Gurdev Singh, J.:— In this reference under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon has recommended that the order of Shri Bhupinder Singh, Magistrate Second Class, Rohtak, dated 16th April, 1962, passed in proceedings under section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code between the parties be set aside for non-compliance with the provisions of section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The facts of the case are given in the reference order and need not be recapitulated in detail.
2. The proceedings were initiated by Ratti Ram on the allegation that the working of the factory of the present petitioners, Chuni Lal, Ram Chander, Rameshwar Das and Ram Babu, was a nuisance to him and other residents of the locality as smoke and flames emitted from its chimney were injurious to health. He further complained that Chuni Lal had obstructed the path by constructing a wall, resulting in blocking the flow of the water and danger to the health of the persons residing in that locality due to stagnant water. When the present petitioners appeared before him in response to the preliminary notice, they refuted these allegations and denied the existence of public right of passage but the Magistrate, ignoring the provisions of section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code proceeded to record the evidence of the parties and passed final orders under section 140 of the Criminal Procedure Code directing Chuni Lal and others to provide outlet for the flow of rain water of the locality and to change the diameter and size of the chimney in accordance with the advice of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineer.
3. As has been observed earlier, the present petitioners while contesting the preliminary notice under section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code, had denied the existence of the public right of way and passage of water through their property. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Magistrate to proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code and to inquire if there was reliable evidence in support of the denial sub-section (2) of section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that if the Magistrate after enquiry finds that there is reliable evidence in support of such denial of the existence of any public right, “he shall stay the proceedings until the matter of the existence of such a right has been decided by a competent civil Court.” The language of this provision of law is mandatory, as has been held in various authorities, including Akulananda Rout v. State . A.I.R 1954 Orissa 210., S.P Trivedi v. State . A.I.R 1954 All 203., Ata Mohammad v. Abdul Rahman . A.I.R 1937 Lah. 676., Hamid Ali v. Emperor . A.I.R 1930 Lah 1046., Nur Alishah v. Natha . A.I.R 1927 Lah. 745. and Julu Mia v. Golam Hussain . A.I.R 1960 Tripura 3.. Section 139-A requiring a Magistrate to refer the question of the existence of public right where it is denied, was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure by Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, No. 18 of 1923. The object of the legislature was that complicated questions about the existence of public right should be decided after full trial, in a civil Court and not in summary proceedings under Chapter 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is only where the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no reliable evidence in support of the denial of the public right that he is at liberty to proceed with the case under S. 137 or 138 of the Criminal Procedure Code and decide the matter without reference to a Civil Court. He cannot by simply ignoring the provisions of section 139-A usurp jurisdiction to decide the question of public right when there is prima facie evidence in support of such denial. In such circumstances, the illegality committed by the Magistrate in flouting the mandatory provisions of section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be defended by recourse to section 537-A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
4. Where the law prescribes that a particular thing has to be done in a particular manner and the provision also affects the jurisdiction of the Court, the procedure laid down must be observed, otherwise it will encourage violation of the mandatory provision and leave it to the good sense or the will or whim of the authority concerned to observe or not to observe the procedure prescribed by law. Under section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code once reliable evidence in support of the denial of public right is produced, the party denying the existence of a public right has a right to have the matter decided by a competent Civil Court and not to leave it to the decision of the Magistrate in a summary proceeding. It is thus obvious that non compliance with section 139-A must ordinarily result in prejudice to the party disputing the existence of public right, and in that view of the matter the provisions of section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be of no avail.
5. As has been observed earlier, there cannot be any doubt that the provisions of section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code are mandatory. Learned counsel for the respondents in these proceedings has, however, relied upon Rajani Kanta Roy v. Ibrahim Sarkar . A.I.R 1929 Cal. 607. and Ramkirpal Singh v. Superintendent Way and Works, E.I.R, Gaya . A.I.R 1946 Pat. 309., in support of his contention that the non-compliance with section 139-A is of no consequence. So far as the Patna decision is concerned it appears to be an agreed order and it cannot serve as a precedent. The decision in Rajani Kanta Roy v. Ibrahim Sarkar, proceeds on the finding that no prejudice had been caused. So far as the Lahore High Court is concerned the consistent view has been that the provisions of section 139-A are mandatory and must be strictly complied with. Reference in this connection may be made to Nur Ali Shah v. Natha, Hamid Ali v. Emperor and Ata Mohammad v. Abdul Rahman.
6. The two decisions of this Court which have been brought to my notice are Sukh Ram Kalu Ram v. Mauohar Lal Ram Saran Das . A.I.R 1960 Punj. 377. and an unreported judgment of Khanna, J. in Criminal Revision No. 1351 of 1962, dated 25-4-1963. Though in the earlier case Sukh Ram… v. Manohar Lal…., J., had held that where an enquiry had actually been made by the Magistrate into the existence of the public right the failure, if any, to comply strictly and meticulously with the provisions of S. 139-A would be curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Khanna, J., took a contrary view in the case referred to above. In none of the two cases is there any reference to the earlier decisions of the Lahore High Court, and the decision of Dua, J. does not appear to have been cited before Khanna, J.
7. In fact Sukhram Kaluram's case is distinguishable on facts. Therein the learned Judge had found that there was no reliable evidence in support of the denial of public right. Consequently there was no occasion for the Magistrate to have recourse to the procedure prescribed by section 139-A and there could be no question of the Magistrate staying the proceedings before him to await the decision of the competent civil Court. Apart from this, since the Magistrate's final order could not be sustained on merits and it was set aside by this Court, the question whether non-compliance with the provisions of section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code had vitiated the Magistrate's order was not of much consequence.
8. In view of the above discussion. I find that the order of the Magistrate cannot be sustained. I, accordingly, accept the recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, and setting aside the order, remit the case to the Magistrate to deal with the matter from the stage of section 139-A of the Criminal Procedure Code and to decide the dispute between the parties in accordance with law.
Recommendation accepted.