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  • Act. Rule 3 of the said Rules
  • Sub-rule (8) of Rule 8
  • meeting.4. Rule 5
  • meeting.5. Rule 6
  • Rule 8. Rule 8
  • sub-rule (2),
  • Rule 7(1),
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Act. Rule 3 of the said Rules
  • Sub-rule (8) of Rule 8
  • meeting.4. Rule 5
  • meeting.5. Rule 6
  • Rule 8. Rule 8
  • sub-rule (2),
  • Rule 7(1),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This order disposes of Criminal Misc. No. 14 of 1975 in Criminal Writ No. 130 of 1975. Surjit Singh, petitioner in Criminal Writ No. 130 of 1975 and younger brother of the detenu Kabal Singh, challenged the detention of Kabal Singh by invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and sought a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, alleging the detention to be illegal and unconstitutional.

While under detention, Kabal Singh had been elected as a Member of the Block Samiti, Jandiala Guru. The miscellaneous application sought an order directing the State Government of Punjab (respondent No. 1) to permit Kabal Singh to participate in the co-option of membership of the Block Samiti (scheduled for August 13, 1975) or otherwise permit his participation in the election for the office of Chairman of the Block Samiti (scheduled for August 19, 1975).

The habeas corpus petition came on for hearing before a Full Bench on September 1, 1975, and was later referred for consideration by a larger Bench because the matter involved points of considerable importance and difficulty, including questions touching a contemporaneous decision in Civil Writ No. 4262 of 1975 (Mool Chand Jain v. Punjab and Haryana Bar Council).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a detenu who is a member of a Panchayat Samiti has a legally enforceable right that obliges the State or detaining authority to make arrangements (including transporting the detenu) to enable the detenu to be present to cast his vote in the election of Chairman or Vice-Chairman.
  2. Whether a detaining authority is under a legal duty to facilitate exercise of the franchise (vote) by a detained member when the statutory scheme requires personal presence and prohibits voting by proxy.
  3. Whether the Court can issue a writ of mandamus or other directions to the detaining authority to make arrangements to enable a detained person to exercise voting rights, and, if so, under what legal circumstances.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The detenu (Kabal Singh) has a statutory right to cast his vote under the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder.
  • Because of that statutory right, there is a corresponding duty on the State Government (or detaining authority) to make arrangements to facilitate the exercise of that right (i.e., to permit attendance or participation in the co-option/election process despite detention).
  • The petitioner sought a direction that the State permit the detenu to participate in the co-option meeting on August 13, 1975, or otherwise facilitate his participation in the election process.

The opinion does not set out detailed or specific arguments advanced on behalf of the State or other respondents; only the petitioner's contention (as above) is described in detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K. Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secretary to Government of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 657 Authority for the proposition that if a valid order of detention prevents a detenu from attending a legislative or representative forum, no occasion arises for the exercise of the associated rights (for example, rights under Article 105). The Court relied on this decision to support the view that valid detention which prevents attendance removes the occasion for exercising certain rights and that the mere possibility of inability to attend does not constitute an unlawful invasion of those rights.
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 1 SCR 88 : AIR 1950 SC 27 Referenced as authority concerning the suspension of freedom of movement during valid detention and the resultant incapacity to exercise certain rights that depend on movement or presence. The Court cited this decision to underpin the proposition that detention suspends freedom of movement and thereby can render certain statutory rights (which require personal presence) incapable of exercise during detention.
Mool Chand Jain v. Punjab and Haryana Bar Council (C.W.P. No. 4262 of 1975) — Bench decision dated 28-7-1975 (Punj) Used to illustrate that not all civil rights are suspended by detention and that on its facts the Court had directed arrangements to allow certain detained advocates to cast votes; however, it did not decide the precise question whether the State is under a legal obligation to make such arrangements. The Court distinguished that earlier decision on the basis that it was decided on its facts and that the precise legal point whether the State had a legal obligation to facilitate voting was not raised or decided there. The current Court therefore did not treat that decision as establishing a general legal obligation on detaining authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the statutory scheme (the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961, and the framed Rules) relevant to election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The Rules require: the proposal and seconding of candidates in the presence of the members; a quorum of one-half of the total members for the first meeting with specified adjournment and notice provisions; and, importantly, Rule 8 (sub-rule (8)) specifically mandates that every member wishing to record his vote shall do so in person and not by proxy.

From this scheme the Court drew two connected conclusions: (a) a candidate can be nominated and thus can contest the office of Chairman or Vice-Chairman in absentia (because nomination requires proposal and seconding by other members), and (b) a member's statutory right to cast a vote is conditioned on his personal presence at the meeting because the rules expressly prohibit voting by proxy.

The Court then addressed the petitioner's contention that the State has a duty to facilitate exercise of the voting right. The Court rejected that contention, reasoning as follows:

  1. The statutory right to vote is subject to the factual limitation that it can only be exercised if the member is capable of exercising it (i.e., able to attend in person).
  2. If a member is unable to attend because of valid detention, the right becomes incapable of exercise; that incapacity does not automatically create a legal duty on the detaining authority to make special arrangements to enable attendance.
  3. A writ of mandamus can only be issued to enforce an existing legal obligation; absent any provision in law imposing on the detaining authority a duty to facilitate voting for detainees, no such writ can be issued compelling the detaining authority to act.

The Court supported this reasoning by reference to K. Ananda Nambiar (holding that valid detention which prevents attendance removes the occasion for exercising certain rights) and to A.K. Gopalan (on suspension of freedom of movement in detention). The Court also discussed Mool Chand Jain, observing that that earlier decision refused to accept the broad submission that "all civil rights stand suspended by detention" and directed arrangements in its facts, but that it did not decide the precise legal question of a State's legal obligation to facilitate voting by detainees.

The Court additionally observed that where detainees are held under certain criminal provisions (for example, Sections 109/151 CrPC, as referenced in Mool Chand), this Court may, in appropriate cases and exercising its discretion, issue directions including those facilitating the detained person's exercise of the right of franchise. However, such relief is discretionary interim relief and not the enforcement of a substantive legal right that is otherwise actionable in court.

Applying the above reasoning to the facts of this case, the Court concluded that no legal ground existed to issue the directions sought by the petitioner to the State or the detaining authority.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The miscellaneous application is dismissed. Application dismissed.

Direct effect and immediate consequences:

  • No direction is issued to the State Government or the detaining authority to permit Kabal Singh to participate in the co-option meeting or to otherwise facilitate his personal attendance for purposes of voting.
  • The Court held that where detention is valid and legal, it prevents attendance and thereby can render a statutory voting right incapable of exercise; absent a statutory or legal obligation on the detaining authority, the Court will not command the detaining authority by mandamus to enable voting.

Broader implications noted by the Court:

  • The decision emphasizes the distinction between rights that are inherently exercisable despite detention (e.g., certain property rights) and rights that require personal presence (e.g., voting under the cited Rules), which detention may render incapable of exercise.
  • The Court recognized its discretionary power to grant directions in appropriate cases (for instance, where detainees are held under particular criminal provisions and where interim relief is warranted), but clarified that such discretionary relief does not convert the facilitation of voting into a generally enforceable legal right of detainees.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule obliging detaining authorities to facilitate voting by detainees and distinguishes the earlier Mool Chand Jain decision as being fact-specific and not deciding the precise legal obligation issue.

No information beyond the text of the provided opinion has been added. This summary reflects only what the opinion states.

    Surjit Singh v. The State Of Punjab And Others

    1. This order will dispose of Criminal Misc. No 14 of 1975 in Criminal Writ No. 130 of 1975.

    2. Surjit Singh petitioner in Criminal Writ No. 130 of 1975, younger brother of detenu Kabal Singh, has challenged the detention of Kabal Singh under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and has thus prayed for the issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus alleging the detention of Kabal Singh to be illegal and unconstitutional. Kabal Singh detenu was elected as a member of the Block Samiti, Jandiala Guru, while under detention. It is alleged in the miscellaneous application that the election for the office of the Chairman of the Block Samiti, Jandiala Guru was to take place on August 19, 1975. It is alleged that Kabal Singh detenu is popular in public and is an eminent social worker. He is keen to contest the election of the Chairman of the Block Samiti of Jandiala Guru. Therefore, a prayer has been made in the miscellaneous application that a direction be issued to respondent No. 1 i.e, the State Government of Punjab to permit Kabal Singh detenu to participate in the co-option of Membership of the Block Samiti, Jandiala Guru, which was to be held on August 13, 1975, or any other order as deemed fit, may be passed in the matter.

    3. The habeas corpus petition came up for hearing on September 1, 1975, before a Full Bench of this Court consisting of three Hon'ble Judges. The learned Judges constituting the Full Bench being of the opinion that the petition involved points of considerable importance and difficulty, ordered that the file of the case be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench. It was observed that in the miscellaneous application a question has been raised whether the State Government is bound to take the detenu to the place where the polling in the elections to a Panchayat Samiti is to take place and while considering this question, the correctness of the decision of this Court in Civil Writ No. 4262 of 1975, Mool Chand Jain v. Punjab and Haryana Bar Council, Chandigarh, D/- July 27, 1975 (Punj), will have to be gone into. Therefore, the miscellaneous application was also referred to a larger Bench alone with the habeas corpus petition. This is how this application is placed before us. Kabal Singh detenu has been elected as a Member of the Block Samiti, Jandiala Guru, under Section 5 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Under Section 17 of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner concerned, or any gazetted officer appointed by him in this behalf, not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Commissioner, shall call the first meeting of the Panchayat Samiti in the manner prescribed, as soon as the election and co-option of all Members of the Panchayat Samiti is notified, to elect the Chairman and Vice-Chairman from amongst the Primary and Co-opted Members. The Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Chairman and Vice-Chairman (Election) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) have been framed under the Act. Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of a Panchayat Samiti shall be held in the office of the Panchayat Samiti or such other place as may be specified in that behalf by the Presiding Officer who shall convene and preside over the meeting called for that purpose. Rule 4 makes a provision for issuing a notice in writing is form A attached with the Rules to the Members specifying the date and time of meeting.

    4. Rule 5 is in the following terms:—

    “5. Proposing and seconding candidates for office of Chairman and Vice-Chairman.

    (1) As soon as the Members have assembled at the appointed time and place the Presiding Officer shall call upon the Members present to propose candidates for the two offices and every proposal shall also be seconded by a member. The names of candidates, their proposers and seconders shall then be recorded in Form B and read out by the Presiding Officer to the members present.

    (2) One-half of the total number of members shall constitute a quorum.

    (3) If at the first meeting there be no quorum present as specified in sub-rule (2), the Presiding Officer shall adjourn the meeting.

    (4) When a meeting is adjourned under sub-rule (3) another meeting shall be convened by the Presiding Officer by giving three days' clear notice to the members.

    (5) No quorum shall be necessary for second meeting.”

    5. Rule 6 makes a provision for the withdrawal of the candidates. According to Rule 7(1), if only one candidate is duly proposed there shall be no ballot and he shall be declared to have been duly elected, and Rule 7(2) provides that if there are two or more such candidates the votes of the members present at the meeting shall be taken by ballot in the manner as provided under Rule 8. Rule 8 provides a procedure for taking ballots. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 8 specifically provides that every member wishing to record his vote shall do so in person and not by proxy. The remaining Rules are not relevant for the purposes of the decision of this miscellaneous application.

    6. It would be seen that a candidate, who intends contesting an election to the office of a Chairman or Vice-Chairman, has to be proposed by a Member of the Panchayat Samiti and has also to be seconded by a Member of the said Samiti so that according to the scheme of the rules, the presence of a candidate for contesting such an election is not necessary. It is further clear from the scheme of the rules that no member can vote by proxy and a member, who intends voting, has to be present in the meeting. It would thus be seen that statutory right has been given to a member of the Panchayat Samiti to cast his vote for election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman and to contest the said election if proposed and seconded in the manner provided. It is clear from the scheme of the rules that a member can contest the election of the office of Chairman or Vice-Chairman in absentia whereas if a member wants to cast his vote at the said election, he cannot do so by proxy and thus his physical presence in the meeting is necessary.

    7. It is contended by Shri Shrinath Singh, the learned counsel for the detenu, that the detenu has a statutory right to cast his vote according to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and, therefore, there is a corresponding duty on the State Government to make arrangements for facilitating the exercise of that right. We are unable to uphold this contention. No doubt it is true that a member of the Samiti has a statutory right to cast his vote but the said right is subject to limitations. Such a right can only be exercised if he is capable of exercising the same. In other words, if a member is unable to present himself at the meeting convened for the purposes, either of his own volition or because of he having been validly detained, he cannot exercise the said statutory right. If the member is being detained by a valid and legal order, the question immediately arises: Whether such a right as mentioned above, casts any obligation on the detaining authority to make arrangements for facilitating the exercise of the said right? The answer clearly is in the negative. The exercise of the right is subject to the condition of the member being present at the time and place of meeting and if a member has been detained under valid orders and there being no provision made in law casting obligation on the detaining authority to make arrangements for the exercise of the said right, it cannot be successfully argued that there is any obligation on the detaining authority to facilitate the casting of vote by making special arrangements. It is, therefore, clear that in a case where the detention of a member is valid, there is no obligation on the detaining authority to facilitate the exercise of the right of franchise and thus this Court under its writ jurisdiction, cannot issue writ of mandamus to the detaining authority for making arrangements for the exercising of such a right which right has become incapable of being exercised because of the valid and legal detention orders. A writ in the nature of mandamus can only be issued if there exists a legal obligation which is sought to be enforced by issuance of such a writ.

    8. If the order of detention is valid, it is obvious that it validly prevents the member from attending the meeting and that being so, no occasion can arise for the exercise of the right of vote. In this connection, reference may usefully be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in K. Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secretary to Government of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 657. In that case, an argument was advanced on behalf of the detenu, who was a Member of Parliament, that the detenu in exercise of the rights granted by Article 105(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India, was entitled to exercise the same and his detention on that ground was also illegal. This contention was repelled and it as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that if the order of detention validly prevents the detenu from attending the session of Parliament, no occasion arises for the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and no complaint can be made that the said right has been invalidly invaded.

    9. It would further be seen that when a person is detained by means of a valid order, his right to freedom of movement stands suspended during the course of the period of detention. Right to cast vote, according to the rules referred to above, is necessarily connected with the presence of the member in the meeting convened and if a person is not in a position to attend the said meeting by reason of the valid orders of detention passed by a competent authority, the said right of his stands suspended during the period of detention as it is incapable of being exercised by any other manner because no such provision has been made in law. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K Gopalan v. State Of Madras., (1950) 1 SCR 88 : (AIR 1950 SC 27).

    10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Bench decision dated July 28, 1975, of this Court in C.W.P No. 4262 of 1975 (Punj), Mool Chand Jain v. Punj. and Har. Bar Council, Chandigarh. That case was decided on its own facts. A contention was sought to be raised on behalf of the respondents in that case that if a person is detained, all his civil rights stand suspended. This contention was not accepted because it is obvious that merely because a person is detained, all his civil rights cannot come to an end. It will depend on the nature of rights. For instance, by a valid detention, the right to freedom of speech and expression; to assemble peaceably and without arms; to form associations or unions; to move freely throughout the territory of India; to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India are such rights which in the nature of things will be incapable of being exercised as the freedom of movement is restricted under the valid orders of detention. But there are other civil rights such as the acquisition and holding of property etc., which even though a person is under valid detention, are capable of being exercised. It was in this context that the contention raised in the said case was repelled.

    11. No doubt the respondent State of Haryana in Mool Chand's case (C.W No. 4262 of 1975, D/- 28-7-1975 (Punj)) (supra) was directed to make appropriate arrangements for enabling some of the advocates mentioned in that petition to cast their votes to the election of members of the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, but it may be pointed out that the precise point whether the State Government was under legal obligation to make such arrangements, was not raised and thus was not decided in that case.

    12. It may further be pointed out that some of the advocates regarding whom the directions were issued for making arrangements for casting of votes, were in jail in proceedings under Sections 109/151 of the Cr PC. I have no doubt in my mind that as regards the persons detained under such provisions and in cases where the detention of a detenu is under challenge before this Court, this Court has ample powers in appropriate cases to issue directions of any nature including the directions, directing the authorities to make proper arrangements for exercising the right of franchise, but whether the said power should be exercised or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, it may be made clear that even in cases of those categories, the detained persons have no legal right which is enforceable in the Court of law but at the same time the Court has got powers to issue interim relief of any kind which it may consider appropriate keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case.

    13. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, no ground is made out for the issuance of the directions prayed for.

    14. For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in this miscellaneous application and the same is hereby dismissed.

    15. Application dismissed.

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    Surjit Singh v. The State Of Punjab And Others
    (Dec 2, 1975)