is agreed by all the parties that the Company for whose benefit the acquisition has been made, viz; Indo Swiss Time Ltd., may be impleaded as a party to the proceedings. The application made by the appellant under order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C to the District Judge will stand allowed. The matter may be disposed of expeditiously by the learned District Judge.

    Special Leave to Appeal granted and tie appeals are allowed in the manner indicated above with no order as to costs.”

    12. On the aforesaid premises also, it was sought to be contended before us that because of the said agreed order consequent upon a compromise by the parties, the ratio of the Full Bench in Indo Swiss Time Ltd's case (supra) was wiped off the record. We are unable to agree. That judgment had laid down certain basic principles with regard to the doctrine of precedent as also elaborated the import of “a person interested” under the Land Acquisition Act who could claim to be impleaded in proceedings thereunder. The majority view with regard to the latter question (on the earlier one, there was unanimity in the Full Bench) had preferred to follow Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra) in preference to the Himalaya Tiles and Marbles Limited's case (supra). If by the agreement of all the parties to the case, the Company was allowed to become a party to the proceedings, one fails to see how the rationale and the ratio of the Full Bench is obliterated. A mere agreement of the parties, in our view, would not abrogate the principles of law enunciated by the Court unless it is in terms overruled by the superior Court. Whilst this appears to us as somewhat plain on principle, it follows equally by way of analogy from Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta . AIR 1967 SC 997. (para. 10 of the report). Venkanna Narasinha v. Laxmi Sannappa . AIR 1951 Bom 57., (Para-15): and, Pramod C. Bhat… v. Kanwar Raj Nath,…. . AIR 1954 Bom 518. (para-13). Thereby it is laid down that a concession of law by parties or their counsel, without more, would not affect the ratio of existing precedent. If that be so, a joint concession in the shape of an agreement or compromise seeking a consensual order could not possibly wipe away the precedential value of the judgment. It has been authoritatively held in Quinn Leathern9, followed in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra . AIR 1968 SC 647., that the ratio of a judgment is the logic and reasoning thereof and not merely its conclusion. The result of a judgment may be varied by agreement or compromise but the reasoning and logic thereof can be displaced only by an identical exercise or a conclusive finding to the contrary of the superior Court. Therefore, the agreed order in Indo Swiss Times Limited's case (supra), before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, does not in my view remotely altar the situation or affect the precedential value of the earlier Full Bench. We would, in terms, wish to notice that before us, the learned counsel for the petitioners did not even hint at any challenge to the correctness or otherwise of the ratio in Indo Swiss Times Limited's case (supra).

    13. We cannot help noticing that counsel for the parties seemed to be somewhat remiss both in the Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited's case (supra) as also directly in Indo Swiss Time Ltd. v. Chhelu Ram, in not pointedly bringing to the notice of their Lordships the conflict of co-ordinate Benches in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra) and that in the Himalaya Tiles & Marbles Ltd case (supra). The majority view in the Full Bench in Indo Swiss Times Limited's case (supra) was rested wholly on the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad's case (supra). It is to be hoped that the matter having now come up for pointed consideration, their Lordships would, in the near future, have the occasion to resolve the conflict and lay down the law with finality on this significant point of somewhat daily occurrence.

    14. To conclude, the answer to the question posed at the very out-set is rendered in the affirmative. It is held that the ratios in Indo Swiss Time Limited's case (supra), still hold the field.

    15. Once it is so, a fortiori, the Division Bench would be bound by the ratio in Indo Swiss Time Limited's case (supra). Indeed, we would wish to record that no independent plea what-so-ever for the reconsideration of the Full Bench, or any attack on its rationale was even raised before us. As has already been noticed, the referring Bench had itself opined that the application filed by the Spinning Mills could have been disposed of in terms of the ratio of the Full Bench. We accordingly direct that the case would now go back to the Division Bench for a decision on merits.

    Prem Chand Jain, J.:— I agree.

    S.C Mittal, J.:— I agree.

    R.M.S
    Reference answered.

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    Kulbhushan Kumar & Co. v. The State Of Punjab And Another
    (Aug 23, 1983)