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  • Dulat
  • Grover, JJ.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Grover, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent challenges a judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The appellant is a limited company which employed Raj Kumar (respondent No. 2) and Pritam Lal (respondent No. 3) as apprentices since 1954. On 26 March 1959 the two engaged in an exchange of abuse and a scuffle said to have arisen from remarks attributed to Raj Kumar about the apprentices not receiving any bonus. Both were suspended the same day and charged. An enquiry was conducted and the Enquiry Officer's report (30 March 1959) found that the fight had occurred but recommended a lenient punishment—withholding increments for one year—because they were young. The General Manager issued show-cause notices on 31 March 1959; both employees expressed regret and gave assurances, but the General Manager directed their dismissal and mentioned previous warnings (two to Raj Kumar and three to Pritam Lal) in the dismissal order.

The Company applied under sub-section (2) of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for approval of the dismissals. The Industrial Tribunal (presided over by Shri Kesho Ram Passey) refused approval, giving reasons including: (i) absence of evidence that work was dislocated or that the employees disobeyed or were disrespectful to an officer, and that the General Manager exaggerated the misconduct; (ii) previous warnings mentioned in the dismissal were not in the charge-sheet nor supported by evidence, and the workmen had no opportunity to meet that allegation; and (iii) the dismissal order was mala fide, harsh, and vindictive.

The Company sought to quash the Tribunal's order under Article 226. The learned Single Judge examined whether the Tribunal had exceeded its limited jurisdiction under section 33 by substituting its judgment for the management on punishment, and he accepted that section 33 confers only a narrow review power on the Tribunal but agreed with the Tribunal's conclusion that the dismissal order showed mala fide elements and procedural defects (notably the unpleaded previous warnings). This appeal follows the Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the scope of the Industrial Tribunal's power under section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 when an employer seeks approval to dismiss or punish a workman—specifically, whether the Tribunal may refuse approval on the ground that the punishment is harsh or whether its inquiry is limited to examining mala fides, unfair labour practices, victimisation, basic procedural error or breach of natural justice?
  2. Whether the Industrial Tribunal was justified in refusing approval to the dismissals on the ground that the General Manager's order was mala fide, harsh and vindictive.
  3. Whether mention of prior warnings in the General Manager's order (warnings that did not appear in the charge-sheet and for which evidence was not produced) rendered the dismissal proceedings unfair or procedurally defective such that the Tribunal could lawfully withhold approval under section 33(2).
  4. Whether a writ under Article 226 should be issued to interfere with the Tribunal's factual finding of mala fides and its consequent refusal to grant approval to the dismissals.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Company / Mr. Bhagirath Dass)

  • The relevant Standing Orders allowed dismissal for riotous or disorderly behaviour; hence the General Manager had authority to decide on dismissal as an appropriate penalty.
  • The Enquiry Officer's recommendation of a lighter penalty did not preclude the General Manager from imposing dismissal once misconduct fell within the Standing Orders permitting such punishment.
  • The Industrial Tribunal's role under section 33 is limited: it should not substitute its view on appropriate punishment if there is evidence to support the employer's action; the Tribunal must make out a prima facie case before withholding permission and cannot refuse merely because the punishment is severe.
  • Reference to previous warnings in the dismissal does not invalidate the order where the proved misconduct would independently justify dismissal; warnings are not required to be set out as a charge and may be relied on to show past record (relying on Balakrishnan v. High Forest Estate and Kalindi (N) v. Tata Locomotive).

Tribunal's Findings / Respondents' Position (as represented in the Tribunal's order)

  • The Tribunal found no evidence of work dislocation or of disrespect/disobedience to any officer; the General Manager exaggerated the misconduct by describing it as riotous and disorderly.
  • Previous warnings mentioned in the dismissal order were not present in the charge-sheet nor supported by evidence, and the employees had no opportunity to meet those allegations—this procedural defect weighed against the employer.
  • The Tribunal concluded the dismissal order was mala fide, harsh and vindictive based on the material before it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
G. Mckenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 389 Defines the principles governing the Tribunal's power under section 33: the Tribunal may give or withhold permission to discharge or punish only on limited grounds—principally to check mala fides, unfair labour practice, intimidation, victimisation, basic error, or contravention of principles of natural justice. The Court relied on this authority to frame the limited ambit of the Tribunal's inquiry under section 33 and to explain that mala fides is a question of fact which a Court of Appeal (or a higher forum on appeal) can reverse but which this Court should not overturn in Article 226 proceedings absent error of law.
Central India Coalfields Ltd., Calcutta v. Ram Bilas Shobnath, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1189 Illustrates that the Tribunal should not withhold permission where dismissal cannot be attributed to mala fides or unfair labour practices; the Tribunal should not refuse approval merely because the punishment is harsh. The Court cited it to emphasise that normally the Tribunal may not judge the severity of punishment where the punishment is legitimately imposed under relevant rules; but distinguished the present case because the Tribunal here found mala fides and procedural defects beyond mere harshness.
Balakrishnan v. High Forest Estate, 1956 1 L.L.J. 98 (Labour Appellate Tribunal) Holds that past incidents for which a workman was let off after a warning cannot be relied on as the main ground for discharge; such incidents can only show the past record. Cited by the appellant to argue that previous warnings need not be pleaded as a charge; the Court referenced it in discussing whether previous warnings could justify dismissal where they were not part of the formal charge-sheet.
Kalindi (N) v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company Ltd., 1960 2 L.L.J. 22 (Supreme Court) Holds that if there is evidence that the punishing authority considered proved charges sufficiently serious to justify dismissal, mention of a misconduct not in the charge-sheet does not invalidate the dismissal; however, absence of such evidence would be a serious infirmity. The Court used this precedent to explain the legal position that an unproved or uncharged allegation need not vitiate dismissal if other proved charges suffice, and contrasted that with the present factual situation where the Tribunal found absence of evidence for prior warnings and lack of opportunity to meet them.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying and reconciling two strands of legal principle: (a) the limited scope of the Industrial Tribunal under section 33—i.e., it cannot ordinarily substitute its view on punishment where an employer has prima facie justified disciplinary action—and (b) the Tribunal's authority to withhold permission where the employer acts mala fide, resorts to unfair labour practice, victimises, or there is a basic procedural error or breach of natural justice.

The Court analysed the facts and the Tribunal's findings as follows:

  1. The appellant rightly argued (and the Court accepted in law) that under the Standing Orders dismissal could be a permissible penalty for riotous or disorderly conduct and that ordinarily the Tribunal should not refuse approval merely because the punishment was severe if the misconduct proved justified such a penalty (citing Central India Coalfields).
  2. However, the Tribunal did not base its refusal solely on the perceived harshness of punishment. The Tribunal expressly found mala fide conduct by the General Manager and pointed to procedural defects—principally that prior warnings relied upon in the dismissal order were not in the charge-sheet, were unsupported by evidence before the Tribunal, and the employees had no opportunity to answer those unpleaded allegations.
  3. The Court emphasised that the question whether the impugned employer action was mala fide is essentially a question of fact. Having regard to the Tribunal's factual conclusion on mala fides and on lack of fair opportunity with respect to previous warnings, the Court found that it was not appropriate in Article 226 proceedings to overturn that conclusion. The Court noted that only a Court of Appeal could properly reverse such a factual finding.
  4. The Court also considered the appellant's reliance on authorities (Balakrishnan and Kalindi) which deal with the legal consequences of mentioning past incidents or uncharged misconduct. It acknowledged that where there is evidence that the punishing authority relied sufficiently on proved charges the mention of additional, unproved misconduct may not invalidate a dismissal. But in the present case the Tribunal was influenced by the absence of any evidence to show that the previous warnings had been given and by the fact that the employees had been denied an opportunity to meet those allegations. This made the Tribunal's conclusion of unfairness and mala fides a tenable factual finding.
  5. Given the Tribunal's factual finding of mala fides and procedural unfairness, the Court declined to exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the Tribunal's exercise of discretion under section 33(2). The Single Judge's refusal to grant the writ was therefore not disturbed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court declined to interfere with the Industrial Tribunal's order refusing approval to the dismissals, and it upheld the learned Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition under Article 226.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Tribunal's refusal to grant approval under section 33(2) stands and the Company’s appeal fails; the Court made no order as to costs.
  • The decision emphasises the confined role of courts in Article 226 proceedings when a Tribunal has reached a factual conclusion (here, mala fides and procedural unfairness)—such findings are not to be displaced by this Court unless there is a proper appellate route or an error of law. In short, while Tribunals should not normally substitute their view on the quantum of punishment, they may withhold approval where mala fides or basic procedural defects (e.g., reliance on unproved warnings denied to the workmen) are established on the facts.
  • No broader legal precedent was announced beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities: the Court applied established principles (as in G. Mckenzie and Central India Coalfields) to the present facts and declined to set aside the Tribunal's factual findings in Article 226 proceedings.

No other orders were made; Dulat, J. agreed. Appeal dismissed.

Show full summary ...

    Shri Gopal Paper Mills Ltd., Yamunanagar v. The Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, Patiala And Others

    Grover, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against a judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    2. The appellant, which is a limited company, had in its employment Raj Kumar respondent No. 2 and Pritam Lal respondent No. 3 who had been serving as apprentices since 1954. On 26th March 1959 these two persons exchanged abuse and had some sort of scuffle. The quarrel is stated to have been the result of some remarks attributed to Raj Kumar to the effect that the apprentices were not going to get any bonus. Both Raj Kumar and Pritam Lal were suspended on the same day and a charge-sheet was delivered to them. An enquiry was held by the management soon after. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 30th March 1959 holding that the fight between the two had in fact taken place but it was recommended that as they were young boys with a career ahead of them, they should be punished by only withholding their increments for one year. The General Manager issued show cause notices on 31st March 1959 in reply to which each of the aforesaid employees expressed regret and gave an assurance that such an incident would not be repeated. The General Manager, however, directed their dismissal and in his order made a mention of two earlier warnings having been given to Raj Kumar and three to Pritam Lal. An application was thereafter made by the management of the Company under sub-section (2) of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for according approval to the order of dismissal. The Industrial Tribunal, which was presided over by Shri Kesho Ram Passey, declined the prayer inter alia on the following grounds:—

    (i) There was no evidence that any dislocation of work had been caused owing to the fight between the aforesaid two employees nor was there any allegation that they had behaved in a disrespectful manner to any officer or disobeyed his order. The General Manager in order to justify the severer penalty which he imposed described the act of each workman as riotous and disorderly which represented a magnified view of the alleged misconduct.

    (ii) The General Manager in his order of dismissal made mention of certain warnings having been given to these employees but there was no such mention in the charge-sheet and no evidence existed in respect of them. They were allowed no opportunity to meet that allegation.

    (iii) The order of the General Manager was mala fide, harsh and vindictive as was shown by the facts enumerated in the Tribunal's order.

    3. The Company approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the Industrial Tribunal. The learned Single Judge, after reproducing the material part of the order of the Tribunal, examined the argument raised on behalf of the Company that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction under section 33 by substituting its own judgment for that of the management in the matter of punishment. The following part of his judgment may be set out to show the manner in which the learned Single Judge viewed the matter:—

    “From the observations made by the Tribunal, it would be a fair inference to make that it regarded the punishment awarded to the young boys in the perspective of the intention with which the management was actuated. I do not understand the order of the Tribunal to mean that the order of dismissal was not the proper punishment to inflict in the case. Considering all the circumstances, Mr. Passey came to the conclusion that the punishment was indicative of the mala fide intentions of the management and there was an element of victimization in the order of punishment which had been proposed.”

    The learned Judge agreed with the contention of Mr. Bhagirath Dass that the scope of enquiry under section 33 by the Tribunal is very limited and if there is evidence to support the action taken against a workman, it was not for the Tribunal to judge what punishment should be awarded or whether the punishment was harsh or proper. The learned Judge proceeded to repeat that Mr. Passey had no doubt mentioned that the penalty was harsh but this was to support his judgment that the decision of the management was not bona fide. He also found that the mention of the previous warnings which had never formed the subject-matter of the charge-sheet, was a basic error in the procedure which provided justification for the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the order of the management was mala fide.

    4. Mr. Bhagirath Dass has again forcefully put forward the points which he had agitated before the learned Single Judge. It has been submitted that according to the Standing Orders which were applicable, these workmen could be dismissed or discharged for riotous or disorderly behaviour and it was for the General Manager to decide whether that punishment should be inflicted or any lesser penalty. Although the Enquiry Officer had suggested that a light penalty should be imposed of stoppage of increment but that did not mean that the General Manager was debarred from ordering dismissal once the misconduct of the workmen fell within the Standing Orders according to which the penalty of dismissal could be inflicted. Our attention was invited to the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court settling the scope and ambit of the power and jurisdiction of the. Tribunal under section 33. Indisputably the law is that the aforesaid section merely empowers the Tribunal to give or withhold permission to the employer during the pendency of an industrial dispute to discharge or punish a concerned workman. While deciding this matter, the Tribunal cannot just review the decision of the management but what it has to see is that before it lifts the ban against the discharge of the workman the employer makes put a prima facie case. The principles governing the giving of the permission in such cases are that the employer is not acting mala fide and is not resorting to any unfair labour practice, intimidation or victimisation, or there is no basic error or contravention of the principles of natural justice vide G. Mckenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen . A.I.R 1959 S.C 389.. Where the dismissal of a workman cannot be attributed to any one of these matters, the Tribunal cannot withhold permission on merely technical grounds. Moreover, in an enquiry of this nature normally it is not open to consider whether the sentence proposed is unduly severe or not. Such a consideration may be relevant in dealing with an industrial dispute but not while disposing of an application under section 33(2)(b). Reference in this connection may be made to Central India Coalfields Ltd., Calcutta v. Ram Bilas Shobnath . . A.I.R 1961 S.C 1189.. There, it was found that it was not a case where any mala fides could be attributed to the management or it could be said that the dismissal amounted to unfair labour practice. The concerned workman in that case had been warned for his misconduct for one kind or other which made a formidable reading on several occasions. On most of the occasions he had pleaded guilty and had apologised and undertaken to behave better. The incident which gave rise to the last enquiry showed that the respondent had made a nuisance of himself to his co-workmen who bluntly told the management that in case serious action was not taken against him, it would be difficult for them to tolerate his misbehaviour. That according to their Lordships, would obviously have meant disturbance of the peace. In these circumstances it was found difficult to appreciate why the Tribunal should not have accorded approval to the dismissal of the workman. Mr. Bhagirath Dass is undoubtedly right in his submission that normally it is not for the Tribunal to decide whether the punishment awarded is unduly severe or not so long it can be legitimately imposed under the law. In the present case if the matter had rested only on the fact that according to the Tribunal the punishment awarded was unduly severe and for that reason approval had been refused, it could legitimately be said that the order of the Tribunal shows an apparent error on the face. But the Tribunal did not found its decision on that fact alone. The Tribunal, came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal was mala fide and the factum of severe punishment was one of the matters that was taken into consideration to come to that finding. There can be no doubt that the question of mala fides is one of fact as was pointed out in Central India Coalfields Ltd., Calcutta v. Ram Bilas Shobnath ., and it is only for a Court of Appeal to reverse that finding and not for this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    5. It has been suggested by Mr. Bhagirath Dass that the Tribunal fell into an error in considering that the previous warnings which were mentioned in the order of the General Manager and which must have influenced his decision were not set out in the charge-sheet which had been given to the employees. It is said that there was no question of mentioning the previous warnings in a charge-sheet as a warning cannot be made the basis of a charge. In this connection reliance has been placed on Balakrishnan v. High Forest Estate . 1956 1 L.L.J 98. being a decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In that case permission had been granted to the management by the Tribunal under section 33 to discharge an employee. The Appellate Tribunal held that the management could not rely on past incidents of workman on which he had been let off after a warning. Such past incidents could be relied on only to show the past record of the concerned workman and could not be made the main ground for permission to discharge the workman. The order of the Tribunal was set aside. Our attention was also invited to Kalindi (N) v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company Ltd. . 1960 2 L.L.J 22., which is a decision of the Supreme Court. It was urged in that case before their Lordships that the orders of dismissal of the workman were bad inasmuch as they were based on a finding of guilt of misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet. The workman had been charge-sheeted for four different acts of misconduct. The Enquiry Officer found each of the workman guilty of the first three charges but recorded no findings as regards the fourth charge but instead found these workmen guilty of a misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet, viz., “behaving in a riotous and disorderly manner by shouting slogans on the shop floor.” The Manager had made orders, of dismissal in three cases on a finding of guilt of only of the acts of misconduct alleged in the three charges. Their Lordships considered that there was no reason to think that he would have discriminated in favour of the other workmen who were the appellants before their Lordships. It was observed that—

    “The conclusion that necessarily follows is that leaving out of account the misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet, viz., ‘behaving in a riotous and disorderly manner by shouting slogans on the shop floor’, the manager would have made the order of dismissal. The fact that this act of misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet was also mentioned as one of the items on which the order of dismissal was based does not therefore effect the validity of the order.”

    6. It was also held that when there was evidence to show that the punishing authority considered the charges proved against the concerned workman as serious enough to merit the punishment of dismissal, a mention of the fourth charge which was not proved in the formal order of dismissal could not effect the validity of the order of dismissal. If there was no such evidence it would be a serious infirmity in the order. It is sought to be argued from all this that even if the previous warnings given to the workmen in the present case had been made the basis of a separate charge and even if that charge had not been proved, the other charge of riotous and disorderly behaviour had been proved for which dismissal could be ordered and therefore, the General Manager's order was perfectly valid. In the present case the question is a somewhat different one. The reasoning of the Tribunal which appealed to the learned Single Judge also is that the workmen had absolutely no opportunity to have their say in respect of the previous warnings. These warnings had not been brought to their notice at any stage and they had no opportunity to satisfy the General Manager that a more serious view should not be taken because of the previous incidents which had been closed and for which apparently no punishment had been awarded. It is not possible to hold that the approach of the Tribunal in this behalf was altogether erroneous as it was open to the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the proceedings ending in the dismissal of the concerned workman lacked fairplay. A Court of Appeal could differ from that finding but it is not within the province of this Court in these proceedings to go into the question whether the Tribunal was justified in coming to the Conclusion on facts that the order of the General Manager was a mala fide one. The Tribunal was also influenced by the absence of any evidence which the management could have placed before it to show that any previous warnings had in fact been given. The learned Single Judge declined to grant a writ to the appellant Company and for the reasons that have been stated above, we have not been persuaded to exercise our extraordinary powers under Article 226 in this case. The appeal consequently fails and it is dismissed but we make no order as to costs.

    Dulat, J.:—I agree.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Shri Gopal Paper Mills Ltd., Yamunanagar v. The Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, Patiala And Others
    (Mar 16, 1962)