I.D Dua, J.:— This order will dispose of Regular First Appeals Nos. 71 of 1955 and 43 of 1950 along with the cross-objections preferred by the respective respondents in both these appeals.
2. In Regular First Appeal No. 71 of 1955, a preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondents Gurnarain etc., by Shri Tuli that the appeal has abated in toto on account of the death of Mukand Lal respondent on 10-12-1956 for bringing on record of whose legal representatives a petition was filed as late as 0-6-1957. Time both for bringing on record his legal representatives as well as for setting aside the abatement had, according to Shri Tuli, exited by the middle of May, 1957. The only reason for this delay given by the appellant is want of knowledge of Mukand Lal's death, who, according to the appellant, resided about 300 miles away from his place of residence. Shri Tuli has also laid stress on the submission that according to the appellant, he came to know of Mukand Lal's death from the notice of the application filed by Shri Tuli's client in the cross-appeal for bringing;on record the legal representatives of the deceased, but the exact date of the knowledge thus acquired has also not been disclosed. It is emphasised that the summons on this application should have been served on him on 7-5-1957 and even from that date nearly a month was taken in presenting the petition to this Court. Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is for the appellant to explain each individual day's delay for securing benefit of extension of period, and such explanation according to Shri Tuli is wanting. In support of the objection, our attention has been drawn to Jagar v. Mst. Natho, AIR 1960 Punj 207, Durgi Dass v. Des Raj, 63 Punj LR 163 Firm Dittu Ram Eyedan v. Om Press Co., Ltd., ILR (1960) Punj 935 : (AIR 1960 Punj 335 FB) and State Of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 S.C 89. It has also been contended that the decree being joint and indivisible against all the defendants, abatement of the appeal as against Mukand Lal deceased must result in its total abatement as against all the respondents.
3. Shri Awasthy has in reply submitted that the appellant's application for bringing on record the legal representatives of Mukand Lal deceased and for setting aside the abatement had been granted subject to all just exceptions on 24-6-1957 by a learned Single Judge of this Court. After that date, this appeal came up for hearing on two occasions before two different Benches and since the respondents did not urge this objection at that stage, it must be deemed to have been waived. He has also laid emphasis on the absence of any counter-affidavit controverting the appellant's affidavit on the point. He has in this connection referred us to the decree-sheet at p. 175 and to a portion of the judgment at p. 173 of the printed paper-book. According to his submission) defendants No. 2 to 6 are merely pro forma and the decree was really passed only in favour of the plaintiffs, with the result that the absence of Mukand Lal, defendant No. 3, from the array of respondents in this appeal cannot affect the adjudication of the appeal on the merits so far as the remaining parties are concerned. According to him, there we a partial dissolution of the firm and defendants Nos. 2 to 6 had as a result thereof quieted the partnership and they were merely impleaded as proper parties and not as necessary parties. Shri Tuli has controverted this submission and has referred to paragraph 13 of his plaint at page 5 of the printed paper-book, where it is stated that the rights of defendants Nos. 2 to 8 are similar to those of the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 3 and 6 could not join the suit due to illness and defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 5 could not join due to their remaining outside and that the suit had been filed with their consent and for their benefit. He has also pointed out that this appeal is heard only in part on earlier occasions but since both he and Shri Awasthy were not the original counsel in the case, they did not know the record fully and even Shri Awasthy was not aware of his application having been presented after the expiry of limitation. He has pointed out that originally Om Sarup was represented by Shri P.C Pandit (now Hon'ble Mr. justice P.C Pandit) and Gurnarain by Shri D.K Mahajan (now Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.K Mahajan) and that it was only during the course of hearing when it was discovered that Shri S.C Mittal Advocate who has since become a District Judge had not been removed, from the guardianship of one of the minor parties that the case was adjourned for taking suitable steps in this connection. It is strongly urged that there could be no waiver of the objection that the appeal has abated merely because on an earlier occasion this objection was not pressed and adjudication claimed.
4. In our opinion, on the facts and circumstances of this case there is no waiver of the objection dis entitling the respondents from pressing it before us. The question whether an appeal has abated on account of the death of a necessary party whose legal representatives have not been brought on the record within the prescribed period and where the abatement has also not been sought to be set aside within the period prescribed has to be answered by reference to the provisions of O. 22 of the CPC. Rules 3 and 4 of this Order are mandatory and I am extremely doubtful if the Court can ignore the automatic abatement merely because an objection to this effect has not been raised by the party affected on an earlier occasion. Where the respondent dies and no application is made for causing his legal representatives to be brought on the record within the time limited, then the appeal abates automatically and there is no question of any period for raising any objection to such abatement. But in the case before us even otherwise the omission to claim adjudication on this point on earlier occasions can scarcely amount to waiver. On the earlier occasions, it may be pointed out, once the appeal was not heard at all because the documents of the respondents Gurnarain etc. were for some reason or the other not included by the office of this Court in the printed paper-book and on the second occasion the basic document in original on which the whole controversy hinged was not traceable. An enquiry was directed by us but it appears that even up till today that document has not been traced.
5. The only point that seems to me to arise is: can it be said that when an ex parte order has been passed granting a time-barred application subject to just exceptions, then if the opposite party does not raise the objection at the earliest Dossible opportunity, the order should be deemed to have become final and binding on him? The learned counsel for the appellant has not cited any precedent nor has he quoted any principle in support of his contention. An ex parte order of this nature, in my opinion, even without the qualifying clause, must always be deemed to be subject to just exceptions and the opposite party to whose prejudice it is passed ex parte is always entitled to object to it. Shri Awasthy has not drawn our attention to any part of the record showing that the respondents had been given formal notice of this applicant or that any order was passed after hearing the opposite party. That being so, as at present advised, I would be disinclined to shut out Shri Tuli from objecting to the ex parte order and showing that the application was barred by time and there being no sufficient ground for the delay, should finally be disallowed.
6. I, however, cannot help expressing the view that in cases where such applications are prima facie barred by time, it was always desirable to pass final orders after giving notice to the opposite side so that the point of limitation affecting the decision of the appeal on the merits is decided at the earliest stage and before the parties incur expenses in getting the record printed. I may appropriately quote at this stage some instructive observations of the Privy Council from the judgment in Krishnasami Panikordar v. Ramasami Chettiar, ILR 41 Mad 412 : (AIR 1917 P.C 179), where an ex parte order had been passed by the High Court while admitting an appeal excusing delay. The order was in the following terms:
“Delay excused in the circumstances, and the appeal admitted.”
7. The Judicial Committee while disapproving this practice observed as follows:
“But while this procedure may have the sanction of usage, it is manifestly open to grave objection. It may, as in this case, lead to a needless expenditure of money and an unprofitable waste of time, and thus create elements of considerable embarrassment when the Court comes to decide on the question of delay. Their Lordships therefore desire to impress on the Courts in India the urgent expediency of adopting in place of this practice a procedure which will secure at the stage of admission, the final deter, mination (after due notice to all parties) of any question of limitation affecting the competence of the appeal.”
8. The Judicial Committee again in Sunderbai v. The Collector of Belgaum, ILR 43 Bom 376 : (AIR 1918 P.C 135) repeated the importance of the observations quoted above. These observations would seem to me to be attracted to the case in hand as well. It is however unnecessary to say anything more on this occasion.
9. In so far as the merits of this application are concerned, it was pointed out id Jagar's case, AIR 1960 Punj 207 that on the death of a respondent it is incumbent on the appellant to cause the legal representatives of the deceased to be made a party and; if no application for this purpose is made within the time limited by law, the appeal must abate as against the deceased. Under Article 177, Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (which Act governs the present case) a period of 90 days is allowed for making such an application and the terminus a quo is the date of the death of the deceased respondent. When the appeal has abated, even then the appellant is given another chance of approaching the Court for an order to set aside the abatement and if he succeeds in proving that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the appeal, the Court normally sets aside the abatement on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit. For this purpose, Article 171 of the Act of 1908 fixes 60 days and the terminus a quo for this purpose is the date of abatement, It is thus obvious that knowledge of the death of the deceased party does not figure in these two Articles with the result that prima facie the date of the knowledge of the death would not be a relevant consideration in determining the question of limitation in these two applications. Rule 9(3) of Order 22 of the CPC, of course, provides for the applicability of section 5, Indian Limitation Act, to the applications filed under Rule 9(2), but then, in order to invoke the assistance of section 5, it is well recognised that each individual day's delay after the expiry of the period of limitation has to be satisfactorily explained and the explanation has to cover the whole of the period of delay. In the case in hand for reasons best known to the appellant, it has not even been disclosed on which precise date knowledge of the death of the deceased was acquired and why the necessary application could not be presented to this Court earlier. We have, therefore, no alternative except to disallow the application for setting aside abatement and for bringing on record the leg representative of Mukund Lal deceased. This petition is accordingly rejected.
10. This brings me to the question of the effect of rejection of this application Now according to the Code of Civil Procedure where the legal representatives of a deceased respondent are not brought on the record within the prescribed time, the appeal abates only qua the deceased. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal as against the respondents who are on the record. The question of the effect of partial abatement on the appeal against the other respondents has thus to be determined by the general principles. If the case is of such a nature that the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased from the record prevents the Court from hearing the appeal as against the others, then the appeal cannot proceed at all, which is some times described to result in total abatement., But this question must, it appears to me, depend, from its very nature, upon the facts of each case, and it is scarcely possible to formulate a rule of general application, which can in all cases, serve as a rigid formula for the Court to determine when it can or cannot proceed to dispose of an appeal as against the existing parties on the record. The test has been put in various forms, but it is unnecessary to embark upon them in detail.
11. Suffice it to say, that the difficulty facing the Court generally arises when the decree appealed against is joint. The test in such a contingency, broadly put, is that, if the decree appealed from, against the surviving respondents, in case of success of the appeal, becomes ineffective, in the sense that it cannot be successfully executed, or if by allowing the appeal two contradictory decrees in respect of the same subject-matter would come into being on the rolls of the Court in the same litigation, then the Court will not proceed with the appeal. It is a matter of common sense that the Court should not be called upon to make two inconsistent decrees about the same property, and making of conflicting decrees should be avoided. This test covers cases when the joint decree is indivisible. In such a case the decree appealed from becomes final as against the deceased respondent with the result that as against him the appellate Court cannot modify the decree either directly or indirectly. We have, therefore, to consider if the decree appealed from in the present case is indivisible.
12. After hearing Shri Awasthy and Shri Tuli, we are satisfied that the decree in question is joint and indivisible and once it is upheld as against Mukand Lal deceased, it is difficult to modify it as against others without giving rise to two conflicting, inconsistent or contradictory decrees in respect of the same subject-matter. The view taken by me is supported by the ratio, inter alia of AIR 1932 SC 89. RFA 71 of 1955, accordingly, fails and is dismissed.
13. In so far as cross objections in R.F.A No. 71 of 1955 are concerned, Shri Tuli has submitted that in view of two Bench decisions of this Court in Mst. Bjkhtawari v. Sadhu Singh, ILR (1959) 1 Punj 900 : (AIR 1959 Punj 558) and 63 Pun LR 163, they do not survive. It is in the circumstances unnecessary to deal with the cross-objections.
14. In so far as R.F.A No. 43 of 1950 is concerned, it merely relates to the orders of the Court below disallowing costs. As is well settled, costs are in the discretion of the Court, and therefore, unless the discretion can be said not to have been judicially exercised or a matter of principle is involved, the Court of appeal, as a matter of practice, does not interfere with such orders. In the present case, it is not shown that the order is tainted with any infirmity justifying interference on appeal, Regarding cross-objections in this appeal, in my opinion, in view of the dismissal of R.F.A No. 71 of 1955 it would not be possible to adjudicate upon them. It may be pointed out that this appeal was transferred from the Court of the learned District fudge, Hoshiarpur, to this Court by learned Single Judge on the 2nd February, 1953, at the instance of Shri Om Sarup. In the application under sections 24 and 151 and Order 13 Rule 10 of the CPC, dated the 22nd December, 1955, it was averred iater alia that in order to avoid two conflicting appellate judgments against one judgment of the learned Senior Sub-ordinate Judge, it was just and fair that both the appeals are heard together by this Hon'ble Court.
15. It is not urged before us that the cross-objections in R.F.A No. 43 of 1956 can be heard and disposed of without affecting the decision of this Court dismissing R.F.A No. 71 of 1955. In the result, these cross-objections also fail and are hereby dismissed.
16. The final result, therefore, is that both the appeals and the cross-objections are dismissed but without any orders as to costs.
17. S.B Capoor, J.:— I agree.
EI/KBK/R.G.D
18. Appeals dismissed.