Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jullundur, under section 16 read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for selling adulterated cow's milk. He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months and fined Rs. 1,000, with an additional rigorous imprisonment of six months in default of payment. The petitioner appealed, and the Additional Sessions Judge, Jullundur, dismissed the appeal except for reducing the default sentence to three months. The petitioner then filed a revision petition before this Court.

The conviction was primarily based on the testimony of Food Inspector Madanjit Singh and Harbans Lal Halwai, supported by the Public Analyst’s report. The sample of milk was taken from the petitioner on 29th June 1968 while he was intercepted carrying 100 kilograms of cow's milk for sale. The sample was divided into three sealed bottles, one of which was analyzed and found deficient in non-fatty milk solids by 21% below the prescribed standard. The sample was taken in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom turned hostile, while the other supported the prosecution. The petitioner denied carrying any milk at the time of the sample collection, a stance supported by one defence witness but not by another.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Food Inspector complied with the mandatory provisions of sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act regarding the presence and signatures of independent witnesses during sample collection.
  2. Whether the testimony of the Food Inspector and associated witnesses was reliable and sufficient to uphold the conviction.
  3. Whether the sentence awarded to the petitioner was appropriate or should be reduced.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The Food Inspector failed to comply with sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act by not associating independent witnesses at the time of sample collection, rendering the prosecution case doubtful.
  • The petitioner denied carrying any milk at the time the sample was allegedly taken, supported by a defence witness.
  • The sentence imposed was excessive and should be reduced.

Prosecution’s Arguments

  • The sample was taken in compliance with the Act, with signatures of two witnesses obtained as required.
  • The testimony of the Food Inspector and one supporting witness was credible and reliable.
  • The sentence awarded was the minimum prescribed and appropriate under the circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State v. Sadhu Singh, AIR 1962 Punj. 548 Requirement that witnesses present at sample collection under section 10(7) of the Act must be independent and disinterested to inspire confidence in the evidence. Discussed as a guideline emphasizing the desirability of independent witnesses, but the Court distinguished the facts and did not hold non-independence as fatal in this case.
Rameshwar Dass Radhey Lal v. The State, AIR 1967 Pb 132 Interpretation of section 10(7) emphasizing that witnesses should be independent to validate sample collection; failure to comply vitiates prosecution. Considered and respectfully disagreed with in part; the Court opined that non-independence does not automatically invalidate the sample collection if other conditions are met.
Babulal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat, 1971 1 SCC 767 Evidence of Food Inspector alone can be sufficient for conviction without corroboration; section 10(7) safeguards against unfair practices but non-compliance does not per se invalidate evidence. Relied upon to hold that the Food Inspector's testimony is sufficient and the presence of witnesses, even if not fully independent, satisfies the statutory requirements.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the statutory requirement under sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, which mandates that a Food Inspector must take signatures of one or more persons present when a sample is taken. While prior rulings stressed the importance of independent and disinterested witnesses to inspire confidence in the evidence, the Court clarified that the law does not explicitly invalidate the sample collection if the witnesses are not wholly independent.

The Court distinguished the facts of this case from those in State v. Sadhu Singh and Rameshwar Dass Radhey Lal, concluding that the presence of two witnesses whose signatures were obtained satisfied the statutory requirement. One witness fully supported the prosecution, and the other, though hostile, did not negate the presence of the sample collection. The Court found the testimony of the Food Inspector and the supporting witness reliable, rejecting the defence assertion that no sample was taken due to lack of any motive to falsely implicate the petitioner.

Regarding sentencing, the Court noted that the sentence awarded was the minimum prescribed by law for a first offence. No mitigating factors were presented to justify reduction, and thus the sentence was upheld.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed.

The Court upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by the lower courts. The decision confirms that while the presence of independent witnesses at the time of sample collection is desirable, it is not an absolute legal requirement rendering evidence invalid if not met strictly, provided the statutory formalities of section 10(7) are substantially complied with. No new precedent was set; the ruling primarily applies the existing principles to the facts before it, affirming the reliability of the Food Inspector’s testimony and the validity of the sample collection process in this case.

    Swaran Singh v. State Of Punjab .

    A.D Koshal, J.:— The, petitioner was convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Jullundur, of an offence under section 16 read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Aquiteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for selling adulterated cow's milk, and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, the sentence in default of payment of fine being further rigorous imprisonment for six months. Against the judgment of the learned Magistrate he filed an appeal which was dismissed by Shri Harbans Singh, Addition all sessions Judge, Jullundur, on the 26th of September, 1970, except in so far as the sentence awarded in default of payment of fire was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for three months. The petitioner has, therefore, come up in revision to this Court.

    2. The conviction was based on the testimony of Food Inspector Madanjit Singh (P.W 1) and Harbans Lal Halwai (P.W 3) read with the report of the Public Analyst (Exhibit P.D). The said two witnesses stated at the trial that a sample of milk was taken by the Food Inspector from the petitioner at 8.10 A.M on the 29th of June, 1968, when the latter was intercepted on the G.T Road outside Jullundur Cantonment Railway Station while carrying 100 kilograms of cow's milk for sale. They added that the sample was divided into three parts, each one of which was sealed into a separate bottle. The Food Inspector further stated that one of the bottles was sent to the Public Analyst whose report (Exhibt P.D) declares that the sample sent to him was deficient in non-fatty milk solids to the extent of 21 per cent of the minimum prescribed standard. The sample of milk was said to have been taken by the Food Inspector in the presence of Harbans Lal Halwai (P.W 3) and Octroi Moharrir Jit Ram (P.W 2) who did not support the prosecution and deposed that the Food Inspector had brought the petitioner to the Octroi Post where he (Jit Ram) signed the recovery memo, at the instance of the Food Inspector and that the latter had stated at the time that the sample of milk had already been secured from the petitioner. Jit Ram (P.W 2) was declared hostile to the prosecution and was cross-examined by the Food Inspector when he stated that the Food Inspector was accompanied by Harbans Lal (P.W 3).

    3. The stand of the petitioner at the trial was that he was stopped on the G.T Road by the Food Inspector who took his thumb-impressions on a number of papers although he (the petitioner) was not carrying any milk at the time. This stand was supported by Paramjit Singh (D.W 2), a brother of the petitioner, but not by Laxmi Chand (D.W 1), the only other witness examined in defence.

    4. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the Food Inspector had not complied with the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act which runs thus:—

    “10(7). Where the Food Inspector takes any action under clause (a) of sub-section (1) sub-section (1), sub-section (4), or sub-section (6), he shall call one or more person to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures.”

    5. Inasmuch as neither of the two persons whose signatures were obtained at the time the sample in question was secured from the petitioner was an “independent witness”. Reliance in this connection is placed on State v. Sadhu Singh,1 and Rameshwar Dass Radhey Lal v. The State . AIR 1967 Pb 132..

    6. In the first of these cases Gurdev Singh, J., with whom Shamsher Bahadur, J., aggreed, observed with reference to sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act.

    “When the law enjoins that the sample be taken in the presence of two persons, it clearly contemplates that the evidence relating to the taking of sample must be above board, and the witnesses in whose presence the sample is taken should be independent and dis-interested so as to inspire confidence. In the present case, we, however, find that both the witnesses associated with the taking of the sample were under the influence of the Food Inspector. At the time and place where the respondent was apprehended and the sample was taken from him, there could have been no dearth of independent witnesses, but we find that no such person was taken into confidence or asked to witness the taking of the sample from the respondent. This conduct of tie Food Inspector certainly creates doubt about his bona fides, and the fact that he ommitted to prepare the relevant memo under sec. 10(7) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, further makes the entire prosecution case doub ful.”

    7. This is how in Rameshwar Dass Radhey Lal's case (supra) Narula, J., interpreted and applied the above observations of the Divisional Bench:

    “Even Ram Niwas P.W 4 is not the kind of witness who would fall within the qualifications ascribed to a proper witness by the Division Bench of this Court in Sadhu Singh's case, AIR 1962 Punj. 548. Admittedly Ram Niwas is also a Diary keeper from whom sample had been obtained by the Food Inspector. He was prima facie under the influence of the Food Inspector and was not a proper witness to be associated for the purposes of satisfying the requirements of section 10(7) of the Act. The criticism of Mr. Bipan Behari Lal Advocate against Ram Niwas being a stock witness of the Municipality for prevention of food adulteration cases may or may not be correct. Of course, the witness cannot be congratulated on the evasive attitude he took in reply to questions put to him about the previous occasions on which he had given evidence for the prosecution in such cases. Be that as it may the mere fact that at the time the witness was himself at the mercy of the Food Inspectorate, disqualified him from acting as a proper witness under section 10(7) of the Act particularly when no second witness had been called in. I am not only bound by the judgment of the Division bench in Sadhu Singh's case, A.I.R 1962 Punj. 548, but I am also in respectful agreement with the ratio of that judgment. Following the same, I hold that the prosecution of the petitioner is vitiated in this case on the additional ground that the disputed sample was obtained without complying with the mandatory requirements of section 10(7) of the Act.”

    8. With very great respect to my learned brother Narula, J., I regret I cannot subscribe to his view in all its aspects. The desirability of the Food Inspectors associating with themselves disinterested persons while taking samples of food suspected to be adulterated cannot be overemphasised. But then the law does not declare in so many words ??? necessary intendment that if none of the witnesses whose signatures are obtained by a Food Inspector under sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act while securing a sample of food is wholly unconnected with the Food Inspector, their testimony cannot be acted upon, or that the action taken by the Food Inspector in securing the sample is rendered illegal and ineffective. In my opinion, all that the Division Bench intended to lay down in Sadhu Singh's case was that it should be the endeavour of a Food Inspector while taking a sample to associate with himself disinterested persons who would inspire confidence of the Court, and not that if the witnesses actually associated were not of that type, the securing of the sample would be struck down as violative of the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act. As it is, the evidence of the Food Inspector alone has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Babulal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat . 1971 1 SCC 767 to be sufficient for a conviction. The following observations made by their Lordships in that case are instructive:

    “It is not a rule of law that the evidence of the Food Inspector cannot be accepted without corroboration. He is not an accomplice nor is it similar to the one as in the case of wills where the law makes it imperative to examine an attesting witness under section 68 of the Evidence Act to prove the execution of the will. The evidence of the Food Inspector alone if believed can be relied on for proving that the samples were taken as required by law. At the most Courts of fact may find it difficult in any particular case to rely on the testimony of the Food Inspector alone though we do not say that this result generally follows. The circumstances of each case will determine the extent of the weight to be given to the evidence of the Food Inspector and what in the opinion of the Court is the value of his testimony. The provisions of Section 10(7) are akin to those under Section 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code when the premises of a citizen are searched by the Police. These provisions are enacted to safeguard against any possible allegations of excesses or resort to unfair means either by the Police Officers or by the Food Inspectors under the Act. This being the object, it is in the interests of the prosecuting authorities concerned to comply with the provisions of the Act, the non-compliance of which may in some cases result in their testimony being rejected. While this is so we are not to be understood as in any way minimising the Deed to comply with the aforesaid salutary provisions. In this case however there is no justification in the allegation that the provisions have not been complied with because the Panch witness had been called and his signatures taken which he admits. In these circumstances the Courts were justified on the evidence of the Food Inspector that he had complied with the requirements and that the samples were seized in the presence of the Panch witness whose signatures were taken in the presence of the accused”

    9. The Panch witness mentioned in the above observations had deposed in Court that the sample in question had not been taken in his presence but that he had signed on the two bottles of milk and wrappers when he was called by the Food Inspector. The situation in the instant case is certainly not as bad as that. Out of the two witnesses whose signatures were obtained by the Food Inspector under sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act, one has fully supported the prosecution case and it is made out from his testimony as well as that of the Food Inspector that the sample of milk was taken from the petitioner while Jit Ram (P.W 2) was also present. The requirements of sub-section (7) of section 10 were thus fully complied with. The real question is as to whether the depositions of the Food Inspector and Harbans Lal Halwai (P.W 3) are reliable and should be acted upon. To that question my answer unhesitatingly is in the affirmative. Even though it may be said that the Halwai would be expected to toe the line of the Food Inspector, there is no reason why the Food Inspector should falsely involve the petitioner in this case. The assertion of the defence is that no sample at all was secured by the Food Inspector. This assertion I refuse to believe in the absence of any cause for the Food Inspector to have animosity against the petitioner.

    10. The only other contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the sentence awarded to him should be reduced. The sentence is the minimum provided by law for a first offence and although in proper cases a still lower sentence can be awarded, no factors such as would justify the adoption of such a course in the instant case have been made out. Finding the conviction to be well-based and the sentence not liable to be reduced, therefore, I dismiss the petition.

    11. Petition dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Swaran Singh v. State Of Punjab .
    (Apr 18, 1972)