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citation codes
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Acts
  • provisions of Older 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • not.9. Order 2, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Article 110 of the new Limitation Act. Limitation
  • Order 2, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Article 127 of the old Limitation Act,
  • SECTION 15 LIMITATION ACT
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Older 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • not.9. Order 2, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Article 110 of the new Limitation Act. Limitation
  • Order 2, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Article 127 of the old Limitation Act,
  • SECTION 15 LIMITATION ACT
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — M.R. Sharma, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment dated August 13, 1963 of the learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Amritsar. The dispute concerns the ownership, partition and management of a printing business known as Wazir Hind Press, Hall Bazar, Amritsar, alleged to belong to a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) of which Lakhbir Singh (alias Lakha Singh) was Karta.

Sequence of relevant events as stated in the opinion: Lakhbir Singh (Lakha) was the Karta. After his death, his eldest son Bhupinder Singh ran the business and died on September 28, 1952. Bhupinder's widow, Mst. Lajwant Kaur, applied for and obtained (January 19, 1953) a licence to run the press in her own name as proprietor. Mst. Rajwans Kaur (widow of Lakhbir Singh), Tarlok Singh and Abnashi Singh (brothers of Bhupinder) filed a suit seeking declaration that the business belonged to the HUF and restraining Mst. Lajwant Kaur from running it in her own name. That suit was decreed on March 31, 1953 by the trial court.

Iqbal Singh (minor son of Bhupinder) and Mst. Lajwant Kaur appealed to this Court (R.F.A. No. 139 of 1955 — Iqbal Singh v. Abnash Singh), decided by a Division Bench on April 11, 1960. The Division Bench held there was no proved actual partition in 1945 and observed, inter alia, that since the joint family had disrupted in 1944 and reunion had not been proved, the declaration sought could not be granted and that plaintiffs could sue for actual partition.

After failing to obtain an injunction against Mst. Lajwant Kaur, the plaintiffs (Rajwans Kaur, Tarlok Singh and Abnashi Singh) filed a suit for partition of the entire HUF property and rendition of accounts against Mst. Lajwant Kaur and Iqbal Singh. The learned trial Judge framed multiple issues (enumerated in the opinion) and reached findings on them. Although the trial judge found the suit to be within time and held that the property was joint, he dismissed the suit because he held it was barred by the principle in Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, are attracted to the facts of the instant case (i.e., whether the earlier suit bars the present suit under Order 2, Rule 2).
  2. Whether the suit filed by the appellants was barred by limitation (i.e., whether the suit was within time).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (through their counsel) sought to uphold the trial court's judgment by submitting that the suit filed by the appellants was barred by time.
  • Respondents' counsel (referred to as Mr. K.S. Thepar / Mr. Thapar in the opinion) relied on the principle in Order 2, Rule 2 and cited authorities (including Sidramappa v. Rajashetty) to support that an omitted portion of a claim could not be later prosecuted separately.
  • On the limitation point, respondent's counsel contended that the trial court should not have excluded the period during which an earlier decree in favour of the appellants had been stayed, arguing that the appellants could not invoke the benefit of Section 15 of the Limitation Act in those circumstances; in support he relied on Sirajul Had Khan v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf (1959 SCR 1287) and A.S. Krishnappa Chettiar v. Nachiappa Chettiar (1964 2 SCR 241).

Appellants' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellants' legal arguments in the form of discrete submissions; it records the appeal and identifies the legal questions the court must decide (Order 2, Rule 2 and limitation), but does not set out a detailed, itemised statement of the appellants' counsel's arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Iqbal Singh v. Abnash Singh (R.F.A. No. 139 of 1955, decided April 11, 1960) Earlier appellate decision on whether there was actual partition and on the status of the family (Division Bench found no proved actual partition and noted disruption/reunion issues). The Court noted the Division Bench's findings that the properties formed part of the HUF and had not been partitioned by metes and bounds; the judgment was used to place the present dispute in context and as a reason against nonsuiting the appellants on a technical plea.
Sidramappa v. Rajashetty, 1970 3 SCR 319 Clarifies the requirement of Order 2, Rule 2 — that a plaintiff must include the whole of the claim in respect of the cause of action and cannot later recover omitted balance by independent proceedings. The Court accepted the legal proposition in Sidramappa but distinguished the facts: it held that the earlier suit in the present case did not lie in the form brought and therefore the principle could not be invoked to bar the present suit.
Sirajul Had Khan v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P., 1959 SCR 1287 Authority cited by respondents in support of their contention on limitation (relating to exclusion of time or related limitation principles). The Court noted the citation but observed it was not necessary to pursue reliance on this authority further because of the particular facts (presence of another house in the HUF) and because the matter was governed by the relevant Limitation Act provision applicable to exclusion from joint possession.
A.S. Krishnappa Chettiar v. Nachiappa Chettiar, 1964 2 SCR 241 Authority cited by respondents in support of their contention on limitation. The Court recorded the citation but did not rely on it decisively, concluding limitation could be determined under the Articles of the Limitation Act applicable to exclusion from a portion of HUF property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confined its primary enquiry to two issues: (1) the applicability of Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure; and (2) whether the suit was within time.

On Order 2, Rule 2:

  1. The Court set out the rule in Order 2, Rule 2 and the three conditions necessary for it to apply: (a) the earlier suit and the later suit must arise from the same cause of action; (b) they must be between the same parties; and (c) the earlier suit must have been decided on the merits.
  2. Analyzing the earlier suit, the Court observed that that suit consisted essentially of a request that the District Magistrate refuse or grant a printer's licence to Mst. Lajwant Kaur so that she could carry on the business in her own name. The Court characterized a licence application as something that "anybody who is possessed of the facilities to enter into this business could perhaps apply" for, and held that the other HUF members could not properly object to the grant of such a licence on the basis that the business assets belonged to the HUF.
  3. The Court emphasized that partial partition is not permissible: a coparcener may use property in his exclusive possession until the entire property is partitioned. Consequently, the cause of action and relief sought in the earlier licence-related suit were different in nature from a subsequent suit seeking partition of the entire HUF property.
  4. The Court accepted the legal statement in Sidramappa but distinguished the present facts, concluding the necessary conditions for applying Order 2, Rule 2 were not satisfied. It therefore reversed the trial court's finding that Order 2, Rule 2 barred the present suit.
  5. The Court also expressed a concern for substantial justice, indicating reluctance to nonsuit the appellants on what it called a "highly technical plea."

On limitation:

  1. The respondents had argued the suit was barred by limitation. The Court noted respondent's counsel relied on Section 15 of the Limitation Act and certain authorities, arguing that time during stay should not be excluded.
  2. The Court found it unnecessary to pursue the Section 15 line of argument because, factually, the HUF also owned another house from which the appellants had not been ousted. The Court held that a situation in which a party is excluded from only a portion of the HUF property is governed by Article 127 of the old Limitation Act (equivalent to Article 110 of the new Limitation Act), which prescribes a 12-year limitation period "from the date when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff" for a suit to enforce the right of partition against a portion of HUF property.
  3. Applying that rule, the Court concluded that the suit could have been filed up to 1965 and therefore was not barred by time when filed.

Resulting procedural disposition: the Court reversed the trial court's finding on Order 2, Rule 2; overruled the contention that the suit was time-barred; allowed the appeal; and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling that the suit was barred by Order 2, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, holding that the earlier suit (relating to a licence and an attempt to restrain running the press in a particular name) did not satisfy the conditions necessary to invoke that rule against the present suit for partition of the entire HUF property.
  • The court also held the suit was not barred by limitation under the facts presented, applying Article 127 (old) / Article 110 (new) of the Limitation Act and concluding a 12-year limitation ran from the date the exclusion became known; therefore the suit was timely.
  • The case is remanded to the learned trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law, and the parties were directed to appear before that Court on September 20, 1976.

Broader implications: The opinion distinguishes the facts of this case from authorities on Order 2, Rule 2 and limitation, and applies established principles to those facts. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule of law beyond the application and distinction of existing principles to the circumstances before the Court.


Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.

    Abnashi Singh And Others v. Shrimati Lajwant Kaur And Another

    M.R Sharma, J.:— The appeal is directed against the judgment dated August 13, 1963, rendered by the learned Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Amritsar.

    2. In order to understand the points in controversy, it becomes necessary to have a look at the following pedigree table:

    3. Lakhbir Singh alias Lakha Singh = Shrimati Rajwans Kaur (widow of Ludha Singh Plantiff No. 3)

    4. It is alleged that the business of printing press under the came and style of Wazir Hind Press, Hall Bazar, Amritsar, belonged to the Hindu undivided family of which Lakha Singh was the Karta. After his death, his eldest son Bhupinder Singh took over the business. He is stated to have died on September 28, 1952. Thereafter, his widow Smt. Lajwant Kaur took over this business and applied for a licence to run the press in her own name as the proprietress of the business. This application was allowed on January, 19, 1953, by the Additional District Magistrate, Amritsar. Upon this, Rajwans Kaur widow of Lakha Singh, Tarlok Singh and Abnashi Singh, brothers of Bhupinder Singh deceased, filed a suit for declaration that the business being the ownership of the Hindu undivided family, Shrimati Lajwant Kaur should be restrained from running this business in her own name Iqbal Singh, the minor son of Bhupinder Singh deceased, was also impleaded as party. This suit was decreed on March 31, 1953, by the learned trial Judge. Iqbal Singh minor and his mother Shrimati Lajwant Kaur filed an appeal against this judgment which was registered as R.F.A No. 139 of 1955 (Iqbal Singh v. Abnash Singh). It was decided by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of S.S Daulat and P.C Pandit, JJ. on April 11, 1960. The Division Bench held that there was no actual partition of the property in dispute in 1945 as alleged by the appellants before them The Bench also observed as under:—

    “In view of all that I have said above since I have held that the joint Hindu family had disrupted in 1944 and reunion has not been proved, the declaration sought for by the plaintiffs cannot be granted. They can if they are advised, file a suit for actual partition of the property or seek any other appropriate relief.”

    5. Having failed to get an injunction against Mst. Lajwant Kaur to run the press in her own name. Mst. Rajwans Kaur, wife of Lakhbir Singh deceased, Tarlok Singh and Abnashi Singh his two sons, flied a suit for partition of the entire property of the Hindu undivided family and rendition of accounts against Mst. Lajwant Kaur and Iqbal Singh. The learned trial Judge who heard this suit framed the following issues on the basis of the pleading raised by the parties:—

    (1) Whether the plaint is properly valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?

    (2) Whether the suit is within time?

    (3) Whether the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata and Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure?

    (4) Whether there has been disruption of joint Hindu family? If so, on what date and with what effect?

    (5) Whether there was complete partition of the property belonging to the family? If so, when and to what effect?

    (6) Whether the plea of issue No. (5) is barred by res judicata?

    (7) Whether the defendants are in adverse and exclusive possession of Wazir Hind Press?

    (8) Whether the properties mentioned in the plaint are joint properties of the parties? If not, which or any of them is joint between the parties?

    (9) What are the respective shares of the parties in the joint properties?

    (10) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any accounts from defendant No. 1? If so, since when?

    (11) Relief.

    6. On issue No. (1), it was held that the court fee had been properly paid. On issue No. (2), it was held that the suit was within time. On issue No. (3) it was held that the suit was barred by the principle of res-judicata. On issue No. (4), it was held that the joint family, had disrupted on December 18, 1944 and thereafter the family ceased to be joint Hindu Family. On issue No. 5, it was held that there had been no partition of the joint property. On issue No. (6), it was held that the respondents could not urge on the basis of the principle of res-judicata that the property in dispute had been partitioned earlier. Issue No. (7) was disposed of with the observation that though the respondents were in adverse possession of the property in dispute yet the suit had been filed within time. Regarding issue No. (8), it was held that the property in dispute was joint property of the parties, Regarding issue No. (9), it was held that the appellants were entitled to half ¼th share of the property left by Lakhbir Singh and that each of the respondents was entitled to have 1/8th share of this property. On issue No. (10), it was held that the appellants were entitled to ask for rendition of accounts from the respondents from the day when the property ceased to remain joint Hindu Family property. Since the finding on the material issue regarding the applicability of Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, had been against the appellants, their suit was dismissed. They have come up in appeal before me.

    7. The learned counsel for the respondents also sought to uphold the validity of the judgment by submitting that the suit filed by the appellants was barred by time.

    8. In the circumstances aforementioned, I am only called upon to decide whether the provisions of Older 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, are attracted to the facts and circumstances of the instant case or not and whether the suit filed by the appellants was within time or not.

    9. Order 2, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, lays down that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which a plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action and whereas plaintiff omits to sue for or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards be allowed to sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. The rule contained in this provision is designed to counteract two evils, namely, the splitting up of claims and the splitting up of remedies. At the same time, before the principle contained in this provision can he applied, three conditions must be satisfied. Firstly the earlier suit and the second suit must arise from the same cause of action and secondly the two suits must be between the same parties, & thirdly the earlier suit must have been decided on merits.

    10. Now, the nature of the earlier suit filed by the appellants was quite different. Mst. Lajwant Kaur had merely applied to the District Magistrate that she be allowed to carry on the business of printing press in her own name under a licence. Anybody who is possessed of the facilities to enter into this business could perhaps apply for such a licence and the same could be granted as a matter of course. Even if Mst. Lajwant Kaur continued with this business by utilising the assets of the Hindu undivided family, the other members of the family could not object that she should not be granted a printer's licence. They could only claim partition of the entire Hindu undivided family property. It is also settled law that partial partition is not permissible. No member of the joint family can come forth and assert that only that portion of the property, which was in the exclusive possession of another member of the family, should be subjected to partition and that he himself be allowed to keep the remaining parcel of the joint family property in his own possession. This is precisely that was done by the Division Bench of this Court while deciding R.F.A No. 139 of 195. It is no doubt true that in that suit the appellants had asserted that respondent No. 1 be debarred from carrying on the business in her own name because the property belonged to the joint Hindu family. But even if a part of the joint family property is in possession of a coparcener or a member of the family, it is open to him or her to make use of this property, till such time as the entire property of the family is partitioned. Even if the appellants had filed a suit for the partition of the properties at that time that suit would have ben dismissed on the short ground that the family had another house which also belonged to the Hindu undivided family and that partial partition of the family property was not competent. Such a suit would have been dismissed on the principle that the suit did not lie in that fern. The dismissal of a suit on such a ground does not debar a plaintiff to bring in a fresh suit in proper form prescribed by law. It was only in the suit out of which the present appeal arises that the appellants claimed partition of the entire Hindu undivided family property. The cause of action for a suit for the partition of the entire Hindu undivided family property are quite different. I am accordingly of the view that the necessary conditions under which the principles of Order 2, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can be invoked are missing in the instant case.

    11. Mr. K.S Thepar, the learned counsel for the respondents, has brought to my notice Sidramappa v. Rajashetty . 1970 3 SCR 319., in which it was observed as under:—

    “The requirement of Order 2 rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, is that every suit should include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action. ‘Cause of action’ means the ‘cause of action for which the suit was brought’. It cannot be said that the cause of action on which the present suit was brought is the same as that in the previous suit Cause of action is a cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. If that cause of action enables a person to ask for a larger and wider relief then that to which he limits his claim he cannot afterwords seek to recover the balance by independent proceedings.”

    12. There is no quarrel with the aforementioned rule of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. As already noticed, the suit earlier filed by the present appellants did not lie in that form. The dismissal of such a suit on the basis of a formal defect did not disentitle them to bring in another suit even on the same cause of action. In these circumstances, the principle contained in Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, cannot be set up as a bar to the present suit. I may also observe that in R.F.A No. 139 of 1955 a firm finding had been given that the properties formed a part of the Hindu undivided family property which had not been partitioned by metes and bounds. If not for anything else, at least for the sake of substantial justice, I would not like to non suit the appellants on the basis of such a highly technical plea. In the circumstances, I reverse the finding arrived at by the learned trial Court on this point and hold that the bar of Order 2, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, did not apply against the maintainability of the instant suit.

    13. On the question of limitation, Mr. Thapar has submitted that the approach made by the learned trial Court was not correct in as much as it could not have excluded the time during which the earlier decree passed in favour of the appellants had been stayed by the injunction granted by this Court. The learned counsel argued that the appellants could not invoke the benefit of section 15 of the Limitation Act in these circumstances. In support of this view, Mr. Thepar has relied upon Sirajul Had Khan v. The Suni Central Board of Waqf., U.P . 1959 SCR 1287. and A.S Krishnappa Chettiar v. Nachiappa Chettiar . 1964 2 SCR 241.. It is, however, not necessary to pursue this line of reasoning any further because admittedly the Hindu undivided family also owned a house from which the appellants had not been ousted. In 1953 when Mst. Lajwant Kaur sought to run the business in her own name, she purported to exclude the appellants only from a part of the property of the family A situation like this would be governed by Article 127 of the old Limitation Act, which is equivalent to Article 110 of the new Limitation Act. Limitation for filing a suit to enforce the right of partition against a portion of a Hindu Undivided family property is 12 years from the date when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff. Under the circumstances, the suit could have been filed up to 1965. I, therefore, over rule the contention raised by Mr. Thapar that the suit should have been held to have been barred by time. For the reasons mentioned above, I allow this appeal and remand the case to the learned trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

    14. Parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the said Court on September 20, 1976.

    15. Appeal allowed.

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    Abnashi Singh And Others v. Shrimati Lajwant Kaur And Another
    (Aug 25, 1976)